The theoretical and practical value of the OECD policy advice for education by ALOISI, CESARE
Durham E-Theses




ALOISI, CESARE (2016) The theoretical and practical value of the OECD policy advice for education,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11748/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP





The theoretical and practical value of the 
OECD policy advice for education 
Cesare Aloisi 
Abstract 
This research seeks to evaluate the policy advice on educational matters provided by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), particularly through its 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The thesis assesses the “value” of 
the OECD education policy advice (EPA), that is, whether the EPA is advice worth following 
because there is evidence that it could help or has helped countries to achieve the goals of 
greater quality and equity in education. 
Firstly, a multi-agent practical reasoning model and political discourse analysis are applied 
to OECD publications to extract education policy recommendations. The EPA is thus 
comprehensively reconstructed, summarised and organised. The EPA is analysed in terms of 
its internal coherence, its consistency over time and over publications, as well as its soundness: 
whether there is empirical evidence that what the OECD suggests that countries should do 
could work in principle. 
In the second part of the thesis, evidence of effective EPA-aligned country policies is 
sought using national and cross-national level data and a mixed-methods approach. From a 
cross-national perspective, country alignment with the EPA is analysed by collecting 61 expert 
judgements from 30 PISA countries using a specifically-developed online questionnaire. The 
plausible impact of EPA-aligned policies is inferred by applying multilevel growth models to 
PISA trends in performance and equity. 
The cross-country analysis is complemented by two case studies: The Republic of Ireland 
and the French Community of Belgium. Data on 50 policies is collected from more than 800 
policy documents and through 25 semi-structured expert interviews carried out over two study 
visits. Policy alignment is analysed with a visual adaptation of the delta-convergence method 
to account for qualitative data. The effectiveness of EPA-aligned policies is evaluated using a 
framework developed by Prof J. Douglas Willms and adopted by the OECD, as well as 
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Volume 1: Main analysis 








This research seeks to evaluate the policy advice on educational matters (education policy 
advice, EPA) provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). It does this by assessing the extent to which following OECD recommendations can 
help countries to achieve the goals of greater quality and equity in education. The evaluation 
analyses the theory and practice of the OECD policy advice: on the one hand, what the OECD 
says countries should do and whether this is reasonable advice; on the other hand, which 
recommendations find actual application on a national level and whether this can be linked to 
improvements in quality (i.e., student performance) and equity. 
The rationale for the evaluation is that, in recent years, the OECD has gained prominence 
in national educational matters, particularly after the introduction of the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2000. PISA has become a well-known “brand” 
among policymakers, and as a result, participating countries have started to introduce policies 
in response to their performance in the assessment. This has led to a strand of research 
investigating the use, usefulness and effects of PISA: how different countries prepare and 
respond to the survey; whether it is a valid and reliable measure of student abilities; and how 
international surveys such as PISA promote a culture of accountability at the country level. 
By placing the spotlight on PISA, this literature has generally left the OECD policy advice 
unanalysed, or it has identified and critiqued only its most distinctive “neo-liberal” aspects 
(deregulation and decentralisation). Many national policies claiming to be in line with OECD 
recommendations have been taken at face value as examples of the globalising effects of neo-
liberalism on education systems through PISA. However, a systematic and comprehensive 
analysis of what the OECD actually advises that countries should do to improve education is 
currently missing. Therefore, it is unclear whether policies purporting to be aligned with the 
EPA are truly so, and whether this has helped countries to increase the performance and equity 
of their education systems as envisaged by the OECD. 
This research is an attempt to fill these gaps by moving the focus of the investigation from 
PISA to the EPA by assessing the quality of the EPA and the ability of EPA-informed policies 
to raise country performance in the three PISA literacies of Reading, Mathematics and 
Science1 and country equity in education. If the EPA is advice worth following, it should be 
possible to detect improvements at a national or international level when it is followed. In this 
introductory section, a brief outline of each chapter is provided as a guide to the reader.  
                                                     
1 The capitalisation is used in this document to differentiate OECD-defined constructs from other 
definitions of “reading”, “mathematics” and “science”, see Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 1 opens with a historical account on the evolution of the OECD aimed at showing 
its growing influence in national educational decisions among and beyond its member states. 
Once relegated to a subordinate role, education has become a key OECD activity since the 
Indicators of Education Systems (INES) programme in 1988 and PISA ten years later (Dale 
& Robertson, 2007), which allowed the OECD to produce education data autonomously. The 
chapter presents the complicated structure behind the development, administration and 
strategy of PISA, paying particular attention to the role of the Secretariat (specifically the 
Directorate for Education and Skills).  
The Directorate is both a network of researchers and the administrative arm of an 
organisation at the service of member countries. It has the autonomy to carry out policy-
relevant research, and sufficient control over information to be in a powerful position when it 
comes to providing education policy advice. However, it lacks absolute ownership of the 
knowledge it produces, and it is characterised by a persistent tension between the creative, 
scientific and epistemic work expected from the highly-qualified staff employed at the 
organisation, and the reality of having to satisfy ‘externally defined national interests for utility 
maximization’ (Marcussen & Trondal, 2011, p. 611). 
Central to Chapter 1 is the argument that PISA is not simply a diagnostic tool, a monitoring 
instrument to measure the state of education systems. Alongside a more “descriptive” (though 
not necessarily neutral) side, comprising country statistics and outcomes from the assessment, 
PISA has a strong normative component—the EPA—telling participants what policy options 
are recommended given the evidence from the survey.  
PISA might be thought of as a “public policy instrument”, ‘a device that is both technical 
and social, […] carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained 
by a concept of regulation’ (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 4). It is argued that while the 
quality of the technical-descriptive side of PISA is linked to the OECD’s ability as a test 
developer, the quality of the socio-normative aspect is linked to its credibility as a policy 
advisor. This is what makes the EPA a critical (but under-researched) component of the OECD 
activity in education. 
The chapter continues with a review of PISA / EPA-informed policymaking on a national 
level. This includes country motivation to be assessed by PISA and the reception and uses of 
the survey by its participants, from the “prodigal child” Finland to the (formerly) “problem 
child” Germany. The evidence suggests that the technical-descriptive side of PISA has both a 
use and an impact within countries, whereas it is not clear whether this is the case for its socio-
normative side—i.e., whether countries take notice of and enact OECD recommendations.  
Chapter 1 concludes with an explanation of the purpose, timeliness and relevance of this 
research. Moving the focus from PISA to the EPA means addressing a gap in the literature 
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and looking at the issue from a broader perspective, one that sees PISA as one component 
within a larger OECD strategy to produce, disseminate and replicate educational knowledge. 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework and the mixed-methods design of this 
research, as well as its leading questions and guiding hypotheses. The study can be framed as 
an exercise in education policy advice evaluation, aiming to contribute to the fields of policy 
evaluation and (international) assessment validation. From validation theory, the research 
borrows the concepts of “validity” and “reliability”, and it applies them to PISA; from 
evaluation theory, the research borrows the concept of ”programme theory” (Chen, 1990), and 
applies it to the EPA. It also agrees with realistic evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) that no 
policy ‘just works’: policy evaluation has to take the context of implementation into account 
when looking for policy effects. Chapter 2 expands on the contribution of both fields and 
clarifies how they are linked by and within this document. 
Because of the central role of the EPA, a working definition of “education policy advice” 
is given in the chapter. The form it might take in OECD publications (in terms of rhetoric style 
and textual features) is reconstructed drawing from practical argumentation theory (Fairclough 
& Fairclough, 2012; Walton, 2006a). The EPA is considered the endpoint of an argument that 
starts with a tension between the goals and values of the OECD and some problematic factors 
which prevent their achievement. The EPA is the proposed solution for the clash, and PISA is 
just one of the pieces of evidence supporting the argument. 
The research is an attempt to relate a complex knowledge-production process (PISA-
informed EPA), via its chain of implications at the national level (the development and 
implementation of EPA-informed policies), to the endpoint: the effectiveness of national 
policies in raising student performance and educational equity. Each of these three aspects is 
associated with a research question, and a fourth one guides the conclusions to the thesis.  
To answer the first research question (RQ1), the EPA is reconstructed in Chapter 3 in order 
to understand what the OECD says countries should do and to ask whether this is reasonable 
advice. Firstly, a policy advice “blueprint” developed from practical argumentation theory is 
applied to selected OECD publications in an iterative fashion to reconstruct the EPA. OECD 
recommendations are identified and thematically organised. The organisation of the OECD 
policy advice in one comprehensive strategy represented by   
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Table 3.2 integrates the feedback of the Director of PISA, Andreas Schleicher, and it 
provides the bases for evaluating country policy alignment and effectiveness in the following 
chapters. 
In the continuation of Chapter 3, the EPA is validated along three dimensions: internal 
coherence, consistency over time and soundness. In the context of this research, “soundness” 
is not about truthfulness or falsehood, but rather about the extent to which the EPA is 
supported by evidence. In other words, what has the OECD been basing its policy advice on? 
And how does the OECD know that what it suggests will produce any positive effects?  
Since it would have been unfeasible to evaluate every single policy recommendation, a 
few were selected from the four main policy areas in the EPA (educational time, equity, quality 
of provision and performance). Each of the policy levers selected for review represents a 
specific issue with the way the OECD grounds and delivers advice. The analysis covers pre-
primary education (educational time); gender, streaming and school choice (equity); teacher 
professional development and school accountability (quality of provision) and curricular 
changes (performance). Problematic aspects are summarised and general conclusions are 
drawn at the end of the chapter.  
In Chapter 4, evidence of country alignment with OECD recommendations (RQ2) and of 
the effectiveness of EPA-aligned policies (RQ3) is sought from a cross-country perspective. 
A cross-national measure of country alignment with PISA recommendations (the EPA Index) 
is introduced, and different approaches are used to estimate, albeit indirectly, the effectiveness 
of following the EPA. As part of the evaluation, the validity and the limitations of PISA as an 
instrument to measure change are also addressed.  
The chapter employs both original data analyses (correlations, individual country 
regressions and multilevel models) and findings from other studies. It proceeds in three steps, 
which use increasingly targeted data. The first step models country outcomes of performance 
and equity over time using PISA data; the second relates policy outputs (i.e., measurable 
policy effects) to PISA outcomes; and the third links policy alignment with these outcomes. 
The first step analyses trends in performance and equity since PISA started in 2000, with 
an expectation that if the EPA is adopted, implemented and effective, then some increases in 
performance or equity should be observed. The second step attempts to set an empirical limit 
on the extent to which education reforms can be expected to produce observable changes in 
country outcomes. This is done by contrasting the “effects” of three policy outputs (general 
economic productivity, equity levels and access to pre-primary education) on PISA scores. 
All three outputs are known to correlate to PISA outcomes, but the hypothesis is that only the 
indicator capturing a specific educational intervention (access to pre-primary education) 
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would be related to changes in PISA scores over time. The magnitude of these changes is the 
empirical ceiling of policy influences on PISA mentioned above. 
The third step complements secondary PISA data analyses with information collected 
through expert questionnaires, to relate country levels of (and changes in) achievement and 
equity to their degree of alignment with OECD recommendations.  
Finally, the chapter considers validity and reliability issues in relation to PISA, in 
particular issues affecting the comparability of scores between countries and over time. While 
the PGB decided that ‘the establishment of reliable trends should become the overriding 
priority’ (Mazzeo & von Davier, 2008, p. 4), PISA is still affected by ‘a plethora of 
inaccuracies’ (Wuttke, 2007, p. 261) that compromise by an unknown degree the accuracy of 
the reported scores and the validity of the statistical procedures. The OECD response to some 
of the PISA shortcomings is discussed, and conclusions are drawn.  
Some authors (Baird et al., 2011; Pedró, 2012) have noted that the policy effects of PISA—
and the value of the EPA—can only be appreciated through trend analyses and triangulation 
of different evidence sources. Therefore, in this thesis the cross-national evidence from 
Chapter 4 is complemented by evidence from two case studies (the Republic of Ireland and 
the French Community of Belgium, CFB) in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, which have the same structure, the use (RQ2) and impact (RQ3) of 
OECD education policy advice in Ireland and the CFB are analysed. The chapters are guided 
by case-study-specific questions and make use of policy documents and semi-structured 
expert interviews to gather data. In the first part, a historical overview of the main educational 
issues before the first PISA cycle frames the context in which the assessment was introduced. 
Irish and Belgian relations with the OECD, participation in other large-scale assessments 
(LSA) and the key educational legislative frameworks are also analysed. 
At the national level, PISA is administered by national project managers, the individuals 
or institutions that who carry out the test, analyse the data and produce national reports. In 
Ireland and the CFB the national project managers are research centres, which are arguably in 
a similar position to that of the Directorate for Education and Skills at the OECD: their 
relevance comes not only from the quality of the research they produce, but also from their 
ability to inform policy. Therefore, it is hypothesised that their interpretation of PISA 
outcomes and consequent policy advice might compete with that of the OECD. To account 
for this possibility, Chapters 5 and 6 include a comparison of the policy recommendations for 
Ireland and the CFB from both the international version of the PISA report, authored by the 
Directorate for Education and Skills at the OECD, and the national one, authored by the 
national project managers. 
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The chapters proceed with a detailed discussion of selected policies covering the context 
surrounding the interventions, their degree of alignment with the EPA and, when possible, any 
evidence of implementation and impact. Three areas of reform are covered: curriculum, 
evaluation and assessment, and equity. Curricular reforms have the potential to impact on 
PISA performance directly, and reforms affecting equity outcomes are also analysed. 
Interventions relating to systemic evaluation and assessment are included as they represent the 
typical accountability policies that some research strands claim to be driven by globalising 
forces such as PISA. The case studies provide a good opportunity to understand whether these 
policies had been borrowed, what role the local context had in shaping them and how they 
could be linked to PISA. 
Chapters 5 and 6 conclude with a summary of trends in policy convergence towards the 
OECD goals, and an evaluation of the plausible impact of national reforms on country 
outcomes in PISA. Policy alignment with the EPA is summarised, drawing from the concept 
of “delta-convergence”, that is, ‘the decreasing distance of policies towards an exemplary 
model, for example a model promoted by an international organisation’ (Holzinger, Knill, & 
Arts, 2008, p. 83; see also Jakobi & Teltemann, 2009).  
The delta-convergence value is a useful summary measure of the degree of EPA-
alignment, and it has already found application in research on PISA (Bieber & Martens, 2011), 
but the ‘exemplary model’ provided by the EPA does not suit a quantitative indicator. 
Therefore, only the principles of delta-convergence are retained to produce a visual 
representation of the progressive alignment of national policies to the EPA. 
Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, the impact of national reforms on PISA outcomes is analysed 
using Willms’ (2006) LSA-based policy evaluation framework. The framework divides 
education policies into categories: ‘universal’ interventions seek to raise the achievement of 
all students; ‘SES-targeted’ policies intervene on the performance of students with a low 
socio-economic status (SES); whereas ‘performance-targeted’ interventions try to improve the 
results of low achievers. Willms’ framework is often used by the OECD as a means to evaluate 
policy effectiveness. The variations of indicators that are specific to each category are claimed 
to be related to specific policies. Here, Willms’ framework is employed but not taken as an 
infallible instrument, and its ability to detect policy effects on PISA is also critiqued as part of 
the analysis. 
Following the six main chapters, some limitations of this study are acknowledged and 
suggestions for future directions are given. A fourth Research Question (RQ4) helps to 
summarise findings from all previous analyses under one heading: how valuable is the OECD 




Chapter 1: A literature review on the OECD, PISA and 
their influence on national policymaking 
This chapter is articulated in the following parts: 
- A brief history of the OECD and the increasingly prominent role of the OECD in 
education. 
- A presentation of PISA and how it is governed and administered. 
- The descriptive and socio-normative functions of PISA. 
- The use of PISA and of OECD policy recommendations in participating countries 
- The purpose and relevance of this research. 
It is argued that countries use PISA rankings and indicators selectively to back policy 
positions; however, PISA also aims to be a public policy instrument, making 
recommendations to influence country policies. The literature has mostly focused on the first 
aspect of PISA, whereas this research will concentrate on the value of PISA-based education 
policy advice (EPA). The EPA is deemed a key but under-researched side of PISA because it 
is related to the credibility of the OECD as a policy advisor. 
What is the OECD? 
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) was established on 
30 September 1961 after a convention was jointly signed on 14 December 1960 by the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the United States and Canada 
(“Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,” 1960). 
Born in 1948 to implement the Marshall Plan in Europe, the OEEC struggled to make 
members’ positions converge, especially with respect to economic and trade agreements. 
When fears over Soviet technological advances accelerated following the launch of the 
Sputnik in 1957, the reshaping of the OEEC into the OECD was seen as an economic and 
political alternative to the expansion of NATO as a means to tighten Western links over the 
Atlantic (Carroll & Kellow, 2011).  
The OECD is an international and intergovernmental organisation (IO) with legal 
personality2 concerned with the promotion of policies ‘that will improve the economic and 
                                                     
2 The OECD inherited the legal personality possessed by the OEEC (“Convention on the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,” 1960), which was as follows: ‘The 
Organisation shall possess juridical personality. It shall have the capacity to conclude contracts, to 
acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property and to institute legal proceedings.’ 
(“Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for European Economic Co-operation on the Legal 
Capacity, Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation,” 1948, Art. 1). 
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social well-being of people around the world’ (OECD, 2011a, p. 8). Topics of interest include 
economics, labour and finance; environment; public governance; science and technology; tax 
policy; trade and agriculture; energy, transportation and sustainable development; and 
education, which is the focus of this document. 
The OECD currently consists of 34 countries,3 providing a budget of EUR 363 million in 
2015 (OECD, 2015a). Each country contributes in proportion to its GDP; the top five 
contributors in 2015 were the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK. Like other IOs, the 
OECD is ‘simultaneously, a geographic entity, an organisational structure, a policy-making 
forum, a network of policy makers, researchers and consultants, and a sphere of influence’ 
(Henry, Lingard, Rizvi, & Taylor, 2001, p. 7), but internally it is articulated around three main 
bodies:  
1) a Council, which is ‘the body from which all acts of the Organisation derive’ 
(“Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,” 
1960, Art. 7);  
2) a ‘complex, hierarchical committee system’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 9), composed 
of ‘about 250 committees, working groups and expert groups’ (OECD, 2015j) listed 
in the “On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity” (OECD, 2015g, 
hereinafter the “Guide to the OECD”);  
3) and the Secretariat, the sole body to employ staff internal to the organisation, whose 
role is to ‘support the activities of committees, and carry out the work in response to 
priorities decided by the OECD Council’ (OECD, 2015j). 
As is the case for other organisations, the three systems are highly interdependent and the 
internal structure of the organisation is difficult to pin down: committees and sub-committees 
come into existence for the lifetime of a project and then disappear; staff enter, exit and move 
within the organisation; restructuring can be structural or merely cosmetic.  
Institutional theories have a long history in sociology, economics and political sciences 
(Scott, 1995), whereas organisations and their epistemology have been the subject of 
numerous ‘paradigm wars’ (Moldoveanu & Baum, 2005) between realists and constructivists. 
Because of their complexity, large-scale organisations have been likened to machines, 
                                                     
3 In alphabetical order (with date of accession): Australia (1971), Austria (1961), Belgium (1961), 
Canada (1961), Chile (2010), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Estonia (2010), Finland (1969), 
France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland (1961), Israel 
(2010), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), Netherlands 
(1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Slovak Republic (2000), 
Slovenia (2010), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), United Kingdom 
(1961), United States (1961). 
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organisms, brains, cultures, political systems, instruments of domination or even psychic 
prisons (G. Morgan, 2006).  
Such a wealth of literature, attempting to explain why organisations are the way they are, 
is for the most part only tangential to this research. However, the underlying idea that 
international organisations are complex phenomena (i.e., complicated and irreducible to some 
components, see Rogers, 2008) with some emergent properties—such as a certain degree of 
agency and autonomy from member states—underpins the whole study and will be invoked 
to clarify some apparent contradictions in the OECD's “behaviour”. 
Why is the OECD important for education? 
Education and economics: 1961–1988 
The OECD was created as an economic platform, and indeed in the 1960s education was at 
the margin of the OECD’s work and at the service of the economic agenda. In line with Human 
Capital theory, investment in education was seen as ‘a precondition for producing an adequate 
supply of scientists and technicians’ (Martens & Jakobi, 2010, p. 164) in order to win the 
space and big science race (Rinne, Kallo, & Hokka, 2004). Human capital encompasses a 
person’s ‘knowledge, skills, health, or values’ (Becker, 1964/1993, p. 16), as opposed to his 
or her physical or financial assets. Education is presumed to foster human capital which, in 
turn, should promote economic growth (Romer, 1990). 
A noticeable change in the status of education within the OECD was observed with ‘the 
establishment in 1968 of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI, initially 
with Ford Foundation and Shell funding), and the replacement of the Committee for Scientific 
and Technical Personnel [which until then had dealt with education matters] with the 
Education Committee in 1970’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 9). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, education in the OECD acquired a strong social 
democratic component.  The reductionist view of education as a means to increase the stock 
of human capital was challenged by a strong Secretariat and by country-level trust in 
Keynesian economics, which gave governments a more prominent role in public policy. In 
this period ‘the “social” came to dominate the “economic”’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 64; quoting 
Papadopoulos, 1995). The focus was on “recurrent” education, a precursor of what today is 
known as “lifelong learning”, and its role in social emancipation and equality (Bengtsson, 
2008; Martens & Jakobi, 2010).  
From the mid-late 1970s into the 1980s, neo-liberalism and its free-market ideology 
replaced Keynesian economics in many OECD countries and sought to minimise government 
interventionism (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Tony Porter & Webb, 2007). Following the failure 
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of the Bretton Woods system of economic policies and the 1973/74 oil crisis (see Eichengreen 
& Kenen, 1994, for an overview), the question of whether education policies were the best 
instrument for addressing social inequalities came to the surface (Blaug, 1976), and education 
was once again placed at the service of economic growth (Papadopoulos, 1995). Concepts 
such as “adaptable workforce” emerged (Henry et al., 2001; Papadopoulos, 1995) whereas 
education reforms were framed as part of an integrated political response to the needs of a 
changing society. 
Education in the spotlight: the INES programme 
Over time, the role of the OECD had sharply declined in financial and monetary matters but 
had acquired new prominence as a source of evidence-based analyses, especially in the trade 
sector (Henry et al., 2001). In education, the demand for comparative (and comparable) data 
had increased (Henry et al., 2001; C. Morgan, 2011; von Bogdandy & Goldmann, 2012). At 
the time, the OECD did not have the capacity to produce its own indicators and had to rely on 
country-reported statistics that were often outdated and hardly comparable (Martens & Jakobi, 
2010). Earlier attempts to relate education systems had revealed the inadequacy of the 
theoretical models used to account for country differences (Henry et al., 2001; Rinne et al., 
2004). As a result, ‘a culture of distrust towards performance indicators had grown up over 
the years’ within the CERI (Henry et al., 2001, p. 87). 
However, calls for education reforms within influential countries such as the US (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) and France resulted in high political pressure 
on the OECD to develop effectiveness (input and output) indicators. Eventually, the CERI 
‘had no choice but to concede’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 87). In 1988, the International Indicators 
and Evaluation of Educational Systems (lNES) project was born, and in spite of the attempt 
by the CERI to underplay—and to an extent undermine4—its success, it rapidly became 
tremendously popular among member countries (Henry et al., 2001). Moreover, the timing of 
the programme coincided with the crumbling of the USSR, a wider OECD strategy to reach 
out to non-Western countries and collaborations with UNESCO and Eurostat on the 
development of further indicators. All this translated into a considerable expansion of the 
OECD’s area of influence on educational matters (Henry et al., 2001; Rinne et al., 2004). 
The work on indicators was carried out by networks led by one country at a time and 
assisted by a scientific advisory group and the Secretariat (Henry et al., 2001). Among these, 
‘Network A, which was charged with the development of indicators on the outcomes of 
                                                     
4 ‘CERI’s position on indicators was reflected in the decision to place the INES project in charge 
of a member of the secretariat with a philosophical background in the expectation, perhaps, that it would 
not succeed’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 88). 
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education, acquired particular prominence’ (von Bogdandy & Goldmann, 2012, p. 56). In 
1992 the work on the INES project, and especially of Network A, flowed into the ‘flagship’ 
publication (C. Morgan, 2011, p. 54; von Bogdandy & Goldmann, 2012, p. 56) of the OECD 
in education, the Education at a Glance (EAG) series, comprising an array of dozens of 
indicators including demographic characteristics, resources, access to education, learning 
environments and outcomes.  
The scope and purposes of the EAG series were the object of great internal debate and 
refinement.  The core assumption behind the newly-developed statistical indicators was that 
national practices differed but the underlying constructs and conceptions of education were 
the same across all countries. This assumption was overly optimistic. Where generic indicators 
such as “lifelong learning”, “equity” or “quality of provision” created ‘categories of 
equivalence […] to give [the illusion of] uniformity among diversity’ (Popkewitz, 2011, p. 
31), the OECD was struggling to reconcile the neo-liberal and neo-conservative views of some 
of its members with more egalitarian ones (Henry et al., 2001).  
The former promoted decentralization and accountability, a market/business-like 
conception of education and individualistic views of equity. The latter, instead, saw education 
as a vehicle for social cohesion and were backed by the CERI, which had not given up on the 
idea of developing better theories before placing confidence into indicators. Specifically, the 
CERI was interested in how the emerging Social Capital Theory (J. S. Coleman, 1988)—
“social capital” was broadly speaking the value of social relations—could fit within education. 
The interaction of all these competing views meant that for years the OECD conveyed mixed 
messages about what equity, quality and efficiency actually meant (Henry et al., 2001). 
Emancipation from external data sources: the development of PISA 
For the publication of EAG, Network A assembled indicators produced by existing 
international studies (C. Morgan, 2011), such as those of the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) and the International Adult Literacy Survey 
(IALS) of 1994, which was ‘a collaborative effort involving several international 
organizations, intergovernmental agencies, and national governments’ (Kirsch, 2001, p. 1). 
There was growing discontent with this practice because the OECD did not have control over 
costs, timing, assessment contents and procedures, or even which countries to involve (C. 
Morgan & Shahjahan, 2014; citing Owen, Hodgkinson, & Tuijnman, 1995).  
Therefore, in 1995, in a period in which the organisation was ‘searching for relevance in 
a changing world’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 114), Network A presented a strategy to the 
other members of the INES project to develop their own assessment (C. Morgan, 2011). The 
strategy was accepted by the Council which, in 1997, authorised the Secretary-General ‘to 
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implement a decentralised Programme for Producing Student Achievement Indicators on a 
Regular Basis’ (OECD, 1997d, p. 2). With this move, the OECD ‘transformed itself from a 
gatherer of educational indicators to a producer of educational data’ (C. Morgan & Shahjahan, 
2014, p. 196). Between the third and the fifth meeting of the Board of Participating Countries 
(now PISA Governing Board, PGB), the official name of the enterprise became Programme 
for International Student Assessment, or PISA (OECD, 1998b, 1998c). 
The importance education had acquired within the OECD thanks to the INES programme, 
EAG and PISA, was further increased by the link between education and growth that a new 
economic paradigm—knowledge-based economy, ‘one in which the generation and the 
exploitation of knowledge has come to play the predominant part in the creation of wealth’ 
(DTI, 1998; cited in Houghton & Sheehan, 2000, p. 1)—made possible (OECD, 1996). 
Knowledge economy provided a new identity to the OECD (and other IOs), one based on four 
‘pillars’ (Robertson et al., 2007): information technology, openness to international trade, 
national innovation systems and education and training for lifelong learning.  
Thus, at the end of the 1990s, the OECD became an influential actor in educational matters 
by working on two interconnected fronts. On the one hand, by subscribing to the narrative of 
knowledge economy, it invested in a certain type of capital; on the other hand, by taking 
control of educational monitoring, it became the official source for the allocation of such 
capital to each of its members. ‘Literacy and numeracy skills have become a currency in 
modern societies around the world’ (OECD, 2010g, p. 33); the OECD is ‘involved in helping 
to specify the skills and competencies that give contemporary human capital its value’ (Sellar 
& Lingard, 2013b, p. 718).  
What is PISA? 
PISA was established as a three year assessment (OECD, 1997d), and this scheduling never 
changed. Thus far, it has been run in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015, although data 
for this latter cycle were not available at the time of writing. 
In the educational literature PISA is categorised as an “international assessment”, “large-
scale assessment” or “cross-country survey”. From an analytical perspective, it is a time-series 
cross-sectional survey (Fairbrother, 2013; Nagel et al., 2010), because it follows countries 
over time (the ‘time-series’ component) while sampling a different group of students at each 
cycle (the ‘cross-sectional’ one). In this document, PISA and similar surveys—such as the 
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Progress in 
International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), both developed by the IEA—are referred to as 
“large-scale assessments” (LSAs). 
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PISA has, up to know, been generally a paper-and-pencil assessment, although countries 
also have the option to participate in a digital version. The test lasts two hours for each student. 
It uses a combination of multiple-choice, short answer and extended response items and all 
items are distributed in 8–9 different but linked booklets, each answered by one student 
(Adams & Wu, 2002). Participating students are sampled by age within a specific window: 
eligible students must be aged from 15 years and 3 months to 16 years and 2 months at the 
beginning of the assessment period, plus or minus one month, and be enrolled at least in Grade 
7 (OECD, 2005b, p. 46).  
Rather than focusing exclusively on academic competence, PISA takes a broader 
perspective and claims to be measuring ‘skills for life’ (OECD, 2001a). These skills are 
expressed in terms of three core literacies (though additional domains such as problem solving 
and financial literacy have also been assessed): Reading of the home language, Mathematics 
and Science5. PISA uses items that are cross-nationally agreed upon but as far as possible 
context- and curriculum-free (Adams & Wu, 2002; OECD, 1999a, 2001a). This approach was 
strongly advocated by the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER, see OECD, 
1998c), which won the first call for tender to develop the instrument (OECD, 1997b) and still 
has a leading role (see for example OECD, 2014h, p. 462). 
PISA is currently developed and administered by the network in Figure 1.1. 
                                                     
5 The OECD “Reading” is defined as: ‘understanding, using and reflecting on written texts, in order 
to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge and potential, and to participate in society’ (OECD, 
1999a, p. 12). “Mathematics” is defined as ‘Identifying, understanding and engaging in mathematics 
and making well-founded judgements about the role that mathematics plays, as needed for an 
individual’s current and future life as a constructive, concerned and reflective citizen’. “Science” is 
defined as ‘Combining scientific knowledge with the drawing of evidence-based conclusions and 
developing hypotheses in order to understand and help make decisions about the natural world and the 








































Source: own elaboration 
The PISA Governing Board (PGB) 
‘Countries appoint representatives to the Board who are knowledgeable about 
large-scale student assessments and their interface with educational policy and 
practice. Representatives comprise a mix of government officials and staff of 
research and academic institutions. […] The Board determines the policy 
priorities for PISA and oversees adherence to these priorities during 
implementation. This includes the setting of priorities and standards for data 
development, analysis and reporting as well as the determination of the scope of 
work that will then form the basis for the implementation of PISA. Economies 
that participate in PISA but do not have associate status are welcome to participate 
in PGB meetings as observers.’ (OECD, 2015h) 
The PGB has also the task of ‘disseminat[ing] its policy advice, analysis, research and data 
to a wide range of Member and non-Member stakeholders’ (Guide to the OECD: PGB). The 
PGB ‘seeks the guidance of the Education Policy Committee’ (ibid.), which in turn is 
responsible for ‘assisting governments to develop effective, efficient and evidence-based 
policies for education and learning to meet individual, social, cultural and economic objectives 
through the development of specific policy recommendations, policy reviews, analyses and 
data collection’ (Guide to the OECD: Education Policy Committee). 
The PISA Consortium 
‘The design and implementation of the surveys, within the framework established by the PISA 
Governing Board, is the responsibility of external contractors under the leadership of the 
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ACER’ (OECD, 2014h, p. 462). These contractors are chosen by the PGB ‘through a 
transparent and open competitive process’ (PISA Governing Board, 2014).  
The Expert Groups 
Expert Groups are in charge of advising the Consortium on the development of the surveys 
for Reading, Mathematics, Science, Problem Solving, Financial literacy and the background 
questionnaires. These groups are ‘appointed by the main PISA contractors with the approval 
of the PISA Governing Board’ and they include subject experts as well as ‘experts in 
assessment, technology, and education research from a range of countries’ (Mathematics 
Expert Group, 2010, p. 4). In fact, if one considers the core domains and the background 
questionnaires, 24 countries are represented within the Expert Groups, but only 10 of them 
(Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the UK and 
the US) had a national expert in at least 4 out of 5 (2000–2012) PISA administrations (see 
Appendix 3, Table 1.A, for a list).  
The PGB has often asked the Consortium to ‘address the imbalance towards North 
American and European expertise when positions in the groups become vacant’ (OECD, 
2010a, p. 4), but argues that ‘the limited size of the expert groups does not mean that only a 
limited number of countries will participate in the development of the project’ (OECD, 2005a, 
p. 22). The Expert Groups certainly consult advisors from more than 10 countries (OECD, 
2014h), but the extent to which suggestions are eventually integrated into the assessment is 
not clear from OECD reports.  
National Project Managers (NPMs)  
NPMs are individuals or organisations in charge of implementing the survey at the national 
level following standardised procedures. Other responsibilities include processing data and 
disseminating results at the national level by organising conferences, seminars and by 
preparing country-level reports. Country reports are needed to ‘contextualise the findings in 
the international reports6 through national analysis and interpretation as determined by each 
country in ways that respond to the specific policy and educational context’ (OECD, 1999c, 
p. 4). 
The relationship between NPMs and the other groups, represented by the dashed red 
arrows in Figure 1.1, shows that there are no clear boundaries separating an international (or 
external) level in the development of PISA and a national or internal one. As leading research 
centres or prominent academics, members of the Consortium and the Expert Groups are likely 
                                                     
6 The “international reports” are the OECD publications summarising the outcomes of each 
administration of PISA, such as PISA 2012 Results: What Students Know and Can Do (OECD, 2014g), 
and available at http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/. 
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to have ties with national-level policymaking or hold posts of responsibility. Similarly, NPMs 
can sit in more than one committee.  
For instance, the ACER is in the PISA Consortium and in charge of the Mathematics 
framework, while ACER staff are NPMs for Australia and members of the Technical Advisory 
Group (OECD, 2014h). Likewise, the service for the Analysis of Systems and Practices in 
Education (ASPE) is in charge of administering PISA in the French Community of Belgium, 
but it is also represented in the PISA Governing Board, the PISA consortium, the Technical 
Advisory Group and the Reading Expert Group.  
Although some countries are more involved than others in the development of PISA (the 
United States, Australia, Japan, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands), in general in only a 
minority of countries’ NPMs are not part of the PGB. Table 1.B in the Appendix shows that, 
in 2015, in 72% of cases NPMs and representatives at the PGB came from the same institute 
or were actually the same person. Overall, this suggests that a clear separation between the 
“international” and the “national” may exist only between the OECD Secretariat—composed 
of international civil servants, who are ‘citizens of OECD member countries […] with no 
national affiliation during their OECD posting’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 12)—and everyone else. 
The Secretariat 
The Secretariat has an administrative side, which is at the service of OECD countries and 
constrains its operations; but also a scientific one, as a network of researchers enjoying some 
academic and managerial freedom. For instance, they can collaborate with external 
consultants whose views may differ from those of the governments and reinforce the 
Secretariat’s voice on policy issues (Henry et al., 2001). The pull between dependence and 
independence is a consequence of the historical development of the predecessor of the OECD, 
the OEEC. The OEEC was forced to compromise between the positions of countries that 
thought the Secretariat should be under the strict control of member states, and those that saw 
a unique opportunity in granting it more independence (Carroll & Kellow, 2011).  
Within the Secretariat at the OECD, the Directorate for Education and Skills works under 
the supervision of the Education Policy Committee and in collaboration with the CERI, the 
PGB and the Institutional Management in Higher Education Governing Board. It branches 
into four divisions: Early Childhood and Schools (managing PISA), Innovation and Measuring 
Progress, Policy Advice and Implementation and Skills Beyond School (OECD, 2015f).  
Some researchers have argued that Secretariats at international organisations have a 
considerable power to shape policies—especially when their staff is ‘highly qualified, 
argumentative and mission-driven’ (Yi-Chong & Weller, 2008, p. 35). Yi-Chong & Weller 
(2008) examined the role of international civil servants in the Secretariat of the World Trade 
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Organization. They traced their influence to the fact that, even if they do not have any last 
word or executive power over a matter, they have creativity, ‘technical expertise and 
bureaucratic skill’ (p. 37), control over information, sometimes a position with recognised 
leadership, and the professional longevity to ‘outlast’ the experiences ‘of most state delegates’ 
(p. 40).  
Within the principal-agent theory framework (Eisenhardt, 1989, for an overview), 
delegated agents such as the Secretariat are ‘actors in their own right’ (Hawkins, Lake, 
Nielson, & Tierney, 2006, p. 5), and Shober (2010) argues that, even when they already enjoy 
some discretion, ‘with a particular combination of factors, [agents] are able to […] shape the 
preferences (i.e., policy goals) of their principals’ by leveraging their ‘already-granted scope 
to gain more autonomy’ (p. 25, emphasis removed).  
This can happen, for instance, under a strong and charismatic leadership (Shober, 2010). 
In the case of the OECD, a current key figure in the Secretariat and PISA is the Director for 
Education and Skills—and Special Advisor on Education Policy to the Secretary-General—
Andreas Schleicher. Schleicher was previously professionally linked to the IEA and CERI. 
His dominant role in the success of PISA emerged clearly during the field work carried out 
for this document. Although the survey is not a “one-man endeavour”, the OECD Secretariat 
acquired a considerable influence in educational matters under his management: ‘Andreas 
Schleicher travels the world proselytising PISA and has been very successful’ (Grek, 2012, p. 
248). 
Moreover, the Secretariat at the OECD has an active role in peer reviews—a “signature” 
activity of the organisation (see “What motivates countries to participate to PISA?”, below). 
Even though they are carried out by member countries, the Secretariat ‘supervises the whole 
review process by providing documentation and analysis, […] often suggests a country for 
review, selects the reviewer, makes personal visits during the examination, and instructs its 
staff to prepare the publications’ (Martens & Jakobi, 2010, p. 11). Given its central role in 
handling knowledge, the Secretariat has the potential to exert substantial influence on other 
bodies such as the Council, the Committees or, in the case of PISA, the PGB.  
Nevertheless, the power held by the Secretariat or the Directorate for Education and Skills 
should not be overstated, because their autonomy is ‘constrained’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 
42) by the interests of all but hands-off stakeholders. Representatives from member countries 
are ‘deeply engaged’ (p. 29) with the work of the Secretariat and the Directorates—and a 
reminder of this is the country presence in all key positions highlighted by Figure 1.1. 
Evaluation mechanisms are in place, and each policy draft produced is the result ‘of a 
complex process of communication, negotiation, bargaining and co-ordination between 
internal and external stakeholders’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 42). Since the beginning of the 
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PISA enterprise, the PGB has often ‘asked’ (OECD, 1998a), ‘requested’ (OECD, 1999b), 
‘recommended’ (OECD, 1999c) or ‘reiterated’ (OECD, 2001c) that a series of actions should 
be taken. It has expressed ‘disappointment’ (OECD, 2001c) about actions of the Directorate 
at times even ‘concerns’, for instance, ‘about the quality of the draft’ or ‘the nature and 
language of the report [, which] was not sufficiently oriented to policy analysts and policy 
makers as the main intended audience’ (OECD, 2002b, p. 6). 
Kellow & Carroll (2013) note that the power of the Secretariat at the OECD ‘relies 
primarily upon its ability to persuade [...] members of the accuracy and value of its data, its 
reports and the conclusions and recommendations they contain’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 
29). However, at the turn of the century it came under considerable criticism because of a lack 
of transparency in its career structure and appointment practices, with a widespread tendency 
among line managers to employ highly specialised short-term staff for specific projects 
without any formal recruitment process (Carroll & Kellow, 2011). This led to a significant 
restructuring of human resourcing and process management between 2004 and 2007. 
This is why it would be inaccurate to refer to the Secretariat or the Directorate as 
“bureaucracies”. A bureaucracy is a rule-creating institution characterised by a stringent 
division of labour, career longevity, impersonality and independence from politicisation, and 
expertise—especially control over information (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, 2004; for 
an original definition, see for example Weber’s essays in Gerth & Wright Mills, 1946). Such 
control endows the bureaucracy with authority: ‘the ability of one actor to use institutional 
and discursive resources to induce deference from others’ (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, 
p. 5).  
It can certainly be claimed that the authority of the Directorate for Education and Skills 
stems from its perceived—or at least self-proclaimed—impartiality and expertise, as well as 
its ability to classify the world, fix meanings and diffuse norms (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004). However, it is also a body characterised by short careers, lack of absolute ownership 
in the production of information, as well as by a persistent tension between the creative, 
scientific and epistemic work expected by the highly qualified staff employed at the 
organisation, and the reality of having to satisfy ‘externally defined national interests for utility 
maximization’ (Marcussen & Trondal, 2011, p. 611).  
What is the purpose of PISA? 
PISA was conceived primarily as tool to inform policymaking. Within the broader OECD 
framework, PISA ‘reflects and complements the priorities of the OECD Members, in 
promoting sustainable development and social cohesion through good governance’ [Guide to 
the OECD: PGB]. Thanks to ‘trend indicators that allow participants to monitor improvements 
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in educational outcomes’, PISA ‘seeks to progressively enhance comparative policy insights 
on how to improve: the quality of learning outcomes; equity in learning opportunities; the 
effectiveness and efficiency of educational processes; and the impact of learning outcomes’ 
[Guide to the OECD: PGB]. 
The international reports were meant to be complemented by thematic reports taking ‘a 
policy-oriented perspective’ (OECD, 1999b, p. 3) and ensuring PISA outcomes could be 
situated ‘in the context of other qualitative and quantitative work at the OECD’ (ibid.). In 
general, thematic reports were to focus on institutional characteristics with ‘policy analysts 
and policy makers as the main intended audience’ (OECD, 2002c, p. 5).  
In November 2002, the first international PISA symposium was held. The nature of the 
symposium was political, not academic, and its primary purpose was to discuss the impact of 
PISA on policies and draw lessons from systemic change (OECD, 2002a, 2002b). Education 
ministers at the OECD saw the potential of PISA for the medium and long term, and suggested 
that one of the aims should be to produce ‘clear signals that can inform education policy on 
how to improve the effectiveness of education’ (OECD, 2001c, p. 4).  
PISA’s objectives were to improve the quality, equity and efficiency of education systems, 
and to increase the ‘“durability” of knowledge and skills and their social and economic 
relevance’ (OECD, 2003b, p. 11)—the ‘skills for life’ that were promoted ever since. To reach 
these objectives, each administration cycle had to emphasise different policy themes (OECD, 
2002b), and ‘policy levers’ (i.e., possible avenues for policy action) had to be established 
(OECD, 2003b, p. 11).  
The overall strategy for PISA did not change substantively over time: in 2013 the PGB 
reiterated that PISA ‘is policy-oriented’; it provides ‘data and analysis that can help guide 
decisions on education policy’ and ‘identifies features common to high-performing students, 
schools and education systems’ (OECD, 2013a, p. 3, emphasis in the text). Martens & Jakobi 
(2010) argued that, with PISA, the OECD can explore topics that are relevant for education 
policy and ‘link them immediately to issues of policy formulation and implementation’ (p. 
175).  
The clear policy orientation of PISA was not matched by a definite strategy in terms of 
what education policy areas to focus on, how to translate PISA results into policy advice and 
how recommendations should be communicated.  
With regard to the first point, the core literacies of Reading, Mathematics and Science 
were an easy choice as they provided an opportunity ‘for innovating and informing national 
curriculum development’ in these areas (OECD, 1998b, p. 6). Additional policy areas were 
identified as possible candidates for PISA-informed thematic reports: equity issues, student 
and school factors, parental involvement, gender differences, streaming, but also ‘policy 
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options for school improvement in cross-curricular and non-curricular areas’ (OECD, 1999c, 
p. 5). The main instrument for collecting data on these topics was the set of contextual 
questionnaires, whose purpose was to ‘contribute to indicators of enduring cross-national 
relevance […and] focus on areas that are amenable to policy development’ (OECD, 1999c, p. 
7).  
The second point relates to the transition from PISA data to their interpretation (i.e., the 
knowledge-construction process). This is a key aspect as it is linked to the validity of the 
assessment. The Directorate for Education and Skills was charged with interpreting PISA data 
but there is evidence, which is reported in a later section, that there was no explicit protocol 
guiding this activity.  
With respect to the third point, a dissemination strategy was agreed between Schleicher 
and the PGB. The international reports had to be ‘as country specific as necessary to be 
interpretable in the national institutional context […and] as accessible as possible for a policy 
audience’, while still remaining comparable and valid cross-nationally (OECD, 2001c, p. 6). 
The PGB asked the Secretariat ‘to ensure a balanced representation of all countries and to 
avoid focusing on extremes only’ (OECD, 2001c, p. 6), and has at times requested to remove 
‘normative and speculative recommendations to individual countries’ (OECD, 2003b, p. 5).  
Whether this goal was achieved is up for scrutiny. The OECD aims to be seen as an 
independent expert, an external objective advisor reporting scientific facts. But it is also a 
“critical friend”, one whose reports and analyses ‘are subtly normative’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 
14): countries are often singled out as evidence backing a policy point, or as a way to provide 
a success story or an exemplar case. Detractors have claimed that PISA reports use a tactic of 
‘naming and shaming’ (Armingeon, 2004; Carvalho & Costa, 2014), which the OECD already 
used in domains other than education to exert influence on member countries.  
The practice of ranking countries in international reports (established in fact by earlier 
IEA studies) has also been questioned because of its limited usefulness for policymaking 
(Goldstein, 2004; Grek, 2009). In this respect, the official PGB position has been both that 
reports ‘should highlight important policy messages emerging from PISA and therefore go 
beyond the ranking of countries’ (OECD, 1999c, p. 3), and that rankings have their place if 
appropriately contextualised (OECD, 2001b). Overall, the evidence suggests that PISA is a 




How is PISA used to inform policymaking? Theory and evidence 
What motivates countries to participate in PISA? 
Participation in PISA has been consistently strong. Thirty two ‘economies’ or ‘jurisdictions’ 
(this includes countries, disputed territories and, more recently, cities) participated in the first 
administration in 2000; eleven countries followed in 2002 (OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a), 
to make a total of 43 participating in the first cycle. After a slight decrease to 41 jurisdictions 
in 2003, the number has been on the rise: 57 in 2006, 65 in 2009—with 9 additional countries 
administering the 2009 assessment in 2010—65 in 2012; 71 ‘are signed up to participate in 
2015’ (OECD, 2015h). This is an impressive achievement, considering that the OECD 
managed in 15 years to create a participant base as large as IEA’s, which has been running 
large-scale assessments since the 1960s.  
The attraction of PISA can be explained by at least three factors (for a further level of 
investigation, see DeBoer, 2010). Firstly, PISA data are relevant for (established or aspiring) 
knowledge-based economies because they are a more accurate estimate ‘of the stock of human 
capital or human skills’ (OECD, 1999a, p. 11) than other commonly-used measures (e.g., 
highest attained qualification). Secondly, the assessment sits comfortably within the lifelong 
learning framework for education of both the OECD and the European Union (CERI, 2008; 
Eurydice, 2001; Saar, Ure, & Holford, 2013). Thirdly, PISA is a perfect instrument for the 
OECD’s governance model. This third aspect is now analysed more in detail. 
According to the principal-agent theory, the OECD is a “collaboration agent”—a platform 
that facilitates collaborative policymaking by collecting and revealing information about 
country efforts to tackle problems that are collectively perceived as shared (Hawkins et al., 
2006). The OECD describes itself as ‘a group of like-minded countries’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 8), 
and others have defined it ‘a comparative forum, accommodating both a sense of national 
autonomy as well as a sense of commonality among the like-minded’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 
56).  
The idea is that individual members (principals) delegate some authority to a 
superstructure (the OECD, the agent) to carry out certain tasks—namely, providing or 
enabling feedback about individual country policies. A distinguishing feature of the OECD 
lies in the method of choice that has traditionally been employed to collect country data and 
provide such feedback: peer reviewing, whereby one country’s practices in a certain area are 
examined by other members. 
Peer reviews are a way to share best practices but also to put countries under pressure by 
highlighting their shortcomings, in hopes to achieve a certain degree of policy transfer, 
adjustment and ‘voluntary’ convergence (Bieber & Martens, 2011). Peer pressure ‘can act as 
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a powerful incentive to improve policy’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 7), especially when it turns into 
‘naming and shaming’, which happens when countries perpetuating some harmful practices 
(for instance, failure to introduce anti-money-laundering legislation) are singled out (Carroll 
& Kellow, 2011). 
It is not that the OECD lacks legal power; for instance, it can make Decisions, which are 
formal acts that are ‘legally binding on all those Member countries which do not abstain at the 
time they are adopted’ (OECD, 2015e). However, these instruments are seldom used, and the 
organisation prefers to govern through ‘soft mechanisms’ such as persuasion, surveillance and 
self-regulation (Martens & Jakobi, 2010, p. 7): 
‘The OECD achieves results mainly by convincing governments of the value of 
adopting policies that are in their collective self-interest. It does not disburse grant 
money and it has no disciplinary powers other than moral [per]suasion.’ (OECD, 
2011a, p. 12) 
PISA fits well within the ‘hortatory nature’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 34) of the OECD 
authority because of its quantitative approach.  Nowadays, ‘peer’ comparisons as a mode of 
governance to regulate country behaviour are often carried out quantitatively through 
statistical reports. This is why “the politics of mutual accountability” (Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal, 
2003), and “governance by comparison” (Martens & Niemann, 2010), have also been termed 
“governance by numbers” (Grek, 2009), “the politics of/as numbers” (Lingard, 2011) and “the 
tyranny of numbers” (Ball, 2015).  
The role of numbers in country politics had already been shown by Desrosières (2002). 
The general argument is that governance by numbers works by decontextualising 
differences—or recontextualising them ‘into more global comparative frameworks’ (Henry et 
al., 2001, p. 104)— to make them comparable. Numbers are ‘strategies of communication’ in 
that they ‘conveniently summarize a multitude of complex events and transactions’, and are 
therefore ‘well suited for communication that goes beyond the boundaries of locality and 
community’ (Theodore Porter, 1995, pp. viii–ix).  
PISA produces a highly numeric kind of knowledge. Students’ ability in Reading, 
Mathematics and Science is measured and scaled, and their overall proficiency is assigned a 
numbered level. Students’ estimated scores are aggregated and countries ranked on a scale 
with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100: this is the number that purportedly defines 
how good overall an education system is in getting young people ready for the 21st century 
and which captures the attention of policymakers and the media. 
Even more important than country outcomes, from a policymaker’s perspective, are 
country inputs and processes—i.e., the features successful countries have and which might 
explain the observed scores. In this, a key role is played by statistical indicators such as 
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“GDP”, “SES” or “school autonomy”, whose correlations with country scores are extensively 
analysed in international reports. 
Born out of the neo-positivist Social Indicators Movement in the 1960s (D. Rutkowski, 
2008; Smith & Baker, 2001), educational indicators are used as if they were neutral 
quantitative measures, but the reality is more contested. Indicators capture a certain way of 
organising the world and as such they are charged with political meanings and objectives. As 
the OECD states: indicators ‘must be able to communicate a story to decision-makers and 
other end-users quickly and accurately’ (OECD & Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission, 2008, p. 40). Take, for example, the use of indicators of The World Bank: 
‘The World Bank does not only collect data and produce descriptive statistics on 
national economies. It also takes those raw data and couples them to particular 
policy problems, often of the Bank’s own creation. The Bank defines 
development, telling us what data measure it. It tells us what constitutes poverty 
and what data are necessary to act on that policy problem.’ (M. N. Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004, p. 7)  
Thanks to PISA, in a ‘self-perpetuating dynamic’ (Sellar & Lingard, 2013b, p. 722), the 
OECD defines an educational issue, generates data and analyses them (Martens & Jakobi, 
2010) at a time ‘when data have become central to the new governance at both global and 
national level’ (Sellar & Lingard, 2013b, p. 716). This makes it ‘an international mediator of 
knowledge’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 84), an ‘artist’, arbitrator and authority in the diffusion of 
ideas (Marcussen, 2004)—but also a supplier of the new ‘currency’ embodied by the three 
literacies (OECD, 2010g, p. 33). It is what Sellar & Lingard (2013b) call “epistemological 
governance”. The OECD situates itself at the centre of an epistemic community—‘a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 
1992, p. 3).  
Far from being a neutral exercise, PISA defines what reality to look at and what it should 
look like. It frames an educational realty, but also a moral one, ‘a single comparative field 
which pivots around certain normative assumptions about provision and performance’ (Henry 
et al., 2001, p. 84); it is in this field that countries assess their strengths and weaknesses against 
each other. Woodward (2009) speaks of a “cognitive” model of governance, which fixes 
meanings, and a “normative” one, which spreads norms  about what constitutes good 
(educational) governance (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; see also Jones, 2007, on “norm 
entrepreneurs”).  
Beyond PISA, Marcussen (2004) argues that the OECD formulates, transfers and 
authorises both causal beliefs, which ‘can range from theories on the one hand, to facts and 
data on the other’, and principled beliefs, which ‘can be anything from visions and good 
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practices to norms for appropriate behaviour’ (p. 16). Therefore, the OECD governance model 
is as much about knowledge as it is about identity (Tony Porter & Webb, 2007).  
To answer the title question (What motivates countries to participate to PISA?), one could 
say that the OECD is “preaching to the converted”, and add three points. Firstly, the OECD’s 
role in the conversion is supported by overarching paradigms dating back to the 1960s, which 
link education to the economy through the conceptual frameworks of human and social capital 
theory, knowledge-based economy and literacy as a skill. Secondly, participating countries 
willingly subscribe to the governance by comparison model: in other words, they want to be 
converted. Standing on the PISA scales gives countries, particularly those outside the OECD, 
a level of exposure in educational matters which they might not otherwise attain. And finally, 
the incredible work done by Andreas Schleicher should not be underestimated. It may be a 
coincidence, but after he became Special Advisor to the Secretary General, PISA featured at 
the very beginning of the OECD’s 50th anniversary report, even before the organisation’s 
efforts to combat climate change (OECD, 2011a, p. 5). 
How has PISA been received and used for national policymaking? 
It has been argued theoretically (Dale, 1999, 2000) and shown empirically (L. Rutkowski & 
Rutkowski, 2009) that countries respond differently to globalising forces. In many cases, PISA 
results seem to be exploited to initiate or justify national policies that are somewhat 
disconnected to international recommendations (Figazzolo, 2009; Grek, 2009), yet a whole 
spectrum of country responses to international data has been reported (Carvalho & Costa, 
2014; Knodel, Martens, de Olano, & Popp, 2010). This includes extreme reactions such as 
self-scandalisation, self-glorification (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004a) or a ‘sabre-rattling political 
rhetoric to drive through educational reforms’ (Baird et al., 2011, p. 2); but also indifference 
(“the most frequent policy response”, according to Steiner-Khamsi, 2004a, p. 208) and 
reflective learning approaches (Baird et al., 2011).  
In this section, specific country reactions to PISA are summarised to understand 
whether—in spite of its policy-driven intentions—the survey ended up being merely an 
exercise in international ranking for political accountability, or whether the OECD 
successfully managed to create a “public policy instrument”, ‘a device that is both technical 
and social, […] carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained 
by a concept of regulation’ (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 4). 
In Canada and in England, PISA is used for public accountability (Grek et al., 2009; 
Volante & Ben Jaafar, 2008). The former Education Secretary, Michael Gove, stated that 
Schleicher is ‘the most important man in English education’ (Exley, 2013) and ‘the father of 
more revolutions than any German since Karl Marx’: 
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‘Because Andreas is responsible for collating the PISA league tables of 
international educational achievement. He tells us which nations have the best-
performing education systems and then analyses that data to determine why that 
is the case.’ (Gove, 2012) 
Public accountability can be seen in Macao, where PISA has informed national and school 
assessment policies and is being used by the central government to evaluate the effectiveness 
of quality assurance interventions (Vong & Wong, 2014). A well-known and often cited 
reaction was the ‘PISA-shock’ in Germany, which is covered later on in this section. A less-
well documented PISA shock was experienced by Norway, and it provided an opportunity for 
the newly-established government to legitimise a series of curricular and assessment reforms 
which were rapidly implemented (Baird et al., 2011; Tveit, 2014). 
Looking at several case studies, it is difficult to discern when new policies were informed 
by evidence from PISA and when instead reformists appropriated a certain language or 
appealed to an external authority to push previously-designed interventions.  
In New Zealand, an educational ‘task force’ was established to evaluate the 
implementation of a new curriculum that had already been designed (Baker & Jones, 2005). 
Baird et al. (2011) report that, in Switzerland, some policy interventions following PISA 
findings ‘had been brewing for decades’ (p. 32). PISA helped only to legitimise the arguments 
of reform proponents (Bieber & Martens, 2011). 
Pons (2012) analysed the reception of PISA in six countries (France, the French 
Community of Belgium, Hungary, Portugal, Romania and Scotland) between 2001 and 2008. 
He argued that an instrumental use of the findings was widespread. PISA was employed ‘to 
justify reforms which were, to a large extent, already prepared or desired by providing political 
leaders with a new vocabulary for action’, even when these interventions ‘were sometimes 
contradictory and hardly based on the PISA survey’ (p. 215).  
Gür, Çelik, & Özoğlu (2011) showed that, in Turkey, PISA 2003 results and related 
alarming headlines in the media were used by the Ministry of Education to push a curricular 
reform that had already been prepared. The authors also noted that some so-called ‘PISA-
findings’ were common knowledge within the system.  
In France, LSAs were traditionally viewed with scepticism, but PISA has progressively 
gained importance. Some authors stressed its usefulness in highlighting shortcomings in the 
system (Cytermann, 2010). Others reported that, since 2006, a ‘culture of international 
comparison’ and a ‘reform advocacy coalition’ developed (Dobbins & Martens, 2012, p. 32). 
Under the Ministry of Xavier Darcos, who had been the French ambassador at the OECD until 
2007, PISA started to be used by the centre-right to advocate for performance-oriented 
reforms, and by the centre-left and the unions to direct the attention towards social inequalities 
(Dobbins & Martens, 2012).  
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The same happened in the French Community of Belgium, in which policymakers from 
opposite sides use the most convenient results to stress the inequality or the inefficiency of the 
education system (E. Mangez & Cattonar, 2009). Carvalho & Costa (2014) observe that 
policymakers tend to employ country statistics rather than policy advice from PISA in what 
they call a ‘selective mobilization of certain “pieces” of PISA knowledge’ (p. 4). 
In all these cases, the OECD/PISA “brand” was used as a political stick, whereas OECD 
recommendations actually played a minor role in “PISA-based” reforms. The examples below 
contrast these findings with evidence that PISA can serve purposes other than instrumental 
accountability—though with varying degrees of success. 
In Spain, PISA influenced some specific policies to promote reading and ICT in schools 
(Bonal & Tarabini, 2013). It also led to the creation of the “Ibero-American PISA Group”, a 
‘mutual support group designed to contribute to a better performance on the PISA, by means 
of continuous technical training and exchanging best practices’ (Bolívar, 2011, p. 67). 
Nevertheless, actual PISA-informed changes were not as common as the use of PISA to justify 
or obstruct reforms. This led Bolívar (2011) to comment that ‘PISA results have not had any 
relevant pedagogical repercussions’ (p. 65).  
An interesting example is the Kyrgyz Republic. Here, ‘the poor results of PISA 2006 gave 
the education officials an opportunity to strategically gain support from international 
development agencies’ (Shamatov & Sainazarov, 2010, p. 158). Embracing the rhetoric of 
crisis, Kyrgyz officials ‘learned to speak the language of the international donors and […] 
familiarized themselves with the current philosophy of aid that emphasizes needs rather than 
accomplishments’ (ibid.).  
In France, the political conflict mentioned earlier produced paradoxical results at times. A 
2004 law aiming to reform the national examination by having part of the final grade depend 
on teacher judgement was informed by OECD recommendations. It was seen by the 
government as a way to make the assessment more reliable and fairer but it was rejected by 
students, who were afraid of teacher bias (Dobbins & Martens, 2012). 
Japan and Korea have integrated ‘PISA-type’ tasks into their national examinations 
(Schleicher, 2009b, p. 492), but there is also evidence that in Japan PISA 2003 results were 
used to promote reforms whose rationale was actually in contrast with OECD 
recommendations. Takayama (2008, 2013) argued that while, on the one hand, the national 
assessment introduced in 2007 borrowed heavily from the PISA literacies, it disregarded the 
influence of socio-economic background on results and contrasted with the school-governance 
model recommended by the OECD. Similarly, the Danish government’s response to the PISA 
2000 unsatisfactory results ‘emphasized a much more traditional conception of subjects […] 
than implied by PISA’s disciplinary literacy […] framework’ (Dolin & Krogh, 2010, p. 571), 
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and its decision to establish a new system of national assessment ‘was not completely 
synchronised with the Danish PISA 2003 report’ (p. 573). 
At times, researchers disagree on the reception of PISA in the same education system. For 
instance, Berliner (2011) claims that ‘people in the USA […] take test results from PISA very 
seriously’ (p. 78), whereas others write: ‘three cycles of the PISA study and their results have 
remained virtually unheard of’ (Martens & Niemann, 2010, p. 15). This would be because 
PISA results do not depart enough from national expectations to prompt any reforms over and 
above what is already in the government’s agenda (Bieber & Martens, 2011; Martens & 
Niemann, 2013). On this matter, Sellar & Lingard (2013a) have recently argued that the top 
performance of Shanghai in 2009 was the PISA-shock the US had been missing to begin the 
PISA-driven policy debate other countries had already experienced. The first outcome was an 
OECD report (Tucker, 2011) commissioned by the Secretary of Education ‘on what the best 
performing school systems were doing and what lessons could be learnt from them’ (Sellar & 
Lingard, 2013a, p. 474).  
Neumann, Kiss & Fejes (2012) compared PISA reception in Hungary and Romania to 
argue that national policies were influenced not just by OECD recommendations, but by the 
particular attitude taken by national project managers with respect to PISA and its findings. 
During the development and administration stages of PISA, Hungarian project managers were 
committed and enthusiastic, whereas Romanian staff were disengaged and ‘primarily 
conceived PISA as a formal bureaucratic task’ (p. 233)—perhaps because country-
participation was felt as a top-down imposition to ‘align and comply with Europe’ (ibid.).  
The deeper internalisation of the PISA principles on Hungary’s part translated into a rapid 
appropriation of the semantics and rhetoric of the OECD: PISA became a ‘focusing event’, 
used by the government ‘to give external legitimacy’ to controversial reforms, and by their 
critics to strengthen their positions (E. Neumann et al., 2012, p. 234; see also Kingdon, 1995, 
on focusing events). In Romania, in contrast, PISA was deemed incompatible with the system, 
so its contribution to systemic reform has been ‘fragmented, slow and uncertain’ (E. Neumann 
et al., 2012, p. 237).  
The role of intermediate players such as PISA researchers and NPMs in producing 
knowledge for policy has also been recognised by Cattonar et al. (2009), Pons (2012) and 
Klemencic (2010). Klemencic (2010) reported that, in Slovenia, many professionals with 
responsibilities for implementing international LSAs at the local level also served as 
government advisors. Therefore, they had the ability to influence national education policies.  
Pons (2012) argued that the PISA national centres ‘played an ambivalent role’ (p. 216), 
because their active participation in the production and dissemination of knowledge from 
PISA rarely resulted in ‘knowledge for learning’ (p. 217, emphasis in the text). In other words, 
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intermediate actors were seen as collating and restructuring OECD evidence but without 
providing the tools to interpret it. This position contrasts with findings from the present case 
studies; it will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6 that the NPMs of Ireland and the French 
Community of Belgium actively provide the tools to interpret PISA reports. 
To conclude this section, two in-depth summaries of the reactions to PISA in Germany 
and Finland are presented. Germany is widely cited as the country in which the influence of 
PISA was stronger, whereas the Finnish system is or has been a model to look up to; it is 
therefore instructive to see whether PISA has made any difference to Finnish policymaking. 
The case of Germany 
One of the main impacts of PISA 2000 is associated with the consequences it had in 
Germany—the so-called ‘PISA shock’—though the country had experienced a ‘TIMSS-
shock’ before (Kerstan, 2000; Seeber & Lehmann, 2013). Ertl (2006) argued that unexpected 
findings from PISA 2000 and 2003 about the inequalities of the German system and its 
underwhelming outcomes could be regarded ‘as a watershed in the discourse on education in 
Germany’ (p. 621).  
The first effect was the rapid development and implementation of national educational 
standards, in line with the experiences of successful countries, and the establishment of the 
Institute for Quality Development in Education in 2004 to evaluate them. The standards drew 
heavily from PISA and represented a major shift in the German understanding of education, 
from a guided process of self-formation (Humanistische Bildung) to the skill-centred 
interpretation more common in English, American and Australian societies (K. Neumann, 
Fischer, & Kauertz, 2010).  
Considering the German federal context, these changes ‘would have been inconceivable 
without the impact of the PISA study’ (Ertl, 2006, p. 623), but the policy impact on PISA was 
not limited to a single intervention: a ‘post-PISA’ agenda was published to address some of 
the shortcomings and inequalities highlighted in the international reports. Some scepticism 
was also expressed concerning the ability of the national standards to produce ‘far-reaching 
improvement of teaching and learning’ (p. 626), because they did not alter teacher dependence 
on existing traditional textbooks.  
Tröhler (2011) argued that PISA ‘created a market, for it has created customers with 
specific demands and specific supply’ (p. 245). After the PISA-shock, consultancy and 
coaching actors such as the Bertelsmann Foundation initiated a series of educational projects 
to provide reassurance in a time of uncertainty (Hartong, 2012). Education stakeholders started 
to take research visits both to Finland and to Sweden (Ringarp & Rothland, 2010).  
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Sweden embodied an exemplar of autonomy, deregulation, equality of opportunities and 
effective pedagogy, and yet at the time of the German visits it was moving from a 
comprehensive to a selective system. It was ‘in the process of dismantling just those parts of 
its educational policy that […] aroused interest and admiration in other countries, especially 
Germany’ (Ringarp & Rothland, 2010, p. 422). This is an example of policy borrowing at a 
‘burnout’ stage (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006, p. 666), that is, ‘the borrowing of educational policies 
from other educational systems that, in the original context, were seen as failures, ineffective, 
or at least highly contested’ (Steiner-Khamsi & Quist, 2000, p. 276; see also Halpin & Troyna, 
1995).  
The case of Finland 
After analysing parliamentary documents since 1991, Alasuutari & Rasimus (2009) found that 
the OECD served four purposes depending on the occasion, so far as Finnish policymakers 
were concerned: it was a reference point to make between-country comparisons; a neutral 
body providing raw statistical data; a source of valuable and effective policy advice; and the 
voice of the international community and the ‘ideological spirit of the time’ (p. 99). Indeed, 
an analysis of Finnish educational reforms following five country reviews undertaken between 
1982 and 2003, suggested that Finland had traditionally been very receptive to OECD advice 
(Rinne et al., 2004). The OECD provided the data for defining the ideologies and practices 
separating an in-group (OECD members) from the out-groups, and it set the parameters 
according to which the within-group competition could take place (Alasuutari & Rasimus, 
2009). In fact, some referred to it as ‘“the instrument, catalyst and certain framework for 
comparison” for Finnish education policy’ (Grek et al., 2009, p. 15; quoting Niukko, 2006). 
It has been argued, however, that the influence of the OECD on Finnish policymaking 
may have been overemphasised. Rautalin & Alasuutari (2007) critiqued Rinne et al.’s (2004) 
contribution because it did not clarify whether Finnish reforms reflected an enactment of 
specific OECD recommendations or were simply aligned with some general goals and values 
but used internally-identified policy drivers.  
Likewise, it is unclear whether the narrative about the excellence of the Finnish education 
system is reflective of reality. Simola & Rinne (2011) showed that three perceived truths about 
the factors behind the Finnish success in PISA—a high belief in schooling, the popularity of 
the teaching profession and the culture of trust towards teachers—are either supported by 
scarce evidence or are the product of contingencies rather than purposive planning. Sahlgren 
(2015) has recently added that the country’s performance may have been due to elements pre-
dating current education policies, such as socio-economic changes and traditional pedagogy.  
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With respect to the instrumental use of PISA data, moreover, Finland does not seem to 
behave differently from other countries. By examining the editorials of the main teacher 
union’s publication in the 2001–2005 period, Rautalin & Alasuutari (2007) sought to 
understand how the ‘exceptional’ (p. 348) results in PISA 2000 and 2003 were used by the 
teaching community in a period of intense dissatisfaction with the system. They found that 
evidence from PISA was used to make claims regarding teacher professionalism in spite of 
inadequate resourcing. The union omitted the shortcomings in teaching practice that had 
emerged from PISA as they would have undermined the argument about the ‘Finnish teachers’ 
high level of professional expertise’ (Rautalin & Alasuutari, 2007, p. 359).  
Similarly, Rautalin & Alasuutari (2009) analyse how policymakers interpreted PISA 
results to justify existing or proposed interventions. As with the case of the teacher unions, the 
use of international outcomes was biased in the sense that the role of the government was 
overemphasised as a cause for success, whereas deficiencies were attributed to external 
factors.  
Some considerations on the impact of PISA on national education 
policymaking 
The increasing number of countries participating in PISA is no guarantee that the assessment 
is fulfilling the role it was conceived for: to help shape education reforms. The evidence 
reviewed in this section provides some clear pointers about the ability of PISA to drive 
policymaking, but it also opens some areas for further investigation.  
PISA has certainly made an impact in the education policy discourse. References to PISA 
data are becoming increasingly common in political debates. Countries perceived as 
successful can achieve the status of ‘reference’ or ‘world class’ societies (Reynolds, Teddlie, 
& Creemers, 2002; Schriewer & Martinez, 2004) to which other countries can turn to seek an 
answer to their internal problems (D. Phillips & Ochs, 2004). However, one country could act 
as a reference society for another for historical reasons, and experts from within a reference 
society often question the degree to which the country is really successful. In fact, the role of 
reference societies is to support a narrative of crisis and reform, rather than to provide realistic 
solutions. They are ‘invented communities’ (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004b, p. 4); they can be any 
group that is ‘out there’ and is perceived to have certain qualities.  
The society presumed to have these qualities can change over time (Carvalho & Costa, 
2014; Waldow, Takayama, & Sung, 2014). This can be observed in PISA with the ‘prodigal 
child’ Finland being slowly replaced by higher-performing Singapore. At different times, 
different qualities are attributed to the same society. Takayama (2010) notes that, in Japan, the 
same education system (Finland) was used by parties to the left and the right to back their 
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respective arguments. Finnish education became ‘a multiaccentual signifier that is articulated 
into competing crisis-reform melodramas’ (p. 67). It is what Rappleye (2006) calls a 
‘multivocal symbol’ (p. 233; reprising Turner, 1974) one ‘permitting different groups to 
“agree while actually holding different understandings and pursuing different agendas”’ 
(Goodman, 2003, p. 15; quoted in Rappleye, 2006, p. 234). 
The OECD is claimed by policymakers to be objective and trustworthy, at least in public 
statements. To some extent, the international community represented by the OECD is itself a 
reference society, and policymakers often appeal to its authority to promote their viewpoints 
regardless of what the OECD actually recommended. Indeed, according to the literature, PISA 
is more often than not used as an accountability stick, a political instrument employed by 
governments and oppositions around the globe to back their lines of argument using only 
country scores and a few other indicators.  
Steiner-Khamsi (2003) termed this approach to PISA “the politics of league tables”, 
whereby ‘international league tables […] are utilized as a policy tool to certify the demands 
of reform proponents’ (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004a, p. 208). Timing is a key component. Drawing 
from diffusion research (for instance, Meseguer & Gilardi, 2009), Steiner-Khamsi (2006) 
argued that reforms may spread like epidemics, and that if times are not ripe external shocks 
will be absorbed by the system. In her view, the meaning of international educational 
indicators ‘is determined domestically’; they are ‘“global speak,” instrumentally invoked at a 
particular time and in a particular policy context, to accelerate policy change’ (Steiner-
Khamsi, 2010, p. 331). 
In times of educational crisis, PISA rankings might be the external shocks that produce a 
window of opportunity for policy change (Breakspear, 2012; Kingdon, 1995). Martens & 
Niemann (2013) refine this framework and suggest that, to impact policy, PISA results must 
sizably deviate from the expectations at the national level and be framed as part of a wider 
problem (i.e., education crisis has to stand for economic or security crisis).  
Note that PISA rankings are not used by reformists only; the ultimate purpose of an 
argument could be maintaining the current political course. Takayama (2008) reports that 
PISA 2003 ‘resonated with the specific cultural, political, and economic context of the time’, 
and that this was exploited by the Ministry of Education ‘to re-establish its political legitimacy 
in a time of increasing neo-liberal state-restructuring’ (p. 387). To policy defenders, ‘far from 
“dispelling myths”, PISA indicators may serve to legitimise preconceived notions of 
educational performance and problems’ (Henry et al., 2001, p. 96; see also Pons, 2012). Even 
Schleicher (2009a) concedes that ‘policymakers tend to use […international comparative 
benchmarks] selectively, often in support of existing policies rather than as instruments to 
challenge them and explore alternatives’ (p. 101). 
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It would be problematic for the OECD if the uses of PISA mentioned thus far were 
reflective of widespread practice, for two reasons. Firstly, it would imply that PISA does not 
return policy-valuable information by itself, it simply flags up national weaknesses and points 
to reference societies that supposedly do better. If this were the case, and PISA were simply a 
mirror of the state of education systems at one point in time, the role of the OECD would be 
reduced to that of being a data provider.  
The second issue relates to the relevance of OECD recommendations. The PGB rejected 
a reduction of PISA to a ranking instrument and underlined on more than one occasion that its 
purpose is to give clear policy directions (OECD, 1999c, 2001b)— ‘the specific practices and 
policies that provide more effective learning opportunities for students’ (OECD, 2013h, p. 3, 
emphasis added). The OECD also acts upon critiques. For instance, after Bloem (2013) noted 
that PISA may be less useful for low- and middle-income countries, in 2013 the OECD 
launched PISA for Development—a project aiming ‘to increase the policy relevance of PISA 
for developing countries through enhanced PISA survey instruments’ (OECD, 2014j, p. 6).  
Given that, why is it often the case that ‘PISA results can be used to support A as well as 
the opposite of A [… whereby] he who holds the greater political power succeeds in using 
PISA as a justification for his own policies’ (Figazzolo, 2009, p. 28)? Even the PGB was 
aware of the issue and following Figazzolo’s (2009) report it decided to look into methods for 
preventing an instrumental use of PISA (OECD, 2009b).  
To summarise, the issue at hand is that either OECD recommendations are not followed 
because PISA is, at best, a descriptive comparative survey returning ambiguous or overly-
generic information, in which case the OECD’s ability to provide accurate policy advice could 
be called into question; or they are ignored in spite of the fact that PISA really is a normative 
survey, in which case the credibility of the OECD as influential policy advisor could be 
doubted.  
There is, in fact, a third case: some aspects of PISA may be descriptive and others 
normative. Some countries may instrumentally use of the assessment and others may have a 
more reflective approach. Cross-country evidence suggest that the use of PISA might not be 
as clear-cut and unsophisticated as sometimes has been claimed. 
Popp et al. (2010) note that while PISA was accompanied by educational changes in 
Germany, France, Mexico, Switzerland and Spain, only in Germany did it cause major 
reforms; other countries showed only signs of ‘adjustment’ or ‘alignment’ (Anpassung, p. 302) 
to the perceived requests from the international community. Reactions also varied among 
English-speaking countries, from the lack of interest shown by the US (at least until now, 
Sellar & Lingard, 2013a) to renewed ‘attention’ or ‘notice’ (Beachtung, Popp et al., 2010, p. 
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302) in New Zealand and England (particularly after the establishment of the coalition 
government in 2010, see Baird et al., 2011).  
De Olano (2010) suggests that there may be no single use of PISA results: in Japan, PISA 
results served to provide legitimacy to the government, whereas in Thailand they were used 
by critics to highlight its failures. PISA was integrated into the internationally-oriented 
reforms in Qatar, whereas a debate on its value is ongoing in Austria.  
Drawing from a stakeholder’s questionnaire, Hopkins, Pennock & Ritzen (2008) note that 
the influence of PISA on policy formation tended to increase from a country’s second 
administration, though in the majority of cases the overall impact of the assessment was still 
medium or low. The reforms ‘most likely to be adopted in light of PISA’ (p. 35) included: 
changes in national curricular standards, the establishment of monitoring institutes, 
interventions targeting underperforming groups of students, changes in resource allocation 
and pilot projects. The authors identified three main policy actions following from PISA: 
curriculum development ‘related to PISA domains and problem solving’ (p. 75); the adoption 
‘of policy options from other countries and economies, but without systematic use of 
evidence’ (ibid.); and the use of PISA as a stimulus to develop smaller-scale initiatives more 
sensitive to local contexts. 
This led Hopkins et al. (2008) to conclude that ‘although PISA undoubtedly has impact, 
the nature and form of this impact appears to be unpredictable’ (p.74). Moreover, the 
perception of the impact level of PISA varied across stakeholders. While around a third of 
policymakers and local government officials believed that PISA had been ‘extremely 
effective’ in contributing to sustainable change by informing policymaking, less than 10% of 
academics and teacher unionists thought so, and even national project managers were 
somewhat sceptical.   
This investigation was followed by Breakspear’s (2012), who surveyed 37 members of the 
PGB. PISA was reported to have been ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ influential for policymaking in 
the majority of cases, regardless of actual country performance. The main effect concerned 
the ‘formation, expansion and improvements’ to national assessments, curricular reforms 
‘often to include and emphasise PISA-like competencies’, and the introduction or amendment 
of performance targets (p. 15). Other interventions focused on socio-economically 
disadvantaged and low-achieving students. In many cases, policies were drawn from reference 
societies such as Finland, Korea, Shanghai, Singapore, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
To address this section’s opening question (How has PISA been received and used for 
national policymaking?), there is evidence that PISA is more than a simple ranking exercise 
and that it can be considered to a certain extent a public policy instrument (Lascoumes & Le 
Galès, 2007). At the same time, there is also evidence that PISA is not a “ready-to-use” 
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policymaking tool, either. Policy information from PISA seems to be either absent or routinely 
ignored—even though PISA presents itself as a product to be ‘consumed’ by policymakers (E. 
Mangez & Hilgers, 2012).  
The double nature of PISA was summarised by von Bogdandy and Goldmann (2008). The 
authors set out from a legal perspective to argue that PISA can be framed as an exercise in 
public authority, because it exerts an impact on country policies that is sufficiently strong to 
limit the liberty of national actors. Nevertheless, they also note that actual policy 
recommendations were almost absent from PISA reports, and that is influence was ‘an indirect 
one, generating general awareness that something must be done rather than inducing specific 
reforms’ (p. 266).  
Overall, the descriptive side of PISA appears to have both a use and an impact. Whether 
this is the case for its normative side, if any exist, is debatable. As mentioned earlier, this 
would put at risk the relevance of the OECD as a trustworthy policy advisor. In the remainder 
of this chapter it will be argued that, firstly, PISA does have a normative component: 
international reports and other PISA-informed OECD publications tell policymakers what 
they should be doing given PISA data. Secondly, there is a gap in the literature, specifically 
the fact that the contents of the normative side of PISA have always been assumed rather than 
explored.  
PISA is a political exercise that aims to ‘outflank’ education systems ‘by constructing 
parallel discourses and practices that at first sight do not challenge national sovereignty but 
nevertheless provide alternatives’ (Dale & Robertson, 2007, p. 8). However, the literature has 
for the most part uncritically assumed that these discourses broadly dealt with deregulation, 
accountability and skills for life, without checking what the OECD actually said through and 
with PISA.  
Instead, it is claimed below that the policy effects of PISA would be better understood if 
the scope of the investigation moved from ‘what is the impact of PISA?’ to ‘what is the impact 
of PISA-informed education policy advice?’ 
The purpose, relevance and timeliness of this research 
This research stems from the following observations. 
A first observation is that although much research is dedicated to understanding the impact 
of the OECD operations in globalising national education policies through PISA, the contents 
of PISA-related publications have hardly ever been the starting point of the enquiry. What is 
the education policy advice (EPA) provided through PISA? What does the OECD suggest to 
its member countries that they should do? 
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It appears that part of the literature assumes the answer to be ‘nothing’ and the influence 
of PISA on country policymaking to be limited to the use and misuse of rankings. This view, 
however, minimizes the role of the OECD in the production of knowledge for policy and its 
interest in being at the centre of an epistemic community. PISA needs ‘to meet the needs of a 
wide range of users – from governments wanting to learn policy lessons, through academics 
requiring data for further analysis, to the general public wanting to track how their nation’s 
schools are progressing in producing world-class students’ (OECD, 1999c, p. 3).  
It is unclear from the literature what these policy lessons might be. All too often, OECD 
recommendations seem to have been dismissed as mere neoliberalism or neo-colonialism. 
This does not help in understanding what the OECD has to say about education. The political 
aspect of PISA is so prominent that some policymakers think it is all there is to it: ‘PISA is an 
accountability engine. It tells you hardly anything about teaching and learning. It tells you that 
there is a problem but it doesn’t tell you how to fix it’ (interviewee in C. Morgan, 2011, p. 
56).  
From the perspective of the OECD and the Directorate for Education and Skills, this would 
be incredibly inefficient. Policy advice is the core business of the OECD: why not use a 
popular educational assessment to make educational recommendations? This author would 
argue that the OECD does use PISA-related publications for this purpose.  
The PGB has been attentive to making PISA relevant and useful through an adequate 
dissemination strategy since the beginning, and many international reports have an 
“Implications for Policy” section. In fact, international reports are but one of the means at the 
OECD’s disposal to reach its intended audience: PISA is the object of dedicated country and 
thematic reports, of ‘a series of concise 4-page monthly education policy-oriented briefs [PISA 
in Focus] designed to describe a PISA topic’, and PISA data are being integrated into other 
OECD publications, such as the EAG series. Moreover, PISA is referenced in online resources 
such as the OECD Observer, the Education & Skills Today blog and the new interactive 
database Education GPS (OECD, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c).  
Even a cursory analysis of these publications reveals that the EPA exists. What remains to 
be analysed is what topics it covers and at whether the OECD policy recommendations may 
be valuable to education systems.  
The EPA may be concerned with the quality, equity and efficiency of education systems—
the core goals of the OECD. It might reflect the OECD strategy to disseminate a market view 
of education (Dale & Robertson, 2007), even though the PGB noted early on that PISA-
informed reports should ‘provide a perspective that goes beyond a labour market focus and 
exploits the full potential of the PISA instruments’ (OECD, 1999b, p. 4). It might be ‘tailored 
to the needs of OECD countries’ (OECD, 1997a, p. 4), even though participation of countries 
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outside the OECD was always welcomed by the PGB (OECD, 1997a, 1998c). The fact is, with 
the notable exception of Bieber & Martens (2011) there have been no attempts to synthesise 
PISA-informed EPA in a coherent framework.  
A second observation is that once a summary of the EPA is developed, research may 
proceed with questions such as: ‘Are OECD recommendations consistent across time and 
national borders’ (Armingeon, 2004)? ‘To what extent are actual policy developments in a 
country in agreement with the OECD policy recommendations’ (Beyeler, 2004, p. 1)? This 
would be the starting point for any serious attempt to move from the ‘use and usefulness of 
PISA’ (OECD, 2009b, p. 4) to the use and usefulness of PISA-informed EPA. It is a minor 
shift in focus that has major implications on research praxis and outcomes.  
When the focus is on PISA, the enquiry concerns the construct validity and the technical 
qualities of the instrument or, as is the case with part of the literature referenced in this chapter, 
how rankings and information from the international reports were received at the national level 
and used as a justification for educational reforms. To some extent, this kind of research 
concentrates on the nature of PISA as a measuring instrument.  
PISA, however, is also a public policy instrument, or at least is intended to be so by the 
OECD: its comparative aspect, which relates to how things currently are, subtends a normative 
aspect related to how things ought to be. On this interpretation, PISA is but a component in 
the OECD strategy to produce, disseminate and replicate educational knowledge. This shifts 
the focus onto the (implicit or explicit) policy advice accompanying the instrument.  
Without any formalisation of the education policy advice, previous research framing 
policymaking under PISA had to borrow its interpretive lenses from other fields, hence 
concepts such as “neo-liberalism in education”. It is argued here, instead, that the effectiveness 
of the OECD’s attempt to steer education policies with the support of PISA is best explored 
by assessing the extent to which national policies match PISA-informed EPA.  
A third observation, which is linked to the previous, is that when the focus shifts from 
PISA to PISA-informed EPA the concept of “usefulness” changes accordingly. “Usefulness” 
is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as ‘the quality of having utility and especially 
practical worth or applicability’ (“Usefulness,” 2016), where the “utility” is in turn ‘fitness for 
some purpose or worth to some end’ (“Utility,” 2016).  
PISA may be useful for building national assessment capacity, connecting policymakers 
and making a large quantity of data available for research and secondary analyses. Wiseman 
(2010) argues that the usefulness of PISA is to focus public debate, to build capacity and to 
‘provide transparency in education where none may otherwise exist’ (p. xviii). To Breakspear 
(2012), PISA is useful because it allows systematic evaluation in countries that do not have 
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national assessments in place, it provides an international benchmark that can be linked to 
national data, and it serves as a model for the design and development of national assessments. 
To have fitness for some purpose or worth to some end, the EPA needs to possess different 
qualities from PISA. Policy advice from PISA must be reasonable, applicable and, most 
importantly, sound; it is useful to the extent to which following it aligns countries to the OECD 
goals by improving performance, equity and efficiency in education. The educational value of 
the EPA—that is, its worth as a reliable tool to inform effective education policies—is poorly 
understood because research has never followed the whole process of knowledge production, 
interpretation, use and impact from the ‘international’ to the national level in a systematic 
fashion. 
Some work was carried out by the OECD, though the distinction between PISA and EPA 
was not made explicit. Late in 2001, the PGB saw in the evaluation of ‘the impact and 
usefulness of PISA in Member countries an important medium-term perspective that would 
need to be considered from both policy and scientific perspectives’ (OECD, 2002c, p. 8). A 
few years later, the PGB assigned to a group of experts the task of evaluating the use and the 
usefulness of PISA / EPA, and the outcomes were summarised in Hopkins et al. (2008).  
Questions included the impact of PISA / EPA on country-level policymaking through ‘a 
review of the delivery chain at national and international levels’ (OECD, 2007d, p. 4) by 
assessing its influence on school-level practices and student learning, national assessments 
and policy coherence. The usefulness of PISA was to be evaluated by looking at its ability to 
provide added value to national assessment practices and ‘a unique contribution for other 
forms of assessment’ (p. 5). Finally, the evaluation was supposed to check ‘the alignment of 
policies to the OECD strategic objectives over the longer term’ (p. 4).  
Hopkins et al. (2008) surveyed 548 interest groups (‘policy makers, local government 
officials, school principals, parents, academics and researchers, and media representatives’, p. 
15) from 43 countries. They observed that ‘one of the ironies of PISA is that although it 
focuses relentlessly on the achievement of students, it has relatively little to say about how the 
conditions of learning can be improved and less about giving school leaders tools to achieve 
this end’ (Hopkins et al., 2008, p. 74) . Even at the central-policy level, there was a feeling 
that policy action has been unsystematic and incoherent, mainly because PISA results had 
provided little direction in this regard:  
‘The evaluation team […] strongly advises the OECD that it uses the outcomes of PISA 
to stimulate a more precise debate among participating countries and economies on how 
various policy options relate to outcomes on PISA assessments. […We] would suggest that as 
a minimum, PISA considers the creation of a policy group for countries who request advice 
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on policy formation in light of PISA results’ (Hopkins et al., 2008, pp. 74–75, emphasis in the 
text). 
Measuring policy impact, and particularly the impact ‘of soft governance, is challenging 
[…, and] the question remains to what extent countries would have implemented the same 
measures irrespective of the OECD’s governance mechanism’ (Martens & Jakobi, 2010, p. 
272). Moreover, ‘it is difficult to decipher the direct impact of PISA on the speed or breadth 
of reforms enacted’ (Breakspear, 2012, p. 6). As a result, the Hopkins et al. (2008) evaluation 
commissioned by the OECD remained an isolated attempt. 
The present evaluation aims to analyse and assess the nature, use and value of the EPA by 
relating a complex knowledge-production process (PISA-informed EPA), to its chain of 
implications at the national level (the development and implementation of EPA-informed 
policies), then to the endpoint: the effectiveness of national policies in raising student 
performance and equity. 
More specifically, drawing from the three observations in this section, this research seeks 
to: 
1) (Re)construct the OECD education policy advice, analyse its internal consistency and 
soundness, and explore the extent to which it is actually informed by results from 
PISA. 
2) Analyse the degree to which national education policies are aligned with PISA-
informed EPA, rather than merely exploit the OECD “brand” or PISA rankings to 
justify their existence. This would address a request for ‘a more thorough study of the 
temporal relationship between policy thrusts and PISA results […to] shed light on the 
plausibility of the claim that PISA causes policy’ (Baird et al., 2011, p. 2, emphasis 
added).  
3) Begin to understand the plausible impact of EPA-informed policies on student 
performance or the equity of the system, because ‘whether and how PISA has helped 
develop education (systems) and its consequences for school practice merit further 
research’ (Hanberger, 2014, p. 176). 
The rationale for point 3, which is schematised in Figure 1.2, is: 
If 
a. PISA helps to identify certain relationships between systemic features and student 
outcomes, and 
b. The EPA draws from PISA findings, research and best practice to suggest ways to 
address shortcomings at the country level, and 
c. national policies draw from the EPA, and 
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d. they are successfully implemented; 
Then  
e. After some time, PISA should be able to detect some improvements in the system. 









Cycle 4 or 5
Increase in 
performance or equity 
a b c d
e
 
Source: own elaboration. 
A critical observation must be made: the model in Figure 1.2 is an ideal. There is no doubt 
that the environment in which PISA operates is so complex that policy generation and 
implementation cannot proceed in such a linear fashion. Nevertheless, it is argued here that 
the closer the actual process to this model, the greater the value of PISA-informed education 
policy advice and the usefulness of PISA. Likewise, it is argued that deviations from this 
model can be—if not measured—at least empirically observed, categorised and perhaps 
ordered, and that the results of such exercise could be used for increasing the utility of OECD 
recommendations. 
The next chapter introduces the guiding hypotheses, theoretical framework and design of 








Chapter 2: Research methodology 
This chapter is articulated in the following parts: 
- A rationale for the research and its objectives, drawing from the previous chapter. 
- The theory framing the research, including a working definition of “education policy 
advice” and an overview of the rhetorical devices employed by the EPA, to guide the 
analysis of the OECD discourse. 
- The research questions and hypotheses. 
- A detailed presentation of the mixed-methods research design, broken down by 
research question (a schematic overview is also available in Appendix 1). 
- Ethics considerations concerning the use of expert interviews as a method of data 
collection. 
Rationale and objectives 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that PISA has thus far played a double role: an 
“accountability stick” in the politics of league tables, whereby PISA rankings and indicators 
are selectively used to back contrasting policy positions; and a public policy instrument, 
making recommendations which may influence country policies. It was noted that countries 
tend to employ PISA more often in its first role, whereas the ambition of the OECD seem to 
be that the normative aspects of PISA prevailed in the policy discourse. 
Since it is unclear whether the effect of OECD recommendations is low or simply under-
researched, a shift in the scope of the investigation from the use and usefulness of PISA to the 
use and usefulness of the PISA-based education policy advice (EPA) was advocated. The few 
attempts to reconstruct the EPA came from political sciences and sociology—meaning that 
educational recommendations were taken as a “proxy” for the OECD’s neoliberalism or 
globalising effects rather than as something worth exploring in itself. 
The chapter concluded by suggesting that framing the EPA as it emerges from OECD 
publications (and PISA reports in particular) could be the starting point in assessing the 
educational value of OECD recommendations: the degree to which PISA-informed policy 
advice manages to translate into clear policy recommendations that can be (and have been) 
reliably used at the national level to inform effective educational interventions. 
This research could be framed as an exercise in “education policy advice evaluation”. Its 
purpose is to suggest ways of improving the validity of both PISA and the EPA by linking 
them to consequences and outcomes, while providing the theoretical and methodological 
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instruments to extend this work to other countries and future assessments. It aims to contribute 
to the fields of policy evaluation and (international) assessment validation. 
Theoretical framework 
As an evaluation of education policy advice, this research is placed at the intersection between 
the assessment validation and the policy evaluation fields. From validation theory, the research 
applies the concepts of “validity” and “reliability” to PISA; from evaluation theory, the 
research applies the concept of ”programme theory” (Chen, 1990) to the EPA. It also agrees 
with realistic evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) that no policy ‘just works’: policy 
effectiveness has to take into consideration the context of implementation to interpret observed 
outcomes. The following section expands on the contribution of both fields and clarifies how 
they are linked by and within this study. 
Validity and validation 
The value of the EPA is linked to the validity of PISA, because the strength of the OECD 
recommendations relies on what can be plausibly inferred from PISA. If PISA indicators were 
inaccurate or unreliable over time, one could not claim that some features of education systems 
produce certain educational benefits.  
The concept of validity has progressed in the last century from being an inherent property 
of a test—whereby a test is valid if it measures what it purports to measure (Kelley, 1927)—
to being a property of the theory behind a test (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), to being a property 
of the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from a test and actions taken as a result of the 
test: ‘Validity is an integrated evaluative judgement of the degree to which empirical evidence 
and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions 
based on test scores or other modes of assessment’ (Messick, 1989, p. 13, emphasis in the 
text).  
The phrasing is not ideal, because Messick used the word “validity” to indicate both a 
process (the ‘integrated evaluative judgement’—i.e., validation) and its outcome (‘the degree 
to which…’—validity). Nonetheless, the theorisation is clear: validation is about assessing 
whether test interpretations and uses are warranted by what a test is designed to measure and 
how it purports to measure it. Under this definition, the test properties and technical features 
become part of the evidence in support of its validity; this includes its reliability, which is the 
capability of a test to produce similar sets of scores given similar inputs. 
Messick’s definition of validity was not uncontested. The debate mainly focused on 
whether social consequences such as ‘unanticipated side-effects of legitimate test use’ 
(Messick, 1998, p. 40, emphasis removed) should or should not be part of the validation 
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process. Proponents of a “socio-politically neutral” nature of validity tried to separate validity 
from validation—for instance by arguing that validity is a property of the test, and that a test 
is valid ‘if and only if […] the attribute exists and […] variations in the attribute causally 
produce variations in the outcomes’ (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004, p. 1061).  
The counter-argument to the socio-politically neutral stance was that narrowing the scope 
of validity would limit its usefulness: ‘It is rare that anyone measures for the sheer delight one 
experiences from the act itself. Instead, all measurement is, in essence, something you do so 
that you can use the outcomes…’ (Hubley & Zumbo, 2011, p. 219; quoting Zumbo, 2009, p. 
66). The intended uses of LSAs are often made explicit by the developing organisations. IEA 
studies have traditionally aimed ‘to use psychometric techniques to compare outcomes of 
different education systems’ (Mullis & Martin, 2006, p. 2), to provide data to identify the ‘key 
factors that influence teaching and learning’, but also to ‘direct educational reforms’ and to 
develop ‘educational systems’ capacity to engage in national strategies for monitoring and 
improving performance’ (IEA, 2010). PISA, instead, can be used to compare outcomes and 
targets, analyse trends and support ‘the political economy of reform’ (Schleicher, 2009a, p. 
103).  
The debate on whether social consequences should pertain to validity is ongoing and has 
recently been reviewed by Newton & Shaw (2014), but this research is more concerned with 
the ‘inferences’ rather than the ‘actions’ (Messick, 1989) from the survey. For the most part, 
the validity of PISA is critiqued in Chapter 4. Some limitations concerning the assessment 
design and its reliability are identified and used to argue that many of the country score 
fluctuations might be a statistical artefact rather than capture policy effects, as is instead often 
argued. 
The link between assessment validation and policy evaluation 
One strand of the research on validity provides a connection between test validation and policy 
evaluation. It is this strand which allows a shift from the validity of PISA to the validity of the 
EPA, which is tackled in Chapter 3. 
Kane (2001, 2006, 2013a), drawing, among others, from Toulmin’s (1958) model of 
argumentation, developed an argument-based approach for test validation, whereby the 
proposed interpretations and uses of a test should be made explicit and summarised in an 
‘interpretation/use argument’ (M. T. Kane, 2013a, p. 2) which then serves ‘as a template for 
validation’ (M. T. Kane, 2013b, p. 17). Explicit interpretation/use arguments are already 
available for PISA, because international reports provide both an extensive analysis of country 
outcomes (interpretation) and some policy recommendations (use). Therefore, it is 
theoretically possible to validate the EPA using Kane’s (2001, 2013a) approach.  
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Consider that the EPA, which is the “end product” of PISA (and as such can be 
investigated through the lens of validation theory), is also intended to be one of the sources of 
national education policies, because countries are supposed to act upon OECD 
recommendations. This is where the literature moves from test validation to policy evaluation. 
A key step in theory-based evaluation (Fitz-Gibbon & Morris, 1996) is the analysis of the 
programme theory (Chen, 1990) or programme logic (Funnell, 1997) of the intervention. The 
programme theory represents the set of assumptions and mechanisms through which the policy 
or intervention is expected to cause the intended or observed outcomes, and it is the model 
guiding the evaluation (Rogers, Petrosino, Huebner, & Hacsi, 2000; Rossi, Freeman, & 
Lipsey, 2004).  
Since the EPA is a set of mechanisms through which countries are supposed to improve 
their performance, a connection between argument-based test validation and theory-driven 
programme evaluation emerges: not only the two fields share one object of investigation (the 
education policy advice, first link), but they also employ similar strategies to analyse it (second 
link). Overlaps can be found even in the language of the scholarship: for instance, in 
assessment validation, Kane (2013a) argues that the inferences about the interpretations and 
use of scores ‘take the general form of “if-then” rules’ (p. 11); likewise, the ‘policy-scientific 
approach’ of evaluation (Leeuw, 2003) requires that statements about causal mechanisms 
should be reformulated ‘in conditional “if–then” propositions or propositions of a similar 
structure’ (p. 7).  
These similarities are not surprising if one considers that the EPA is a ‘speech act’ (Austin, 
1962)—or, more precisely, a (directive) illocutionary act—that is, an attempt ‘by the speaker 
to get the hearer to do something’ (Searle, 1976, p. 11). OECD recommendations are both an 
argument (whereby implementing certain policies will bring benefits) and an intervention (i.e., 
an attempt to intervene in national policy formation): their argumentative side can be 
validated, whereas their illocutionary effectiveness can be evaluated.  
The use of policy evaluation methodologies to validate (inferences from) international 
assessments has a precedent: for instance, Hanberger (2014) evaluated the programme theory 
behind the PISA enterprise. He assessed whether the assumptions behind the ability of PISA 
to influence the policies of participating countries were supported by the literature. He found 
that ‘there is no logical connection between […] the activities of publishing PISA results […] 
and providing policy recommendations […] and the assumption that these activities will help 
actors, particularly at the local level, learn about their own practices and take action to improve 
education’ (Hanberger, 2014, p. 177). Therefore, he concluded that ‘PISA can at best function 
as an alarm system and a facilitator of policy change at the national level’ (ibid.).  
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Notice that Hanberger (2014) connected assessment validation and policy evaluation by 
analysing the use of PISA ‘as a programme for transnational governance and an evaluation 
system producing evaluative knowledge for changing national education policy in line with 
the OECD’s objectives’ (p. 170); this research, instead, focuses on the use of the EPA as the 
product of the interpretation of PISA findings and a tool to improve the quality of education 
in participating countries.  
The difference is subtle but can be expressed as follows: while Hanberger (2014) 
theoretically evaluated whether PISA-informed EPA could influence national policies, this 
research adds one step and empirically evaluates whether PISA-informed EPA has influenced 
national policies, and whether EPA-informed policies could influence country performance. 
Developing a theoretical framework for the education policy advice 
As mentioned in these first two chapters, so far there has not been any systematic attempt to 
frame the education policy advice of the OECD. For this research, it was necessary to draw 
from a range of fields to define what education-specific policy advice is and what it may look 
like in the OECD discourse. The “ontology” of the EPA was primarily informed by evaluation 
literature, whereas its “semiotics” by political discourse theory. 
The nature of education policy advice 
There is disagreement about what exactly qualifies as a “policy”, but there is some consensus 
that policies are both a textual product and an unwritten process; they are systematic stances 
or sets of practices that governments and other stakeholders adopt to address problems, 
(re)distribute resources or (de)regulate behaviours (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, & Henry, 1997).  
Policymaking is not limited to parliamentary (primary) legislation, but includes secondary 
legislation such as ministerial orders, regulations and all official decisions made by a delegated 
authority (for example, a governmental agency). Policies can be more or less prescriptive. 
They can be very wide in scope and time, such as national plans, frameworks or fundamental 
acts, or be limited to short-time programmes or interventions targeting small groups or areas. 
Since this research aims to uncover the specific education policy advice of the OECD, one 
would think that adopting the OECD definition of “policy” would solve the terminological 
issue, but there is no such definition, even though the organisation writes as if the meaning 
was clear. The OECD seems to have accepted Sir Charles Cunningham’s adage whereby 
‘policy is rather like the elephant - you recognize it when you see it but cannot easily define 
it’ (Cunningham, 1963, p. 229).  
This research adopts instead the definition of Knoepfel et al. (2007), whereby policy is: 
‘a series of intentionally coherent decisions or activities […] carried out by 
different public […] actors whose resources, institutional links and interests vary, 
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with a view to resolving in a targeted manner a problem that is politically defined 
as collective in nature. This group of decisions and activities gives rise to 
formalised actions […] aimed at modifying the behaviour of social groups 
presumed to be at the root of, or able to solve, the collective problem to be resolved 
(target groups [for instance, the teachers]) in the interest of the social groups who 
suffer the negative effects of the problem in question (final beneficiaries [for 
instance, the students])’. (Knoepfel et al., 2007, p. 24, emphasis removed) 
The ‘formalised actions’ Knoepfel et al. (2007) refer to are related to the concept of “policy 
lever”. Policy levers are the compulsory (e.g.: legislation, regulation, official texts) and non-
compulsory instruments (resource allocation, persuasion or pressure) that policymakers can 
use to translate their policies (in the more abstract sense of stances, wants and sought practices) 
into action. They are the expression of a political will. Levin (2005) categorised policy levers 
as in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Levin’s categorisation of policy levers 
Type Example Means 
Mandate Primary and secondary legislation Legal coercion 
Inducement Additional funding, recognition of 
accomplishment  
Strategies to promote attention to 
policy goals 
Capacity-building Training Building of institutional skills and 
systems 
System-changing Reform of bodies or agencies Changes in structures 
Opinion mobilization Communication strategies Non-mandatory external pressure 
Source: own elaboration from Levin (2005, pp. 152–153) 
There is a certain consistency between the OECD’s and Levin’s (2005) use of the phrase 
“policy levers”. Both seem to employ it to indicate political actions and choices. For instance, 
EAG distinguishes between ‘learning outcomes […], policy levers or circumstances that shape 
these outcomes, [… and] antecedents or constraints that put policy choices into context’ 
(OECD, 2014d, p. 17). The OECD adds: ‘antecedents at a lower level of the system may well 
be policy levers at a higher level. For teachers and students in a school, for example, teacher 
qualifications are a given constraint while, at the level of the education system, professional 
development of teachers is a key policy lever’ (p. 18). 
The ability of Levin’s (2005) framework to capture the OECD’s definition of “policy 
lever” was tested using a document explicitly designed ‘for policy makers, analysts and 
practitioners’— the Education Policy Outlook for Australia (OECD, 2013b, p. 2, emphasis 
removed)—by checking the extent to which Australian ‘policy responses’ (p. 4) identified by 
the OECD fell within Levin’s (2005) model. Upon analysis, most policy responses (mainly 
national strategies, partnerships, frameworks, standards and funding allocations, but also 
small-scale programmes) belonged to one of Levin’s (2005) categories. The most difficult 
interventions to frame were government-commissioned reviews of current practices: in fact, 
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these can be considered precursors of policies aimed at drawing attention to an issue and 
putting accountable stakeholders under pressure, rather than policies in their own right.  
Once an operative definition of “policy” was linked to the contributions of Knoepfel et al. 
(2007) and Levin (2005), the scope moved onto the  “education” part of the phrase. Intuitively, 
education policies are those that fall within the remit of a Ministry of Education [MoE]7, but 
many “education” policies nowadays are the result of collaboration among different offices, 
units, departments or even ministries.  
Typical examples are large social protection policies meant to help children in education, 
such as the Child Poverty Strategy in the UK (Department for Work and Pensions & 
Department for Education, 2011) or the smaller-scale Back to School Clothing and Footwear 
Allowance in Ireland (Department of Social Protection, 2015), which ‘helps […parents] meet 
the cost of uniforms and footwear for children going to school’ but is dispensed by the 
Department of Social Protection. Other examples include instances in which a Ministry, like 
the Ministry of Health, draws from the expertise of the MoE to deliver education on health-
related issues (this was the case in Saudi Arabia; see MOH Portal Team, 2014); or conversely, 
when the MoE asks more competent Ministries to help with the definition and implementation 
of specific policies (like an IT policy in Moldova; Moldovan Association of ICT Companies, 
2014).  
For its part, the OECD has advocated more policy synergy since the 1990s and is an active 
promoter of policy coherence for sustainable development, whereas PISA regularly measures 
background variables, such as age of arrival in the country or number of TV sets available in 
the house, which are hardly “educational” in the strict sense but can capture family contexts 
and mechanisms (such as parental ability to negotiate their children’s educational needs at 
home) that affect academic performance. In summary, if one were to judge from real-life 
situations, it would not be evident whether ‘education’ in “education policy” should be taken 
to mean policies for the education system, for people in education or for the education of 
people.  
For practical reasons, the scope of this investigation was limited to policies for which the 
MoE could be held accountable. Furthermore, to limit instances of social and welfare policies 
stretching this boundary, this research focused only on policies involving schools and school 
staff directly, or seeking to educate parents with a view of influencing their children’s 
behaviour or performance in school. 
Thus, for the purpose of this document, “education policy” is defined as:  
                                                     
7 In many Anglo-Saxon countries the equivalent to the Ministry of Education (MoE) is the 
Department of / for Education. 
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‘A decision or activity as intended by Knoepfel et al. (2007) giving rise to some 
action that can be broadly captured by Levin’s (2005) policy lever framework and 
for which the Ministry of Education (or a delegated agency) is primarily 
responsible.’  
By extension, “education policy advice” is generic or country-targeted recommendations 
involving education policies the OECD makes8.  
The form of education policy advice 
The second step for capturing the EPA in the OECD discourse was to understand the form it 
might take in terms of rhetoric style and textual features. The theoretical approach chosen 
drew from the concept of “practical arguments” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; a link with 
assessment validation is provided in M. T. Kane, 1992; originally in Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 
1979). It was hypothesised that OECD recommendations would share at least three qualities 
with practical arguments. 
Firstly, practical arguments are more concerned with action than with truth. The 
conclusion of a practical argument is not about ‘what is’ but rather about ‘what should be 
done’. Because of this, in ‘political and other practical argumentation’, even when there is not 
‘anything wrong or questionable about an argument’ the other party ‘may be entitled to reject 
the proposal for which the argument is presented in support’ (Kock, 2007, p. 98)9. Indeed, the 
effectiveness of a practical argument does not rely so much on truthfulness and falsehood as 
it does on the ability of the argument to appeal to the hearers’ goals and values.  
Secondly, unlike classical argumentation such as induction or deduction, practical 
arguments are based on ‘plausible’ and ‘presumptive’ inferences: a plausible inference ‘is one 
that can be drawn from the given apparent facts in a case suggesting a particular conclusion 
that seems to be true’ (Walton, 2001, p. 166, emphasis added); a presumptive inference 
‘enables a conclusion to be drawn provisionally from premises’ (ibid., emphasis added), 
provided ‘there is no sufficient evidence to show that the proposition is false’ (Fairclough & 
Fairclough, 2012, p. 39; quoting Walton, 2006a, p. 72). It will be shown in the next chapter 
that much of the EPA is based on presumptive inferences.  
Finally, both OECD recommendations and practical arguments are used in 
“deliberations”, ‘a group activity in which it is assumed that although the participants have 
differences of opinion, they also share common goals, and want to move ahead in taking a 
                                                     
8 As an aside, note that even some actions of the OECD, such as peer reviews, could fit into Levin’s 
(2005) framework—specifically in the last category. This suggests that OECD governance methods 
may count as education policy, blurring even more the boundaries between “international” and 
“national” policymaking.    
9 There is a technical difference between a “proposition” and a “proposal”: since proposals concern 
what to do, their conclusions cannot be true or false (Kock, 2007; also Russell, 1951). In this section 
the two terms are used interchangeably. 
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collective action to carry out some task’ (Walton, 2006b, p. 181). This recalls the consensus-
building activity of the OECD. The EPA is an attempt ‘by the speaker to get the hearer to do 
something’ (Searle, 1976, p. 11), but it takes place within a deliberating context, as there is an 
understanding that all hearers should follow the advice for the common good.  
The argumentative structure of deliberations was called by Walton (2006b) ‘multi-agent 
practical reasoning’ and was summarised as follows: ‘We have a goal G. […] G is supported 
by our common set of values, V. […] Bringing about q is necessary (or sufficient) for us to 
bring about G’ (p. 214). Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) adapted this model to political 
discourse with two modifications: they included the limiting or enabling circumstances in 
which decisions have to be made, and they recognised that sometimes the sharing of goals and 
values may be requested rather than pre-existing (it is not a matter of ‘I / we want’ but of ‘you 
ought to want’ something for the common good).  
These contributions informed a preliminary model of multi-agent practical reasoning 
applied to the OECD (Figure 2.1).  PISA results feature twice in the picture because of their 
double role: on the one hand, they monitor the current situation (the circumstances) of each 
country; on the other hand,  they are meant to provide evidence that certain behaviours are 
associated with certain outcomes, with an implication that adopting the behaviour would make 
it easier to reach the goals. Walton (2006b) calls this component the ‘Means Statement’ 
whereas Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) the ‘Means–Goal’ (i.e., how the means are linked to 
the goals). 
 
Figure 2.1: Draft model of multi-agent practical reasoning applied to the OECD  
Values
Are or ought to be 
shared by countries
Means-Goal







Future state of affairs 
in which values are 
realised
Claim for action





Source: Own elaboration informed by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012); Walton (2006a) 
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The ability of the draft theoretical model in Figure 2.1 to capture instances of EPA was 
tested with a practical argument extracted from PISA in Focus. The analysis is presented in 
Appendix 3 (Table 2.A) and the exceept is the following: 
‘PISA results consistently show that a 15-year-old student – regardless of his or 
her background – who had attended pre-primary school for at least one year 
performs better in mathematics than a student who hadn’t. That pre-primary 
enrolment rates are growing faster among advantaged students than among 
disadvantaged students signals that countries have to work harder to ensure that 
all families, particularly disadvantaged families, have access to high-quality pre-
primary education, and to information about such programmes, near where they 
live. An investment in early education, both for parents and for governments, pays 
dividends later on in life.’ (OECD, 2014c, p. 4) 
The analysis of this paragraph highlights some shortcomings in the ability of the 
preliminary model to frame the EPA while revealing many salient features about the way the 
OECD delivers policy recommendations.  
Firstly, the EPA is rather specific even though it is directed to a very wide audience. What 
countries should do is explicitly mentioned: target pre-primary education, both in terms of 
quality and quantity, through investment and information. The strategy that each individual 
country would adopt to target pre-primary education through investment and information is 
left open, but it is likely to fall within one of Levin’s (2005) categories (Table 2.1). This 
confirms that the excerpt above has the intent of informing education policies, and therefore 
that this is a legitimate EPA instance. 
Secondly, there are some core underlying goals and values that provide the basis for the 
whole argument (performance, equity, efficiency) but, unlike the EPA, they are often left 
implicit, as they are probably assumed to be shared by the recipients. Evidence from PISA is 
used to support both the Means–Goal and the Circumstances parts of the argument. If countries 
ensure that families have access to pre-primary education (Means-Goal) the goal of having 
higher performance (implicit in the text) will be reached because students ‘who had attended 
pre-primary school for at least one year performs better in mathematics than a student who 
hadn’t’ (PISA findings). Likewise, the fact that ‘pre-primary enrolment rates are growing 
faster among advantaged students’ (Circumstance and PISA findings) suggests that countries 
should ‘work harder’ to increase access to pre-primary education for disadvantage families 
(Means-Goal) to reach the valued goal of equity (implicit in the text).  
Notice, however, that not all recommendations follow from PISA evidence. For instance, 
the fact that pre-primary education has to be ‘high-quality’ is a reasonable suggestion but it is 
not and cannot be based on PISA results, because quality is not a variable measured by the 
survey (whereas length of enrolment is). This suggests that, even when commenting on 
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findings from PISA, the OECD may interweave evidence from PISA with that from other 
sources (including, but not only, the educational literature). 
One limitation of the model above was that it did not capture satisfactorily a specific 
function of PISA findings that was frequently highlighted in the literature: signalling that there 
is an issue. When the OECD mentions that growth in enrolment is higher among advantaged 
students, it is not only describing a state of affairs (which is what Fairclough & Fairclough, 
2012 mean by “Circumstances”); it is implying that the state of affairs is unwelcome. Indeed, 
the sentence ‘pre-primary enrolment rates are growing faster among advantaged students’ 
accomplishes two purposes: it problematises a situation and at the same time it delimits 
(circumscribes) the relevance of the argument to policymakers who feel more affected by the 
problem. Countries in which access to pre-primary education is felt (with or without reasons) 
as a current and real social issue will be more likely to be receptive take heed of the advice. 
As a result of these considerations, the draft model in Figure 2.1 was revised to emphasise 
the problem-framing aspect of PISA. 
Figure 2.2: A revised model of multi-agent practical reasoning applied to the OECD 
Means-Goal






Values, goals and the 
OECD strategy
Are or ought to be 
shared
Claim for action
Countries should do q
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Conflicts with the 














Source: Own elaboration informed by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012); Walton (2006a) 
The revised model considers the EPA as the endpoint of an argument beginning with a 
tension between the aims of the OECD and some problematic factors that prevent achieving 
the goals and realising the values. The EPA is the proposed solution for the clash. PISA is but 
one of the pieces of evidence used to support parts of the argument. Data from PISA can be 
used to flag up and delimit the problem or to sustain the means-goal statement with the 
experience of high-achieving countries.  
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The appropriateness of this model was confirmed by its superior ability to frame the 
previous excerpt from PISA in Focus (Table 2.2, below; a further analysis is presented in 
Appendix 3, Table 2.B). 
Table 2.2: The revised practical reasoning model applied to an OECD argument from PISA in Focus 
n. 40 
Problem Evidence 
‘Pre-primary enrolment rates are growing faster 
among advantaged students than among 
disadvantaged students’ 
PISA 
Goals and values  




Same as problem N/A 
Means-goal  
If (low-SES) families can access pre-primary 
education (equity and) performance will 
improve 
‘PISA results consistently show that a 15-year-
old student – regardless of his or her 
background – who had attended pre-primary 
school for at least one year performs better in 
mathematics than a student who hadn’t’ 
If quality is high, performance will improve, 
because quality improves performance 
N/A 
If low-SES families know about pre-primary 
programmes equity and performance will 
improve, because more information will lead to 
more access and therefore to higher equity and 
performance 
N/A 
‘An investment in early education […] pays 
dividends later on in life’ 
N/A 
EPA  
‘Countries have to work harder to ensure that all 
families, particularly disadvantaged families, 
have access to high-quality pre-primary 
education, and to information about such 
programmes, near where they live’ 
N/A 
Source: (2014c, p. 4). The parts in italic are implicit and can only be presumed to correspond to the 
OECD line or reasoning.  
This preliminary analysis gives a sense of what to expect when looking for PISA-informed 
EPA in international reports and other publications. OECD recommendations are explicit but 
values and objectives are often implicit. In line with findings from previous literature, PISA 
is used to define problems and provide solutions. But the most interesting feature in the OECD 
model of argumentation is that, as it happens in the political arena, not all claims are backed 
by PISA evidence, and the transition between supported and unsupported claims happens 
frequently and tacitly.  
Of course, while the purpose of PISA is to provide ‘evidence-based policy guidance’ 
(OECD, 2011a, p. 5), there is a limit to the number of variables it can measure. But if even the 
OECD, whose core values include being objective and evidence-based (OECD, 2011a), does 
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not clearly separate what was measured from what was assumed, how can it criticise 
policymakers (e.g., in Schleicher, 2009a) for using PISA instrumentally? 
Research questions and a working hypothesis 
This research is an exercise in education policy advice evaluation. It draws from evaluation 
theory to define “education policy” and adopts the conceptual instruments of political 
discourse theory to identify the EPA. The EPA is considered to be the source programme 
theory for national education policies, and in agreement with realistic evaluation, national 
policies are investigated in context. The validity and reliability of PISA are also explored as 
part of the evaluation.   
The research is guided by four questions: 
RQ1) Is the OECD education policy advice “sound” advice? 
RQ2) To what extent do countries follow the OECD education policy advice in their 
national policies? 
RQ3) What is the evidence that education policies informed by OECD 
recommendations influenced country performance? 
RQ4) Considering the evidence, how valuable is the OECD education policy 
advice? 
RQ1 aims to reconstruct the EPA and analyse whether it is coherent, consistent and supported 
by evidence (including PISA evidence). This is the more theoretical aspect of the OECD 
policy advice. Its practical side is investigated in RQ2 and RQ3. RQ2 concerns the use of the 
EPA. Acknowledgement of the OECD goals and values by policymakers is separated from 
policy alignment with the EPA. Only reforms that are actually in line with the EPA can provide 
evidence that following it makes a difference for country performance and equity. RQ3 
searches for this evidence. Finally, the last research question summarises the evaluation by 
looking at the overall value of the EPA. Here, “value” means that the EPA is advice worth 
following either because there is evidence that it could work (RQ1) or because there is 
evidence that it did work (RQ2 and 3).  
One possible set of answers to these questions are summarised in the following box, which 
can be used to make explicit the researcher’s stance, as well as his bias, during the 
investigation: 
Education policy advice might be vague or inconsistent over time. Despite the powerful 
narrative about the influence of the OECD in national policymaking, reforms that seem 
aligned with OECD recommendations may not necessarily informed by them. Of the few 
policies that make explicit use of the EPA, even fewer might be successfully implemented. 
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Finally, a very small number of implemented policies may have plausibly contributed to 
(positive or negative) changes in educational outcomes, even when these outcomes are 
measured by the very assessment that originally informed policymaking. 
 
Whether the argument above holds or not depends on the findings from this research. It is 
just one hypothetical line of reasoning that needs being proven. To summarise it, is it possible 
that: 
Despite the use of data from PISA within political and scientific circles, OECD 
recommendations are currently of little educational value, because they are not solidly 
grounded empirically; they provide vague policy direction; advice is not followed; and even 
when it is followed it is not associated with measurable changes? 
 
Research design 
The main components of theory-based evaluation are the explication of the programme theory 
and of the causal links between the theory and the outcomes, as well as the gathering of 
theoretical and empirical evidence to ‘assess the strengths and weaknesses of the links in the 
theory’ (Mayne, 2012, p. 272). The objective is ‘not only knowing whether a program is 
effective […] but also explaining a program’s underlying causal mechanisms’ (Coryn, 
Noakes, Westine, & Schröter, 2011, p. 203).  
These components are integrated into this research as follows. Firstly (RQ1), the 
programme theory is made explicit by reconstructing the EPA, which provides the overall 
argument linking country policies to the shared goals of performance and equity (measured in 
terms of PISA scores). This part of the research is covered in Chapter 3. Secondly, evidence 
is sought of country alignment with OECD recommendations (RQ2) and of the effectiveness 
of EPA-aligned policies (RQ3). Both questions are tackled in Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 
addresses the issue from a cross-national perspective, whereas Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated 
to two education systems: Ireland and the French Community of Belgium. Finally, conclusions 
are drawn following RQ4: is the OECD education policy advice worth following? 
A mixed-method design was employed because the analysis needed both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence to be thorough. This decision reflects accepted practice in evaluation 
research (Desimone, 2009; Heck, 2004; Stern et al., 2012), but mixed-methods approaches are 
progressively being adopted as a de facto standard procedure in many social sciences 
(Bryman, 2006).  
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This chapter uses a narrative style to guide the reader through the research design. This is 
to keep a consistent flow, to introduce the main concepts or operative definitions only when 
they are needed, and to provide a clear rationale to each procedure. However, a summary of 
data collection instruments and analytical methods is provided at the beginning of each 
section, and a schematic overview of the whole research is available in Appendix 1. 
Education policy advice (RQ1, Chapter 3) 
Sampling frame OECD publications, including: PISA international and technical 
reports, thematic reports, OECD blogs and databases  
Sample All PISA international and technical reports, five issues of PISA in 
Focus, OECD databases and 21 articles from the OECD blogs 
Data collection instruments Systematic online search in OECD websites and databases 
Analytical methods Content analysis (reconstruction), literature review (validation) 
 
Despite the simplicity of the concept (the policy recommendations given by the OECD to 
interested countries), identifying, summarising and validating the EPA was a challenging 
process which required addressing multiple issues.  
Reconstructing the education policy advice  
In the preliminary stages, which are summarised in the theoretical section earlier on in this 
chapter, a multi-agent practical reasoning model was devised (Figure 2.2). The model was 
meant to serve as a blueprint: it was hypothesised that most instances of the EPA would take 
a similar form. 
In the main analysis, the model was applied to OECD publications through an iterative 
two-step process—following Krippendorff (2004)—of (1) unitising and sampling, and (2) 
categorising / abstracting. 
Unitising and sampling 
In content analysis, sampling units are ‘units [of text] that are distinguished for selective 
inclusion in an analysis’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 98). To reconstruct PISA-based education 
policy advice, the most theoretically-relevant sampling units are the PISA international reports 
from 2000 to 2012, the monthly PISA in Focus series as well as thematic and country reports. 
Outside its dedicated publications, PISA is referenced in many other OECD products: for 
example, Education at a Glance, the Education Policy Outlook series and CERI reports; or 
online resources like the OECD Observer, the Education & Skills Today blog and the 
Education GPS database. Overall, the OECD publishes around 250 new titles per year and 
many of them use PISA data as a source of evidence. To keep the sample size manageable, 
priority was given to primary sources (the international reports) and to publications that were 




1) International reports 
2) PISA in Focus 
3) Education Policy Outlook  
4) Education & Skills Today 
5) In-depth reports (e.g.: Top of the Class, OECD, 2009e) 
6) OECD Observer 
7) Education GPS 
8) CERI reports 
Once the sampling units were decided, two strategies were used to locate the EPA (the 
coding unit, Krippendorff, 2004).  
The first was to focus on the sections most likely to contain policy advice (the context 
units, Krippendorff, 2004). In international and other reports, this included: the foreword; the 
executive summary; conclusions to chapters; and specific sections targeting policymakers 
such as the “Policy Implications” chapter or the “Key policy issues” section, which tend to be 
a recurrent feature in OECD publications. Online material, instead, was filtered using the 
“PISA” tag and by searching for contributions by Andreas Schleicher. Eventually, 21 articles 
were selected, 20 from the period 2011–2013 and one from 2003; most came from Education 
& Skills Today but some came from OECD Insights, the OECD observer and the Times 
Education Supplement magazine.  
The second strategy was to search within whole sampling units for keywords, and in 
particular for words or phrases indicating deontic modality. Deontic modality ‘concerns what 
is possible, necessary, permissible, or obligatory, given a body of law or a set of moral 
principles or the like’ (von Fintel, 2006, p. 2). Keywords included: 
- Modal verbs, and especially should, must, might, may. 
- Semi-modal verbs: need to, ought to. 
- Verbs used in a deontic sense such as suggest, recommend, advise; and related nouns: 
suggestion, recommendation, advice (usually by just using the stem suggest-, 
recommend- and so on). 
This allowed the capture of problem-setting statements like the following:  
‘Education systems with large proportions of students performing below, or even 
at, Level 1 should be concerned that significant numbers of their students may not 
be acquiring the necessary literacy knowledge and skills to benefit sufficiently 
from their educational opportunities.’ (OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a, p. 73) 
And it also allowed the capturing of actual EPA:  
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‘An important policy objective should therefore be to strengthen the role that 
education systems play in moderating gender differences in occupational 
expectations.’ (OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a, p. 146) 
It could be argued that this double approach of focusing and scanning might still miss 
recommendations that are outside the context units or that do not include deontic expressions. 
This is a fair objection, but it is in the interest of the OECD to produce EPA that is clear, 
visible and coherent across publications. Repetita iuvant, it helps to repeat, and if a 
hypothetical recommendation appeared only once, in a secondary publication, hidden within 
the text, then policymakers would hardly notice it and this would imply that it is not considered 
to be too important by the OECD. Moreover, online resources such as blog posts were filtered 
by topic but read in their entirety. 
Instead of extracting all policy recommendations from all sampling units above and then 
reorganising them, policy recommendations were categorised into policy areas before moving 
from one unit in the list to the next. This was done to reduce redundancies, as it had been 
noticed that OECD publications tends to restate the same or very similar concepts across one 
another. Consider, for example, the following sentence, which appeared verbatim in five 
different international reports: ‘as expenditure per student on educational institutions 
increases, so also does a country’s mean performance’ (OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a, p. 
113; OECD, 2001a, p. 93, 2004b, p. 102, 2007b, p. 61, 2010g, p. 34, 2014g, p. 34). By 
logically organising the EPA before moving onto another unit, instead, it was possible to adopt 
an incremental approach, whereby new information redefined and fixed previously created 
categories until saturation was reached.  
Categorising and abstracting 
There was a distinct feeling that the OECD policy recommendations were meant to be 
clustered by area, but it was also evident that the OECD had not done so in a systematic 
fashion. The EPA was never given as one single umbrella strategy, but rather emerged as a 
collection of recommendations that were spread around several textual units. Therefore, a 
single OECD programme for education had to be reconstructed by iteratively coding and 
grouping policy recommendations according to their area of intervention. Other researchers 
had encountered similar difficulties when trying to specify what the OECD suggests that 
countries should do (Bieber & Martens, 2011).  
The first hurdle was understanding what areas of intervention the OECD considers to be 
related to education (i.e., deciding the categories).  
A starting point was provided by the Declaration on Future Educational Policies in the 
Changing Social and Economic Context (OECD, 1978). Information from the Declaration was 
complemented by two databases: the Education Policy Outlook Reforms Finder (OECD, 
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2015d), an interactive database containing the policy interventions reviewed in the published 
reports, and the Education GPS, ‘the OECD source for internationally comparable data and 
analysis on education policies and practices’ (OECD, 2016b, emphasis in the text).  
Another source used to identify the policy levers potentially addressed in the EPA was the 
PISA background questionnaires. The selection of the contextual variables underpinning the 
questionnaires is informed not only by research, but also by policy interests. This happens 
with all LSAs, from TIMSS and PIRLS (Chrostowski, 2004; Kelly, 2003; Mullis, personal 
communication on 2 October 2014) to PISA. Therefore, it was thought that OECD 
recommendations would likely gravitate around background indicators.  
Harvey-Beavis (2002) noted that ‘in May 1997 the OECD Member countries through the 
[… PGB] established a set of priorities and their relative individual importance to guide the 
development of the PISA context questionnaires’ (p. 33). The themes captured by background 
indicators ‘had to be of enduring policy relevance and interest’ (OECD, 2005b, p. 36); they 
had to be internationally comparable and ‘add significant value beyond that which can be 
accomplished through national evaluation and analysis’ (ibid.); they also had to be consistent 
with other PISA cycles. The ‘main goal’ of background indicators ‘essentially is to guide 
priority setting and decision making in educational policy’, because policymakers ‘want to 
understand why students achieve certain levels of performance’ (OECD, 2013c, p. 171).  
Background variables included student-, school- and system-level factors such as family 
SES, gender, migrant status, learning climate, teacher CPD, tracking, government funding or 
accountability systems in place (see assessment frameworks and technical reports from with 
Harvey-Beavis, 2002; to Klieme & Kuger, 2014). In general, they tended to map onto the 
following policy areas of the Education GPS: equity, evaluation and quality assurance, finance 
and funding, learning environment, organisation and governance, school leadership and 
teachers.  
The educational areas covered by the Declaration (OECD, 1978), the Education GPS and 
the background variables became the categories sorting the recommendations extracted from 
international reports and other OECD publications. The outcome of this exercise was a draft 
table summarising and organising the education policy advice. The best criterion with which 
to assess its quality would have been to determine the extent to which the contents of the table 
actually reflected the views of the OECD. In other words, did the reconstruction adequately 
capture the education policy advice “construct”?  
To test this, drawing from the idea of ‘stakeholder-derived theories’ (Coryn et al., 2011; 
Patton, 2008), the draft table was submitted to Andreas Schleicher via email (26 September 
2014). The Director of PISA was deemed to be the person in the best position to assess the 
accuracy and thoroughness of the EPA, given his involvement in its production and 
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dissemination. Schleicher agreed for the most part that the analytical reconstruction 
represented the EPA and made some amendments (30 September 2014). The final EPA table 
can be found in Chapter 3 (Table 3.2). 
Validating the education policy advice 
Once it was established with the help of Schleicher that the EPA table provided a sufficiently 
accurate representation of the OECD policy recommendations, the actual advice was validated 
along three dimensions: internal coherence, consistency and soundness of the programme 
theory (i.e.: Is it reasonable to expect that following the recommendations would contribute to 
the realisation of the goals of the OECD?). 
The internal coherence is the extent to which different policy directions are not in conflict 
with one another, and it can be assessed both theoretically and empirically: theoretically, one 
can envision a situation in which all recommendations were implemented and look for 
potential breaks in the policy mechanisms; empirically, one can look at existing country policy 
configurations and see if any of them occur together more often than others.  
The theoretical approach drew from research on policy coherence (Nilsson et al., 2012) 
and findings are presented in Chapter 3. Analytical methods exist also to examine policy 
configurations (one example is qualitative comparative analysis, see Ragin, 1987), but this 
research borrowed only their underlying ideas. Specifically, Chapter 5 and 6 highlight the 
instances in which specific country policies conflict with one another, or when parts of one 
policy embrace the EPA and other parts contradict it. 
The consistency of the EPA was analysed in terms of its stability over time and its 
connection with PISA findings, under the assumption that the EPA should be data-driven. If 
policy recommendations were not evidence-based or did not change when PISA data 
suggested that they should, the OECD branding of PISA as a scientific instrument to inform 
policymaking could be criticised. The policy advice itself might still be sound and valuable, 
but then one could argue that if the objective is to acquire policy recommendations, countries 
could cut costs by not participating to PISA and just following the advice. This analysis was 
carried out by matching the EPA with co-textual information, charts and data.  
Finally, the soundness of the programme theory made explicit by the EPA was evaluated. 
Chapter 3 will show, however, that the EPA tends to be more of a collection of individual 
recommendations from different policy areas than one interwoven strategy. Each of these 
recommendations also subtends a programme theory, and therefore a theory-based evaluation 
should be carried out for each single recommendation. Experienced evaluators have shown 
that this is not feasible (Delahais & Toulemonde, 2012; Weiss, 2000).   
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Consider one actual recommendation, ‘Reduce disabled or immigrant students’ 
segregation by better allocating special education teachers where they are most needed’. A 
validation exercise would firstly have to clarify all constructs implied in the argument, such 
as “disabled” or “segregation”. Then, a programme theory would have to be drafted linking 
existing teacher allocation practices (there are probably as many as there are countries) to new, 
‘better’ ones, and showing how this would reduce student segregation. Evidence for (and 
against) all links would have to be produced. The programme theory should be amended in 
light of new data and eventually the whole ‘theory of change’ (Weiss, 1997) would have to be 
evaluated.  
Repeating this process for all recommendations is impractical, yet at the same time, the 
EPA should not be accepted at face value.  
A compromise was found by adopting the following strategy. Firstly, evidence was sought 
that each policy recommendation could produce the stated outcomes, but not how or why. This 
made the process more manageable while still providing some bases from which to evaluate 
OECD claims. Secondly, it was recognised that different types of evidence had different 
weight: studies linking policies to educational outcomes weighed more than studies linking 
policy outputs to educational outcomes.  
Policy outputs are variations in indicators such as school accountability, degree of tracking 
in the system, level of parental choice, or teacher self-reported hours of professional 
development, that are thought to be caused by policies. These indicators are not policy; they 
are the result of policy and external factors. Almost all secondary analyses of PISA data 
correlate policy outputs with country achievement but have little to say about policy processes, 
whereas the assumption underpinning the EPA is that introducing certain policies, whose 
outputs can be summarised by certain indicators, bring about changes in performance or 
equity.  
Therefore, best evidence was sought in meta-analyses or research syntheses, to increase 
the probability that the reported effects could apply to a range of widely different interventions 
in different countries. Articles that were not meta-analyses were reviewed only when they had 
been cited by the OECD as the foundations of specific recommendations. 
The use of education policy advice for national policymaking (RQ2, Chapters 
4–6) 
Sampling frame PISA participants 
Sample 91 experts from 61 countries (extensive approach) 
25 experts from 2 education systems (intensive approach) 
About 800 documents from 2 education systems (intensive 
approach) 
Data collection instruments Expert questionnaires (extensive approach) 
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Study visits in 2 education systems (intensive approach) 
Expert interviews (intensive approach) 
Online and library-based documentary searches (intensive 
approach) 
Analytical methods Rankings and graphs (extensive approach) 
Delta-convergence table (intensive approach) 
 
Defining “alignment” to OECD recommendations 
Once the EPA was framed for this research, the degrees of connection between the EPA and 
country policies had to be defined more clearly. Research on PISA has spoken of the ‘impact’, 
‘use’, ‘utilisation’, ‘effect’, ‘influence’, ‘interpretation’, ‘reception’, ‘consequences’ or 
‘implications’ of PISA to indicate the interactions between PISA and country policies. 
Depending on the scope of the investigation and the scholarship in which it took place, this 
interaction may or may not involve the EPA. It could be about media reception, policymakers 
referencing PISA outcomes to justify reforms, or the emergence OECD values in national 
policies. Indeed, the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 showed that the most frequent interaction 
between PISA and country policies is simply the entrance of the names of the OECD and PISA 
into policy discourses.   
However, high media or political attention does not necessarily translate into policy action. 
This type of interaction—which could be called the “reception” type—has probably the 
weakest links with country changes in performance or equity (Martens & Niemann, 2013, 
showed that there is hardly any relationship between a country’s ranking and media coverage). 
Therefore, it is the least useful for evaluation purposes. 
A less frequent type of connection is “acknowledgement” of the OECD or PISA in 
national policies. This happens for example when the introductory statement for a new policy 
(such as an amended curriculum or a restructuring of the Inspectorate) refers to OECD peer 
reviews or PISA outcomes as objective evidence that a country’s education needs reforming 
to improve quality or equity, and claims that the policy being introduced will be a solution to 
the problem. This interaction embraces at the country level the Problematisation or the Goals 
and Values stages of the practical reasoning model in Figure 2.2. At the same time, it gives 
credit to (acknowledges the role of) the OECD or PISA for helping the country notice that 
there was an issue. It is thought to be less frequent than the reception type simply because 
there are fewer policy documents than there are policy debates. 
Sometimes OECD or PISA acknowledgement is accompanied by target-setting. In this 
case, PISA outcomes are used both to problematise an issue and to measure policy 
effectiveness at a future stage. However, neither simple acknowledgement nor 
acknowledgment with target-setting necessarily have strong links with the EPA: even if PISA 
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results and OECD values are mentioned, there is no guarantee that the policy was actually 
drafted following OECD recommendations.  
When this happens, the interaction becomes policy “alignment”. A policy can be said to 
be aligned with the EPA when it operationalises the Means–Goal argument in Figure 2.2 
whereby ‘if countries do q, goals will be reached’. An aligned policy purports to do that “q”. 
Since there are various recommendations composing the EPA, there are various “qs” which a 
policy may seek to do, and therefore various degrees of policy alignment. Policy alignment is 
a key component in the evaluation of the EPA: only if positive results are achieved by policies 
aligned with the EPA can this latter be claimed to be good advice. This was the major 
shortcoming of previous research on the policy effects of PISA: lacking a theorisation of the 
EPA, it stopped at the Problematisation or the Goals and Values stages without addressing the 
Means–Goal argument. 
An important point to note is that policies need not acknowledge the OECD or PISA to be 
aligned with the EPA. For example, the OECD recommends making provisions for early 
childhood education, but one country’s policies on this may be informed by European 
frameworks or American experiences rather than by the OECD. If a policy that “happens” to 
be aligned with the EPA were found to be effective, it could still be argued that the EPA is 
sound even if it was not deliberately followed in that specific instance. Indeed, sound advice 
should work regardless of whether the advisor is credited for it.  
One final type of connection is when a policy is both aligned with the EPA and 
acknowledges the contribution of the OECD or PISA. These interventions are drafted 
explicitly to address issues highlighted by the OECD and may be more closely informed by 
findings from PISA or peer reviews. Given that this is an analogous process, at the country 
level, to policy enactment at the school level (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012)—whereby a 
lower-level agent tries to make sense of, and act upon, directions coming from the top—this 
type of interaction was called “enactment”.  
The increasing degrees of connection between country policies and OECD 













“Reception” includes reactions to OECD and PISA in 
the media, in pubic debates and / or in parliamentarian 
interrogations. 
“Acknowledgement” indicates recognition of the OECD 
or PISA, or their goals and values, in policy documents.
“Target-setting” happens when policymakers plan to 
use PISA outcomes to evaluate policy effectiveness.
“Alignment” means that a policy complies with one or 
more OECD recommendations in the EPA—whether 
purposively or not.
“Enactment” differs from alignment in that an 
intervention is drafted explicitly to address issues 
highlighted by the OECD, and therefore acknowledges 




Source: Own elaboration 
Notice that reception, acknowledgement and alignment pertain to a policy level that could 
be called “of intentions” and which is separated from policy implementation. In other words, 
the existence of a policy that purports or demands for a series of actions to be initiated is no 
guarantee that those who are supposed to initiate them will actually do so. Policy 
implementation is taken into account in this research because even the strongest case of EPA 
enactment cannot have any effect if educational practice does not change. A separation of the 
level of intentions from that of implementation is what Hopkins et al. (2008), drawing from 
Stake’s (1967) evaluation model, defined policy ‘intents’ and ‘observations’. 
Measuring policy alignment 
Once these operative definitions were set, there was the issue of measuring country 
interactions with OECD or PISA in over 70 education systems. Following a similar approach 
to that used by Martens et al. (2010) in their investigation about the influence of international 
organisations on national policymaking, the analysis was split into two lines of inquiry: one, 
more extensive, broadly exploring policy alignment with the EPA at the cross-country level 
(Chapter 4); the other, more intensive, seeking to establish as accurately as possible the extent 
to which specific national policies in two education systems had been informed by the EPA 
(Chapters 5 and 6).  
Extensive approach (Chapter 4) 
For the extensive approach, data on country policies were collected through expert 
questionnaires. Another method that had been considered was using policy databases from 
UNESCO (UNESCO-IBE, 2015), the EU (Eurydice, 2016b) and the OECD (OECD, 2015c), 
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but there were drawbacks. The main one was that these databases provide too few details about 
a policy to determine its degree of alignment with the EPA.  
In a very thorough study, Braga, Checchi, & Meschi (2013) tried to circumvent this issue 
by considering policy alignment with some external framework at an aggregate level, by the 
number of policy changes in one same policy area. For instance, if they found that three 
reforms dealt with the expansion of pre-primary education, each would weigh 1/3 of a unit; 
the degree of country alignment at one point in time would then be 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1, depending 
on the number of interventions that had happened since the baseline year. This is a clever 
approach, but it has limitations. Firstly, policies tackling the same issue are generally not 
additive: two policies on teacher autonomy may have been introduced by different 
governments and have opposite purposes; one may have replaced the other; or the meaning of 
“autonomy” may have been different each time.  
Moreover, not all policies can be easily matched to OECD recommendations. For 
example, in 1995 the Hungarian parliament voted a resolution ‘offering financial incentives 
to upgrade education and research and improve quality’ (Garrouste, 2010, p. 253). While the 
policy is about resource allocation and quality, the EPA links quality to equitable resource 
allocation. What could an appropriate alignment value be, in this case? 0, 1/2, 1? Or perhaps 
-1, because we do not know whether the policy was equitable or not. 
To avoid incurring in these issues, the approach chosen for this study was to involve 
experts who could comment on policy alignment with the EPA in their respective countries. 
The use of experts for data collection was motivated by their effectiveness as a source of 
information (Martens et al., 2010) and their ability ‘to bridge the divide between case studies 
and the comparison of a large number of countries based on more general and publicly 
available data’ (Dorussen, Lenz, & Blavoukos, 2005, p. 317).  
The sampling frame included researchers, academics, governmental and non-
governmental officers, and independent consultants. Some were PISA national project 
managers, members of the expert groups, or they were affiliated with institutions related to 
the development or administration of PISA; others were academics and researchers in 
education known by or introduced to this researcher in a snowball fashion. 
Overall, a total of 91 experts, representing 61 countries that took part in PISA 2009 and 
2012, were contacted via email and asked to give an overall anonymous rating of their 
country’s alignment with OECD recommendations on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Not 
at all’ to ‘Completely’ (Appendix 3, Table 2.C).  Emails were sent in March–April 2014 and 
a follow-up to all non-respondents was sent in April 2015. In total, 40 answers were received 
from 30 education systems, which is equivalent to a response rate of 44% representing half of 
the countries.  
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Respondents were provided with the opportunity to provide a breakdown of their overall 
rating by completing an anonymous online questionnaire based on the EPA called the OECD 
Policy Advice Implementation Questionnaire (PAIQ; Aloisi, 2014; a paper version is available 
in Appendix 3, Table 2.D). The contents of the instrument matched the EPA with the exception 
of the sections added by Schleicher, which were received only sometime later. The only 
practical difference is that Recommendation 3.5 in the EPA to ‘stimulate a supportive school 
climate and environment for learning’ does not appear in the PAIQ.  
Respondents had to tick the OECD recommendations they thought their country had 
followed, and their answers were sent through an automated email service. The 
recommendations that were ticked were coded “1”; those which had not been selected were 
coded “0”. Sixteen country breakdowns were collected in this fashion, which resulted in a 16 
x 14 matrix of 0s and 1s (Appendix 3, Table 4.N). With this information, it was possible to 
rank countries in terms of coverage of the EPA and also in terms of the priority each system 
gave to equity policies. 
Intensive approach (Chapters 5 and 6) 
For the intensive approach, two education systems were selected as case studies: Ireland and 
the French Community of Belgium. The inclusion of case studies was motivated by the realist 
view whereby ‘causal outcomes follow from mechanisms acting in contexts’ (Pawson & 
Tilley, 1997, p. 58 emphasis removed). Many sources give credit to this view. Evidence from 
the literature review highlighted the pivotal role of timing and context when trying to 
understand the impact of EPA on individual countries. Levin (2005) underlined the importance 
of origin and adaptation of education reforms. Scheerens et al. (2015) provided evidence of 
the ‘loose coupling’ between governmental policies and school practice, whereby high-level 
policies are not necessarily implemented in the classroom.  The importance of context in 
educational change was recognised even by the OECD (Snyder, 2013), despite its more 
mainstream narrative about the possibilities of cross-country comparisons.  
All education systems are potentially interesting and many, as Chapter 4 shows, have 
followed the EPA to a certain extent. The choice eventually fell on Ireland and French-
speaking Belgium after securing the opportunity to obtain key data on site. Two research visits 
were organised at the Educational Research Centre of Dublin, in Ireland (www.erc.ie), and 
the service for the Analysis of Systems and Practices in Education of the University of Liège, 
Belgium (http://www.aspe.ulg.ac.be). To ensure methodological consistency between the two 
visits, each followed the same research protocol.  
Six case study questions were used to guide the within-country analysis. They reproduced, 




CSQ1) What information emerges about country performance from international and 
national PISA reports, and what policy advice is given? 
CSQ2) What were the main educational policies in this country between 1995 and 
2009? 
CSQ3) Reception and use: 
a. What were the reactions to OECD reports, in terms of reception or future 
planning? 
b. What are the contact points between the EPA for this country and actual 
interventions? 
CSQ4) What is the context surrounding these interventions—i.e., what other 
influences concurred to shape these policies? 
CSQ5) What evidence exists about the plausible impact of policies (are they 
theoretically sound, were they implemented, what are the recorded effects)? 
CSQ6) To what extent was following the EPA useful for this country (the benefits 
outdid the costs, relevant new knowledge was produced, cognitive or non-
cognitive outcomes, or equity, improved…)? 
The first four case study questions (CSQ1–4) deal with the production and use of the EPA 
(RQ1–2), whereas CSQ5 and 6 informed the analysis on the plausible influence of EPA-
informed policies on country scores (RQ3, see the next section in this chapter).  
CSQ1 maps onto RQ1 and it serves to differentiate general EPA from country-specific 
EPA. Individual countries are frequently cited within international PISA report as an example 
of good or bad practice. If the ‘naming and shaming’ theory is accurate (Carvalho & Costa, 
2014; Lingard, 2011; Takayama, 2008), policymakers will be more likely to look at the 
specific recommendations in the text surrounding the parts in which their country is 
mentioned. However, most countries also produce national versions of the international 
reports, and these may be the only source policymakers get to read. Therefore, an enquiry into 
country alignment with the EPA should firstly check that the EPA provided in the national 
reports is itself in line with the EPA provided by the international PISA reports.  
Answering CSQ2 was necessary to create a policy database, whereas CSQ3 helped to 
discriminate reception and acknowledgement from actual alignment. CSQ4 maps onto both 
RQ2 and RQ3: on the one hand, it seeks to trace policy origin and adoption (Levin, 2005) as 
well as the extent to which the OECD did not influence national policymaking (RQ2); on the 
other hand, it serves to understand whether similar policies in different contexts produced 
different educational outcomes (RQ3). 
Two sources of evidence were used in each case study: policy documents and education 
experts. Policy documents were consulted to identify the main educational interventions in the 
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period under consideration (CSQ2), understand their alignment with national or international 
EPA (CSQ3) and outline their context (CSQ4). Education experts were interviewed to answer 
all case study questions.  
The process of data collection and analysis was iterative, because the data provided by 
either source could complement, contradict or point to data from the other, which led to further 
data gathering, comparison and analysis. It also served for cross-validating the data: policy 
experts validated this author’s interpretation of the findings from the documentary analysis, 
but knowledge of the documents meant that experts’ opinions did not have to be taken at face 
value. 
Policy documents consisted of parliamentary acts, guidelines and circulars, as well as 
official policies developed by governmental institutions such as educational boards, 
authorities, regulators and inspectorates. To qualify for inclusion, policies had to satisfy two 
requirements. Firstly, they had to be introduced within the period under consideration (1995–
2009); this excluded bills, green papers, and any proposed change in the education system, 
but strategies, plans and other frameworks were still examined as they often led to the 
identification of specific policies. Secondly, they had to affect, at least on paper, a large share 
of their target population; this excluded pilot studies but not policies targeted at a small part 
of the total student population such as, for example, those aimed at the bottom 10% of 
achievers. The data were gathered from academic, institutional or professional websites (e.g., 
teacher unions) and libraries.  
Policies are both text and discourse (Ball, 1993); therefore, the analysis of policy 
documents was complemented by interviews with educational experts, who could enrich the 
written narrative with personal accounts or informed insider judgements. Educational experts 
were identified during the documentary analysis and by asking researchers in the host 
institutions. They generally included MoE officers, academics, researchers, members of 
professional associations and teachers’ unions officials.  
Once the experts had been identified, they were contacted via email or telephone. If they 
expressed an interest in being involved in the study, a face-to-face interview was arranged 
following a strict interviewing protocol that sought to minimise ethical issues (see the “Ethics 
Considerations” section, below) and maximise effectiveness and consistency between the two 
case studies; its format drew from relevant literature on interviewing methods (Rowley, 2012), 
as well as from research on carrying out expert interviews (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002) for 
evaluation purposes (Gugiu & Rodríguez-Campos, 2007), and it is outlined below. Overall, 
16 experts were interviewed following this protocol in Ireland, and 9 in Belgium.  
An initial letter ‘giving the name and status of the researcher carrying out the study, a brief 
rationale of the study including its purpose and value and why the individual [was] being 
92 
 
invited to take part’ (ESRC, 2015, p. 42) was sent. Upon acceptance, a topic for the interview 
(generally one or two policies) was agreed. This was done to increase the quality of the data, 
as sometimes over 15 years had passed since the policy under consideration had been 
introduced. Focusing on few policies was a way to give participants the opportunity to prepare 
for the interview by reviewing old documents and recalling their involvement at the time. 
Nevertheless, during the actual interviews some experts still preferred to give an overview of 
the issues surrounding many policies rather than a detailed account of one or two. 
Interviews were semi-structured, in the sense that they comprised a fixed part using 
CSQ1–6 but additional questions could be asked to follow-up important points (Kvale, 2007). 
Following the recommendations of experienced evaluators and established practice (Bryman, 
2012; Patton, 2002), all 25 interviews were meant to be recorded, but eventually only 9 of 
them could be because, on the one hand, some experts agreed to only ‘have an informal chat’ 
about their topic, whereas others asked to turn off the recording equipment before beginning 
the interview.  
It is acknowledged that some details may have been lost when the interviews were not 
recorded, but using note-taking and no audio recording forced both parties to focus only on 
key information and moved the emphasis from the interviewee to the policies. The interviewee 
was signalled when direct quotations were being written down. At the end of each interview, 
all points covered were recapitulated and direct quotations re-read, which provided the 
opportunity for further discussion, clarification and collaborative construction of meaning.  
After the interview, the notes were integrated with information from the documentary 
analysis and a draft was sent to the interviewees, with their contribution highlighted, for 
further review. This step was needed to ensure anonymity, but it carried the risk that 
participants could disagree with the research outcomes (Boddy et al., 2010). This issue was 
addressed by allowing informants to comment only on the parts of the document to which they 
had contributed. The reviewed drafts flowed into a core document reporting, for each 
individual policy: a description, the country context and national influences, the contact points 
with education policy advice, policy implementation and plausible impact. Chapters 5 and 6 
are based on these core documents.  
Finally, country alignment with the EPA was summarised drawing from the concept of 
“delta-convergence”, that is, ‘the decreasing distance of policies towards an exemplary model, 
for example a model promoted by an international organisation’ (Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 83; 
see also Jakobi & Teltemann, 2009). The delta-convergence value is a useful summary 
measure of the degree of EPA-alignment, and it has already found applications in research on 
PISA (Bieber & Martens, 2011). However, it was difficult to assign justifiable numerical 
values to Belgian and Irish convergence, because the ‘exemplary model’ provided by the EPA 
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is not sufficiently precise to be interpreted in a quantitative fashion. Therefore, the principle 
of delta-convergence was adapted to produce a visual representation of the progressive 
alignment of national policies to the EPA. 
The plausible influence of EPA-informed national policies on country 
achievement and equity (RQ3) 
Sampling frame PISA participants (extensive approach) 
Education policies 1995–2006 from 2 education systems (intensive 
approach) 
Sample 57 countries with at least 3 data points, but variable (extensive 
approach) 
About 50 policies from 2 education systems (intensive approach) 
Data collection instruments OECD, World Bank, UNESCO databases (extensive approach) 
Study visits in 2 education systems (intensive approach) 
Expert interviews (intensive approach) 
Online and library-based documentary searches (intensive 
approach) 
Analytical methods Correlation analysis (both Pearson’s and Spearman’s), linear 
regression and multilevel growth modelling (extensive approach) 
Willms’ (2006) framework, graphs and review of existing 
evaluations (intensive approach) 
 
The extensive and intensive strategies used for measuring policy alignment were also used in 
the last part of the analysis, because RQ3 follows directly from RQ2. The issue when looking 
for policy effect was how to link some specific national policies, via policy outputs, to 
educational outcomes, and draw valid conclusions. Extant literature provided direction but no 
individual publication could solve the problem. This section outlines the nature of the problem 
and then introduces the approach used in this research. 
Some strategies for capturing policy effects and their challenges 
Many studies using data from international LSAs, and especially econometric analyses, sought 
to find a relationship between some country-, school- or student-level indicators and student 
achievement (Bol, Witschge, Van de Werfhorst, & Dronkers, 2014; Fuchs & Wößmann, 2007; 
Hanushek & Wößmann, 2011; Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, & West, 2007). However, these 
studies are generally not designed to account for the contribution of specific policies in 
producing the values the indicators take. 
What this literature refers to as “policies” are in fact policy outputs (Schlicht-Schmälzle, 
Teltemann, & Windzio, 2011; Teltemann, 2014)—an observed variation in some indicators 
over time that is assumed to be due to policies. Policy outputs are often interpreted as static 
systemic features rather than the dynamic result of governmental interventions. Therefore, 
even studies linking output indicators (such as grade retention) to specific interventions (e.g., 
economic incentives for teaching SEN students, Goos et al., 2013), tend to rely on cross-
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sectional data. Actual policy change on outputs was analysed by Jakobi & Teltemann (2009), 
but the link between outputs and country performance was outside the scope of their 
investigation.  
A key issue when linking national policies to policy outputs to educational outcomes is 
accounting for time. Each moment is associated with a certain socio-political and economic 
context which may or may not enable the implementation of EPA-informed policies (Steiner-
Khamsi, 2010). ‘Different temporal conditions occur for different kinds of institutional 
experiences’, and therefore, ‘the correct amount of social goods and services [should] be 
delivered at the appropriate point in the social process for the integration, maintenance, and 
improvement of the system to which policies are directed’ (Hayden, 2006, p. 10). 
The first problem when dealing with time is deciding how long it takes from the moment 
a policy is implemented to the moment it affects students enough for changes in learning 
trajectories to be detectable. The word “deciding” was used on purpose, as it is apparent from 
the literature that this is mostly a matter of a researcher’s judgement.  
Fullan (2000) argued that school districts can improve in 8 years—or even in half that time 
(Fullan, 2007, p. 18)—but he did not set any time scale for systemic changes. “Success stories” 
such as Ontario’s were presented as evidence that sizeable change can be achieved rapidly 
(Levin, Glaze, & Fullan, 2008). Likewise, Earl, Watson, & Torrance (2002) argued that the 
English National Strategies for Literacy and Numeracy ‘made significant changes in primary 
education throughout England in a remarkably short period of time’ (two years), but also that 
they were ‘not yet deep-seated enough to continue without consistent pressure and support’ 
(p. 35). In fact, follow-ups showed that the improvements may have been the result of score 
inflation due to test familiarity (Tymms, 2004), and that they plateaued anyway after four 
years (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006).  
Borman et al. (2003) found that sustained implementation of comprehensive school reform 
models increased achievement, and that after five years the effect sizes were twice as large as 
at the baseline. Harris (2011) argued that implementing successful reforms can take ten 
years—an estimate agreed by Jakobi & Teltemann (2009)—whereas Wedell (2009) stated: ‘it 
is clear that the successful implementation of educational change takes a long time’—perhaps 
a generation or more (p. 18).  
The generational timescale was adopted by Goos et al. (2013). While gathering lagged 
data on systemic features that may have affected PISA results, the authors noted that 
‘deviations of merely a few years [between observations of a same variable] were neglected’ 
because ‘the implementation of reforms […] most often occurs over the course of several 
years or decades’ (p. 65). This viewpoint was considered unsatisfactory for this research, as it 
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assumes that policy effects are almost time-invariant. If that were the assumption, why did the 
author decide to collect data from different periods at all? 
For the purpose of this research, it was decided to focus on policies introduced between 
1995 and 2009. This time frame was informed by the literature above and was a compromise 
between scale and data availability. The further back in time one goes, the harder it is to find 
policy documents and receive accurate information from educational experts. Yet this time 
frame allows policy effects to become manifest after up to about 10–12 years, though in this 
case only pre-2000 reforms could be associate to PISA outcomes (recall that PISA was 
administered in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012). 
The second problem when dealing with time is deciding how to model it. Common 
approaches in evaluation include: instrumental variables, whose variation causes variation in 
the predictor but not in the outcome; regression discontinuity, whereby the results of students 
just above and below an policy-induced cut-off point are compared; or differences-in-
differences (or double difference), where data between two groups are compared before and 
after a policy has targeted either one (Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2009; Schlotter, 
Schwerdt, & Wößmann, 2011).  
Theoretically, these strategies should be able to trace student outcomes back to policy, but 
the myriad confounding factors and assumptions involved means that, in practice, they might 
not be more accurate than expert judgement (Meghir & Rivkin, 2010). Consider for instance 
an extensively-studied policy that is not part of the EPA: changes in class size. The 
effectiveness of changing class sizes has been explored using a wide range of methods, 
including those outlined above (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2011; Meghir & Rivkin, 2010; 
Schlotter et al., 2011); and yet it took seventy years for research to reach some consensus (in 
one country only, the United States) that reducing class size has a small positive impact, and 
the debate is still ongoing on the matter of cost-benefits (Chingos, 2013).  
Time series models, such as autoregressive and moving average models (Shumway & 
Stoffer, 2011), were also considered because they can accurately model trends. However, 
when one considers that a country participating in all PISA cycles has at most five data points 
for its outcome variable (country estimates of student achievement) and that missing data are 
common in these kind of large-scale datasets (Jakobi & Teltemann, 2009), an important gap 
appears once again between what is theoretically recommended and what is practically viable. 
The few data points available for the outcome variable are related to a wider issue: whether 
PISA is an appropriate measure to detect policy effects at all. This issue is tackled in Chapter 
4 but was recognised from the early stages of the design of this research. The problem might 
not be PISA per se, but the moderate effects of educational interventions. Despite the powerful 
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narrative about the possibilities for systemic change (Barber & Mourshed, 2007; Fullan, 2009; 
Hargreaves, 2009; Schleicher, 2013a; Sugrue, 2008), in fact: 
‘The empirical evidence on the impact of reform in these five settings 
[governance, curriculum, assessment and accountability, inspection, privatisation 
and choice] is quite limited, and almost non-existent in some cases […], especially 
taking into account the enormous effort involved. They have changed some 
relationships in important ways, including giving individual schools much more 
autonomy in some settings. They have changed the work of administrators in 
significant ways, and certainly intensified pressures on teachers. They have 
increased the importance of parents in a number of ways. They appear on the 
whole to have had small impacts on student achievement levels’ (Levin, 2005, p. 
189). 
Similarly,  Scheerens et al. (2015) found that PISA, rather than confirming the importance 
of education policies for student outcomes, suggests that ‘contextual, “ecological” conditions 
[…and] school composition in particular’ (p. 32) strongly limit the capability of policy to 
make a sizeable difference, at least in the short period: ‘Compared to the effect of SES, the 
impact of variables that are prone to manipulation by policy makers is quite modest […;] our 
findings may be a warning against over-optimistic expectations of educational policy 
measures’ (p. 33).  
Given all these methodological limitations, the approach followed in this study is 
described below. 
Extensive approach (Chapter 4) 
The extensive approach was designed in three steps that used increasingly targeted data to 
capture policy effects. 
The first step was to analyse trends in performance and equity since PISA started in 2000. 
If the EPA is adopted, implemented and effective, then some increases in performance or 
equity should be observed. Score and inequality changes over time were modelled using 
correlational analysis, individual country regressions and multilevel growth models.  
Multilevel or hierarchical modelling (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Goldstein, 2011; Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002) is a type of regression analysis that can simultaneously model country-specific 
and average trends by taking into account between- and within-country similarities. To do 
this, it assigns a variance component not only to Level-1 units (within-country scores over 
time), but also to average country achievement (the Level-2 units). Evidence of policy effects 
was sought in country trajectories, in the clustering of OECD and partner countries, and in 
trends in the within- and between-country variance. Detailed information on the modelling 
approach, including variables and diagnostics, are available in Appendix 5 and 6. 
The second step was to contrast the differential effects of three policy outputs (economic 
productivity, equitability and access to pre-primary education) on PISA outcomes. All three 
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outputs are known to correlate to PISA outcomes, but it was posited that the factor that is more 
malleable by specific education policies (access to pre-primary education), would show a 
stronger relationship with changes in PISA outcomes. Smaller correlations were expected for 
the “generic” educational factor (equitability) and even smaller for the non-educational one 
(productivity). By comparing the size of the three indicators, the second step attempted to set 
an empirical limit on the extent to which education reforms could be expected to produce 
measurable changes in country outcomes. 
The third step used information collected through the expert questionnaires (see 
“Measuring policy alignment”, above) to relate country achievement and equity to their degree 
of alignment with the EPA. Because of the small sample size for which there were data, it was 
decided not to use multilevel modelling at this stage. Instead, countries were ranked twice: by 
degree of alignment with the EPA, and by their ability to translate policy statements into 
action. This ability was measured through a “government effectiveness” indicator, reflecting 
‘perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies’ 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 7).  
The weighting of policy alignment ranks by government effectiveness ranks produced an 
overall index of policy alignment with OECD recommendations, or “EPA Index”. The EPA 
Index was correlated (using Spearman’s ρ) to country changes in performance and equity to 
analyse the relationship between policy alignment and outcomes. 
To summarise, the first step modelled educational outcomes in performance and equity; 
the second related outputs to outcomes; and the third linked policy alignment with outcomes. 
Altogether, they sought to gather increasingly targeted evidence that country alignment with 
OECD recommendations may affect their PISA outcomes.  
Intensive approach (Chapters 5 and 6) 
Further evidence was gathered during the two study visits (guided by CSQ5 and CSQ6). Irish 
and Belgian policies were analysed using Willms’ (2006) LSA-based policy evaluation 
framework. The framework divides education policies into categories: ‘universal’ 
interventions seek to raise the achievement of all students; ‘SES-targeted’ policies intervene 
on the performance of students with a low socio-economic status (SES); whereas 
‘performance-targeted’ interventions try to improve the results of low achievers. According 
to the OECD, policy effectiveness can be inferred by analysing variations on indicators that 
are specific to each category.  
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In this research, such variations were interpreted in light of findings from existing policy 
evaluations carried out by national experts. Existing evaluations were preferred to original 
analyses for the same reason underpinning the use of expert interviews: it was thought that the 
collective knowledge produced by local researchers and research teams would exceed by far 
in breadth, depth and rigour the possibilities of someone from outside the system and with 
very limited time. This also allowed for critiquing the ability of Willms’ framework to detect 
policy effects on PISA. 
Ethics considerations 
Given the involvement of external informants in the research, ethical considerations were 
addressed following general guidelines (BERA, 2011) as well as departmental ones. A critical 
point was to ensure confidentiality and anonymity (Boddy et al., 2010): because of the 
relatively small pool from which experts could be drawn and the use of snowball sampling, 
participants were likely to know each other. While, on the one hand, this made it easier to 
recruit new informants, it also meant that each interviewee was highly identifiable by just 
mentioning his/her affiliation. Therefore, several measures were put in place to protect the 
participants’ right to anonymity:  
1) Preliminary ethical approval was sought from the School of Education’s Research 
Ethics and Data Protection Sub-Committee.  
2) Upon contact, a letter outlining the research project and the reason for expert 
participation was sent (Appendix 4). 
3) Prior to the interview, participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent 
form (Appendix 4).  
4) Once the interviewee’s comments had been integrated into the draft analysis, the part 
of the document informed by the interview was sent to them for further review. This 
was to ensure that the expert felt he/she could not be identified by other parties.  
5) Care was taken in the final report and in this thesis to remove critical information and 
to identify all interviewees by a code (“I” or “B”, for Ireland and Belgium, followed 
by a number). In some occasions, it was felt that even this system may compromise 




Chapter 3: The OECD education policy advice (EPA) 
This chapter is articulated in the following parts: 
- A reconstruction of the OECD education policy advice. 
- An analysis of its coherence and internal consistency, including the extent to which 
it is informed by PISA. 
- An analysis of its soundness focused on recommendations aimed to improve country 
equity, quality of provision and student performance, as well as their use of 
educational time. 
It is argued that the EPA is highly consistent over time, partly because it is somewhat 
disconnected from PISA data, but it is not conceptualised as a coherent programme. Some 
recommendations find strong backing in the literature, whereas others do not, suggesting that 
the fragmented identity of the OECD has an impact on its ability to promote a uniform 
educational strategy. 
Introduction 
The difficulty in reconstructing the EPA is that it has been forty years since the OECD last 
took an explicit official stance on what educational objectives countries should pursue. The 
OECD “Declaration on Future Educational Policies in the Changing Social and Economic 
Context” (OECD, 1978) focused on:  
- student acquisition of basic competences ‘as conceived within each country’ (PISA 
did not exist);  
- the development of schools as a place that contributed to ‘self-reliance, sense of 
responsibility and co-operative spirit of young people’;  
- teacher training and professional development to establish links ‘between the school 
and adult life’; gender equity; provisions for migrant students and other 
disadvantaged groups; 
- ensuring that ‘any necessary procedures related to educational choice, assessment 
and certification’ did not compromise pupil development;  
- finding the correct balance between general and vocational qualifications, and the 
provision of work experience during schooling; and lifelong learning.  
Since then, only two formal recommendations on education were made, both in 2005: one, 
on earthquake safety in schools (C(2005)24), and the other on cross-border higher education 
(C(2005)147). This contrasts dramatically with the 40 Recommendations and 4 Declarations 
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on environment; the 9 Decisions, 12 Recommendations and 1 Declaration on chemicals; or 
the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (OECD, 
2015b). At least until PISA, there were few collective attempts to regulate education compared 
to other sectors.  
There are grounds to claim that PISA provided an opportunity to spell out educational 
objectives and policy advice more explicitly. One objective of the INES programme—and 
PISA by extension—was to ‘promote sound education policy development in member and 
partner countries by highlighting successful educational outcomes and strategies’ (OECD, 
2012d, p. 4). As argued in Chapter 1, if PISA were just a ‘thermometer’, it would only pair 
high costs with minimal returns to feedback, like a school test used for a summative purpose 
(Hattie & Timperley, 2007; citing Lorrie A. Shepard et al., 1995). 
Instead, it is because PISA data are analysed in a broad policy context (OECD, 1999c) and 
linked to certain recommendations that PISA has a prominence which IEA assessments 
currently do not enjoy. The EPA is a strong and increasingly relevant feature of PISA reports: 
‘initial reports issued by the OECD […] have been expanded from a single, mostly descriptive 
book reporting on PISA 2000 to the five-volume report on PISA 2009 published in 2010’ 
(Klieme & Kuger, 2014, p. 8).  
The OECD education policy advice 
Chapter 2 described how a blueprint to capture policy recommendations in OECD publications 
was developed and applied. Firstly, a working definition of “education policy advice” was set 
and a multi-agent practical reasoning model was devised to discriminate policy statements 
from other types of text. Then, relevant OECD publications were sampled and, in an iterative 
fashion, the EPA was identified, categorised and abstracted into a general framework. The 
categories were based on PISA background indicators, as well as on the areas and themes in 
the Education Policy Outlook Reforms Finder (OECD, 2015d; also Appendix 3, Table 3.A) 
and in Education GPS (OECD, 2016b; also Appendix 3, Table 3.B).  
These sources provided an effective starting point for organising many policy 
recommendations, but not all. For instance, the following excerpt was initially coded as 
“equity – inclusion – SES”: 
‘Some inclusive policies try to reduce between-school socio-economic 
segregation by redrawing school catchment boundaries, amalgamating schools, or 
by creating magnet schools in low-income areas.’ (OECD, 2010e, p. 105) 
After accounting for other sources, however, it was noticed that school amalgamation was 
an example of policies on student stratification and grouping (a new category); redrawing 
catchment boundaries was an example of school choice (another new category); whereas the 
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formation of magnet schools was not an actual policy option, as the OECD claimed that in 
fact more effective solutions existed (OECD, 2013e, p. 59).  
In many other instances, the policy categories used by the OECD were inadequate to frame 
the EPA. The excerpts in Table 3.1 all come from a single page in the 2012 international report 
(OECD, 2014g, p. 253): 
Table 3.1: Instances of EPA that were difficult to categorise using only OECD policy categories 
EPA Issue 
Some countries ‘have implemented targeted 
policies to improve the performance of low-
performing schools or students’. 
Policies targeting low achievement may be 
concerned with both equity and accountability 
or represent a category on their own. 
‘Some countries […] have given schools and 
local authorities more autonomy but have 
recognised that autonomy works only in the 
context of collaboration and accountability’. 
Should autonomy and accountability be a single 
category? 
Some countries ‘have reshaped the organisation 
of schools to facilitate collaboration and 
economies of scale between individual schools 
by creating school clusters’. 
School collaboration and clustering are 
somewhat captured by the “organisation” 
theme, but they are not measured by any 
indicator. 
‘Recognising that a positive learning 
environment is key to promoting positive 
attitudes among students which, in turn, 
promote learning, [… some countries] have 
improved their students’ attitudes, dispositions 
and self-beliefs towards school in general, and 
towards mathematics in particular, by, for 
example, reforming their curricula so that they 
are better aligned with students’ interests and 
21st century skills’. 
Here, learning environments and student 
attitudes are invoked to introduce (with a rather 
sudden logical leap) curricular reforms. 
Curriculum is a sensitive topic for the OECD, 
because much of the novelty of PISA is built 
around its purpose to measure “skills for life” 
rather than curricular achievement. Therefore, 
since the beginning no indicator was dedicated 
to this aspect (see for instance Harvey-Beavis, 
2002; OECD, 1999a). Yet, the issue of 
curricular alignment with ‘students’ interests 
and 21st century skills’ frequently appears in 
international reports and other publications. 
 
To summarise, the way the OECD categorises education policies had to be further 
developed to include all policy recommendations in the sampled publications. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, a new framework was produced and submitted to Andreas Schleicher to review. 








1. Educational Time  
1.1.  Increase overall time 
spent in education 
Policies expanding access to pre-primary education, targeting 
enrolment or changing the age of entry into school. 
1.2.  Increase instruction time Interventions targeting lateness, attendance, by introducing full-
day schooling, or by increasing the time spent in classes. 
2. Equity  
2.1.  Reduce disabled or 
immigrant students’ 
segregation 
Interventions reviewing the sorting of pupils in institutions, or by 
better allocating special education teachers where they are most 
needed. 
2.2.  Reduce the gender gap For instance, by promoting subjects/career paths that are 
traditionally dominated by one gender to boys or girls. 
2.3.  Reduce the streaming / 
grouping / stratification of 
students 
By reviewing the academic or vocational paths, reducing the 
transfer of students to different schools, reviewing retention 
policies or ability grouping within classes. To prevent drop out, 
ensure high quality vocational education and training and 
equivalence and transferability between vocational education and 
training and academic pathways. 
2.4.  Reduce school 
competition 
By changing school incentives to take in the 'best' students or by 
tackling the elite status of private institutions. In school choice 
environments, mitigate its negative impact on segregation with 
options such as controlled choice schemes, incentives to make 
disadvantaged students attractive to high quality schools, school 
selection mechanisms and vouchers or tax credits. Improve 
disadvantaged families’ access to information about schools and 
to support them in making informed choices. 
2.5.  Help socio-economically 
deprived students 
By providing additional instruction, free learning resources, fee 
waivers, cash transfers/vouchers or a modified curriculum. 
3. Quality of provision  
3.1.  Strengthen the teaching 
profession 
Policies focusing on: qualifications required, initial teacher 
training, allocation of excellent teachers/principals where they are 
needed the most, retention of teachers in the most challenging 
schools, teacher pay, in-service training/professional 
development, career paths. 
3.2.  Allocate resources more 
efficiently or in a more 
equitable way 
By changing the share of spending towards public and private 
schools, by targeting socio-economic depressed areas or acting 
upon the evaluation of intervention programmes. Available 
resources and the way they are spent influence students’ learning 
opportunities. Use funding strategies, such as weighted funding 
formula, that take into consideration that the instructional costs of 
disadvantaged students may be higher. 
3.3.  Pair more autonomy 
with accountability measures 
For instance, by increasing school autonomy in budget, 
curriculum and/or assessments while at the same time holding 
schools accountable for their results by public posting of results, 
external monitoring of standards (both aspects are required for the 
association to have a positive effect). 
3.4.  Promote cooperation 
between parents, teachers, 
principals and schools 
Through collaborative programmes, by increasing parental 
involvement in school matters and in school governance, by 
facilitating/incentivising school-based research or the sharing of 
good practice. 
3.5.  Stimulate a supportive 
school climate and 
environment for learning 
Low performing disadvantaged schools are at risk of difficult 
environments for learning. Policies specific for these schools need 
focus more than other schools on the following: prioritise the 
development of positive teacher-student and peer relationships; 
promote the use of data information systems for school diagnosis 
to identify struggling students and factors of learning disruptions; 
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adequate student counselling, mentoring to support students and 
smoother their transitions to continue in education. In addition, 
these schools may benefit from alternative organisation of 
learning time, including the duration of the school week or year, 
and in terms of the size of schools. In schools [there] can be a 
policy to reinforce student-student and student-teacher 
interactions and better learning strategies. 
4. Student Performance  
4.1.  Help low-performing 
students 
Through feedback and appraisals for students, or by establishing 
early-warning mechanisms and providing a modified curriculum 
or additional instructional support for struggling students. 
4.2.  Standardise the 
educational outcomes 
For example, by introducing central, external exit examinations 
for qualification purposes. 
4.3.  Review curricular 
priorities 
By introducing curricula that are 'better aligned with students' 
interests and 21st century skills' (OECD, 2014g, p. 253), or by 
examining curricular choices 'in the light of the performance of 
other countries' (OECD 2007a, p. 113) 
Sources: Own elaboration drawing from OECD (2001a, 2004a, 2012c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2013g, 
2014g, 2015c, 2004b, 2007a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g); OECD & UNESCO-UIS 
(2003a, 2003b); Schleicher (2011b, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f). The parts in 
italic were added by Andreas Schleicher. 
In this new organisation, the EPA is divided into 4 areas: educational time, equity, quality 
of provision and student performance. The first category was included to capture 
recommendations on pre-primary education and instruction time. The fourth category differs 
from the third in that it includes policies targeting student performance more directly.  
Clearly, any attempt to frame the EPA includes an element of judgement, and other 
researchers may have come to different conceptualisations. For instance, the recommendation 
4.2 ‘Standardise the educational outcomes’ could be merged with the recommendation 3.3 on 
accountability, as centralised external exit examinations (CEEEs) are often use for this 
purpose. While the econometric literature considers both CEEEs and public posting of school 
results as accountability measures, the OECD tends to associate accountability only to public 
posting of results, whereas its position about CEEEs is more ambiguous. Therefore, the two 
policy levers were kept separate in the framework.  
There are some redundancies and small inconsistencies among the sample policies. Surely 
this is due in part to the fact that Schleicher could only have a brief look to the document, but 
they also testify the difficulty of organising policy recommendations that have yet to be 
officially formalised in a coherent system. This is why the table is presented with its flaws, 
with the acknowledgement that it could and should be improved by researchers and especially 




Validating the OECD education policy advice 
The purpose of the EPA is to provide countries with ways of developing policies pursuing the 
OECD objectives of performance, or ‘productivity’ (OECD, 2013c, p. 171), efficiency and 
equity (regardless of the extent to which individual members subscribe to these values). 
Within the framework of practical argumentation, validating the advice is an attempt to answer 
this question: Is it reasonable to expect that following the recommendations would contribute 
to the realisation of the goals of the OECD?  
Two strategies were employed to assess this: firstly, that the EPA does not contradict itself 
across categories (internal coherence) or over time (consistency); secondly, that the EPA is 
supported by at least some empirical evidence. 
Internal coherence 
On a broad level, it is clear that OECD recommendations are organised along some core 
dimensions that tend to be more complementary than conflicting. There is a core interest 
towards inclusion, lifelong learning, teacher training and structural institutional arrangements. 
The issue is when one moves away from general topics and analyses the organisation of more 
specific policy options. Policy areas crop up and disappear across the publications informing 
the framework in Table 3.2, so that the end result looks more like a collection of stand-alone 
suggestions than a coherent strategy.  
For instance, the OECD is undoubtedly interested in the governance of schools and 
education systems, yet it is harder to understand how “governance” is defined, what policy 
levers would affect educational governance, and how policies for governance are supposed to 
fit with other policies.  
According to the Education Policy Outlook Reforms Finder, governance policies affect 
‘education priorities’ and the ‘organisation of decision-making process’. In the Education 
GPS, in contrast, governance is divided into ‘parental involvement’, ‘school choice’, ‘public 
& private stakeholders’ and ‘school autonomy’. In the PISA 2006 international report, these 
four policy levers appear in the same chapter, though the chapter itself not called “governance” 
but ‘school and system characteristics’, and it includes also non-governance policies such as 
‘admittance, selection and grouping policies’ and ‘school resources’ (OECD, 2007b, p. 7). 
The 2006 report does mention ‘school founding and governance’, but they fall under ‘public 
and private school management’. The technical report from the same administration (OECD, 
2009c) never mentions the word “governance” in the main text. 
Similar critiques can be made for other policy areas. The outcome is a policy vision for 
education that has some but not complete cohesion, it is a ‘patchwork of loosely connected 
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topics [… that] have been strung together to provide a minimum semblance of coherence’ 
(Henry et al., 2001, p. 52). The OECD often notes that some policies are more suited to some 
contexts than others and that recommendations are just ‘options’ (OECD, 2013d, p. 16); it also 
notes that policies may be ‘applied in combination’ (ibid.) but does not commit to explaining 
how.  
In summary, there is one such thing as the OECD education policy advice; however, much 
of it remains latent and there are great disparities in how frequently and how clearly 
recommendations belonging to different categories appear in OECD products.  
To some extent, this is unavoidable because of the complexity of education as a subject 
matter. On top of this, the fragmentation of the OECD as an organisation and the relative 
novelty of education as an independent and valuable branch mean that there might not be a 
unique view on what policy areas countries are supposed to address and how. The OECD has 
been called a ‘network of networks’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 64) and it appears to be 
cyclically affected by some sort of identity crisis: ‘Over the past 20 years or so, the diagnosis 
has been the same: The OECD is in search of a distinct identity […]. No wonder, therefore, 
that the two earlier secretaries-general have had problems in explaining what [… it] actually 
does’ (Marcussen & Trondal, 2011).  
If one considers that the recommendations in Table 3.2 are a synthesis of hundreds of 
pages and they do not reach policymakers in such a structured layout, it should not surprise 
that there are varying national level interpretations of the “common” goals and values of the 
OECD.  
This thesis is not alone in claiming that more should be done in terms of organisational 
clarity of the EPA. After the first PISA administration, the Strategic Development Group 
asked for three improvements (OECD, 2003c, pp. 10–11): 
1) ‘A better conceptionalisation [sic] and operationalisation of the key policy objectives 
that are driving the development of PISA’; 
2) ‘The establishment of key policy levers that shape these policy objectives’; 
3) ‘The development of analytic approaches on the ways in which the policy levers 
interact with the policy objectives’. 
Hopkins, Pennock, & Ritzen (2008) noted that even though PISA should ‘help countries 
and economies to develop insights into what kinds of good instructional practices, school 
organisation and system level decisions make a difference’ (p. 75), ‘the policy drivers that 
may or may not be associated with the performance of individual countries have not yet been 
subject to systematic scrutiny’ (ibid., emphasis added). The PGB recognised this issue in 2005, 
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but suggested that the earliest that policy levers could be feasibly investigated would be with 
PISA 2012 (OECD, 2005a). As of 2011, this was still work in progress (OECD, 2011e). 
Consistency over time 
The consistency of policies over time is related to their credibility (Majone, 1996): if the EPA 
kept changing, the OECD could not aspire to be a stable point of reference for country policies. 
At the same time, the EPA is supposed to be informed by PISA findings, and therefore it 
should change only when empirical evidence points to other directions. How does the OECD 
deal with this tension? In general, the OECD seem to privilege consistency over accuracy, and 
what follows is evidence in support of this impression. 
Firstly, there is a certain disconnect between PISA evidence and policy recommendations. 
The OECD tends to reuse previously-given recommendations even when the indicators 
change. While 70 indicators were created between 2000 and 2009, more than 55 were used 
just once (OECD, 2013c). Of these 55, some were domain-specific indicators which were 
meant to be excluded when the domain changed. Other variables, however, were simply 
dropped. If policy recommendations were highly dependent on these variables they might have 
changed as the variables did, but this is not the case. Many recommendations are repeated 
verbatim in every international report, regardless of the presence or absence of evidence from 
PISA to support them. 
For instance, it was affirmed in 2003 and 2006 that ‘for some countries’ improving quality 
and equity ‘may mean taking measures to […] improve early childhood education’ (OECD, 
2004b, p. 198, 2007b, p. 205). This is a rather general statement (‘improve’ in what sense?), 
and the only empirical support given to it by PISA was that student attendance at pre-primary 
education correlated to PISA outcomes in 2003 (no data were available in 2006).  
Notice that being able to report a relationship between student responses in a self-
completion questionnaire on pre-primary attendance and PISA outcomes 10 years later is still 
an exciting finding (it was 'striking', OECD, 2004b, p. 267). However, the OECD did not 
include evidence about the specific value of being able to participate in early childhood 
education in the general recommendation quoted above, in either in 2003 or in 2006. It was as 
if PISA evidence was not necessary to drive the policy point, even though the recommendation 
was made in PISA reports.  
Secondly, the EPA is often informed by case studies rather than PISA data, even in the 
PISA reports. This is exemplified by the growing tendency of including “success stories” in 
dedicated boxes within the main analysis, and using them to give policy recommendations. 
There were no such boxes between 2000 and 2006, 6 in 2009 and 18 in 2012. These case 
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studies often have only a loose connection with PISA or the work of the OECD, even though 
they are meant to be exemplars of what is possible to achieve by following the EPA. 
Consider the case of Brazil. Brazil ‘offers a good example of how low-performing 
countries can use international benchmarking to improve their education systems’ (OECD, 
2010d, p. 102). In both 2009 and 2012, the OECD mentioned that Brazil improved in PISA 
and proceeded to enumerate a series of national interventions in education (see OECD, 2014g, 
pp. 76–78). Unsurprisingly, all these reforms were praised. This was regardless of whether 
they had been conceived before or after PISA, or whether they had been implemented or were 
still at the planning stage. For instance, the OECD reported that an examination system for 
teacher certification had been delayed but at the same time—in contradiction to this fact—that 
its establishment sent ‘a strong signal of what content and pedagogical orientation should be 
developed’ (OECD, 2014g, p. 78).  
Sometimes the praise did not even take into account whether Brazilian reforms actually 
represented the views expressed by the OECD in other circumstances. A positive comment 
was made about an ‘important increase in education expenditure’ (p. 77), although the OECD 
has often stressed precisely the fact that higher spending does not necessarily translate into 
better results: ‘the Slovak Republic, which spends around USD 53 000 per student, performs 
at the same level as the United States, which spends over USD 115 000 per student’ (p. 34). 
Interestingly, since 2005 Brazil has spent about the same amount per student as the Slovak 
Republic, yet the former was praised for its increase in commitment whereas the latter for its 
parsimony.  
Overall, the boxes dedicated to Brazil were informed by a range of sources, but the links 
with PISA were restricted to a few outcome figures, even if this was supposedly ‘a good 
example’ of the usefulness of PISA as an instrument for policymaking (OECD, 2010d, p. 102).  
The consistency over time of the EPA and the use of external sources to inform it raise 
questions about the extent to which “PISA-based” policy recommendations are actually based 
on PISA. This is problematic, as it goes to the heart of the knowledge-for-policy construction 
process of the OECD. If the OECD does not always distinguish what was shown empirically 
from what was assumed, it is making the same instrumental use of PISA as countries.  
Does the education policy advice precede or follow PISA evidence? 
Even when policy recommendations are linked to PISA evidence, it can be shown that PISA 
data is sometimes presented and interpreted to suit pre-existing policy stances. Three such 
practices are identified below. 
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First practice: unidirectional reading of graphs 
The first practice is interpreting what are essentially flat graphs in the most favourable sense. 
Consider a regression line of equity on income distribution leaving 96% of the variance 
unexplained (OECD, 2010e, p. 32). The OECD suggests that this weak relationship ‘shows 
that equity in educational opportunities can be achieved even where income is distributed 
highly inequitably’ (ibid.).  
This is correct, but so are the following equivalent readings: where income is distributed 
highly inequitably, equity in educational opportunities is often not achieved; countries can 
have high inequality in income distribution regardless of their equity; or, below-average 
income inequality can be achieved independently of the educational equity of the system. 
These are all paraphrases of the same concept (no links between equity and income 
distribution were observed), but the OECD chose the phrasing that could better represent 
‘what is possible’ in education (McGaw, 2008, p. 223; OECD, 2010e, pp. 3, 18, 2013h, p. 4; 
Schleicher, 2009a, p. 100), rather than what is happening.  
Another example of this “narrative of possibility”: ‘the findings from PISA suggest that 
systems prioritising higher teachers’ salaries over smaller classes tend to perform better, which 
corresponds with research showing that raising teacher quality is a more effective route to 
improved student outcomes than creating smaller classes’ (OECD, 2010f, p. 106).  
The counterargument is as follows. Leaving aside the problem that a causal link between 
teacher salary and teacher quality has yet to be established (Springer & Balch, 2009; Tirivayi, 
Maasen van den Brink, & Groot, 2013), using information from the same table (OECD, 2010f, 
p. 85, Figure IV.3.7) one could equally claim that countries pairing small classes and/or low 
teachers’ salaries with high expenditures tend to perform better and, in many cases, to be more 
equitable. Or that 4 out of the top 5 performers have either larger classes, higher salaries and 
low expenditures (Hong Kong, Shanghai); or smaller classes, lower salaries and high 
expenditures (Canada, Finland).  
Second practice: confusing graphs 
A second practice is to display both statistically significant and non-significant observations 
in the same picture, with only a slight change in shading to separate the two. This can increase 
the perception of strong bivariate relationships when there is little evidence for them. An 
example is a scatterplot of changes in equity and performance in the second volume of the 
2012 report (OECD, 2013e, p. 57, reproduced below), in which the point representing the 
statistically non-significant change in Liechtenstein may add to the impression of a negative 
correlation. The OECD uses this graph to argue that ‘improvements in performance need not 
come at the expense of equity’ (OECD, 2013e, p. 57).  
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Figure 3.1: Change between 2003 and 2012 in the strength of the socio-economic gradient and 
annualised mathematics performance 
 
© OECD. (2013). PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity (Vol. II). Paris: OECD Publishing. 
http://doi.org/10.1787/9789264201132-en 
If one separates significant and non-significant changes (Appendix 3, Figure 3.A and 
Figure 3.B), another narrative that could be told is that, firstly, in the vast majority of cases, 
variations in equity or performance (or both) between 2003 and 2012 were so small that the 
chances are they were not different from zero. Secondly, even if they were different, they 
would be uncorrelated, as the regression line in Figure 3.A shows. Therefore, one could claim 
that improvements in equity were not beneficial for country performance. 
In fairness, in the few instances in which changes in equity and performance reached 
statistical significance, a negative correlation can indeed be observed: those countries that 
managed to reduce the association between student socio-economic status and achievement 
by 10 percentage points in 10 years also experienced a 25-point increase in scores. However, 
this correlation is computed on observations from only six countries and one aggregate value: 
the OECD average—which, by the way, indicates that in OECD countries an increase in equity 
between 2003 and 2012 was associated with a decrease in PISA scores.  
Murphy (2014) expressed similar concerns and concluded:  
‘inconsistent use of statistical methods in its 2006 analysis and selective reporting 
of its 2009 analysis, and the fact that over both surveys attention has been drawn 
to positive findings […] while negative results for consequential accountability 
policies have been hidden or played down leave PISA and the OECD open to 
criticism that their work does not meet the highest standards of objectivity and 
favours certain schooling policies.’ (D. Murphy, 2014, p. 913)  
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Third practice: variable p-values 
A third related practice is that the OECD is sometimes flexible in terms of what confidence 
level counts as being statistically significant. p-values are some of the most widely 
misinterpreted statistical concepts (Gelman, 2013; Schervish, 1996), but the OECD provides 
an excellent definition: ‘differences are labelled as statistically significant when a difference 
of that size, smaller or larger, would be observed less than 5% of the time, if there were 
actually no difference in corresponding population values’ (OECD, 2010f, p. 139). 
Unfortunately, the accuracy in the definition is paired with some laxity in the practice. 
10% levels are regularly reported (though clearly labelled), and sometimes indications of 
statistical significance are left to the end-of-chapter notes. For instance, the main text may 
report that ‘countries that use standards-based external examinations tend to perform higher, 
even when accounting for national income’ (OECD, 2010f, p. 46). One has to read the 
endnotes to find out that the confidence level for that finding was 7% because of the ‘large 
amount of missing data regarding standards-based external examinations’ (pp. 59–60).  
Together, the three practices highlighted here reflect a general attitude whereby PISA data 
is used to confirm rather than challenge pre-existing assumptions. This is somewhat 
unavoidable, given the correlational nature of PISA and the political role of the OECD, but 
privileging consistency over accuracy means unlinking the EPA from the evidence: it creates 
a vicious circle in which, at some point, the EPA precedes (and survives) the data. At that 
point, it is unclear what other value PISA may have rather than being used as a mere 
accountability stick and a rich source of data for researchers. 
Recent trends 
It should be acknowledged that in recent years the OECD has substantively increased its 
grounding of background variables in research, which might progressively affect the content 
of its recommendations.  
For instance, PISA returns information on the students’ engagement and sense of 
belonging to school. The rationale for this is that positive attitudes can influence achievement 
and lifelong learning. In 2000, the OECD wrote: ‘The evidence is […] that those who do like 
school perform better than those who do not’ (OECD, 2001a, p. 108). It immediately 
proceeded to qualify this statement by recognising that the observed relationship could be the 
outcome of reversed causality, but still provided the following “PISA-based” 
recommendation: ‘the results suggest that school policy and practice should [… create] an 
engaging learning environment for all students’ (ibid.).  
In 2003, the OECD deferred an investigation on the relationship between attitudes towards 
school and performance, but repeated both the recommendation and the argument’s warrant 
that affectionate students ‘are more likely to do well in their studies’ (OECD & UNESCO-
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UIS, 2003a, p. 122). The investigation came out in the same year. The foreword mentioned 
once again that students’ participation and sense of belonging are important ‘because of their 
relationship with student learning’ and ‘because they represent a disposition towards 
schooling and life-long learning’ (OECD, 2003a, p. 3). In the analysis, however, the author 
noted that there was no observable correlation between engagement and performance and 
wrote: ‘It cannot be infered [sic] from these findings that efforts to increase student 
engagement are likely to lead to better literacy skills’ (Willms, 2003, p. 29). In other words, 
for two administrations the OECD had given “evidence-based” policy suggestions which were 
not supported by evidence, but by a policy stance that presumed a link between engagement 
and performance. 
The 2012 international report saw a major change: the mechanisms explaining how 
engagement was believed to affect student learning were based in research and clearly 
articulated. As a result, the sense of belonging was no longer theoretically conceptualised as 
directly related to performance. Therefore, when it was found that ‘the relationship between 
students’ sense of belonging and their mathematics performance was weak in 2003 in all 
countries and economies, and remained weak in 2012’ (OECD, 2013f, p. 55), this did not 
shake the general argument: engagement fosters other aspects such as truancy, teacher-student 
relations and school climate, which in turn impact on the whole school community. Put in 
these terms, even if the EPA was not particularly different from that in 2000, it was more 
coherent and provided better bases with which to evaluate its soundness. 
Soundness 
This last example may indicate a new direction in the way policy issues are integrated into the 
design of PISA, one that sees research evidence play a much more prominent role. This is 
summarised by the following excerpt from the 2012 assessment framework:  
‘Given that PISA is entering its fifth cycle of surveys, it is time to reconsider the 
overarching framework that guides the development of questionnaires and the way 
that this information is used in analysing and reporting data. […] Questionnaire 
content has largely been determined by contemporary priorities rather than long-
term policy and research goals. […] PISA has matured. As a sound and stable 
basis for international comparative studies and trend information on education 
systems, PISA requires a coherent architecture for future context questionnaires 
that balances stability with innovation, and domain-specific with general issues.’ 
(OECD, 2013c, p. 168) 
In the 2012 international report, clear relationships between variables were made manifest 
and, as a result, so were the mechanisms leading to performance or equity outcomes. The draft 
framework for 2015 (Klieme & Kuger, 2014) continues along the same lines, meaning that 
the EPA might become more coherent in the future. This would be a welcome change from an 
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evaluation perspective, because the OECD policy recommendations thus far have been 
characterised by an almost complete lack of an explicit programme theory. As was claimed in 
Chapter 1, the OECD writes what countries should do, but not how or at least why its advice 
should work, with the exception of having been attempted by some successful countries.  
This is a major shortcoming of the EPA which affects the credibility of the OECD’s 
knowledge-for-policy construction model. To state it more overtly: if evidence from PISA—
the instrument conceived to shape or at least support policy recommendations—has had a 
marginal role in shaping or supporting policy recommendations; and if a coherent explanatory 
framework for measuring and interpreting measures was only recently devised; what has the 
OECD been basing its policy advice on? And how does the OECD know that following what 
it suggests will produce any positive effects?  
In the remainder of this chapter, evidence in support of the EPA is sought, with a proviso. 
Each recommendation (e.g., changing retention policies or establishing additional support for 
struggling students) involves a complex but unstated network of causal mechanisms linking 
interventions with outcomes. It would be impossible develop a programme theory to evaluate 
each of them, and some evaluative approaches (e.g. contribution analysis, see Mayne, 2012) 
require even more than a “simple” programme theory. What was possible, rather, was to select 
from the four main educational areas (educational time, equity, quality of provision and 
performance, see Table 3.2) a few recommendations that were emblematic of a specific issue 
in terms of the way the OECD grounds and delivers advice, and to review their overall 
plausibility, drawing from education literature.  
The recommendations analysed below deal with pre-primary education (educational 
time); gender, streaming and school choice (equity); teacher professional development and 
school accountability (quality of provision) and curricular changes (performance). 
Problematic aspects are summarised and general conclusions are drawn at the end of the 
chapter.  
Educational time 
The policy recommendation analysed in this section is about extending pre-primary education 
by expanding access or extending its duration. 
Pre-primary education 
The OECD advises that ‘one of the most efficient educational strategies for governments is to 
invest early10 and all the way up to upper secondary’ (OECD, 2012c, p. 9).  
                                                     
10 Although “early childhood” is ‘considered to start at conception and continue through the 
transition to primary school, which may occur as early as age six or as late as age eight’ (Engle, Gamer, 
& Vargas-Barón, 2011, p. 8), in OECD publications “early” education refers to pre-primary education, 
which officially [Source: UNESCO] starts at ages 3–5 until 6–7. 
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This policy recommendation stems from interdisciplinary studies (such as Ramey, Ramey, 
& Lanzi, 2006; Ramey & Ramey, 1998) on the impact of early year interventions on life-span 
development. This work has recently been reframed by James Heckman as skill formation, 
whereby early interventions have a higher rate of return than later ones because ‘skill begets 
skill and motivation begets motivation’ (key recent publications include Cunha & Heckman, 
2010; Heckman, 2008; Kautz, Heckman, Diris, ter Weel, & Borghans, 2014; see also Salverda, 
2011, for a summary of the model). Literature from the United States finds ample evidence 
that some pre-primary programmes are a cost-effective way to address inequalities and 
achievement (Almond & Currie, 2010; W. S. Barnett, 2011; Camilli, Vargas, Sharon, & 
Barnett, 2010; Deming, 2009; Duncan, Ludwig, & Magnuson, 2010; Schweinhart & Fulcher-
Dawson, 2009; Schweinhart et al., 2005; Wong, Cook, Barnett, & Jung, 2008).  
At the individual level, ‘striking disparities in what children know and can do are evident 
well before they enter [primary school]’ (Committee on Integrating the Science of Early 
Childhood Development, 2000, p. 5). At the country level, the policy issue is whether 
increasing access in pre-primary education could by itself raise country performance (as was 
the case, historically, with the expansion of primary and secondary education), or whether the 
focus should be on increasing its quality. Brazil was recently put under pressure to choose 
between expanding and improving the system after a World Bank evaluation showed that 
‘children who attend low-quality pre-schools perform the same on literacy tests two years later 
as do children who attend no pre-school at all’ (Evans & Kosec, 2012, p. xi). The authors 
concluded that ‘the quality of a pre-school (and not merely attendance) determines student 
outcomes’ (p.5).  
It has been argued that increased access through publicly-funded pre-school programmes 
may produce ‘substantial educational, social, and economic benefits, but only if the 
investments are in programs in which teaching is highly effective’ (Pianta, Barnett, Burchinal, 
& Thornburg, 2009, p. 51, emphasis added). In developing countries, successful early 
interventions appear to require the ‘integration of health, nutrition, education, social, and 
economic development, and collaboration between governmental agencies and civil society’ 
(Engle et al., 2007, p. 234).  
At the same time, it was shown earlier in this document that, although the OECD speaks 
about quality and coverage in its EPA, in fact it measures only the latter. Drawing from PISA 
2009, the OECD (2011b) reported that ‘students who had attended some pre-primary school 
outperformed students who had not’ (p. 1, emphasis added), and this was ‘even after 
accounting for their socio-economic backgrounds’ (ibid.). The analysis was expanded with 
PISA 2012, when most countries were found to have either low rates of enrolment in pre-
primary education, or a higher relative risk in terms of performance associated with non-
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attendance (or both—see OECD, 2013e, p. 101). This suggests that expanding access to pre-
primary education may have an impact on country scores by either slightly affecting the 
performance of a large number of students, or substantially affecting that of a minority.  
The rationale for greater participation finds both theoretical backing (Darragh, 2007) and 
empirical support. Mitchell (2011) describes the benefits of a governmental strategy to 
increase participation in pre-primary education in New Zealand. Similarly, the introduction of 
universal pre-school education in Oklahoma was reported to have improved the school 
readiness of children (Gormley, Gayer, Phillips, & Dawson, 2005). After evaluating the 
impact of a pre-school initiative in New Mexico over four years, Hustedt et al. (2009) write 
that, even though aspects concerning the quality of the programme could be improved, 
‘continued expansion of the […] initiative is warranted’ (p. 6).  
Moving beyond the ‘quantity versus quality’ debate, the availability, duration and quality 
of pre-primary education have all consistently been found to be related to achievement and 
equity, even by longitudinal studies (Sylva, 2014). And yet, surprisingly, this has never been 
considered a key policy issue by the PGB. In 1997, it was completely absent from the list of 
policy priorities guiding the development of the context questionnaires (Harvey-Beavis, 
2002), and no indicators for this variable were included in the 2000 or 2006 administrations. 
The factor was given low priority by the PGB even in the 2015 cycle and therefore, despite 
the extensive evidence presented by the Expert Group in favour of its salience, detailed 
questions about the pre-primary experiences of PISA students were relegated to an optional 
parental questionnaire (Klieme & Kuger, 2014). 
Equity 
Half of the OECD educational efforts are dedicated to convincing member countries that 
equality of opportunities and unbiased outcomes are worthy targets that pay off in terms of 
economic and social benefits. Therefore, one would expect the EPA covering these aspects to 
be supported by the strongest evidence. This section analyses recommendations on gender 
gap, on stratification policies and on school choice. 
Gender gap 
Perhaps the most unexpected finding about gender gap concerns the extent to which results 
from international LSAs reflect actual underlying differences. These results generally show a 
large advantage of girls in reading, a smaller advantage of boys in mathematics and very little 
difference in science (Eurydice, 2009b). Some researchers (Lafontaine & Monseur, 2009; 
Lietz, 2006a, 2006b), however, have noted that the differences observed since the early 1990s 
may in part be explained by methodological changes in LSAs.  
115 
 
This and other evidence led some authors to go as far as to conclude that ‘boys are doing 
as well as girls in reading achievement and have done so for over the past century’ (Loerke, 
2012, p. 267). Similarly, Corbett, Hill, & St. Rose (2008) reported that the gender gap in the 
US was marginal and had been narrowing over the previous 35 years. It has often been pointed 
out that socio-economic inequalities have a much greater impact than gender differences on 
outcomes, and should therefore be granted higher policy priority (Connelly, Sullivan, & 
Jerrim, 2014; Corbett et al., 2008; Eurydice, 2009b; Loerke, 2012). 
This is not a sufficient reason to neglect the gender issue, though. Female disadvantage in 
mathematics, albeit small, has been consistently observed both in TIMSS and in PISA (Else-
Quest, Hyde, & Linn, 2010), but also in other cross-sectional studies (Dickerson, McIntosh, 
& Valente, 2015) as well as in large-scale longitudinal studies (Robinson & Lubienski, 2011). 
Recent research has pointed to a greater variability of male achievement at the extreme ends 
of the distribution: the performances of high-achieving boys are substantively higher than the 
girls’ in mathematics and science, and substantively lower than the girls’ in reading (Baye & 
Monseur, 2016). 
Within countries, boys’ and girls’ performances also appear to be related: ‘In countries 
where girls lag less behind boys in mathematics and science, they also are more ahead of boys 
in reading’, and vice versa (van Langen, Bosker, & Dekkers, 2006, p. 172). Marks (2008) 
claimed that this could be capturing the effectiveness of education policies targeting girls, but 
other researchers have shown that the correlation becomes negative for high performers: at 
the higher end of the spectrum, the disadvantage of boys in reading decreases and that of girls 
in mathematics increases (Stoet & Geary, 2013). This is not what one would expect from 
policies targeting girls, unless they were not effective with the strongest achievers. 
The interest of the OECD in addressing the gender gap is certainly justified when it comes 
to higher education. In the majority of OECD countries, participation and attainment in higher 
education favours females over males, and yet gender segregation by subject is still evident 
and stable (Vincent-Lancrin, 2008). This affects STEM subjects (science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) but also other traditionally male-dominated programmes like 
doctoral medicine (S. L. Morgan, Gelbgiser, & Weeden, 2013).  
The determinants of the gender gap in secondary and higher education are not fully 
understood. Once differences in cognitive abilities are discounted (Spelke, 2005; Spinath, 
Eckert, & Steinmayr, 2014), the remaining theories can be sorted into two interrelated 
categories (Buchmann, DiPrete, & McDaniel, 2007; Eurydice, 2009b): individual factors 
(socio-emotional skills, behaviour, attitudes, self-concept) and environmental factors (social 
expectations including teacher and parents, school bias including resources, curriculum and 
assessment). Research has uncovered some mutually reinforcing dynamics.  
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On the one hand, boys and girls seem to have slightly different social and behavioural 
skills in early years which may contribute to widening the gender gap over time (DiPrete & 
Jennings, 2012). Specifically, self-concept, self-efficacy, attitudes and motivation towards 
gendered subjects develop early, affect achievement and alter study and career choices (Jiang, 
2014; Perez-Felkner, McDonald, Schneider, & Grogan, 2012). In a meta-analysis of the 
relationship between intelligence, personality, motivation and gender differences in 
performance, Spinath, Eckert, & Steinmayr (2014) concluded that ‘girls are somewhat better 
adapted to today’s school environment than boys, and this can partially explain why they often 
outperform boys in academic contexts’ (p. 239). 
On the other hand, external factors such as peers and teachers can moderate or reinforce 
inequalities. Peer culture, for instance, shapes masculine identity and may therefore foster or 
help to prevent antisocial behaviours, which in turn are linked to underachievement and 
dropout (Ferreira, Santos, Fonseca, & Haase, 2007; Legewie & DiPrete, 2012). Gender-bias 
in teacher ratings (Campbell, 2015; Hartley & Sutton, 2013; Hinnant, O’Brien, & Ghazarian, 
2009; Raag et al., 2011; Robinson & Lubienski, 2011; Robinson-Cimpian, Lubienski, Ganley, 
& Copur-Gencturk, 2014) influences teacher expectations, student beliefs and achievement. 
Changing educational pathways today provide women with ‘growing opportunities for 
pursuing non-STEM degrees and careers that are equally prestigious and socially important’ 
(Mann & DiPrete, 2013, p. 7), and this could explain why gender segregation has remained 
stable in STEM subjects. At the same time, however, extrinsic motivation has been found as 
the greatest distinguishing factor between girls that choose to enter a degree in mathematics 
or physics and those that do not (Mujtaba & Reiss, 2013; Reiss, 2013). 
Overall, given the multitude of factors contributing to the gender gap both in secondary 
school and in the transition to higher education, the OECD recommendation of de-gendering 
career paths is appropriate, but perhaps insufficient. Surely, following the EPA could mean 
improving some segregating apprenticeship programmes (Beck, Fuller, & Unwin, 2006) or 
changing the advice people in an influential position, such as teachers, may give (S. Brown, 
Ortiz-Nuñez, & Taylor, 2011; Reiss, 2013). However, it could do little to alter the 
shortcomings of career guidance initiatives (Bimrose, 2009) or to tackle the structural systemic 
inequalities giving rise to the unrealistic expectations held by many students (Jerrim, 2014).  
Following recent trends in its approach to the construction of the EPA, in its latest 
publications the OECD has begun to address gender equality in greater depth. The new policy 
recommendations were still somewhat simplistic, but they were clear, targeted and consistent 
with research findings: give students a greater choice in what they read, privilege homework 
over video gaming, train teachers to be aware of their own gender biases, build girls’ self-
confidence, and provide better guidance (OECD, 2015i). 
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Stratification policies: tracking, grouping, retention 
Despite some terminological uncertainties (Betts, 2011), and despite a few outlying findings 
that are likely due to methodological approaches (Schlicht, Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 
2010; Waldinger, 2006) the sorting of students into separate groups or curricular tracks is 
generally considered to be ineffective. Over the years, evidence has accumulated from both 
cross-country studies (Ammermueller, 2013; Haahr, Nielsen, Hansen, & Jakobsen, 2005; 
Hanushek & Wößmann, 2011; Horn, 2009; Link, 2012; Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010), and 
national follow-ups to LSAs like those in Germany (Maaz, Trautwein, Lüdtke, & Baumert, 
2008), in the Netherlands and Flanders (Prokic-Breuer & Dronkers, 2012), in Hungary (Horn, 
2013), and in other countries (see the examples in Salverda, 2011).  
Duru-Bellat & Suchaut (2005) concisely explained that ‘any restriction on enrolment or 
early setting aside of certain students, any grouping by distinct level or streaming […] and all 
phenomena of segregation among schools […] tend to increase social inequality in 
performance without improving average level or even elite level’ (p. 192). Even gifted 
students might not necessarily benefit from differential instruction, which has been reported 
in some cases to have a negative impact on their self-concept and anxiety (M. Becker et al., 
2014).  
By improving labour-market allocation while increasing inequalities (Bol & van de 
Werfhorst, 2013), tracking reinforces the role of education systems as person-sorting 
machines (Spring, 1976), which is the opposite of the emancipatory role valued by the OECD. 
Tracking ‘by and large, reinforces [the effects of] family background. It increases inequality 
and reduces intergenerational mobility for most measures of educational attainment and early 
labour market outcomes’ (Brunello & Checchi, 2007, p. 847). When it comes to grade 
retention, the academic consensus is even more definite: ‘it would be difficult to find another 
educational practice on which the evidence is so unequivocally negative’ (Hattie, 2008, p. 98; 
citing Holmes, 1989; see also Education Endowment Foundation, 2016). 
Among other suggestions, the OECD recommends avoiding the practice of transferring 
students between schools as a disciplinary action to manage behavioural or performance 
issues. But the way the EPA is presented resembles more a passing comment than a real point 
for action.  
Firstly, the OECD writes: ‘In school systems where it is more common to transfer weak 
or disruptive students out of a school, performance and equity both tend to be lower. Individual 
schools that make more use of transfers also perform worse in some countries’ (OECD, 2010b, 
p. 15). It seems that the OECD considers these policies ineffective, an impression corroborate 
by the following: ‘Schools and teachers in [… successful] systems do not allow struggling 
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students to fail; they do not make them repeat a grade, they do not transfer them to other 
schools’ (OECD, 2012f, p. 4).  
But then the OECD adds: ‘Transferring pupils who do badly may be partly a symptom, 
rather than a cause, of schools and school systems that are not producing satisfactory results, 
especially for lower-achieving students. It is worth noting that the schools with lower transfer 
rates tend to have greater autonomy and other means of addressing these challenges’ (OECD, 
2010b, p. 15). Suddenly the issue of student transfer feels like a pretext to introduce another 
recommendation: increase school autonomy.  
Besides, while there is extensive literature on the causes and consequences of school 
mobility (Gruman, Harachi, Abbott, Catalano, & Fleming, 2008; Mehana & Reynolds, 2004; 
Rumberger, 2003), and there are some policy evaluations of interventions to reduce 
‘voluntary’ transfers (i.e, those initiated on the students’ side, for example Fleming, Harachi, 
Catalano, Haggerty, & Abbott, 2001), much less information is available on student transfers 
as a disciplinary policy. Some research suggests that some schools let go (Riehl, 1999) or 
actively transfer students to boost their performance, but this has negative consequences on 
the achievement and dropout rates of transferred students (Bowditch, 1993; Rumberger & 
Palardy, 2005).  
On the matter of dropout, Schleicher proposed (somewhat in line with other OECD policy 
recommendations in this area, OECD, 2011d) a higher degree of compatibility between 
general and vocational training. This might make the vocational pathway more appealing (or 
less unappealing), but consider that the most important dropout risk factors originate at the 
family level and are socio-economic in nature (Freeman & Simonsen, 2015; Rumberger & 
Lim, 2008). In some countries, students progressing in vocational tracks have very practical 
issues such as lower access to funding (Farías & Sevilla, 2015).  
Increasing student opportunities to move between tracks does not mean that families 
would actually be able to seize them, or even that they could see such opportunities as 
available to them (A. Daly & Thomas, 2008). There is a well-known process of self-limitation 
whereby students ‘exclude many institutions that are located beyond perceived boundaries of 
physical, academic or social space’ (Hoelscher, Hayward, Ertl, & Dunbar‐ Goddet, 2008, p. 
145; and see Chapter 6 on the French Community of Belgium). Students who have already 
dropped out are even harder to reach (Polesel, 2010). Finally, policies trying to bridge 
vocational and general pathways may be very ineffective. An example is the English Diploma: 
introduced in 2008, it suffered from a ‘low uptake, low understanding, low recognition and 
high complexity syndrome’ (Hodgson & Spours, 2010). It was terminated in 2013.  
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School competition and choice: school vouchers 
The theme of student mobility is closely related to parental choice in school selection and 
school competition to attract students. This is a very large and controversial research field 
because it is built upon ever-going debates on public versus private education, or social 
democracy versus liberal democracy. In this section, only one of the policy options available 
to countries is examined: school vouchers, which are predominantly used in the US but are 
increasingly becoming popular in other OECD countries as well.  
To give a sense of the partisanship dominating the issue, two definitions follow. According 
to the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, which is in favour of vouchers, ‘Vouchers 
give parents all or a portion of the public funding set aside for their children’s education to 
choose private schools that best fit their learning needs’ (Friedman Foundation for Educational 
Choice, 2015); according to Raise Your Hand Texas, which is against vouchers, ‘Vouchers 
are taxpayer-funded subsidies for private schools with no accountability and restrictive 
admissions policies’ (Raise Your Hand Texas, 2015). 
In fact, the landscape is much more complex. Vouchers are ‘inherently a flexible 
instrument that can be designed in many ways’ (Hoxby, 2003, p. 14) and because of this, 
research attempting to find benefits (or flaws) that are common to all interventions has 
consistently reported mixed results.  
In the early 2000s, Hoxby (2003) argued that evidence from the ‘first generation’ of such 
interventions was positive. Voucher programmes were successfully targeting disadvantaged 
or underachieving students who then improved their performance, while also managing to 
increase the “productivity” (i.e., the ‘achievement per dollar spent’, p. 17) of public schools 
(because low-performing students had moved to private schools thanks to the vouchers). 
Hoxby’s (2003) argument and findings were immediately rebutted by Ladd (2003) on the basis 
of a different theoretical stance and interpretation of the evidence. In the same years, Belfield 
& Levin (2002, 2005) argued that the debate could not be settled as long as the evidence was 
being sought in support of pre-existing ideological positions, but they agreed with Ladd (2003) 
that the size of the observed effects was generally small.  
The final blow to Hoxby’s (2003) argument was provided by a review by Rouse & Barrow 
(2009), who wrote: ‘The best research to date finds relatively small achievement gains for 
students offered education vouchers, most of which are not statistically different from zero. 
What little evidence exists about the likely impact of a large-scale voucher program on the 
students who remain in the public schools is inconsistent at best’ (Rouse & Barrow, 2009, p. 
37).  
Subsequent research revealed that many claims about the benefits of voucher programmes 
were based on findings from a very specific intervention (the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
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Program), which had a small impact and on reading scores only (What Works Clearinghouse, 
2012). Generally, research from both the US and other countries reported little or no effect on 
achievement, and mostly negative effects on segregation (DeLuca & Dayton, 2009; Usher & 
Kober, 2011; Waslander, Pater, & van der Weide, 2010; Witte, 2009). Their cost-effectiveness 
was similarly questioned (Yeh, 2010). There is some evidence, however, that these 
programmes might increase graduation rates and parental satisfaction (Usher & Kober, 2011).  
It has been claimed that vouchers increase the productiveness of those public schools 
experiencing drops in student enrolment because students with vouchers prefer neighbouring 
private schools (Egalite, 2013a), but methodological variations across studies mean that this 
last point is far from settled (Egalite, 2013b; Merrifield, 2013). Figlio & Hart (2014) used the 
introduction in 2001 of the Florida A+ policy to argue that vouchers can have a positive 
competitive effect, whereas Bowen & Trivitt (2014) used the discontinuation of that same 
policy in 2006 to argue the opposite.  
Finally, it has been found that voucher students leaving the programme to return to public 
schools initially experience increases in achievement, although the reasons why this might be 
the case are not understood (Carlson, Cowen, & Fleming, 2013). 
Overall, investing in voucher programmes does not appear to be a particularly solid 
recommendation. In his review of the EPA presented earlier in this chapter, Schleicher 
mentioned vouchers as an instrument to make disadvantaged students more attractive for high 
quality schools. This evokes the idea of a “progressive voucher scheme”, which can be found 
in a few specific OECD publications on the topic. On top of funding based on low 
achievement, progressive vouchers give extra funding to disadvantaged students, which 
should act both as a means to provide more resources to those who need them most, and as an 
incentive for schools to take in more low-SES students (Musset, 2012; OECD, 2012c). 
However, the difference between progressive and “standard” vouchers is not made explicit in 
PISA international reports, and it is not evident that implementing progressive vouchers would 
decrease segregation. 
Quality of provision 
The OECD is very attentive to the institutional features potentially increasing teaching and 
learning quality. Two recommendations are tackled in this section: measures to strengthen the 
teaching profession and accountability systems. 
Teacher professional development 
Teachers can make a substantial difference to student learning (Hattie, 2008; T. J. Kane, 
McCaffrey, & Staiger, 2013; Muijs et al., 2014), and the OECD is active in collecting data on 
teachers not only through PISA but also, and especially, through the five-yearly Teaching And 
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Learning International Survey (TALIS). Among the many policies for strengthening the 
teaching profession, one specific intervention is discussed here: continuing professional 
development (CPD), otherwise called “in-service training”. The most comprehensive 
resources on the OECD’s stance on CPD are TALIS publications (e.g., OECD, 2009a), 
thematic reviews such as Teachers Matter (OECD, 2005c, 2011g) and a report from an 
international summit (Schleicher, 2011a).  
The OECD policy advice is that CPD should be based not only on teachers’ needs, but 
also on their performance and on the needs of their school. To align these three components, 
the OECD suggests that teacher profiles could be developed. Teacher profiles lay out 
professional expectations in terms of content knowledge, skills and effectiveness; they should 
be outcome-based, informed by research and developed with the help of the category, and 
should act as ‘a framework to guide initial teacher education, teacher certification, teachers’ 
ongoing professional development and career advancement’  (OECD, 2011g, p. 11).  
Some CPD time should be fixed, some should be based on incentives and some should 
depend on school needs, and the CPD provided could be partly free and partly a paying service. 
CPD should be part of the school evaluation system and should be expected from older 
teachers, too. ‘Effective professional development needs to be on-going, include training, 
practice and feedback, and provide adequate time and follow-up support. Successful programs 
involve teachers in learning activities that are similar to those they will use with their students’ 
(Schleicher, 2011a, p. 19). Finally, the OECD recommends promoting frequent and structured 
teacher cooperation to enhance student achievement. 
The best evidence available on CPD mostly agrees with the OECD recommendations, 
especially in terms of CPD having to be structured and systematic. It also adds some further 
insights. Helen Timperley (Timperley, Wilson, Barrar, & Fung, 2007; Timperley, 2008) 
confirms that the conditions for teacher learning are similar to those for student learning: 
existing practice and assumptions should be challenged, new practice should be modelled and 
teachers should be given the opportunity and the support to apply new knowledge and skills. 
Opportunities for CPD could be modelled around  the indications of current research, for 
instance the educational effectiveness strand, which has been found to have a greater impact 
on teacher skills and student outcomes than the holistic/reflective approach (Antoniou & 
Kyriakides, 2011).  
Teacher learning opportunities and skill development should focus on student outcomes; 
in other words, ‘success needs to be defined not in terms of teacher mastery of new strategies 
but in terms of the impact that changed practice has on valued outcomes’ (Timperley, 2008, 
p. 8). The same applies to teacher cooperative activities, which have been found to be effective 
only when geared towards solving an educational problem: ‘As an intervention on its own, a 
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collegial community will often end up merely entrenching existing practice and the 
assumptions on which it is based’ (p. 19; see also Vescio, Ross, & Adams, 2008).  
Timperley et al. (2007) also found that the funding model employed for CPD had no 
bearing on its successfulness. The effectiveness of aligning teachers’ needs to national and 
professional standards, research evidence, school operations and student outcomes was 
reported by Blank & de las Alas (2009), and teacher profiles may well be one way to reach 
this objective.  
Even though evidence on what makes quality CPD is growing (along Timperley’s work, 
see Adey, Hewitt, Hewitt, & Landau, 2004), it is harder to translate this knowledge into actual 
programmes. Interventions that have been shown to be effective in more than one 
circumstance exist (Allen, Hafen, Gregory, Mikami, & Pianta, 2015), but some of their 
mechanisms (e.g., their “dosage”, Pianta et al., 2014) are still not well understood and in 
general these interventions are not widely adopted.  
Even when robust study designs are employed, research on CPD is always affected by 
sampling and generalisability issues. Gersten et al. (2010) provide an insight into the practical 
difficulties that require overcoming in these kinds of studies, and one illustrative example is 
found in Heller et al. (2012), a randomized experiment which had to rely on a sample of 
volunteers. In general, few studies meet the strictest quality standards: Yoon et al. (2007) 
retained 9 out of the 1,300 pre-screened studies; Blank & de las Alas (2009) 16 out of 416; 
and Gersten et al. (2014) 5 out of 910.  
Moreover, while there is unequivocal evidence that some forms of CPD improve teaching 
and learning (Joyce & Showers, 2002), there is one non-negligible aspect of the OECD advice 
that might prevent full policy implementation: including CPD in teacher evaluation. Despite 
big advancements, there is no consensus on the best approaches to evaluating teachers (Coe, 
Aloisi, Higgins, & Elliot Major, 2014; Darling-hammond, 2015; Hallinger, Heck, & Murphy, 
2014; Raudenbush, 2015). Much of the debate revolves around finding the right balance 
between the formative and summative components of teacher assessment (Popham, 1988) and 
whether it is effectively possible (Master, 2014) or necessary (Hinchey, 2010) to separate 
them. The problem is that, at the bottom, teacher appraisal has to overcome not only 
methodological, but also political challenges ‘dealing with issues of trust, authority, and 
knowing who is in charge of the information generated’ (Coe et al., 2014, p. 26). 
All things considered, perhaps the most interesting aspect about CPD is how little the 
OECD seems to be able to capitalise on an area in which almost all its recommendations are 
backed by independent evidence.  
CPD was only briefly mentioned in the most recent TALIS reports (OECD, 2014e, 2014i) 
and recommendations focused only on the importance of mentoring and the lack of 
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opportunities and incentives. Of course, thematic reports have been produced (OECD, 2005c, 
2011g), but compare the somewhat underwhelming coverage of CPD with the treatment 
reserved for an issue such as performance-related pay for teachers. When it comes to teacher 
pay, policy mechanisms were extensively and deeply analysed (Springer & Balch, 2009) and 
dedicated policy briefs (OECD, 2012b) sanctioned its salience, even though its effectiveness 
as a policy option is much more disputed than that of CPD. This may be a coincidence, and 
yet it feels as if, in this case, the importance of teachers’ pay was “inflated” to the detriment 
of CPD because of its greater harmony with the economic slant (and expertise) of the OECD. 
Autonomy and accountability 
In PISA 2003, the OECD had reported that associations between autonomy and performance 
were generally weak, but also that autonomy in ‘in certain aspects of school management’ 
(OECD, 2004b, p. 236)—and especially in budget allocation—appeared to have some positive 
relationship with achievement. Similar claims were made in 2006. Autonomy in budgeting 
captured the greatest policy interest, although autonomy in curricular decisions began to 
emerge as a policy option (OECD, 2007b).  
With regard to accountability, until PISA 2006, the OECD had measured some variables 
connected to accountability policies, including the existence of centralised external exit 
examinations (CEEEs) and whether schools’ data were posted publicly (a practice often 
derogatively called “league tables” in educational literature). In 2006, both policies had a 
statistically significant association with student performance, although only the relationship 
with public posting of achievement data remained significant after accounting for 
demographic and socio-economic factors (OECD, 2007b). Although the section on 
accountability came right before that on autonomy in the international report, no links between 
the two were established.  
Things changed in 2009. On the one hand, contrary to the policy preferences until then, a 
‘clear relationship’ was highlighted ‘between the degree of curricular autonomy a school 
system offers its schools and the system’s performance’ (OECD, 2010f, p. 41), whereas the 
viability of autonomy in budget allocation was suddenly questioned. On the other hand, a 
connection between autonomy and accountability was established. What had happened? 
In those years, a series of secondary analyses revolving around the work of econometrician 
Ludger Wößmann (Fuchs & Wößmann, 2007; Wößmann et al., 2007; Wößmann, 2005) had 
introduced an interaction between autonomy and CEEEs which, ‘in light of economic theory’, 
was ‘intuitively appealing’ (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2011, p. 148). The argument goes as 
follows: in general, autonomy is negatively associated with outcomes, but the CEEEs make 
the association positive by ‘introducing accountability and transparency and preventing 
opportunistic behavior in decentralized decision-making’ (Fuchs & Wößmann, 2007, p. 452). 
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This is not a new idea: having a decentralised system that is controlled through incentives and 
sanctions is one of the staple characteristics of new public management (Dunleavy & Hood, 
1994; Hood, 1991), but it is argued here that Wößmann’s results allowed the OECD to 
establish a theoretical connection between autonomy and accountability. 
Wößmann is the director of the Ifo Center for the Economics of Education 
(http://www.cesifo-group.de) and a senior expert at the European Expert Network on 
Economics of Education (EENEE, http://www.eenee.de), a think tank sponsored by the 
Directorate General for Education and Culture of the European Commission and coordinated 
by the very same Ifo Center. Andreas Schleicher also collaborates with the EENEE as an 
external advisor. Schleicher’s collaboration ‘gives the network a major possibility to co-
ordinate its work with the crucial work at the OECD, to disseminate its research to the OECD 
and to receive feedback from the leading institution on internationally comparative measures 
of characteristics of education systems’ (EENEE, 2015). It is plausible that Schleicher got to 
know Wößmann’s work on CEEEs through the EENEE and “imported” it to the OECD. In 
fact, Wößmann’s work started being referenced in international reports from PISA 2009. 
The OECD did not simply reproduce the main arguments of this strand of econometric 
research; it integrated them into its own theory—which was still under development—of how 
autonomy interacts with accountability. For instance, while Wößmann (2005) noted that all 
autonomy measures (including curricular autonomy) are negatively related to PISA scores 
unless CEEEs exist in the system, the OECD continued to argue in 2009 and 2012 that 
curricular autonomy was a positive feature of education systems, and at most it mentioned en 
passant that this positive association ‘can play out differently within countries and economies’ 
(OECD, 2010f, p. 41, 2013g, p. 52)—a very disputable euphemism to say that there was also 
evidence of negative or no correlations.  
The OECD also conceptually merged CEEEs and “league tables”, whereas econometric 
literature keeps them separate (Boarini & Lüdemann, 2009). Specifically, in both 2009 and 
2012 the OECD used a reference to Fuchs & Wößmann (2007) to introduce the core idea that 
‘schools with more autonomy tend to perform better than schools with less autonomy when 
they are part of school systems with more accountability arrangements’ (OECD, 2013g, p. 
18). By ‘accountability arrangements’ the OECD means the public posting of achievement 
data and the existence of standardised subject policies within schools, such as ‘a school 
curriculum with shared instructional materials accompanied by staff development and 
training’ (p. 53).  
Fuchs & Wößmann (2007), however, used only CEEEs as a predictor variable and never 
mentioned public posting of achievement data in their paper. In 2009 the conceptual leap from 
econometric literature to the “league tables” was immediate, whereas in 2012 it was mediated 
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by the statement that CEEEs were ‘considered here as one form of accountability’ (p. 51). To 
add to the complexity, it should be noted that when the OECD links autonomy and 
accountability it is actually referring to two interactions: one is between public posting of 
achievement data and autonomy in resources, whereas the other between standardised subject 
policies and autonomy in curriculum and assessment. 
After this excursus, one may wonder what other evidence exists about the effectiveness of 
autonomy and/or accountability arrangements. Re-analyses of PISA data reported mixed 
results. Boarini & Lüdemann (2009) found, using PISA 2006, a significant and sizeable 
positive relationship between CEEEs and performance, a smaller positive coefficient for 
public posting of achievement data, but no observable “effects” of autonomy—or autonomy 
interacting with accountability—on PISA scores. Using the same dataset, Hindriks et al. 
(2010) argued that within Flanders more autonomous schools tended to have better results, 
but the link with accountability had to be based on the presence of a system of school 
inspections because ‘there are no central examinations’ in the region (p. 26). Hanushek, Link, 
& Wößmann (2013) combined data from PISA 2000–2009 and argued that ‘the effect of 
introducing autonomy is more positive in countries that hold the system accountable by central 
exit exams’ (p. 226, emphasis added)—but they did not study the impact of “league tables”.  
Scheerens et al. (2015) used multilevel structural equation modelling on the PISA 2009 
data and suggested that presumed relationships between autonomy, accountability and 
performance were spurious and disappeared once school SES was introduced in the model. 
Benton (2014) demonstrated that, at least in the case of PISA 2009, the positive interaction 
between autonomy and accountability at the cross-country level was a statistical artefact 
caused by data aggregation, which disappeared when carrying out separate regression analyses 
for different countries. Outside the PISA dataset, however, Loeb & Strunk (2007) found that, 
in the US, autonomy over resources positively interacted with school accountability.  
Even the literature focusing purely on CEEEs is divided. Wößmann continues to argue for 
their usefulness as a predictor variable in a range of settings (including labour market analyses, 
see Schwerdt & Wößmann, 2015), but Jürges et al. (2012) used a longitudinal extension to 
PISA 2003 and showed that CEEEs only improve curriculum-based knowledge and not 
overall literacy. Helbach (2012) merged the PISA 2000 and 2009 datasets and argued that 
student assessment through standardized tests (a proxy for CEEEs) has a positive association 
with country performance when interacting with other forms of school accountability, but not 
on its own. A research synthesis from the US reported no or negative effects of CEEEs on a 
range of performance and equity outcomes (Holme, Richards, Jimerson, & Cohen, 2010). 
Finally, some of the bases upon which the reinforcing effects of autonomy and 
accountability are predicated can be questioned: will not ‘holding schools accountable through 
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national student testing [… practically reduce] their autonomy over curriculum’ (Jensen, 
Weidmann, & Farmer, 2013, p. 37) because of a backwash effect? On a methodological level, 
to what extent are principal self-reports of school autonomy or accountability (used in PISA 
and other LSAs) a valid measure of the “real” variables (Brauckmann & Schwarz, 2014; 
Negrea & Duse, 2014)?  
Student performance 
Curricular changes 
The OECD advises that countries should introduce curricula that are ‘better 
aligned with […] 21st century skills’ (OECD, 2014g, p. 253).  
Reviewing curricular priorities is an interesting recommendation, because on the one hand the 
OECD claims that PISA focuses ‘on young people’s ability to use their knowledge and skills 
to meet real-life challenges, rather than on the extent to which they have mastered a specific 
school curriculum’ (OECD, 2001a, p. 14). On the other hand, ‘this orientation reflects a 
change in the goals and objectives of curricula themselves which are increasingly concerned 
with what students can do with what they learn at school, and not merely with whether they 
have learned it’ (ibid.).  
The basic assumption is that traditional national curricula are self-centred and 
disconnected from what students would really need in their future life. “21st century” curricula, 
in contrast, share with the PISA literacies an applied and real-life problem-solving slant, and 
can therefore be tested by PISA. Thus, it is not the case that PISA does not assess mastery of 
‘a specific school curriculum’ (OECD, 2001a, p. 14), but rather that it assesses mastery of that 
specific but implicit curriculum that has been agreed by the PGB from one cycle to the next. 
This is why the OECD felt entitled to praise a Canadian region for its new ‘21st century’ 
curriculum (OECD, 2014f, p. 119): having a national curriculum is not an issue, the issue is 
having a curriculum that is different from the “PISA curriculum”. The question, then, is what 
does the PISA curriculum comprise? What is the nature of the so-called “21st century skills”? 
Schleicher (2007) acknowledged that ‘there is no overarching agreement on what 
fundamental competencies 15-year-olds should possess’ (p. 352), but it is clear that, according 
to the OECD, 21st century skills must include the PISA literacies. After participating in PISA, 
many countries attempted to align their national curricula to it. This phenomenon was 
highlighted in Chapter 1, but a deeper analysis can be made, taking scientific literacy as an 
example. Some policy responses included reforms in Denmark (Dolin & Krogh, 2010) and 
the Netherlands (Eijkelhof, Kordes, & Savelsbergh, 2013); the US Framework for K-12 
Science Education, whose core ideas ‘are consistent with frameworks for national and 
international assessments’ like PISA (National Research Council, 2012, p. 141); or the aptly 
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named “Twenty First Century Science”, ‘a set of GCSE science courses giving all 14-16-year-
olds a worthwhile and inspiring experience of science’ (Nuffield Foundation, 2015).  
Dillon (2009) argued that “scientific literacy” is a slippery concept that can be fit for 
multiple purposes, which may explain why it found its way in many curricular reforms 
regardless of their actual correspondence to what the OECD intends by the phrase. Other 
authors have questioned the accuracy and appropriateness of the construct “science” and the 
extent to which PISA manages to assess it (Kind, 2013; Lau, 2009; Le Hebel, Montpied, & 
Tiberghien, 2014; Serder & Jakobsson, 2014), though a discussion is outside the scope of this 
section. 
While many national curricula are being aligned with the PISA literacies, it is unclear 
whether what PISA actually tests is a washed down version of national curricula. Lau (2009) 
critiques the lack of information from the OECD about the extent to which PISA was 
‘informed, but not constrained by the common denominator of national curricula’ (OECD, 
2006, p. 7). He turns one of the purported strengths of PISA (the fact that country scores are 
not affected by the curricular relevance of the PISA items, see McGaw, 2008) into a possible 
liability: if the OECD always tries to minimise the variability of the items’ curricular 
relevance, how can it be claimed that PISA is not measuring the common denominator of 
national curricula (Lau, 2009)?  
In spite of the influence of the PISA framework on country curricula, and of country 
curricula on PISA items, it is not known whether curricular alignment increases country 
performance—let alone whether employers will actually value the skill sets promoted by the 
OECD and others (like The Partnership for 21st Century Skills, www.p21.org), which is the 
assumption at the basis of this paradigm shift. As Ladwig (2010) reminds us, calls for 
‘nonacademic’ outcomes outside the mastery of traditional subjects are not new in education. 
Skill-based curricula always bring back questions of ‘just how much […] we really want 
schools to do’ (pp. 113–114) and about the wider purposes of education. These kinds of 
curricula would have to be evaluated from the extent to which they are successful ‘both in 
producing schooling outcomes and in the intended subsequent social effect’ (ibid.).  
It is too early to know what social effects could be linked to high PISA performance, and 
evidence of the predictive validity of PISA exists but is limited. Studies with a longitudinal 
component in Canada (Knighton & Bussière, 2006) and Denmark found that higher PISA 
scores were associated with increased odds of completing secondary education. In the 
International Adult Literacy Study, employment status and earnings were more strongly 
correlated with PISA literacies than with educational qualifications (Schleicher, 2007). 
Fischbach et al. (2013) showed that, in Luxembourg, higher PISA scores were associated with 
higher school grades and lower probability of repeating a class, and reported that a link 
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between PISA scores and grade repetition or school completion was also found in Germany 
and Australia. Jakubowski (2013) highlighted that, in Australia, PISA items purporting to 
measure higher thinking skills were related to future student qualifications, but he had to 
concede that it was too early to know what the relationship between PISA and ‘the most 
desirable outcomes’ (p. 25), such as labour market outcomes, could be.  
The strongest critique to this research strand is that it only shows that the best students 
also score high in PISA. If anything, this is evidence that PISA measures some general 
academic ability, rather than 21st century skills. Furthermore, none of these studies related 
student attainment to curricular changes, which means that it is not known whether following 
the EPA has any effect on student outcomes. Note that if any such effects were observed, they 
would still be difficult to interpret: they could be read both as a positive outcome (students are 
becoming more “literate”) or as a negative one (you can teach to PISA).  
This issue is tackled in more detail in the next chapter, but in general, the problem is that, 
without an external frame of reference, one cannot know whether PISA can be affected by 
score inflation in a similar way as high-stakes tests are. Brunner et al. (2007) used a quasi-
experimental design to show that PISA 2003 scores could be improved by 9—24 by pre-
testing students and coaching them for two weeks before retaking the assessment. More 
recently, Schleicher (2013f) fiercely rebutted claims that the success of Shanghai was due to 
teaching to the test, arguing that the PISA 2012 technical report (OECD, 2014h) found no sign 
of malpractice. 
A final point that is worth drawing attention to concerns another part of the OECD 
recommendation, namely the suggestion that curricula should be ‘better aligned with students’ 
interests’ (OECD, 2014g, p. 253). As an example, the OECD says: 
‘Japanese students are interested in inquiry-based learning, whereas science 
teaching at the upper secondary level does not cater to that interest. This finding 
could contribute to an understanding of why Japanese students in PISA show 
relatively low levels of positive attitudes toward science.’ (OECD, 2013c, p. 172) 
However, Ogura & Goto (2013) reported that Japanese students in grades 10 and 12 simply 
value scientific tracks less than other options, which may explain their low levels of positive 
attitudes towards science. Perhaps the issue in Japanese education is not lack of inquiry-based 
learning but lack of interest in a scientific career. Would the OECD still claim that curricula 
should be better aligned with students’ interests when students’ interests do not involve one 
of the PISA literacies? It is likely that the actual OECD advice is not, as written, that 
governments should adapt the literacies to what students might consider of interest, but rather 
that they should try to convince students that the OECD literacies are interesting. 
Besides, aligning curricula to perceived students’ interests to make them more relevant is 
a difficult endeavour which is currently not supported by solid theoretical underpinnings. In 
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some Australian regions, similar changes made student assessment less valid and tended to 
exacerbate the differences between more and less academically-minded students (Fenwick, 
2011). When listening to students’ interests becomes personalised learning, there is a risk that 
education is turned into a market in which only the savviest customers will be able to thrive 
(Prain et al., 2013). 
Conclusions to Chapter 3 
This chapter has reconstructed the OECD education policy advice and has briefly evaluated 
its internal coherence, consistency over time and soundness. 
The coherence of the EPA 
The EPA is difficult to frame accurately. Whilst made of explicit recommendations, as a whole 
the policy advice emerges from OECD publications without ever having been clearly 
summarised and organised as was done for this thesis. It feels as if it were the result of several 
contributing voices over the years, from within and outside education, without a unique plan 
for country education. In fact, the Strategic Development Group argued over ten years ago 
that ‘the key policy objectives that are driving the development of PISA’ (OECD, 2003c, p. 
10) needed to be conceptualised better, and that the policy levers that could help countries to 
achieve these objectives had not been explicitly identified. 
There are a few generic core areas of interest that recur over time and across publications; 
issues related to disadvantage, lifelong learning, or teacher quality. Many other areas instead 
are given attention only intermittently. A certain “fuzziness” characterises the boundaries 
delimiting the educational topics and subtopics that are the object of the OECD 
recommendations (and recall the fuzziness of the very concept of “education policy”). 
Similarly varying is the modality with which the advice is given: the OECD practical 
arguments can involve some very explicit and specific recommendations, some implicit and 
general ones, and many other variations along the axes of explicitness and specificity. Overall, 
the OECD is a very prolific advisor, but the outcome is a ‘patchwork of loosely connected 
topics [… that] have been strung together to provide a minimum semblance of coherence’ that 
Henry et al. (2001, p. 52) poignantly recognised.  
This author would argue that the problems with the coherence of the EPA are due to the 
fact that educational concepts (e.g., “accountability”, “choice” or “leadership”) are symbols, 
‘vehicles [… carrying] a load of “meanings”’ (Turner, 1975, p. 152). Educational concepts 
appear transparent but they actually hide multiple interpretations; they originate from different 
fields (e.g., the econometric or educational effectiveness literature) and accordingly they may 
acquire different meanings.  
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Educational concepts and related indicators (other symbolic constructions) are supposed 
to be value-free, and this is an advantage for the OECD because ‘the less obviously political 
in form symbols are, the more efficacious politically they prove to be’ (Cohen, 1979, p. 87). 
Since symbols are ‘multivocal, manipulable, and ambiguous’ (Turner, 1975, p. 146), so are 
symbolic systems like the framework embodying the OECD educational understanding and 
policy stance. Symbolic systems ‘confront us as lacking coherence, “with gaps, modifications, 
and inconsistencies” […] because of “the continual intrusion of pragmatic issues into the kinds 
of functions symbols are made to serve”’ (Firth, 1973, p. 426; quoted in Turner, 1975, p. 146).  
Turner (1975) argued that order in symbolic system comes ‘from purpose, not from 
connaissance’ (p. 147). Given the complex internal functioning of the OECD, its recurrent 
identity crisis (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Marcussen & Trondal, 2011) and the novelty of 
education as a primary branch, it is not surprising that the EPA is “disordered”. Nevertheless, 
it is a stain on the mantle of scientific rationality that the OECD supposedly wears (M. N. 
Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). 
The consistency of the EPA 
The analysis showed that the EPA is remarkably stable over time, but the extent to which this 
was the result of happenstance as opposed to a purposeful decision could not be investigated 
within this research. Nevertheless, some tentative interpretations can be advanced.  
The priorities of the PGB may play a role when evidence is scarce. If priorities do not 
change and there is no strong evidence for or against a policy, then some presumptive 
inferences may be reproduced from cycle to cycle until they are disproved. Examples include 
recommendations on school funding, class size or teacher qualifications, which continue to be 
included in PISA reports in spite of a limited ability of their indicators to provide valuable 
information.  
There are claims that teacher training and qualifications are ‘most important for 
educational policy, because there is a growing need to recruit teachers from non-traditional 
backgrounds’ (Klieme & Kuger, 2014, p. 28). However, they have also been found to be 
unrelated to teacher quality or effectiveness (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006, 2012). Class size 
(Leithwood & Jantzi, 2009) and funding (Gibbons & Mcnally, 2013) may or may not be 
effective depending on the context and form of implementation, but they are still measured by 
PISA.  
Perhaps it is because of their political (rather than educational) value; perhaps they are 
simply part of a heritage that has thus far gone unquestioned. An interviewee from one of the 
case studies introduced later on in this document mentioned that the OECD does not draw 
only from empirical research, but also from educational “fashions” and values. For instance, 
131 
 
the rationale for including class size as a measure is that it has ‘always been included in the 
School Questionnaire’ (Klieme & Kuger, 2014, p. 33). The combination of low informative 
power and a constant interest would provide little incentive to vary the recommendations, 
which would explain why some of them are reproduced verbatim across publications and over 
time. 
Another (and complementary) possibility is that, in areas that have attracted less interest 
from the PGB, the Secretariat may have enjoyed more autonomy and found more openings to 
introduce and reiterate some key concepts shared by the research community within the 
OECD. This is more an impression informed by the findings than a research hypothesis, and 
besides, there is evidence refuting it. For instance, competition and choice have never been 
top PGB priorities for PISA, but rather than disinterest this may reflect the fact that they are 
highly contested options. Issues of schools competing for their students created several 
tensions in the 1980s between egalitarians and neo-conservatives (Henry et al., 2001). At 
present, international reports carefully balance explanations for either view, although the 
shortcomings of school competition are generally given more room.  
The role of PISA in informing the EPA 
The analysis found inconsistent presentation of statistical information, cluttered graphs and 
some unidirectional reading of correlational data in international reports. Moreover, success 
stories were sometimes used to promote the usefulness of PISA as a source of information, 
when in fact PISA or the EPA played a limited role in informing the policies of exemplar 
countries. Altogether, there were indications that the EPA might pre-date PISA evidence, 
instead of being informed by it.  
This is consistent with Pedró’s (2012) claim that policy advice from PISA is not evidence-
based, but rather a ‘leap in the dark’. Pedró (2012) observed that strong claims are often build 
upon ‘feeble’ bases (p. 157) qualified by a disclaimer. Sometimes, this practice is taken even 
further: Pedró (2012) brings the example of praise for public posting of achievement data in 
the 2006 report which was directly contradicted by the evidence in the same chapter. In sum, 
the OECD seems to be able to make, in official publications, the same instrumental use of 
PISA as countries do.  
The stability of the EPA over and above PISA evidence may be necessary for constructing 
successful knowledge for policy, but it certainly testifies against the validity of PISA in 
producing data for policy. It does produces data, it is indeed used—or at least mentioned—in 
policymaking, but the ‘bridge’ (Pedró, 2012) between data and policy is sometimes created ad 
hoc. This is a definite consequence of the poor theoretical framework critiqued in the previous 
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section. In these circumstances, the EPA becomes little more than a policy narrative, a story 
with which to make sense of the unknown (Roe, 1994).  
The soundness of the EPA 
The analysis explored the soundness of the EPA in selected recommendations. The 
overarching theme was once again the lack of structure in the framework, which is captured 
by four interrelated issues.  
Strong evidence not capitalised on 
Pre-primary education is an example of a recommendation in which very strong scientific 
evidence is not matched by an (official) interest of the PGB. This variable was not measured 
in 2000 and 2006, and although it was part of the 2015 framework it was not assigned a high-
priority status. It is unclear why this may be the case. Naturally, early childhood provisions 
are different in any country, but so are priority indicators such as leadership and school 
management (Klieme & Kuger, 2014). Moreover, ‘every country in Europe has set up some 
form of publicly subsidised and accredited early childhood education and care for children 
below the age of compulsory schooling’ (Eurydice, 2009a, p. 75). Perhaps the PGB is aware 
of the importance of pre-primary education, but perceived difficulties in policy action may 
result in this component being assigned lower priority: countries might know that with or 
without OECD backing, they can do little to change the existing situation.  
Other examples are stratification policies such as tracking and retention, where the 
consensus is that they have a negative impact on equity and no impact or negative impact on 
achievement. The OECD acknowledges and insists on this point (for instance through PISA 
in Focus, see OECD, 2011i, 2014a, 2014b), but the quality and strength of the EPA do not 
seem to match those of the evidence. When practical advice is given—such as to provide ‘extra 
teaching time for students who fall behind’ (OECD, 2014a, p. 4) or ensure transferability 
between the academic and vocational pathway (see Table 3.2)—little research exists to 
confirm or contradict such statements. A peculiar case is student transferring as a disciplinary 
action, an example of ineffective policy used by the OECD to advocate for more school 
autonomy with no clear theorisation linking the two.  
A third example is CPD, a practice finding great support in the literature (provided it has 
certain qualities) and correspondingly limited attention from the OECD, especially in 
comparison with other policies (teacher pay) whose evidence base is far more disputed. It was 
argued that this may be due to the prevalence of the econometric experts within the 
organisation, who may be less aware of topics traditionally belonging to the education field.  
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Theorisation becoming better over time 
At the beginning of PISA, educational areas such as gender gap lacked theoretical support. 
The conceptualisation of gender gap was confusing because the OECD problematised it in 
terms of both higher education choices and secondary education achievement. The magnitude 
of the gap in secondary education is uncertain. The recommendation about making certain 
pathways more appealing to the underrepresented gender was appropriate, but insufficient, 
since the source of the problem lies in a combination of individual and environmental factors.  
More recently, the OECD substantively improved its theoretical framing of the issue. As 
a result, it may be able to give more targeted advice in the future. Some positive signals in this 
direction come from The ABC of Gender Equality in Education report (OECD, 2015i), whose 
policy recommendations were perhaps not very cohesive, but they were focused, clear and 
consistent with research findings. 
EPA still under development 
School competition and choice have been contested topics for many years, but vouchers have 
entered the OECD radar only recently. They were practically absent from international reports 
until 2009, when they were described as a possible school choice (OECD, 2010f). In 2012 a 
stronger link between vouchers, choice and inequality was made, but it was not accompanied 
by any specific policy recommendation (OECD, 2013g). In the Education GPS, however, they 
are included as a policy option which facilitates (voluntary) student transfer, whereas PISA in 
Focus suggests that they can work as socio-economic equalisers when they target specific 
disadvantaged groups (OECD, 2012a). The reference is to the ‘progressive’ voucher schemes 
(Musset, 2012; OECD, 2012c), but a clear distinction between progressive and non-
progressive schemes is drawn only in some publications.  
Overall, it seems as if the OECD were beginning to introduce vouchers as a viable policy 
option that still needs being framed appropriately, especially since they belong to a category 
(competition and choice) which is contested in the literature and by some member countries. 
A similar argument can be made for school autonomy. Initially, findings on different types 
of autonomy (resources, curriculum, assessment, staffing) were presented together as if 
“autonomy” only meant one thing, although budget allocation was given somewhat more 
prominence. Progressively, data on autonomy were disaggregated and curricular autonomy 
was placed under the spotlight. At the same time, a connection was established between 
autonomy and accountability, perhaps drawing from econometric research but replacing the 
role of CEEEs with public posting of achievement data as a measure of accountability (see for 
example OECD, 2011f).  
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An evolution of the EPA is welcome; in fact, it is exactly what should happen when the 
evidence changes. However, the impression in this instance is that a strong EPA was absent 
until the opportunity came to connect autonomy and accountability within a New Public 
Management framework. This may have the double effect of clarifying but also crystallising 
the EPA. 
PISA for PISA’s sake 
When the OECD suggests that country curricula should be more aligned with 21st century 
skills it is implicitly conceding that it is not true that PISA is curriculum-free, only that it 
follows its own. Some would frame the undefined “PISA curriculum” within the neo-liberal 
agenda, but for the purpose of this study it is sufficient to recognise that it includes the core 
literacies (Reading, Mathematics and Science) and other skills (Problem-solving, Finance) 
that are less frequently assessed. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the extent to 
which the PISA curriculum is not a watered-down and amended version of national curricula 
without studying each country’s curriculum.  
However, it can be argued that at present there is no evidence that aligning national 
curricula to vaguely-defined 21st century skills would improve country performance in 
PISA—let alone have an impact on labour market outcomes as “promised” by the OECD. The 
fact that different studies found PISA scores to be predictive of a lower risk of school dropout 
may simply indicate that PISA captures general academic ability rather than skills for life. 
Finally, it was observed that when the OECD suggests that curricula should reflect the 
students’ interest, in reality it is restating the importance of PISA by arguing that governments 
should motivated students to embrace its curriculum. 
The next chapter 
Some authors (Baird et al., 2011; Pedró, 2012) have noted that the policy effects of PISA—
and the value of the EPA—can only be appreciated through trend analyses and triangulation 
of different evidence sources. Chapter 4 provides a cross-national measure of country 
alignment with PISA recommendations (the EPA Index) and different approaches to trend 
analysis to estimate, albeit indirectly, the effectiveness of the EPA. As part of the evaluation, 
the validity and the limitations of PISA as an instrument to measure change are also addressed. 
Cross-national evidence from Chapter 4 is complemented by evidence from two case studies 





Chapter 4: A cross-country analysis of the use and impact 
of the EPA 
This chapter is articulated in the following parts: 
- A cross-country analysis of trends in performance and equity. 
- The relationship between specific policy outputs and PISA outcomes. 
- An exploration of country alignment with the EPA. 
- A summary of the limitations of PISA. 
There is evidence of policy alignment with the EPA in some countries and cross-country 
trends in performance have been on the rise, though only moderately. However, there is less 
evidence that countries are implementing OECD recommendations in terms of equity, though 
there are indications that doing so might be associated with changes in performance. While 
the reliability of PISA is high, it is argued that score differences below 20 points across 
countries or over time may often be a statistical artefact, and should not be overly-emphasised 
in policy reports. Finally, a significant correlation was found between country expansion of 
pre-primary education and increases in PISA scores ten years later. This adds to the evidence 
on the positive effects of early childhood education widely reported in the literature, and 
makes one question the decision of the PGB not to consider it a policy priority, as was noted 
in Chapter 3. 
Introduction 
In this chapter, large-scale evidence on the use of EPA for national policymaking and its 
plausible impact on country outcomes is sought by comparing original data analyses11 with 
findings from other studies. The chapter proceeds in three steps that use increasingly targeted 
                                                     
11 Except where indicated, all analyses in this chapter were original work, carried out within the 
statistical environment R (R Core Team, 2015) using the “nlme” package (version 3.1-117, Pinheiro et 
al., 2015) and the “ggplot2” package for charts (Wickham, 2009). The analyses used the PISA datasets 
that are freely available from the OECD website (https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/, accessed 16 
April 2016). The equity measures used for the analyses in the “First step: trends in performance and 
equity” section, below, were not available for all country-years. Therefore, a new dataset comprising 
the Strength and the Slope of the socio-economic gradient (see equity section) for all countries and all 
years was produced using the statistical software IBM® SPSS® Statistics 22 and the methodology 
available in the PISA Data Analysis Manual (OECD, 2009d). Data on country GDP and gross 
enrolment ratio at pre-primary education were taken from The World Bank and UNESCO databases. 
For more information on the multilevel modelling approach used in this chapter, refer to Appendix 5 




data. The first step models educational outcomes in performance and equity; the second relates 
outputs to outcomes; and the third links policy alignment with outcomes. 
The first step is to analyse trends in performance and equity since PISA started in 2000. If 
the EPA is adopted, implemented and effective, then some increases in performance or equity 
should be observed. In this chapter, score and inequality changes over time are modelled using 
correlational analysis and multilevel growth models. Particular emphasis is given to 
interpreting the linearity of trends, the clustering of OECD and partner countries, and the 
stability of the within-country variance compared to the changes in the between-country 
variance. 
The second step contrasts the relationships of three policy outputs (general economic 
productivity, equity levels and access to pre-primary education) with PISA outcomes. The 
rationale is that any detectable “effect” on PISA scores should be larger for the factor that is 
more malleable by specific education policies (access to pre-primary education), smaller for 
the “generic” educational factor (equitability) and even smaller for the non-educational one 
(productivity). By comparing the effects of the three indicators, the second step attempts to 
set an empirical limit on the extent to which education reforms could be expected to produce 
measurable changes in country outcomes. 
The third step complements secondary PISA data analyses with information collected 
through expert questionnaires, in order to relate country levels and changes in achievement 
and equity to their degree of alignment with OECD recommendations. The questionnaires 
return both an overall rating of country alignment with the EPA and a breakdown for a small 
sample of countries. 
Finally, the chapter considers validity and reliability issues in relation to PISA, in 
particular issues affecting the comparability of scores between countries and over time. The 
OECD response to some of the PISA shortcomings is discussed, and conclusions are drawn.  
First step: trends in performance and equity 
Trends in performance 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 map trends in Reading between 2000 and 2012, and Mathematics 
between 2003 and 2012. Scores in the Reading domain are comparable across five 
administrations and have the highest variability, yet trends look very linear. Most changes are 
small, but there is evidence of some large score increases, especially among non-OECD 
countries. The red and blue lines show the overall gap between OECD and partner countries. 
In Reading, the dots on occasion 0 (the first comparable PISA cycle) appear more spread out 
than they do on occasion 4 (PISA 2012), which suggests that results may be converging with 
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time. In Mathematics, large changes are rarer and the spread seems more constant than for 
Reading, but the difference between the OECD cluster and other countries is still visible. 
Science trends (not displayed) are very similar to those in Mathematics. 
Figure 4.1: Trends in PISA Reading scores by measurement occasion. A value of 0 corresponds to the 
year 2000. 
 
Figure 4.2: Trends in PISA Mathematics scores by measurement occasion. A value of 0 corresponds to 
the year 2003. 
 
































The impressions of linearity, of differences between OECD and partner countries and of 
a slight decrease in spread over time are supported by correlational and multilevel analyses, 
which also provide some indications of the magnitude of score changes over time. 
Correlational analysis: change between two time points 
Table 4.1: correlation between country mean PISA scores, using the full (D0, n = 66) and reduced (D1, 
n = 30) datasets 
   FULL DATASET (D0) 
   READING 2000‒2012 MATHS 2003‒2012 SCIENCE 06‒12 

























 00 1 .94 .91 .95 .93 .92 .92 .93 .89 .93 .94 .92 
03 .94 1 .97 .96 .92 .95 .94 .94 .90 .95 .95 .92 
06 .92 .97 1 .97 .94 .94 .96 .94 .91 .96 .96 .94 
09 .94 .96 .96 1 .97 .93 .95 .96 .93 .95 .98 .96 






 03 .92 .94 .93 .94 .94 1 .99 .98 .95 .97 .96 .94 
06 .91 .94 .95 .95 .94 .99 1 .98 .96 .98 .97 .95 
09 .90 .93 .94 .96 .95 .97 .97 1 .98 .96 .98 .97 




 06 .92 .94 .94 .95 .94 .97 .97 .96 .92 1 .98 .97 
09 .92 .94 .95 .97 .97 .96 .96 .98 .95 .98 1 .99 
12 .88 .91 .92 .93 .98 .94 .93 .95 .97 .96 .98 1 
Source: own elaboration using PISA data. 
Table 4.1 summarises the Pearson’s correlation coefficient r between country mean scores 
in Reading, Mathematics and Science from PISA 2000 to PISA 2012. The Reading scales are 
comparable between 2000 and 2012; the Mathematics scales between 2003 and 2012; and the 
Science scales between 2006 and 2012 (OECD, 2009d). The correlations in the upper-right 
part of the table were computed using a dataset of all countries with at least two observations 
(D0, n = 66, Appendix 3, Table 4.A) with pairwise deletion of missing data, which means that 
the subsets being correlated between each pair of assessment cycles included different 
countries. To account for this, the bottom-left side of the table shows correlations from a 
reduced dataset (D1, n = 30) comprising only complete cases—i.e., only those 30 countries 
that took part in all PISA assessments. 
Correlations using either dataset are highly comparable and very strong, ranging from .89 
to .99 in D0 and from .84 to .99 in D1. This suggests that countries experience very little 
variation in scores within and across domains over time. These correlations do not depend on 
the standard errors of the mean country scores (analysis not shown). Within subjects, 
correlations decrease with some regularity, which is what one would expect if scores were 
changing in a linear fashion. Between subjects, correlations in Mathematics and Science are 
very similar, suggesting that scores in one domain “explain” with a high level of accuracy the 
scores in the other. To have an idea of the magnitude of the score variability plotted in Figure 
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4.1 and Figure 4.2, the distribution of score changes between different PISA cycles is shown 
in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of score changes by time gap and domain 
  
 
The ‘time gap’ is the distance between 
assessments. Time gap 1 indicates consecutive 
assessments, time gap 2 includes scores two 
cycles apart (e.g., PISA 2000 and 2006, 2003 
and 2009), and so on. The width of the boxes is 
proportional to the sample size n. The notches 
extend to ±1.58 ×
𝐼𝑄𝑅
√𝑛
, where IQR represent the 
interquartile range, and they theoretically 
represent the 95% confidence interval around 
the median (McGill, Tukey, & Larsen, 1978); 
the reader is advised, though, that this 
calculation is only an approximation and that 
the images are only indicative. Outliers are 
plotted in red. 
Source: own elaboration using PISA data 
The boxplots show that the magnitude and variability of score changes tend to increase 
the further apart two assessments, confirming that score changes, especially negative ones, 
tend to be incremental rather than sudden. Large improvements (or decreases) from one cycle 
to the next are possible but unlikely, and in general, most country score changes are well below 
±20 points on the scale with a SD of 100  (Lenkeit & Caro, 2014, calculate that 95% of them 
are between -13.8 and +17.8 points).  
Some outlying score changes are shown in Table 4.2. The fact that extreme score changes 
are observed mostly in Reading and among non-OECD countries raises a question: have these 
countries implemented particularly effective policies targeting reading literacy, or are the data 
for Reading less reliable?  
Table 4.2: a list of country score changes above ± 40 points 
CHANGE COUNTRY OECD? DOMAIN PERIOD 
-44.53 Argentina No Reading  2000‒2006 
40.09 Japan Yes Reading  2006‒2012 
40.99 Serbia No Reading  2006‒2009 
41.67 Romania No Reading  2006‒2012 
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42.49 Liechtenstein No Reading  2000‒2003 
42.61 Peru No Reading  2000‒2009 
45.10 Serbia No Reading  2006‒2012 
45.11 Albania No Reading  2000‒2012 
47.13 Israel Yes Reading  2006‒2012 
50.16 Qatar No Maths  2006‒2009 
57.07 Peru No Reading  2000‒2012 
58.49 Qatar No Maths  2006‒2012 
59.502 Qatar No Reading  2006‒2009 
75.29 Qatar No Reading  2006‒2012 
Source: own elaboration using PISA data 
A cursory examination of the PISA reliability coefficients provided by the OECD 
(Appendix 3, Table 4.B) shows that the Reading scale is as reliable as the Mathematics and 
Science scales, but a more thorough discussion about the robustness of PISA across changing 
times and conditions, which is presented at the end of this chapter, returns a more complex 
picture. Moreover, the case of Qatar suggests that the actual impact of (EPA-aligned) policies 
may be lower than what the numbers in Table 4.2 imply. 
Qatar began its “Education for a New Era” reform in 2001. The reform was designed by 
the RAND Corporation following international recommendations summarised in Guarino & 
Tanner (2012) as the ‘principles of adequacy in funding, accountability, autonomy and equity’ 
(p. 224). The major intervention was the creation of publicly-funded independent schools 
pairing autonomy in curriculum and staffing with increased accountability (Zellman et al., 
2009). Four subjects were compulsory (Arabic, mathematics, science and English), but 
teachers and principals were otherwise given pedagogical and curricular freedom, as well as 
additional CPD opportunities. Independent schools were also granted more powers for hiring, 
paying and dismissing teachers. Accountability was established through evaluations, 
standardised assessments and school reports cards that would allow parents to make informed 
choices.  
The first independent schools were established between 2004 and 2005, and a first 
evaluation by the RAND Corporation was completed in 2007. Independent schools had 
managed to increase the percentage of students approaching governmental standards in Arabic 
and English, though self-selection of highly motivated teachers and students in the new 
schools could not be excluded. The implementation of the reform was also hampered by 
systemic resistance and unintended consequences that made evaluators doubt whether any 
improvement could be sustained over the following years (Zellman et al., 2009).  
Using national data from 2004–2006, Guarino & Tanner (2012) reported that ‘many of the 
reform principles that reflected international recommendations were almost immediately 
transformed – largely in the direction of mimicking the pre-existing system’ (p. 243), which 
141 
 
severely reduced the effectiveness of the intervention. ‘Initially generous funding levels were 
reduced, […] provider autonomy was curbed and the population from which providers could 
be drawn […] was limited to individuals within the system’ (ibid.). Accountability ‘was 
enforced primarily via spending restrictions’, whereas ‘the parental choice mechanism […] 
was relatively weak’ (p. 242). Gender parity was hardly achieved.  
Despite the many shortcomings, Guarino & Tanner (2012) thought that the reform had 
planted some seeds for future achievement. Indeed, Qatar improved its performance by up to 
75 points in PISA and by over 100 points between TIMSS 2007 and 2011 (Mullis, Martin, 
Foy, & Arora, 2012; Mullis et al., 2008). However, the performance gap between public 
(including independent) and private schools in favour of these latter remained the same 
(Cheema, 2015), the rate of improvement has been decreasing and gains between PISA 2009 
and 2012 are explained almost completely by changes in the socio-economic and demographic 
composition of the student population (OECD, 2014g).  
Furthermore, it is not unlikely that changes in the performance of immigrant students may 
be the main driver behind PISA trends, irrespective of any educational reforms. In Europe, 
20% of the PISA 2009 Reading items were easier for immigrants, even though they are 
generally a disadvantaged minority (Araújo & Dinis da Costa, 2012). In Qatar, immigrant 
students are the majority, have higher motivation and consistently outperform natives in all 
PISA literacies, Reading in particular (Areepattamannil, Melkonian, & Khine, 2015; 
Areepattamannil, 2012; Cheema, 2014). Response patterns in the English version of PISA 
2006 were closer to those of pupils in English-speaking countries than to those of Qatari 
students taking the Arabic version of the assessment (Grisay, De Jong, Gebhardt, Berezner, & 
Halleux-Monseur, 2007).  
Overall, the “Education for a New Era” reform was originally in agreement with the EPA 
but several adjustments during its implementation rapidly brought it out of line. There is 
evidence of performance (but not equity) increases in LSAs, but the reform did not bridge the 
gap between public and private education and did not affect the behaviours and outcomes of 
Qatari students—its intended target population. It is hard to claim evidence of impact or that 
any impact was due to policy alignment with the EPA. In fact, an alternative narrative might 
state that once the Qatari leadership amended the education reform so that it was less aligned 
with the EPA, country performance improved. 
Other questions about the relationship between PISA scores and the effectiveness of 
country policies are raised by Figure 4.4, which plots results from Mathematics 2003 and 
2006. The correlation between the two sets of value is .99 in D0 and D1, the highest among all 
PISA correlations in Table 4.1. The plot shows the 95% confidence intervals around the 
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country scores in 2003 (horizontal blue bars) and in 2006 (vertical red bars), as well as the 
regression line (in green) and the principal axis (in black)12.  
Figure 4.4: The highest score correlation, Mathematics 2003‒2006 
 
Source: own elaboration using PISA data 
Very few countries (such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico) experienced statistically 
significant changes in Mathematics between these two PISA cycles. Is it reasonable to 
maintain that only these countries managed to introduce effective policies? And to what extent 
do changes between two time points reflect actual increases in student ability? Possible 
answers are explored below by considering the case of Indonesia. 
Indonesia overhauled its education system in 2003. New legislation introduced 
competency-based curricula, a more stringent teacher certification system, as well as increased 
                                                     
12 While the regression line is the line of best fit, the principal axis is not a summary of the data but 
a statement based on equality: it is the line that would be obtained if scores in 2006 were equal to those 
in 2003. The regression line is often a less-than-ideal method to calculate difference in performance 
between two time points (He & Tymms, 2013). Consider the case of Thailand: Thailand falls exactly 
on the principal axis, meaning that its scores in 2003 and 2006 were almost identical (and indeed, they 
were 416.978 and 417.073). This is not evident from the regression line. When comparing two time-
points, knowing that Thailand progressed less than expected considering all data-points (an inference 
about space) is arguably less informative than knowing that it progressed less than expected considering 
its previous performance (an inference about time): the principal axis helps to visualise changes in 
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autonomy in governance and pedagogy (Mullis, Martin, Minnich, et al., 2012; UNESCO-IBE, 
2011a). This, along with improvements in Reading and a reduction in the percentage of low 
achievers, earned the country some praise from the OECD (2011c). Indeed, Reading scores 
increased by 31 points between 2000 and 2009 and Mathematics scores also increased by 31-
point between 2003 and 2006 (the gap shown in Figure 4.4). Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011) 
focused on this gap and found that the greatest share of score variance between the two cycles 
was not explained by school and student characteristics or background. They concluded that 
‘Indonesia was able to better educate its students in 2006 than in 2003’ (p. 18).  
However, they did not consider the alternative explanation that the observed changes 
might have been a statistical artefact, especially in consideration of further results. If, as they 
claimed, ‘the 2006 score was partly the result of reforms, policies, strategies, and interventions 
that were put in place years ago, even a generation ago’, then the trend should have continued 
in 2009 and 2012, but this was not the case. In Mathematics, the 2003–2006 gain was followed 
by a 20-point loss in 2009 and, once socio-demographic changes are taken into account, a flat 
trend emerged between 2003 and 2012 (OECD, 2014g). Lenkeit & Caro (2014) demonstrated 
that the long-term changes in Reading and Mathematics in Indonesia were completely driven 
by socio-economic and factors that were ‘non-malleable’ by education policies.  
The Mathematics performance of the country was stable also according to TIMSS 1999–
2007 (Mullis et al., 2008). TIMSS and PISA are different, but not incomparable. In fact, Wu 
(2009) showed that once student age and content coverage were taken into account, TIMSS 
and PISA 2003 shared 93% of the score variance; simple adjustments to sampling and 
assessment content would be sufficient to cancel the gap between PISA 2003 and 2006 for 
Indonesia. In summary, the improvements in Reading or Mathematics in Indonesia—and 
especially the gain between 2003 and 2006—were probably not driven by recent education 
reforms.  
The examples of Indonesia and Qatar suggest that policy alignment may stop at the level 
of the intentions and not be fully achieved in practice, even when a country has the resources 
to invest in reforming the system. Moreover, the analyses above support the hypothesis that 
the impact of country-level education interventions may be small and incremental, rather than 
large and sudden. Most changes are smaller than a fifth of a PISA standard deviation, although 
partner countries appear to have experienced larger score fluctuations, which may be due to 
changes in the socio-economic composition of test-takers.  
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Multilevel analysis: change between OECD and partner countries over many time 
points 
To model the trends in Figure 4.1 or Figure 4.2, the OECD uses a method referred to in the 
literature as ‘no pooling’ (Gelman & Hill, 2007), whereby within-country observations (PISA 
scores) are regressed separately for each country (OECD, 2012e, 2014g). The method 
accurately tracks individual trends, but it tends to over-estimate between-country differences 
and has trouble detecting global trends.  
Multilevel or hierarchical modelling (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Goldstein, 2011; Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002), in contrast, is a form of ‘partial pooling’ analysis that can accurately model 
both individual and general trends by taking into account between- and within-country 
similarities. To do this, it assigns a variance component not only to Level-1 units (within-
country scores over time), but also to average country achievement (the Level-2 units). For 
ease of reading, only relevant results are discussed in this section; technical details are 
available in Appendix 5 and 6. 
A model accounting for differences in initial country performance levels and allowing for 
different slopes in country trends (the random-intercept random-slope Model C in the 
Appendix 3, Tables 4.C and 4.D) provided a good fit for the data. It confirmed that the 
between-country variance is much larger than the within-country variance, this latter 
accounting for about 2–5% of the total variance. It also confirmed that PISA scores change 
little from year to year: the average effect of time on scores is between +2.4 and +3.3 points 
per cycle, or +0.6–1.1 point per year depending on the domain. The global effect of time on 
scores is small because of the opposite trends of OECD and partner countries: while the 
improvement of OECD economies tends to shrink or even turn negative with time, the 
improvement of partner countries remains strong and positive.  
The between-country variance is decreasing with time (Appendix 3, Table 4.E) and the 
covariance between intercept and slope is negative. In other words, lower-achieving partner 
countries improve at a faster rate than higher achieving OECD ones. Altogether, these results 
corroborate the impression of score convergence, or ‘fanning in’ (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & 
Goldstein, 2012), expressed at the beginning of this chapter. This linear model was also able 
to capture most of the within-country variance. The fact that 12 years of PISA can be easily 
summarised with one line suggests that for the most part the effect of policies on scores must 
be small and progressive, rather than large and sudden. 
Model diagnostics (Appendix 6) revealed a curvilinear structure was found in Reading 
data. This replicates, in a different domain and on a larger scale, OECD findings whereby the 
rate of change in Mathematics is not constant in some countries (OECD, 2014g, p. 55). The 
implications of this are discussed in the next section. 
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The implications of trends linearity, country clustering and changes in 
between-country variance  
What can linearity, score differences between OECD and partner countries and decrease in 
spread tell us about the use and effectiveness of the EPA?  
Linearity in country trends 
Linearity, paired with a low within-country variance, implies that either the EPA has not been 
fully implemented or it has yet to produce any detectable effects: countries simply continue in 
their set course. This is why the curvilinear trends reported above are interesting: if they 
continued for another two or three administrations, and if they were not due to score drifting 
or teaching to the test, they could be indirect evidence of the effectiveness of the education 
reforms of the early 2000s.  
Part of the difficulty in looking for policy effects is that there is little indication in the 
literature of how long it takes for policies to have an impact, and therefore what time frames 
to observe. Time frames range from two years up to a generation. Fullan (2000) argued that 
school districts can improve in 8 years—or perhaps in four (Fullan, 2007, p. 18). Others have 
claimed that sizeable change can be achieved in an even shorter time span. For instance, Earl, 
Watson, & Torrance (2002, p. 35) argued that the English National Strategies for Literacy and 
Numeracy ‘made significant changes in primary education throughout England in a 
remarkably short period of time’ (two years; see also Levin et al., 2008, on Ontario). A follow-
up report on the English strategy, though, noted that, without pressure and support, the 
improvements plateaued after four years (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006). Borman et al. (2003) 
found that sustaining the implementation of comprehensive school reforms produced, after 
five years, effect sizes that were twice as large as those at the beginning of the intervention. 
Harris (2011) argued that implementing successful reforms can take ten years, whereas Wedell 
(2009) stated: ‘it is clear that the successful implementation of educational change takes a long 
time’—perhaps a generation or more (p. 18).  
The analyses in these sections suggest that PISA is able to pick up changes in performance 
only after three or four administrations, on average; therefore, effective reforms introduced 
between PISA 2000 and 2003 are likely to produce observable effects only in PISA 2009 or 
2012. Of course, large variations in country scores can be seen even between two 
administrations, which could be evidence of countries implementing ‘quick fixes’ that are 
immediately absorbed by the system because of a lack of political and financial support 
(Harris, 2011; Hopkins, Stringfield, Harris, Stoll, & Mackay, 2014). However, the .99 
correlation between Mathematics 2003 and 2006, the case of Indonesia and evidence from 
TIMSS suggest that single large fluctuations are more likely to be statistical artefacts. 
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The different magnitude of score changes among OECD and partner countries  
It is more difficult to interpret why score changes have been larger among partner countries. 
The compelling narrative promoted in international reports is that, perhaps, these education 
systems were more malleable to the reforms auspicated by the OECD or they were more ready 
to implement them, unlike ‘complacent’ countries living off traditions and past reputation 
(Schleicher, 2013f). Turkey was one of the lowest achievers but managed to improve its 
performance—and that of its students in the lowest percentiles—with the contribution of a 
curricular reform reflecting ‘the assumption, on which PISA is based, that schools should 
equip students with the skills needed to ensure success at school and in life’ (OECD, 2014g, 
p. 123).  
This narrative, however, does not explain the score drop in Malaysia, a country that has 
directed considerable attention to pre-primary education, teacher training and quality 
monitoring (all featuring in the EPA) well before its first participation in PISA (UNESCO-
IBE, 2011b). In a later section, the reliability of PISA over time and its robustness to 
confounding factors are investigated, as are alternative explanations of the difference in the 
size of score changes between OECD and non-OECD countries.  
The decrease in between-country variance 
The reduction in spread might be seen as evidence of globalising forces in education: countries 
align their policies to a common standard—which in this case may be the OECD standard 
summarised by the EPA—and this translates into more homogeneous outcomes.  
There is little empirical research on this phenomenon using data from international LSAs. 
Rutkowski & Rutkowski (2009) tried to detect curricular convergence in mathematics by 
looking at the item response patterns of 16 countries in TIMSS 1995–2003. The authors found 
that ‘rather than students’ responses becoming more similar over time, regional clusters 
remained intact over the three administrations’ (p. 148), suggesting little convergence on a 
global scale. Similar findings were reported by Dudaite & Elijio (2008) looking at TIMSS 
Mathematics 1995 and 2003; they also added that between-country correlations increased in 
those eight years, so that countries were ‘drawing closer to each other in their mathematics 
profile’ (p. 6), but the size of this effect was very small. In fact, an increase in Pearson’s r does 
not imply that countries were drawing closer; rather that their trends were becoming more 
stable. 
There are two issues with attributing the reduction of country variance to country 
alignment with the EPA or to the PISA curriculum. Firstly, the standard error (SE) on the 
measurement has decreased in partner countries by twice the amount it did in OECD countries, 
and currently the values for the two groups are roughly the same (own calculation using data 
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from PISA 2012, but see also OECD, 2014h, Table C.1). In other words, PISA is becoming 
more accurate, especially in relation to the performance of non-OECD countries, which may 
explain the between-country variance reduction. Secondly, this view does not clarify why the 
results of the OECD cluster are worsening with time, as it emerged from the blue lines in 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 and was confirmed by the multilevel models. Why would any 
alignment with the EPA have a positive effect in partner countries and a negative effect in 
OECD countries? 
Trends in equity 
The OECD defines equity in terms of fairness and inclusion: ‘Equity as inclusion means 
ensuring that all students reach at least a basic minimum level of skills. […] Equity as fairness 
implies that personal or socio-economic circumstances, such as gender, ethnic origin or family 
background are not obstacles to educational success’ (OECD, 2012c, p. 15, emphasis in the 
text). 
Inclusion is often measured negatively in terms of the percentage of students achieving 
below the lowest PISA proficiency level (1 or 2 depending on the cycle); it can be argued, 
however, that raising the scores of the lowest achievers might make a system “technically” 
equitable according to PISA without narrowing social gaps. For example, the success of 
Poland in PISA was attributed to the 1998–1999 reform delaying entry to vocational education 
by one year: students no longer had the option to enter vocational education after eight years 
of primary education, but only after six years in primary followed by three years in lower 
general secondary education (OECD, 2011h; UNICEF, 2012). As a result, between-school 
variance and the percentage of low achievers decreased. Yet, the relationship between 
students’ socio-economic background and scores did not: more advantaged student had the 
same edge on more disadvantaged students before and after the reform. In other words, gains 
in PISA were not paired by social gains: ‘the negative effect of the tracking system was simply 
postponed by one year’ (OECD, 2011h, p. 25). 
A stronger measure of equity, in this author’s opinion, makes use of the concept of 
“fairness”, which generally refers to equality of opportunity regardless of socio-economic and 
demographic circumstances (Roemer, 1998). One possible measure of this is the socio-
economic gradient. The “socio-economic gradient” is the regression line (or curve) of student 
scores on their composite index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS). It has different 
attributes (see OECD, 2013e, p. 35; Willms, 2006), but the most important are its Strength 
and its Slope (capital letters are used to differentiate them from general statistical terms).  
The “Strength” of the socio-economic gradient is the amount of score variance captured 
by the regression line (in statistical terms, the R2): the higher the “explained” variance, the 
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stronger the ESCS-score relationship, and the less equitable a system. The “Slope”, instead, 
refers to the extent to which differences in socio-economic background are associated with 
differences in outcomes, with steeper slopes being related to greater disparities. Theoretically, 
using either one of the two measures in statistical analyses should yield the same results, 
because if ESCS and PISA scores were converted to standardised scores (Z-scores), the 
correlation between them would be the Slope of the line and the R2 the Strength. Nevertheless, 
it was decided to follow the OECD procedure and run analyses using both attributes as the 
outcome variable. 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 map, as an example, trends in Strength and Slope using Reading 
as achievement measure. Unlike trends in performance, trends in equity are less linear. Fewer 
differences between OECD and partner countries can be detected and when they are more 
visible (e.g., in the Slope), this can be explained by the higher average scores of OECD 
members rather than substantial differences in equity. In fact, the rates of change look similar. 
The between-country variance seems to increase rather than decrease.  
Notice that there is an inverse relationship between equity and the values on the y-axes: 
the higher the socio-economic gradient, the lower the equity (the higher the inequality). 
According to PISA, Macao is the most equitable country, at least in terms of educational 
opportunities. On an international level, the average Strength accounts for between 11% and 
16% of the country score variance depending on the domain and the year, whereas the Slope 
for 34–38 points.  
Figure 4.5: trends in the Strength of the socio-economic gradient for Reading.  
 
Source: own elaboration using a new dataset of equity measures derived from PISA data. The unit on 



















Figure 4.6: trends in the Slope of the socio-economic gradient for Reading.  
 
Source: own elaboration using an original dataset of equity measures derived from PISA data. The unit 
on the y-axis is “PISA points”.  
To detect general trends, separate single-level and multilevel models were fitted, following 
a similar approach to that used in the previous section to estimate trends in performance.  
Table 4.F in Appendix 3 reports the initial level and average change of the Strength and 
Slope of the socio-economic gradient in different countries. Thirty-eight percent of PISA 
countries experienced statistically significant changes in equity until 2012. In most cases only 
the Strength or the Slope reached the significance level, probably because of the large SE. In 
countries where changes in both Strength and Slope were statistically significant the direction 
of the trend was the same and opposite trends were never observed, which corroborates the 
validity of the methodology (remember that the Strength and the Slope are supposed to be two 
sides of the same coin).  
Table 4.3: Trends in the Strength or the Slope of the socio-economic gradients.  
Strength → Increase  No change Decrease  
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Table 4.3 shows that, on a global level, the situation is rather balanced: in most countries 
equity levels are stable; 14 countries have experienced an increase in inequality (trends in 
either the strength or the slope of the socio-economic gradients are positive), and 11 countries 
have experienced a decrease. Stronger evidence of higher inequality is available for Romania, 
the Russian Federation and Taiwan, whereas the opposite holds for Germany, Jordan, 
Liechtenstein, Mexico and Turkey. Liechtenstein in particular has lost on average 9–12 
percentage points in Strength since the first PISA administration.  
Multilevel models were also fitted. Results are shown in Appendix 3, Table 4.G and Table 
4.H. The balanced situation found through single-level analysis was mostly confirmed: 
inequality levels appear to be stable. There is some evidence that the Slope might be 
decreasing in Science, but the magnitude of the change is small: while more advantaged 
students used to score 31.5 Science points more than the average student in 2006, by 2012 the 
gap had been reduced to 27 points. Likewise, there is some evidence that the Strength of the 
socio-economic gradient in OECD countries in Reading, which was on average 14% of the 
total score variance in 2000, decreased to about 11% in 2012. Unlike trends in performance, 
however, the between-country variance is increasing over time (Appendix 3, Table 4.I), which 
means that countries are becoming more different in their inequality levels. 
Overall, the stability of equity levels in both OECD and partner countries suggests that, if 
countries are implementing policy measures following the EPA, these are having little effect 
on a global scale. For each country experiencing a decrease in inequality there is another 
experiencing an increase, and another two showing no change. It is more difficult to interpret 
the widening spread between countries; given the varying number of countries participating 
to each administration and the small magnitude of the change, this may simply reflect random 
fluctuations.  
Second step: the limits of education reforms 
The evidence gathered thus far suggests that trends in achievement and equity are highly 
stable, and therefore that any effect of education policies is either very small or has yet to be 
seen. Year-on-year fluctuations could be due to random errors, whereas convergence in PISA 
performance is paired with divergence in equity measures. Moreover, it is possible that factors 
other than education policies underlie the observed trends. It was shown earlier that, in the 
case of Qatar and Indonesia, changes in the socio-economic and demographic composition of 
the student population explained most changes in PISA outcomes. Accounting for these 
variations reduces the increase of Qatar by 20 points, Chile by 19, Brazil by 11, Turkey by 11, 
and it makes some of these improvements statistically non-significant (own calculation from 
the PISA database, see OECD, 2014g, p. 188, for the impact on annualised change).  
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These findings raise a question about the extent to which country performance may be 
affected by factors unrelated to education policies. Answering this question can set an 
empirical limit on the ability of education policies to influence PISA outcomes. If factors non-
malleable by education policies were consistently found to account for, say, 50% of country 
results, then education policies could only be said to make “half” the difference.  
In this section, the limits of education reforms are explored by contrasting the effects of 
three policy outputs (economic productivity, equitability and access to pre-primary education) 
on PISA outcomes. All three factors have a particular relationship with PISA scores and a 
different place in the OECD narrative.  
It is known that country economic productivity (generally expressed in terms of GDP or 
GDP per capita) correlates with PISA scores, though the OECD tends to downplay the 
magnitude of the correlation. It is known that more socially equitable countries have better 
social outcomes, and the OECD argues that more educationally equitable countries have better 
educational outcomes. Finally, it is known that the quality and quantity of early childhood 
education has a positive impact on educational trajectories and later life outcomes, and the 
OECD has recently presented PISA evidence that access to pre-primary education correlates 
with higher scores in Reading, Mathematics and Science. 
What is not known is whether changes in the three factors over time are associated with 
changes in PISA outcomes, and if they are, whether their relationships with PISA are of 
comparable magnitude. In this research, it is posited that any detectable “effect” on PISA 
scores should be larger for the factor that is more malleable by specific education policies 
(access to pre-primary education), smaller for the “generic” educational factor (equitability) 
and even smaller for the non-educational one (productivity).  
Because of the high aggregation level and the few time points, even the largest correlation 
is expected to be of moderate magnitude. Recent studies of educational effectiveness suggest 
that schools are more ‘decoupled’ from education policies than previously thought (Scheerens 
et al., 2015), thus ‘the impact of variables that are prone to manipulation by policy makers is 
quite modest’ (p. 33). Under this theoretical framework, ‘sustained educational policies can 
bring about considerable societal changes’ but their short-term impact is limited (Scheerens et 
al., 2015, p. 33; also Snyder, 2013). 
The impact of economic productivity on PISA trends 
One of the most commonly-used measures of country productivity is GDP. The gross domestic 
product has an ambivalent role within the OECD narrative. The OECD reports that ‘countries 
with higher national income13 tend to perform better’ (OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a, p. 111; 
                                                     
13 Represented by GDP in this context, even though “GDP” and “income” are not synonymous. 
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OECD, 2001a, p. 92, 2004b, p. 100, 2007b, p. 59, 2010g, p. 34), but it also admonishes its 
audience that ‘the countries that are the strongest performers in PISA are not the wealthiest’ 
(OECD, 2012f, p. 1).  
The latest statement belongs to a narrative of possibility whereby high achievement is 
within reach of all countries in spite of their contextual conditions, which is necessary to make 
PISA appealing to developing countries. The problem is that the narrative of possibility 
conflicts with another position the OECD holds: the belief in human capital theory. Human 
capital theory states that education and wealth are related, but this relationship corroborates 
the narrative only insomuch as human capital (measured by PISA outcomes) ‘causes’ 
economic growth (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2012).  
If the reverse were true, in fact, one could think that country performance in PISA had 
more to do with economic rather than educational policies, which is an issue when the target 
audience of the survey are education stakeholders. Could Argentina have scored 44 points less 
in 2006 than it did in 2000 as a result of its economic crisis of 1998–2002? The OECD did not 
investigate this question.  
One strategy the OECD adopts to hold the narrative and the theory together is to 
acknowledge but downplay the correlation between GDP and PISA scores. According to 
OECD figures, the extent to which GDP per capita “explains” country differences in PISA 
scores has dropped from 43% in 2002 to 21% in 2012 reaching even lower values in-between 
(OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a; OECD, 2014g). If one takes into account how the data was 
calculated or presented, however, a different story emerges.  
In 2002, simply ‘excluding Luxembourg, which is an extreme outlier due to its high per 
capita income, [increases] the overall correlation coefficient across all participating countries 
[…] to 60 per cent’ (OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a, p. 111). Following the same approach 
and removing the outliers from the 2012 scatterplot increases the variance “explained” (the 
R2) from 21% to 59%. As another example, in PISA 2009, the OECD-reported figure of 6% 
(OECD, 2010g, p. 14) was computed using data from OECD countries only, which tend to 
cluster in the flatter part of the graph.  
In general, it is true that GDP levels and PISA outcomes are only partially related: using 
all available data and including outsiders, the R2 has been stable at 22%–32% since PISA 
2000. It is also true that this figure masks important differences between richer and poorer 





Figure 4.7: The relationship between GDP per capita (thousands USD), income and PISA scores 
(Reading) 2000–2012 
 
Source: own elaboration using PISA data 
Figure 4.7 displays the relationship between GDP per capita (expressed in constant 2005 US 
Dollars) and Reading scores in lower and high income countries14 between 2000 and 2012. 
Outcome data have been pooled; therefore, countries are represented by more than one dot, as 
the example of Qatar shows in the picture.  
There is a strong correlation between wealth and PISA outcomes in lower-income 
countries, with GDP accounting for 58% of the score variance on average across 
administrations. Past this threshold, the line becomes flat and GDP is no longer associated 
with Reading scores in high-income countries. This difference has been evident since the first 
PISA administration, as Table 4.4 shows.  
Table 4.4: The relationship between income and PISA scores (reading) over time, by country income.  
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Lower income 0.76 (16) 0.73 (13) 0.83 (24) 0.76 (23) 0.64 (18) 
High income -0.01 (23) 0.07 (26) -0.09 (32) -0.07 (38) 0.12 (41) 
Source: own elaboration using PISA data. The first value in the cell is Pearson’s r. The number between 
brackets is the sample size. 
                                                     
14 The World Bank divides economies into four groups according to their gross national income 
(GNI) per capita: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income. In this research, “lower income” 
includes countries from the first three groups (low, lower-middle and upper-middle). The “high income” 
category corresponds to a GNI per capita above $9,265 in 2000 up to above $12,615 in 2012 (The 
World Bank, 2014). 
y = 11.463x + 361.14
R² = 0.5801
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Interestingly, the strength of the correlation appears to have weakened in 2012 for lower-
income countries and strengthened for high income ones, although the small sample sizes 
prevent firm conclusions.  
The fact that PISA correlates with GDP more strongly in poorer countries is consistent 
with the literature (Binder, 2009; Brist & Caplan, 1999). However, this does not explain PISA 
trends, only the relative position of countries along the performance distribution. The question 
is whether changes in GDP may be associated with changes in scores and—given that many 
strong improvers are low-performing, lower-income partner countries—whether the 
relationship plays differently between OECD and non-OECD countries.  
Recent research suggests that this is a real possibility. Permani (2009) found evidence that 
GDP growth can foster educational outcomes in a range of East Asian countries, regardless of 
their income: low (Cambodia), lower-middle (Thailand), upper-middle (Malaysia), or high 
(Singapore). Mazumdar (2000) found that adult literacy rate was a precondition for higher 
GDP per capita in high-income countries but a consequence of it in lower-income ones.  
Cracolici, Cuffaro, and Nijkamp (2010), though, reported for a sample of 64 countries 
observed between 1980 and 1999 that ‘there exists only a unidirectional relationship from gdp 
to li [literacy rate], i.e. gdp precedes li’ (p. 349).  
To model the relationship between changes in GDP per capita and changes in educational 
outcomes, the multilevel growth model used earlier for trends in performance and equity was 
expanded to include country average and change in GDP per capita as regressors (see 
Appendix 5 for details). Clearly, this relationship is mediated by the introduction of education 
policies that were made possible by higher productivity, and this takes an unspecified amount 
of time. Therefore, all changes in GDP taking place during the lifetime of each PISA cohort 
were considered, which corresponds to regressing PISA outcomes on economic trends from 
1985 until 2012.  
Table 4.5 reports, as an example, the results from the period 1985–1997. A regression 
over this period compares the different economic conditions in which each of the five 
successive Reading cohorts was born, and models whether changes in these conditions were 
related to better or worse student scores 15 years later. Trends for other periods were also 
modelled (i.e., GDP when PISA students were one year of age, two, three and so on), but the 
outcomes were similar for all time frames and all domains.  
Table 4.5: A multilevel model of Reading scores on GDP per capita 1985–1997, when the five 
successive PISA cohorts were born, for all countries and for a subsample of lower-income countries.  
Reading All countries Lower-income countries 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
(Intercept) 407.89*** (10.01) 162 367.69*** (14.60) 53 
Δ GDP 0.08 (0.41) 162 -0.07 (2.60) 53 
Time 4.90*** (1.24) 162 5.98*** (1.24) 53 
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OECD 66.87*** (12.23) 48    
AVG GDP 0.69** (0.32) 48 11.88*** (2.88) 18 
Time*OECD -4.13*** (1.50) 162    
σ2u0   1466.04 (994–2276)  981.73 (455–2116)  
σ2u1   10.40 (3.94–27.92)  7.87 (0.65–95.35)  
σu01  -75.031   -43.037   
σ2e  98.57 (76.34–127.27)  115.92 (73.33–183.25)  
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1. Source: own elaboration using PISA data. σ2u0 is the variance of 
country intercepts (the variability of PISA scores upon first administration); σ2u1 is the variance of 
country slopes (the variability of the rate of change in PISA scores); σ2u01 is the covariance of intercepts 
and slopes; σ2e is the within-country variance (the variability PISA scores around individual country 
trends). “Δ GDP” captures the effect of a within-country change in $1,000 per capita GDP on PISA 
scores over and above the effect of Time, and regardless of a country’s mean per capita GDP and OECD 
membership (note the interaction between Time and OECD, capturing the fact that OECD countries as 
a group have improved less in PISA over time than partner countries). “AVG GDP” measures the extent 
to which a $1,000 between-country difference in GDP per capita is associated with PISA outcomes. 
The subsample of lower-income countries (n = 29) on the right part of the table is composed of countries 
whose GDP per capita was below $17,000 in 2012. This is higher than the World Bank definition of 
“lower income”, but close to the point at which the scatterplot in Figure 4.7 “bends”. This amendment 
was necessary to increase the sample size. Given that most countries in the sample were not OECD 
members, the OECD variable was excluded from the model. 
On a global level, changes in GDP are never associated with changes in Reading, 
Mathematics or Science, regardless of whether they occurred very close to the time when the 
students sat the test or 15 years earlier. Instead, average GDP is consistently and significantly 
related to PISA scores, confirming the findings from the correlational analysis at the beginning 
of this section. When all countries are taken into consideration, the magnitude of this 
relationship is small: a between-country difference of $10,000 is associated with a difference 
in Reading of 5–7 points. It was argued that the GDP–PISA correlation varies by country 
income, however, and in fact the analysis carried out on a subset of lower-income countries 
suggests that in these contexts wealth “matters” more: the same $10,000 difference in GDP 
per capita corresponds to 100–120 points in Reading. This is 20 times the relationship existing 
in high-income countries.  
Other analyses (not shown) were carried out to see whether the correlations would be 
higher for more policy-malleable outputs such as the expenditures per student in primary or 
secondary education, in lower- and high-income countries. For comparability reasons, the 
analyses only considered the quantity of money spent for education but not how it was 
allocated.  
All findings pointed to the same conclusions: in richer and poorer economies alike, 
changes in GDP or expenditures are not followed by related changes in PISA outcomes. Yet, 
on average, GDP per capita and spending per student strongly correlate with achievement 
levels, at least until a threshold which could be placed between $7,000 and $17,000 for GDP, 
and between $2,000 and $5,000 for student expenditure. There was also some evidence that, 
among lower-income countries and in recent years, greater changes in GDP corresponded to 
smaller changes in PISA. This may have captured the threshold effect on some fast-developing 
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countries moving left to right in Figure 4.7 and therefore entering the flat part of the graph. 
Some exceptions are Chile or Poland, which have moved to the ‘high income’ category while 
increasing their PISA scores by more than 30 points. 
That a strong correlation could be observed between average PISA outcomes and average 
GDP, but not between changes in the two variables, might seem paradoxical, but this is 
probably a limitation of the model employed. GDP tends to grow over time in all countries, 
whereas PISA scores are more variable. By matching a general tendency to rapid fluctuations, 
the model cannot pick up those small departures from the generalised GDP growth that might 
instead make a difference to PISA scores and which returns zero correlations. ARIMA models 
could be better suited for future analyses. 
The relationship between educational equity and PISA trends 
The OECD position is clear: ‘countries do not have to sacrifice high performance to achieve 
equity in education opportunities’ (OECD, 2013e, p. 3) and this is because, ‘if some countries 
are able to achieve high levels of learning outcomes for students from different backgrounds, 
the implication for others is that it is feasible to meet both equity and quality goals’ (OECD 
& UNESCO-UIS, 2003a, p. 164). Secondary analyses of PISA data support this position 
(Condron, 2011; Willms, 2006), and in general there is little doubt in the academic world that 
equity and achievement are compatible.  
At times, however, the OECD has taken a stronger stance on the matter: ‘the evidence is 
conclusive: equity in education pays off.’ (OECD, 2012c, p. 14). Therefore, ‘investing in […] 
education for all, and in particular for children from disadvantaged backgrounds, is both fair 
and economically efficient’ (p. 9, emphasis added). This is a substantially different statement: 
it is one thing to say that equity does not hurt achievement but another to claim that high 
achievement “needs” an equitable system.  
The literature supporting this “stronger” statement generally covers the intergenerational 
consequences of inequality, such as differential educational attainments between parents and 
offspring (S. E. Black & Devereux, 2010; Bol & van de Werfhorst, 2013; Pfeffer, 2008; 
Salverda, 2011). Educational literature agrees that increasing inequality does not improve 
performance (e.g., Duru-Bellat & Suchaut, 2005), whereas influential books such as The Spirit 
Level (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) have shown that inequality has a detrimental effect on 
societies over long periods of time: countries that became less equitable had increased crime 
rates and those which became more equitable had decreased crime rates. Could a similar 
relationship be observed, and in a short span of time, in terms of countries becoming more or 
less educationally equitable and experiencing increases or decreases in PISA outcomes?  
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Earlier in this chapter, it was shown that country inequality levels (as defined by PISA in 
terms of Strength and Slope of the socio-economic gradient) have remained stable, which casts 
some doubt on the ability of equity to have played a role in the observed performance trends. 
Moreover, Teltemann (2014) studied whether the educational reforms implemented after 
PISA were effective in promoting both high achievement and more equity. She found that the 
implementation of more or less equitable policies was generally uncorrelated with PISA 
outcomes, with the exception of non-targeted ability grouping, whose increase at the country 
level was also associated with an increase in inequality.  
These findings are followed up in the current section, which explores the relationship 
between country changes in equity and PISA outcomes with correlational and multilevel 
analysis. 
In the correlational approach, countries which experienced a significant change in the 
Strength or Slope between the first and the last available administration were selected. It was 
found that in over half the cases, significant changes in the socio-economic gradient 
corresponded to non-significant changes in PISA scores: observable changes in equity had not 
had any detectable effect on outcomes. These cases were excluded from further analyses.  
The remaining two sets of data, comprising countries with statistically significant changes 
in both socio-economic gradient and PISA scores, were correlated (the decision to restrict the 
dataset was so that only “clear” cases with changes in both variables were analysed). The 
results are presented in Table 4.6. Results suggest that changes in both the Strength and the 
Slope correlate moderately and negatively with PISA scores, meaning that increases in 
inequality may indeed be associated with decreases in scores.  
Table 4.6: Correlation between country change in Strength or Slope between first and last comparable 
PISA participation and changes in their PISA scores 
Reading Mathematics Science 
Strength Slope Strength Slope Strength Slope 
-0.26 (8) -0.25* (30) -0.11 (8) -0.42** (27) -0.16 (5) -0.22 (24) 
**p <0.05, *p <0.1 (one-tailed). Source: own elaboration using PISA data. The first value in the cell is 
Pearson’s r, the number between brackets is the sample size. 
Multilevel models were also employed, regressing PISA outcomes on the Strength and the 
Slope of countries’ socio-economic gradient and using the same approach employed in the 
rest of the chapter. Contradicting the correlational analysis, however, no evidence was found 
(Appendix 3, Table 4.J) that average levels or trends in the socio-economic gradient were 
associated with changes in achievement. Taken together, these contrasting findings provide 
more support to the OECD’s “weaker” argument (more equity does not translate into worse 
achievement) than its “stronger” one (more equity translates into better achievement). This 
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conclusion applies particularly to the Strength of the socio-economic gradient, which is 
‘PISA’s main measure of equity in education outcomes’ (OECD, 2013e, p. 35). 
Increased access to pre-primary education and changes in PISA scores 
Figure 4.8 maps trends in gross enrolment ratio (GER) in OECD and partner countries between 
1988 (when the first PISA cohort was aged 4) and 2013. Despite some large drops between 
1988 and 1995–1998, and many within-countries fluctuations, the global trends have been on 
the rise.  
Figure 4.8: Gross enrolment ratio in OECD and partner countries 1988–2013 
 
Source: own elaboration using UNESCO data 
The average GER was 59.5% in 1988 (SD = 29, Median = 59.9%, median absolute 
deviation [MAD] = 26.2, n = 49, OECD = 31) and 86.9% in 2013 (SD = 21.79, M = 92%, 
MAD = 12.9, n = 36, OECD = 24). OECD and partner countries have increased enrolment 
ratios by the same amount, on average: slightly more than one percentage point per year 
(Appendix 3, Table 4.K). An analysis of variance showed that a curvilinear model provides a 
better fit for the data, meaning that the rate of change has been increasing. However, the linear 
and curvilinear models in Appendix, Table 4.K differ by only about one percentage point when 
it comes to predicting the average GER across OECD countries in 2013.  
At the time of the first PISA administration, of the 53 countries with a valid GER value, 
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shown). By 2012–2013, only two countries had a GER lower than 50% (Turkey and Tunisia). 
Although the gross enrolment ratio is probably an overestimation of actual enrolment, there 
does not seem to be a crisis of access to pre-primary education. This suggests that the OECD 
recommendation (increase overall time spent in education, through policies expanding access 
to pre-primary education, targeting enrolment or changing the age of entry into school) is 
grounded only insomuch as it refers to bridging the participation gap between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children, rather than to widening overall participation. 
Increased access to pre-primary schooling is a very specific education policy whose 
effectiveness is strongly backed by the literature. Therefore, it was a better candidate than 
GDP and country equity levels for uncovering significant relationships with PISA outcomes. 
To evaluate the impact of increase in GER on PISA outcomes, a multilevel model was fitted 
using GER data from the 1988–2000 period, when each successive PISA Reading cohort was 
aged 4. Results are presented in Table 4.7.  
Table 4.7: A multilevel model of the relationship between mean and change in pre-primary GER and 
PISA  
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
(Intercept) 377.06*** (12.84) 171 370.93*** (13.80) 135 403.18*** (15.26) 90 
Δ GER 0.35*** (0.13) 171 -0.01 (0.14) 135 0.00 (0.15) 90 
Time 4.72*** (1.43) 171 6.14*** (1.77) 135 4.81** (1.93) 90 
OECD 70.19*** (13.03) 57 61.90*** (14.10) 57 43.72*** (12.84) 48 
AVG GER 0.60*** (0.21) 57 0.80*** (0.22) 57 0.65*** (0.24) 48 
Time × 
OECD 
-4.79*** (1.70) 171 -6.51*** (2.09) 135 -3.53 (2.17) 90 
σ2u0   1695.88 (1116–2576) 2083.66 (1418–3061) 1366.24 (909–2052) 




σu01  -127.919   -205.433   -70.480   






***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1. Source: own elaboration using UNESCO and PISA data. As in Table 
4.5, σ2u0 is the variance of country intercepts; σ2u1 is the variance of country slopes; σ2u01 is the 
covariance of intercepts and slopes; σ2e is the within-country variance.     
Average country GER is significantly related to PISA outcomes, though the size of its 
effect is much smaller compared to that of OECD membership: a ten percentage-point 
difference in pre-primary enrolment is associated with a 6–8-point gap in PISA (but see 
below). Also noteworthy is that increased enrolment (captured by ΔGER) is linked with 
changes in Reading twelve years later. Specifically, a ten percentage-point increase in GER 
corresponded to an increase of 3.5 Reading points, over and above any impact of other policies 
captured by the time variable, but no link was found with Mathematics or Science.  
Even if these coefficients seem small (increasing coverage from 50% to 100% would 
theoretically increase PISA scores by about half a standard deviation), it should be borne in 
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mind that these relationships were detected after a decade. And, to put things in perspective, 
it is a similar correlation to that associated with a $10,000 difference in GDP per capita (or 
$1,000 in developing countries).  
The analysis was repeated separately on lower- and high-income countries (see footnote 
14 for a definition) to see if average or changes in GER ‘mattered’ more to poorer economies. 
The country sample could be split into two similar-sized categories (n = 29 for lower-income 
countries, 10 of which were OECD members; n = 28 for high-income countries, 24 of which 
were OECD members). As expected, OECD members were underrepresented in one group 
and overrepresented in the other. The results are presented in Appendix 3, Tables 4.L and 4.M. 
The average GER coefficient is positive for lower-income countries and not significantly 
different from zero for high income countries. This means that the effect captured by the full 
sample model in Table 4.7 was completely driven by developing countries, in which there is 
almost a 1-to-1 relationship between average PISA scores and average GER: a 10-point 
difference in GER corresponds to 9–12 PISA points. Interestingly, however, the effect of 
change in GER on Reading scores is of similar magnitude between the two groups. This 
suggests that policies affecting access to pre-primary education could be equally valuable to 
developing and developed economies.  
Altogether, these findings provide empirical evidence on an international scale that 
increasing access to pre-primary education may indeed be beneficial for country performance 
in PISA, as argued by the OECD. Moreover, they suggest that if any policy effects can be 
detected through PISA, they might be able to produce up to a 0.3–0.4-point increase in PISA 
outcomes per percentage point increase in the indicator, though most policies would probably 
have a substantively smaller impact. 
Third step: country alignment with the EPA and outcomes 
Results from the previous sections provide a mixed picture about the equity and performance 
of PISA participants. The only similarity between the two components is that their trends are 
highly stable. That left aside, OECD countries might be becoming more equitable but their 
overall performance is decreasing; the between-country variance appears to decrease when 
measured in terms of achievement and increase when measured in terms of equity.  
Most of the time, there is no relationship between changes in inequality and in 
performance, but when changes are large enough to be detected, they are negatively correlated: 
countries that reduced their inequality level the most have also experienced the largest score 
increases. Wealthier countries tend to do better at PISA, yet faster developers are not the 
strongest improvers. It was also possible to detect the indirect effect of a very strong policy, 
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the widening of access to early childhood education, on PISA outcomes in lower- and high-
income countries.  
Thus far, evidence of policy alignment and effectiveness has been general and largely 
inferential. To reach a greater level of specificity, additional data were collected from experts 
in different countries on recent national education reforms. 
Expert questionnaire 
A questionnaire (Appendix 3, Table 2.C) was administered via email to 91 academic and non-
academic experts, sampled according to their professional position and presumed knowledge 
of both PISA and national education policies. The question was: ‘To what extent have your 
government’s education policies been in line with the OECD’s advice, over the last decade?’ 
Forty experts responded, and their answers (A = Not at all; B = Very slightly; C = To a modest 
extent; D = Quite a lot; E = Completely) are summarised in Table 4.8 (one respondent per 
row).  
Table 4.8: expert rating of country alignment with the EPA over the last decade 
Country Rating Country Rating Country Rating Country Rating 
Australia C Denmark D Norway C Taiwan D 
Belgium 
(French) 
C Finland C Peru C Taiwan C 
Brazil B Germany C Portugal D Thailand B 
Brazil C Germany C Qatar D Thailand C 




C UK D 
Canada D Indonesia D Russian 
federation 
D/C* UK D 
Canada 
(Ontario) 
D Ireland D Russian 
federation 
C UK A 
Chile C Japan C Slovenia C UK D 
Czech 
Republic 
D/C* Jordan C Spain C UK 
(Eng.) 
B 
Denmark D Latvia C Sweden B US B 
*The answer was conditional to the policy being written or implemented. This is part of the accuracy 
that had to be sacrificed to keep the stem as simple as possible. Source: own elaboration using data from 
the expert questionnaire. 
There is substantial agreement among experts, with 85% indicating that governmental 
policies in their country were ‘to a modest extent’ or ‘quite a lot’ in line with the EPA. The 
fact that most respondents chose the central option and almost no one went for either of the 
extremes is unsurprising, given the general nature of the question and the fact that in each 
country, some policies had probably been informed by the EPA and some had not.  
The distribution of responses in options B and D, instead, is very interesting. Only five 
experts thought that policies in their country were ‘very slightly’ in line with the OECD policy 
advice, against 14 who thought they were ‘quite a lot’ in line. This asymmetry shows that the 
experts in the sample were more ready to commit to a stronger than a weaker influence of the 
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OECD in national education policies, suggesting that EPA-aligned reforms might be more 
common than non-aligned ones. 
Another noteworthy finding is that expert ratings from the same country generally agreed. 
An exception was the response from the UK: three experts stated that policy alignment was 
strong, one that it was non-existent and one that it was very weak. Unfortunately, with only 
one question standard techniques to assess inter-rater agreement such as Krippendorff’s α 
(Dorussen et al., 2005) could not be used, and the fact that the UK comprises different 
countries with independent education systems did not help. The variability in these responses 
illustrates the difficulty of summarising complex information (such as ten years of policy 
alignment) reliably. This is why this study complements the cross-country analysis with two 
focused case studies, reported in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Finally, it is remarkable that countries that are routinely used by the OECD as evidence of 
the usefulness of the EPA were deemed by experts to have been only moderately affected by 
OECD recommendations. Brazil was mentioned in Chapter 3 because the claim that it ‘offers 
a good example of how low-performing countries can use international benchmarking to 
improve their education systems’ (OECD, 2010d, p. 102) was not matched by evidence; 
answers from the questionnaire add to that critique. Japanese efforts ‘to promote more relevant 
learning’ may well have translated into ‘good results on the PISA test’ (OECD, 2014f, p. 125) 
but, according to the expert’s response, curricular relevance was not necessarily aligned with 
OECD recommendations. Despite the ‘PISA shock’, policy alignment in Germany has 
remained modest, and partial alignment can be found also in neo-liberal Chile or “model 
student” Finland. Portugal, however, is presented as a successful reformer by the OECD and 
the questionnaire supports this view.  
Breakdown by country 
Respondents were sent a second email linking an online questionnaire called the OECD 
Policy Advice Implementation Questionnaire (PAIQ; Aloisi, 2014; also Appendix 3, Table 
2.D). The questionnaire asked respondents to select the specific policy areas in the EPA (Table 
3.2) that had been translated into policy. Selected areas were coded “1” and non-selected areas 
were coded “0”. Sixteen country breakdowns were collected in this fashion, which resulted in 
a 16 x 14 matrix of 0s and 1s (Appendix, Table 4.N). The Russian Federation features twice 
in the table: the two experts disagreed on the number of areas Russian interventions covered, 
but they agreed that four dealt with increasing time in education, reducing segregation for at-




Assuming Russian policies affected ten rather than four policy areas, country results can 
be displayed in Figure 4.9.  
Figure 4.9: Number of recommendations in the EPA covered by country policies 
 
Source: own elaboration using data from the expert questionnaire and the PAIQ. 
The blue bars and the values on the left y-axis show the number of recommendations in 
the EPA that had been integrated within national policies, ranging from 12 (Korea) to 1 (Israel) 
with an average of about 6 per country. There is no evident relationship between the overall 
rating of country alignment with the EPA from the first experts’ questionnaire (shown by the 
letters above each bar) and the number of areas affected by policy interventions. Given that, 
in most cases, both data were provided by the same expert, this suggests a certain variability, 
once again, in the individual interpretation of options such as ‘to a modest extent’ and ‘quite 
a lot’. Not all columns are labelled because some experts only answered the PAIQ.  
In terms of policy areas, 80% of countries in the sample have implemented or planned 
reforms to strengthen the teaching profession, 67% have worked on time spent in education 
and on the standardisation of outcomes and 60% on interventions targeting low achievers 
(Appendix 3, Table 4.N). On the contrary, reducing stratification and competition were the 
least popular policy options. This leads to the second part of the graph, represented by the red 
dots and dashed line elements.  





























Total areas of interventions
Total Equity boundary Equity : Other policies ('relative risk')
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Table 3.2 can be assigned to two groups, one comprising five recommendations on equity 
and one comprising the remaining nine. The countries’ preference for equity policies over 
others can be expressed numerically in terms of relative risk, which is simply the ratio between 
the frequency of adoption of equity policies over the frequency of adoption of the other 
policies. This ratio is represented by the dots and the values on the right y-axis in Figure 4.9. 
The dashed line indicates the boundary ratio of 1: above the line, equity policies are given 
higher priority than all others combined, whereas below the boundary they are given lower 
priority. 
For instance, reforms in Finland covered eight recommendations, three from the equity 
group and five from the other areas. In total, Finnish reforms addressed fewer equity 
recommendations, but policymakers also had fewer choices. If one considers instead that three 
out of five (60%) possible Equity categories were covered by Finnish reforms, against five out 
of nine (56%) of the remaining categories, it emerges that in fact policymakers in Finland 
adopted, within the available options, more recommendations from the equity area than from 
all other areas combined. In terms of relative risk, three out of five divided by five out of nine 
equals 1.08, which means that equity policies are slightly more likely to have been chosen 
than other policies. 
There is a tendency for countries that have covered more policy options to have a higher 
ratio (though theoretically the two values should be unrelated), and the ratio is above the 
boundary in only three cases. Perhaps, equity recommendations are followed once other areas 
have already been addressed. Canada is an outlier: despite the few EPA sections touched by 
national reforms, half of them were about equity, specifically about reducing the gaps between 
genders and between the majority of students and minority groups. 
At the other extreme, the value for Portugal is not fully consistent with OECD 
publications. The OECD reported that inequality increased between 2006 and 2012 and 
student dropout rate is still high, which may have led the expert to reckon that not enough had 
been done in terms of equity. Moreover, many Portuguese policies focused on other areas like 
‘training teachers, granting more autonomy and expanding assessments’ (OECD, 2013f, p. 
105). At the same time, however, Portugal did show some commitment to equity policies such 
as extending the end of compulsory education or the ‘School Social Action’ programme, 
whereby ‘additional support, such as meals and books, is provided to disadvantaged students’ 
(p. 104). 
These results are a reminder of the limitations of this exercise. Responses were collected 
from a small sample of experts and, with the exception of the Russian Federation, only one 
set of answers per country are available. After analysing and comparing experts’ responses 
from the initial questionnaire and the PAIQ, it is clear that the validity and reliability of the 
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two instruments could be improved. The efforts made to increase participation had to face the 
limited resources available. Recall also the difficulties in framing the EPA, whereby even the 
most thorough attempt (Table 3.2) has a degree of arbitrariness. For instance, it could be 
argued that Recommendation 4.1 on helping low-performing students could belong to the 
equity area, because disadvantage and low achievement are correlated, and similar arguments 
could be made regarding pre-primary education or resource allocation. A different 
categorisation would have produced different ratios. 
The relationship between policy alignment and country outcomes 
An ideal follow-up to the PAIQ would use expert answers (Korea, 12; Chile, 10; etc.) as 
evidence of policy alignment with OECD recommendations, and this evidence could be added 
as a time-invariant variable in a multilevel model of performance and equity trends. This was 
not the approach used in this research, however, for theoretical and practical reasons. On a 
practical level, the sample size was too small to warrant the use of multilevel modelling. On a 
theoretical level, values from the PAIQ are better placed on an ordinal scale than on an interval 
or a ratio scale; it makes no sense to claim that Korea is twice more aligned with OECD 
recommendations than Denmark, because the expert rating does not capture the number, 
strength and effectiveness of national interventions. For these reasons, the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ) was deemed to be a more appropriate measure to 
capture the relationship between policy alignment and country outcomes.  
PAIQ values of policy alignment were ranked (ties were allowed). To account for the 
countries’ differential ability to translate policy plans into action, PAIQ ranks were weighted 
by country rankings in governmental effectiveness, one of the variables in the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators database (see also Kaufmann et al., 2010). The weighting of 
PAIQ ranks by effectiveness ranks produced the index of policy alignment with OECD 
recommendations, or “EPA Index”.  
The EPA Index attempted to capture both the degree of policy alignment and its strength, 
producing different country rankings from those obtained using PAIQ values only (Appendix 
3, Table 4.O). For instance, reforms in the Netherlands or Denmark covered few EPA 
categories, but if one takes into account that those few categories were probably linked to 
more effective policies than the same categories in other countries, then the Netherlands and 
Denmark are in a stronger position compared to Portugal or the Russian Federation, even 
though these latter scored higher in the PAIQ. 
Table 4.9 shows the Spearman’s ρ between EPA Index and country measures of 
achievement and equity. The row “Scores” is country performance, whereas “Inequality” is 
given by the Strength of the socio-economic gradient. “Level in 2012” refers to performance 
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and equity values in 2012. “Change first–last” is the change in performance and equity 
between the first and last PISA participation of this small country subset (The Netherlands did 
not participate to PISA 2000, Israel and Chile to PISA 2003, and Jordan to PISA 2000 and 
2003). For the annualised change, performance values were taken from the PISA 2012 
database, whereas values for equity were calculated via individual country OLS regressions. 
Table 4.9: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between PISA outcomes and the EPA Index of 15 
countries 
 Level in 2012 Change first–last Annualised change 
 Read Maths Science Read Maths Science Read Maths Science 
Scores 0.71*** 0.68*** 0.72*** -0.25 -0.31 -0.12 -0.27 -0.22 -0.11 
Inequality 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.05 -0.33 0.15 0.03 -0.30 0.14 
*** p < 0.01. Source: own elaboration using PISA, World Bank and the original equity databases, as 
well as data from the PAIQ. 
Country performance ranks in 2012 and EPA Index are strongly positively correlated, but 
weaker relationships can also be seen between EPA Index and inequality (the Strength of the 
socio-economic gradient in 2012). In other words, the countries with higher policy alignment 
tend to be both the highest performers and, to a lesser extent, the most inequitable economies 
of the sample. The relationship between EPA alignment and performance changes is weak and 
negative, which captures the fact that Finland and Denmark have seen their performances 
decrease whereas Israel, Indonesia and Thailand improved. No clear relationship can be 
identified between the EPA Index and trends in equity. 
Notice that even though the correlation between EPA alignment and country performance 
in 2012 is statistically significant, its size is driven by the Governmental Effectiveness variable. 
If one removes the interaction between the effectiveness and PAIQ values, ρ(PAIQ–PISA) is 
between 0.21 and 0.29 and is non-significant, whereas ρ(Effectiveness–PISA) is 0.66–0.71 
and is significant. Therefore, these results provide only mixed evidence that EPA alignment 
is in any way related to PISA outcomes.  
Some limitations of PISA and their influence on the trends of OECD 
and partner countries  
Many times in this chapter, a disclaimer has had to be made that observed changes in 
performance and equity might be a statistical artefact. This is because there is strong evidence 
that PISA scores are affected by multiple sources of error, including construct validity, cultural 
and translation biases, sampling, scaling and equating, and other validity and reliability issues 
(summarised, for instance, in Hopmann, Brinek, & Retzl, 2007; Prenzel, Kobarg, Schöps, & 
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Rönnebeck, 2013). In this section, validation issues in PISA are conceptually organised in two 
categories: comparability across countries and comparability over time. 
Comparability across countries 
Sampling 
A first issue with sampling in PISA concerns unit replacement when some schools decline to 
participate in the assessment. In theory, a country is considered to have an acceptable school 
response rate when at least 85% of the schools initially invited to participate do so; if the 
response rate falls between 65% and 85% (an ‘intermediate’ response rate) replacements can 
be accepted, whereas values below 65% are not acceptable (OECD, 2014h). If replacements 
are used, the ‘acceptable’ response rate threshold is raised to 95% comprising first and second 
respondents.  
The OECD does not state what happens if response rates are below 95% after replacement, 
but even if it did, it is clear that these stringent rules are not adopted in practice. Countries are 
routinely given second and third chances regardless of their response rate. Influential 
economies such as the US, the UK and the Netherlands were allowed to take the test even 
when initial response rates were—on paper—not acceptable (Adams & Wu, 2002). Surely, 
sometimes response rates are so low that countries are excluded ex post facto, but this is an 
exception rather than the norm.  
It is certainly good practice to be flexible but, as the late Sigbert Prais poignantly 
remarked, ‘what is the point of stipulating a “standard”, if it is at once replaced by something 
else?’ (Prais, 2003, p. 151). When one considers that student scores are used for estimation 
when the student participation rate within a school (original or replacement) is as low as 25% 
(OECD, 2014h), it is evident that non-response bias is an issue. This is what Prais (2003, 2004) 
pointed out in an exchange with Raymond Adams (2003) with particular reference to England. 
Prais (2003) noted that the way the OECD deals with response rate was at best simplistic and 
that, considering effective participation at the school and student level, results for England 
may have been artificially raised ‘by some 38 points’ (p. 152).  
A second issue with sampling concerns the representativeness of the PISA population. 
Student population coverage has been over 95% for OECD and non-OECD countries since 
the first administration, meaning that the PISA sample reflects the contexts and characteristics 
of most students in a country (provided all students in the sample take the test). The PISA 
sample, however, does not include students not in education at the age of 15. Therefore, the 
extent to which it represents all 15-year-olds in a country, including those who were in 
education and left, varies. With the progressive opening of PISA to partner economies, the 
number of countries whose PISA sample represents less than 80% of the 15-year-old 
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population has increased from 5 to 17 in 2012. The 20% or more of young people not covered 
by the PISA sampling frame effectively represents data missing not at random, but it is unclear 
how this may influence country outcomes.  
Some strong improvers such as Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey have increased their 
15-year-old population coverage (Turkey moved from 36% in 2000 to 68% in 2012). The 
OECD interprets coverage increase as a sign that countries were more effective in reaching 
out to young people that would not have entered education otherwise (see for instance Box 
I.2.4 in OECD, 2014g). As the OECD argument goes, if these newly-enrolled students came 
from the bottom of the performance distribution, then Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey 
managed to increase their performance in spite of the negative effect on their average score of 
a greater number of lower-achieving students, which is an excellent result. However, it is not 
known whether increases in the coverage index capture increases in “incidence” of enrolment 
rather than different ways to measure it.  
While it is ‘a critical component of the sampling frames’, in fact, student enrolment is 
estimated on data that are ‘rarely available at the time of school sampling’ (OECD, 2014h, p. 
71). In Mexico there were fewer 15-year-olds in 2012 than in 2000, yet the enrolled population 
was estimated to be 34% larger (Appendix A in OECD & UNESCO-UIS, 2003a; OECD, 
2014g). Quality controls are in place and it is likely that, in this case, ‘large deviations between 
the total national number of 15-year-olds and the enrolled number of 15-year-olds were 
questioned’ by the PISA Consortium (OECD, 2014h, p. 81), but the OECD does not release 
information about the investigation procedure.  
The school sampling frame is another critical estimate, ‘NPMs were therefore advised to 
be diligent and thorough’ in its construction (OECD, 2014h, p. 70). The OECD concedes that 
‘the definition of a “school” is difficult’ (p. 85) and that some countries choose other sampling 
units instead. In Mexico, in 2003, ‘schools where instruction is delivered in shifts were split 
into the corresponding units’ (OECD, 2004b, p. 328). According to the international and 
technical reports, this was not the case in 2009 or 2012 and it is unclear what choice was made 
in the intermediate cycles. One has to accept that ‘differences were queried’ (OECD, 2014h, 
p. 83). 
Finally on this point, three additional factors may have affected the scores of countries in 
the southern hemisphere: the international target population is conceived ‘to better fit the age 
structure of most of the Northern Hemisphere countries’ (OECD, 2014h, p. 66); the end of the 
testing window has moved from 31 October to 31 August between PISA 2000 and 2003; and 
the ‘no testing period’ shrank from the first three months to the first six weeks of school 
between 2003 and 2006 (Adams & Wu, 2002; OECD, 2005b, 2009c).  
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Translation and item-by-country interaction 
Grisay et al. (2007) found evidence of regional clusters in country response patterns to PISA 
items. They remarked that the PISA 2006 booklets ‘did not function exactly in the same 
manner in all participating countries, and that the differences in languages used probably 
played a role in the item/country interactions’ (p. 253). They also found lower equivalence 
between the international version of the assessment and national versions in low-GDP, Middle 
Eastern and non-OECD Asian countries, suggesting that results from those regions were less 
comparable than results from Western OECD countries. Similar issues were reported for all 
three PISA domains between 2000 and 2006 (Akour, Sabah, & Hammouri, 2015; Grisay, 
Gonzalez, & Monseur, 2009; Le, 2009; Yildirim & Berberoĝlu, 2009).  
In this regard, Kreiner & Christensen (2014) critiqued the application of the Rasch model15 
to PISA on the grounds that it fails to account for the strong differential item functioning [DIF] 
that can be observed in all PISA items and booklets. Existence of DIF means that item 
difficulty varies systematically across countries when compared with the rest of the scale; 
since mean scores are estimated assuming that there are no such variations, results for 
countries in which the DIF is stronger are artificially inflated or deflated. Schleicher (2013d) 
fiercely rejected Kreiner & Christensen’s (2014) argument, but there is no doubt that the items 
selected for each PISA cycle can and do affect country scores in ways that are not related to 
student ability. This was also pointed out by Goldstein (2004), who argued that DIF 
‘essentially precludes any comparison based upon a single scale’ (p. 328); and by Wu (2010): 
‘Given that the inclusion of particular […] units and items is largely by chance […], we query 
about the level of confidence we can place on the results’ (pp. 21–22).  
Part of the problem lies in the philosophy of the Rasch model. Rasch is not a statistical 
model that can be fitted to the data; it is a measuring approach requiring the data to fit the 
model. For Rasch to work, test development must be conceived as an iterative process 
whereby ‘misfitting’ items are followed up after each assessment and amended to better fit the 
model requirements (unidimensionality, local item independence etc., see Bond & Fox, 2001). 
This approach to measurement requires procedures that are hardly compatible with the times 
and scale of PISA, yet the model is applied with ‘almost no reference to the debates about [… 
its] appropriateness’ (Goldstein, 2004, p. 328) and in spite of evidence suggesting that models 
relaxing Rasch assumptions could prove more useful for the purposes of the assessment 
(Oliveri & von Davier, 2011). 
                                                     
15 The Rasch model (Rasch, 1980), in its original form, assumes that the probability that a candidate 
will answer an item correctly depends exclusively on the candidate’s ability and the item’s difficulty. 
For more information, http://www.rasch.org/rasch.htm (Accessed 16 April 2016) 
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Comparability over time 
Problems in the application of the Rasch model 
Issues of DIF and other violations in the assumptions of the Rasch model also have 
consequences on the comparability of country outcomes over time because of their effect on 
link items. “Link items” are items that are common to all assessments, although the exact 
number changes by domain and by cycle, because the item pool is progressively renewed 
(Appendix 3, Table 4.P). They are used to equate the PISA scales from one cycle to the next 
so that assessments from different years can be compared, but this practice is affected by two 
main issues.  
Firstly, PISA tests are chain-linked: PISA 2012 is anchored to PISA 2009, which is 
anchored to PISA 2006 and so on (OECD, 2014h). This means that country outcomes could 
experience the same ‘drifting’ of student scores in some national assessments (Tymms, 2004), 
whereby achievement increases as a result of errors being brought forward from one year to 
the next. The size of these errors does not depend on the student sample but on the much 
smaller sample of link items, which makes linking error the greatest source of variability in 
country-level trends (Haertel, 2004; Michaelides & Haertel, 2014). This could be a problem 
especially for Reading, the domain with the lowest number of link items (Appendix 3, Table 
4.P). 
Secondly, the linking error in PISA changes by subject and by assessment cycle but is 
considered to be the same for all countries. If link items have DIF, however, additional error 
will be introduced because of the item-by-country interactions. It has been shown that if the 
linking error took DIF into account, the 24-point drop of Japan in PISA 2003 (the largest 
decrease at the time) should be considered statistically no different to zero (Monseur & 
Berezner, 2007; Wu, 2010).  
More generally, Gebhardt & Adams (2007) demonstrated that 25% of observed changes 
between 2000 and 2003 were due to DIF and Wu (2010) argued that linking errors alone could 
account for score differences of up to 40 points. Considering that linking errors are but one 
source of variability, and that the greatest variability tends to affect lower-performing 
countries and Reading scores (G. Brown, Micklewright, Schnepf, & Waldmann, 2007; 
Monseur, Baye, Lafontaine, & Quittre, 2011), it is not unreasonable to think that many of the 




OECD reactions to the limitations of PISA 
After enumerating issues with the sampling, modelling and interpretation of PISA (many of 
which were described above), Wuttke (2007) concludes that ‘PISA is state-of-the-art’ but is 
also affected by ‘a plethora of inaccuracies’ (p. 261) compromising by an unknown degree the 
accuracy of the reported scores and the validity of the statistical procedures.  
When the PGB decided that ‘the establishment of reliable trends should become the 
overriding priority’, it commissioned an external review of the PISA design (Mazzeo & von 
Davier, 2008, p. 4). An exchange between the reviewers and the Consortium followed: the 
Consortium critiqued the reviewers’ inability to demonstrate the effectiveness of some 
proposed changes, whereas Mazzeo & von Davier rebutted, similarly to Wuttke (2007), that 
the complexity of PISA paired with the scarcity of available data made it impossible for 
anyone to go beyond broad recommendations (Mazzeo & von Davier, 2008). There is a feeling 
that when the review took place it was already too late: to use a metaphor, the PISA machine 
had been assembled by so many hands that by then no individual knew how the components 
interacted, and any intervention was precluded by the fact that the engine was already running 
at full speed.  
The OECD has recently started to acknowledge that sometimes the specific mechanisms 
driving PISA trends are ‘unclear’, that existing explanations are incomplete and that ‘other 
reasons should be explored in the future’ (OECD, 2014h, p. 272). It noted that ‘the complexity 
of the PISA 2000 design is such that the impact of this on the item parameter estimation and 
hence the equating is unclear’ (OECD, 2012e, pp. 216, 237). But for some researchers, 
recognising that there are issues is unsatisfactory if not followed by action, especially in the 
sense of greater disclosure of assessment data (Hopmann et al., 2007).  
Hopmann & Brinek (2007) lament that the behaviour of the PISA consortium in Germany 
towards researchers resembled that of pharmaceutical companies facing a potential scandal: 
firstly, answering  criticism with silence; ‘if that is not enough, the next step is often to raise 
doubts about the motives and the abilities of those who are critical of the enterprise’; then, 
‘acknowledge some problems, but […] insist that they are very limited in nature and scope, 
not affecting the overall picture’; and finally, downplay the novelty of the issues and suggest 
that they have already been dealt with, often by referencing some ‘opaque technical reports’ 
or ‘unpublished papers’ (pp. 14–15).  
Of course, comparing PISA with ill-conceived drugs is probably ‘overreaching’ 
(Hopmann & Brinek, 2007, p. 15), and it should be appreciated that the OECD has officially 
displayed an interest in improving the quality of PISA. The external review commissioned to 
Mazzeo & von Davier (2008) is one example; another is the change in the computation of the 
linking error after the critique of Monseur & Berezner (2007). At the same time, the many 
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voices inside the organisation contribute to creating a sense of friction between the scientific 
and the political side of the endeavour.  
At a meeting in which this author was present, a participant challenged Schleicher on the 
fact that statistically-inflated score changes, such as the Japanese drop between 2000 and 2003, 
had real consequences on national policies (on this matter, Takayama, 2008). Schleicher 
commented that countries should be more patient and wait for more consistent trends to 
emerge before embarking in systemic reforms. He added that international reports consistently 
remind readers of the correlational nature of the findings. This is true, yet the overarching 
message is another: ‘even relatively small differences between countries in the average 
performance of students, where they are statistically significant, should not be overlooked’ 
(OECD, 2007b, p. 115). 
Conclusions to Chapter 4 
This chapter has collected and analysed large-scale evidence on the use of the EPA for national 
policymaking and its plausible effects on country outcomes. Firstly, educational outcomes in 
performance and equity were analysed using PISA data as well as data from an original dataset 
of equity measures. Secondly, the different “effects” of changes over time in three country-
level factors (economic productivity, equitability and access to pre-primary education) on 
PISA trends were explored.  
It was expected—and confirmed with the analysis—that the relationship between output 
and outcome would be stronger for the factor that is more malleable by specific education 
policies (access to pre-primary education), smaller for the “generic” educational factor 
(equitability) and even smaller for the non-educational one (productivity). This helped to set 
a first empirical limit to the extent to which the “effect” of education policies on PISA may 
be detected: about 0.3–0.4 PISA points per percentage point increase in a relevant indicator 
(in this case, gross enrolment ratio). It also confirmed the validity of OECD recommendations 
when it comes to early childhood policies, though it seems that most countries were already 
moving in that direction. 
A third step linked policy alignment to outcomes, by collecting data from educational 
experts from countries participating to PISA through an email questionnaire and a follow-up 
online survey. Using their responses and a World Bank indicator of governmental 
effectiveness, an index of country implementation of OECD recommendations—the EPA 
Index—was produced and correlated to PISA scores. No clear relationship emerged between 
implementation of the EPA and changes in performance or equity. 
These analyses were followed by a brief validation of PISA, which served to moderate the 
strength of the inferences that could be drawn from the three steps. A summary of the evidence 
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gathered to answer the research questions 2 and 3 follows, but generally, the use of country 
scores or equity measures to justify policy stances seems unwarranted. This is primarily 
because of the large error associated with individual country outcomes and, to a lesser extent, 
because of the risk that actual changes may be driven by factors which are non-malleable by 
education interventions. There is little evidence that the EPA is being followed or is effective, 
apart for one recommendation (access to pre-primary education) which is strongly backed by 
the literature and may indeed be associated with country improvement. 
Evidence of country alignment with OECD recommendations (RQ2) 
Despite the wide scope of the chapter, some inferences about country alignment with OECD 
recommendations are possible.  
Firstly, if there were widespread interest in following the OECD advice of increasing 
within-country equality, this is not evident from the data. There is some evidence that 
inequality is decreasing, but the effect concerns only OECD countries and can only be detected 
in the correlation between the Strength of the socio-economic gradient and Reading scores. 
Furthermore, the rate of decrease is very small (3 percentage point in 12 years) and in general 
equity trends are very stable.  
On a specific policy level, there is evidence of policy convergence in pre-primary 
enrolment over time, but it is difficult to identify global shocks after 2000. Gross enrolment 
ratios have increased by about 1.2 percentage points per year since 1988 in both OECD and 
partner countries. The rate of increase is accelerating, but by a very small amount which does 
not substantively affect average estimates. It was argued in Chapter 3 that pre-primary 
education has never become a priority for the PGB despite its relevance for student 
trajectories. Still, the possibility that PISA results have influenced its rate of expansion in 
participating countries should not be discarded. Some individual country increases seem 
particularly sharp, especially after 2008. These results could be followed up in future research.  
Finally, many experts stated that their countries were more in line than not with the EPA, 
but a follow-up questionnaire (the PAIQ) revealed that, in a small sample of 15 countries, only 
five had implemented policies covering more than half of the EPA and only three had 
privileged equity policies. Given that answering the PAIQ required more time and 
commitment, it is likely that responses more accurately reflected country contexts than those 
from the first expert questionnaire. These findings add to the evidence that there is a gap 
between the use of PISA, the acknowledgement of OECD values and actual country alignment 
with the EPA. 
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Evidence of impact of EPA-aligned policy (RQ3) 
In terms of performance, trends are highly linear and within-country variance accounts for 2–
5% of the total. On a global level, countries have improved on average by 0.6–1.1 point per 
year depending on the domain, and most score changes are within ±20 points regardless of the 
distance in time between the two measurements. Altogether, these results suggest that any 
policy effect, whether aligned with the EPA or not, must be very small. It probably takes four 
or five PISA administrations to claim with enough confidence that country scores did indeed 
change.  
Larger changes were found among partner countries and for Reading scores, but the extent 
to which they had been brought about by education reforms and had not been inflated by 
statistical error was called into question. There was also some evidence that global trends in 
Reading and certain country trends may be positive and curvilinear: if these findings were 
confirmed in future administrations, they could provide indirect evidence of the impact of the 
education reforms of the early 2000s on PISA performance (though not of policy alignment). 
In terms of equity, trends are generally stable; half of the countries saw no change and the 
remaining half is equally split between countries in which inequality is increasing and 
countries in which it is decreasing. Trends in equity and achievement do not seem to be 
strongly related, either: OECD and partner countries have similar levels of equity, yet their 
results are very different; between-country variance is decreasing in performance and 
increasing in equity; and findings from multilevel models have shown that equity levels are 
unrelated with PISA outcomes. Overall, if countries have been implementing equity measures 
following the EPA—and this does not appear to be a priority, according to the PAIQ—these 
are having little effect on a global scale.  
There is also some evidence that both performance and equity are decreasing in higher-
achieving countries such as Korea, Finland and New Zealand, whereas in Germany, Mexico 
and Turkey they are both improving. In fact, a moderate negative correlation between changes 
in inequality and changes in achievement was found. More data from future PISA cycles could 
be collected to establish whether the observed relationship was the result of sampling error or 
not and what role policy alignment with the EPA might have had.  
GDP trends were not related to detectable changes in scores, whereas trends in 
participation in early childhood education were, albeit weakly: countries that increased access 
to pre-primary education when the PISA cohorts could benefit from it experienced small PISA 
score increases (but only in Reading). These findings provide some reassurance that certain 




At the same time, the role of societal trends outside the control of MoEs should not be 
underestimated. At the student level, the literature agrees that family background is a reliable 
predictors of later outcomes, which means that socio-economic policies may matter at least as 
much as education reforms. At the country level, a threshold was identified in the relationship 
between country wealth, expenditure per student and PISA outcomes: under certain levels, the 
association between economic factors and country scores becomes so strong that it is hard to 
deny that “money matters” for educational outcomes in poorer countries. 
Unfortunately, expert responses were too few to provide reliable data on the influence of 
EPA-alignment on achievement or equity. A weak positive relationship was found between 
expert responses in the PAIQ and ranking in PISA, and the relationship was stronger when a 
measure of policy alignment—the EPA Index—was used; in this latter case, however, the 
association was probably driven by an interacting variable (governmental effectiveness). The 
correlation between EPA alignment and performance changes was weak and negative, 
capturing the fact that Finland and Denmark saw their performances decrease whereas Israel, 
Indonesia and Thailand improved. A weak positive correlation instead emerged for country 
levels of inequality in 2012, but not for equity trends. 
Altogether, these results provide little support to the claim that EPA alignment is related 
to PISA outcomes, at least on a very large scale. This is mostly due to the small effect sizes 
paired with lack of data, and therefore this impression might change with future cycles. Case 







Chapter 5: The use and impact of OECD education policy 
advice in Ireland 
The cross-country analysis in Chapter 4 was complemented by study visits to Ireland and the 
French Community of Belgium. A comparative outline of the two education systems is 
provided in the Appendix. The analyses in this and the next chapter were guided by the six 
case study questions (CSQs) listed in Chapter 2. The chapter is articulated in the following 
parts: 
- A historical overview of the main educational issues in the country before its first 
PISA participation, including country relations with the OECD, participation in other 
LSAs and the key educational legislative framework. 
- A summary of the targeted EPA received after each PISA cycle, drawing from the 
national version of the report. 
- A detailed analysis of selected policies, covering the context surrounding the policy 
interventions, their degree of alignment with the EPA and, when possible, any 
evidence of implementation and impact. 
- A summary of country trends in policy alignment with the EPA. 
- An evaluation of the plausible impact of national reforms on PISA outcomes. 
The first step helps to frame PISA within an existing national context. It shows how receptive 
a country may have been to the new assessment and any pre-existing alignment with the EPA 
(CSQ4). The second step accounts for two issues: that a country may have received specific 
recommendations beyond the general policy advice summarised in Chapter 3, and that the 
interpretation of PISA outcomes by the national project managers and their policy advice 
might not be in line with that of the OECD (CSQ1). The third step helps to compare the 
experiences of both countries in similar areas whilst taking into consideration the complexity 
of policymaking and the nuances in policy alignment (CSQs 2–5). At the end of the chapter, 
the fourth and fifth steps organise the evidence collected to answer the overall research 
questions 2 (country alignment with OECD recommendations) and 3 (impact of EPA-aligned 
policies). 
In the case of Ireland, it is argued that the country has always been receptive to OECD 
recommendations but since 2005 policy alignment has increased even further. There are few 
policies satisfying the criteria of being aligned with the EPA, having been implemented 
effectively, and being sufficiently old, that effects on student learning can be evaluated; 
however, DEIS and Project Maths provide evidence that EPA-aligned policies can be effective 




The evolution of education between religion and market economy 
The 1937 Constitution established that the rights and responsibilities for children’s education 
fell upon parents; the only obligation of the state was to arrange for (but not necessarily supply) 
free primary education. As a result, Irish education has traditionally been publicly-funded but 
privately-managed, specifically by the Catholic Church. The non-interventionism of the state 
has been criticised as a ‘pious stasis’: for many years, the function of education was to 
reproduce ‘a certain social type, pious, familial, loyal to the native acres, culturally ingrown 
and obedient to clerical guidance in matters moral and intellectual’ (Garvin, 2004, p. 184; 
quoted in O’Connor, 2014, p. 197).  
The ‘triumphalist’ period of the Catholic Church in education (O’Donoghue & Harford, 
2011) lasted at least until the mid-1960s, when the Department of Education and Skills (DES) 
began to play a more active role in the development and implementation of education policies 
following ‘the increased participation rates from the 1960s, the development of the 
comprehensive and community schools, and the expansion of the vocational sector to include 
Regional Technical Colleges (now Institutes of Technology)’ (Eurydice, 2016c).  
The turning point in the transition from a ‘theocentric’ to a ‘mercantile’ paradigm 
(O’Sullivan, 2005) was Investment in Education (Government of Ireland, 1965), a ‘technical 
study of trends in Irish education and of the use of human and material resources in that 
system’ (p. xxxiii). The report was prepared by a survey team appointed in 1962 and it 
benefitted from ‘the guidance’ of the OECD (p. xxxiv), which also contributed with technical 
and financial support. The advisory role of OECD ‘gave the report a neutral identity’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 141).  
The authors provided only one formal recommendation, but it was sufficient to change the 
role of the state in educational affairs: ‘the creation in the Department of Education of an 
educational development unit’ (Government of Ireland, 1965, p. 387) ‘to continue the kind of 
work that [the] survey [had] begun’ (p. 350). More implicitly, the report also ‘indicated 
numerous reforms required in the national system of education’ (OECD, 1991, p. 7).  
Despite its pivotal contribution, Investment in Education acted ‘as a means of extending 
and legitimating a paradigmatic shift that had already occurred’ (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 137)—
a shift that had led Ireland to participate ‘eagerly’ (p. 136) in the OECD Washington 
Conference of 1961 and to be the first country to volunteer to undergo peer review.  
The new paradigm owed much of its success to the support of Irish parents, who saw their 
role change from ‘mute followers’ to decision-makers: human capital theory not only provided 
them with ‘an understanding of education that they shared but it also named and legitimated 
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in official discourse what they had previously lived namelessly’ (pp. 154–155). Since then, 
Irish parents have continued to request greater empowerment, sometimes advocating 
accountability measures opposed by teachers, such as being able to access achievement data 
or school performance reports (Kellaghan, McGee, Millar, & Perkins, 2004).  
The emergence of human capital theory was accompanied, but not matched, by discourses 
on equity, which captured the interest of intellectuals and researchers thanks to the Coleman 
Report (J. Coleman et al., 1966) but remained at the outskirts of the political arena. Even the 
introduction of comprehensive schooling was framed as a practical need rather than a moral 
imperative. An exception was gender equality, appearing in the 1970s as a highly systematised 
discourse ‘incorporating an unambiguous belief system, explicit apparatus, together with 
instruments and mechanisms for the articulation of correct practices, the monitoring of 
behaviour and action, the arbitration of doubt and dissent, and for its reproduction over time’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 425). 
Equity became a valuable goal of education only in the 1980s, though it was still 
interpreted in economic terms. In agreement with the OECD view of the time (and to some 
extent today), the Commission on Taxation wrote that ‘education policy may be perhaps the 
most powerful weapon available to democratic government in seeking to introduce equality 
in the distribution of incomes’ (quoted in Fitzgerald, 2001, p. 156). Once it entered the system, 
addressing educational disadvantage became a staple of the educational agendas of both left 
and right-wing ministers16 (see for example MoE O’Rourke's statement of educational 
priorities in OECD, 1991).  
O’Sullivan (2005) argues that discourses on equity caught on across the political spectrum 
because of their fuzziness, which made them applicable to a range of contrasting situations. 
The term used by the author is “pastiche”—a form characterised by ‘avoidance of dissonance 
and contestation, deferral and dispersal in understanding disadvantage, the enjoining of 
agreement, the mobilisation of diverse participants, and the orientation and facilitation of 
action’ (pp. 322–323). This recalls the multi-vocal nature of OECD indicators mentioned in 
Chapters 1 and 3. 
Many reforms have taken place since the 1980s, yet it has been argued that ‘the structure 
of Irish second-level education remains largely as it was in 1965’ (O’Connor, 2014, p. 204): 
primary and secondary-level education is segregated on grounds of religion and gender, and 
‘the state’s commitment to education still does not extend much beyond the payment of 
salaries’ (p. 203). Some of the interventions reported later in this section suggest that the role 
                                                     
16 A list of education ministries is available at http://www.education.ie/en/The-
Department/Ministers/Ministers-for-Education-From-1921-to-Date.html (Accessed 16 April 2016) 
180 
 
of the state is more incisive than claimed by O’Connor, but they provide little evidence of 
changes in religious and gender segregation. 
International relations: the OECD and the European Community 
Three factors contributed to shaping Irish education: ‘the international restructuring of 
economies, the impact of reports and recommendations from the European Community (EC) 
and the influence of the OECD’ (Drudy, 2000; cited in Halton, 2003, p. 334). Connections 
between the OECD and Irish policymakers have existed since the establishment of the 
organisation in 1961. The 1965 Investment in Education report was prepared under the aegis 
of the OECD, though some claim that its role was much more limited than commonly assumed 
(Hyland, 2014). In 1969, a follow-up report on the state of the education system highlighted 
the following weaknesses: the inefficiency of small primary schools; traditional teaching 
methods and low attention to physical sciences, biology and mathematics; teacher training; 
and the fact that education in Ireland was a conservative system based on the transmission of 
values and reflecting ‘the [traditional] social structure of the community […] even when the 
circumstances of the community have undergone important changes to which education must 
respond’ (OECD, 1969, p. 84). 
In 1973, Ireland joined the Economic European Community and ‘adopted a strong pro-
European stance influenced by its desire for still closer links with mainland Europe’ (OECD, 
1991, p. 11). When the OECD inspectors returned, in 1991, they praised increased access and 
better curricular experiences for pupils in primary education (thanks to the well-received 
Curaclam na Bunscoile [primary school curriculum] of 1971) but they also reported that ‘the 
system as such [had] remained largely the same’ as 20 years earlier (OECD, 1991, p. 36). 
Systemic change ‘was not planned methodically but expanded in piecemeal fashion in order 
to respond to importunate pressures’ (ibid.). They found an innate conservativism, made worse 
by the presence of powerful interest groups outside the government and the absence ‘of a 
purposeful central authority having the political will, administrative capacity, and requisite 
financial resources to formulate and implement reforms’ (ibid.). The OECD also highlighted 
the lack of school and pupil data, the lack of consistency in teacher training and education, 
and the lack of a clear role for the Inspectorate: where primary school inspectors actively 
evaluated pupil and teacher performance, secondary school inspectors rarely visited schools 
and used most of their resources administering inadequate national examinations. 
The Minister replied to the inspectors that ‘the Irish education system and the results that 
it produced compared favourably with those of any country’ (MoE O’Rourke in OECD, 1991, 
p. 116), but many of the OECD recommendations eventually flowed into the new Green Paper 
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for education (DES, 1992; Halton, 2003). Consequences of the OECD report on Irish 
policymaking can be seen for instance in the following excerpt from a debate in the Seanad17: 
‘The 1992 OECD report referred to in the Green Paper indicated that, while the 
problems of basic literacy were relatively low, the problems of functional literacy 
were alarmingly high [… The] Department has commissioned the Education 
Research Centre […] to carry out a national survey on literacy. This survey will 
be part of an international one led by those who produced the OECD report to 
which I have referred.’ (MoE Bhreathnach, 1993)  
The Green Paper, ‘which was regarded as an attempt to introduce an “enterprise culture” 
into schooling’ (Halton, 2003, p. 332), was followed by an unprecedented mobilisation of 
stakeholders in education that found its highest expression in the National Education 
Convention of 1993. Proceedings from the Convention (Convention Secretariat, 1994) 
informed the White Paper (DES, 1995) and, to some extent, the main legislative effort of that 
period: the Education Act, 1998 (Oireachtas, 1998). In all this, the OECD never quite 
disappeared from the picture: ‘What we are doing in Ireland is of considerable interest to our 
partners, and the OECD is specifically monitoring this process where the partners in education 
are being consulted, heard and responded to before the “tablets of stone” [the government’s 
White Paper] are finished’ (MoE Bhreathnach, 1994).  
Key educational framework 
The Education Act (1998) was the first comprehensive legal framework for education since 
the foundation of the state. It sets the educational goals for the country (§ 6), the objectives of 
schools (§ 9), the role of the Inspectorate (§ 13), of the school Board of Management (§ 15) 
and of the School Principal (§ 23). It also establishes institutions such as the Educational 
Disadvantage Committee (§ 32) and the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment 
(NCCA, § 41).  
Table 5.1 shows the remarkable alignment between the Education Act and the EPA both 
in contents and language, particularly in matters of equity. It is plausible that the views of the 
OECD and the European Commission, which had already entered the Irish policy discourse 
through the Green and the White Papers, contributed to shaping the founding Act of Irish 
education. 
Table 5.1: contact points between the Education Act, 1998, and the OECD education policy advice 
Educational time 
 § 25(c) and 30(1)(c) grant the MoE the authority to prescribe—following consultation— 
‘the length of the school year, the school week or the school day’ and ‘the amount of 
instruction time to be allotted to each subject’ 
                                                     
17 The Parliament of Ireland (Oireachtas) is divided into two Houses: The House of Representatives 
(Dáil Éireann) and the Senate (Seanad Éireann). The Irish names are used in this document. All debates 
are available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/ (accessed 16 April 2016). 
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Equality of opportunities to learn 
 All actors should promote ‘equality of access to and participation in education’ § 6(c), 
21(2), 41(2)(j), 41(3)(b).  
 All actors should work toward the inclusion of children with a disability or other special 
education needs § 6(a), for instance by promoting ‘effective liaison’ of all who have ‘a 
special interest in, or experience of’ SEN education § 6(g). 
 Schools should ‘promote equality of opportunity for both male and female students’ § 9(e) 
and the NCCA should ‘promote equality […] of instruction in any particular subjects 
between male and female students’ § 41(2)(j). 
 “Educational disadvantage” is defined as ‘the impediments to education arising from 
social or economic disadvantage which prevent students from deriving appropriate benefit 
from education in schools’ § 32(9), an Educational Disadvantage Committee is 
established and resource allocation should account for ‘the level of disadvantage of 
student in schools’ § 12(1). 
 Schools should ‘ensure that students have access to appropriate guidance to assist them in 
their educational and career choices’ § 9(c) and the curriculum for guidance and 
counselling may be set by the MoE § 30(1)(d). 
Quality of provision 
 All actors should ‘promote best practice in teaching methods’ § 6(f), and for this purpose 
the NCCA should ‘from time to time to review the inservice [CPD] training needs of 
teachers’ § 41(e). 
 All actors should work to ‘enhance the accountability of the education system’ § 6(l). § 13 
addresses the work of the Inspectorate but largely ‘reflects the existing practices of the 
Inspector in statutory form’ (McElduff & Sheehan, 2001, p. 5). Principals should 
‘regularly evaluate students and periodically report the results of the evaluation to the 
students and their parents’ § 22(2)(b). 
 Principal and teachers should ‘collectively promote co-operation between the school and 
the community which it serves’ § 22(2)(c). 
Student performance 
 § 30(1)(a) and (b) grant the MoE the authority to prescribe the school curriculum.  
 The NCCA should devise ‘mechanisms whereby students who have problems achieving 
their potential may be identified as early as practicable and assisted’ § 41(b). 
 The NCCA should devise methods to assess students ‘having regard to national and 
international standards and good practice in relation to such assessment’ § 41(d). 
 
Not all provisions in the Act agree with the EPA. For instance, § 6(e) states that all actors 
in education should ‘promote the right of parents to send their children to a school of the 
parents’ choice’, which is contrary the EPA and negatively impacts on the equity of the 
system.  
Previous participation in international assessments 
Before PISA, in 1990/1991 Ireland participated in both the IEA Reading Literacy Study (RLS) 
and the Educational Testing Service’s (ETS) Second International Assessment of Educational 
Progress (IAEP2, Lapointe, Askew, & Mead, 1992; M. O. Martin, Hickey, & Murchan, 1992). 
Results from IAEP2 were collected in Education at a Glance (CERI, 1993), which in turn was 
the reference source for the Irish government to claim in the White Paper that ‘the overall 
science achievement of thirteen-year-old students in Ireland is low compared to a number of 
other OECD countries’ (DES, 1995, p. 23). O’Leary (2001) demonstrated, using data from 
both IAEP2 and TIMSS 1995, that the poor performance reflected sampling choices rather 
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than actual learning but, he argued, policy-makers continued to use IAEP2 results at face 
value. In 1994, Ireland took part in the OECD International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS; 
DES, 1997; see also Thorn, 2009, for a summary of the adult literacy studies).  
In 1995, Ireland took part in TIMSS. Findings were reported over three years respectively 
focusing on grades 7-8 (Beaton, Martin, et al., 1996; Beaton, Mullis, et al., 1996), grades 3-4 
(M. O. Martin et al., 1997; Mullis et al., 1997) and grades 11-12 (Mullis et al., 1998). Ireland 
emerged as an average-ranking country on most indicators, with the exception of mean 
performance and improvement between 3rd and 4th grade. The primary grades attracted most 
positive comments, whereas the small performance improvement in the transition from 
primary to secondary education was highlighted in more than one instance. Other negative 
points were teachers’ beliefs about mathematics and assessment, student beliefs about science, 
the reliance of teachers on textbooks, time dedicated to the instruction of science and to 
homework, and Irish teachers’ complaints about class sizes. This was the last TIMSS 
assessment until 2011. Most interviewees were reluctant to discuss why Ireland interrupted its 
participation, but there was some agreement that the decision was unexpected and was pushed 
by a senior advisor to the MoE—perhaps the Chief Inspector Eamon Stack, who was in charge 
between 1997 and 2009 and was replaced by Harold Hislop in 2010. 
In 1998, the DES commissioned the Educational Research Centre (ERC) ‘to conduct a 
national assessment of the mathematics achievement of pupils in fourth class in primary 
schools’ (Shiel & Kelly, 2001, p. v). Similar low-stakes assessments had already taken place 
after the introduction of the Curaclam na Bunscoile of 1971, but the National Assessment of 
Mathematics Achievement 1999 was particularly relevant for three reasons: it took place 15 
years after its most recent predecessor, it restarted a five-yearly practice that, since 2004, also 
includes the assessment of English reading, and it was statistically linked to TIMSS 1995 and 
1999 (Shiel & Kelly, 2001).  
Overall, Ireland’s attention to international and standardised assessment pre-dates PISA 
and may have made its adoption easier. The first mention of PISA in a parliamentary debate 
dates to 22 October 1998, when the MoE Micheál Martin was asked whether the DES was 
involved in any study on literacy levels in secondary education: 
‘My Department is participating in an OECD project which aims to produce policy 
relevant and internationally comparable indicators of student achievement. The 
project is called PISA, Programme for International Student Achievement. The 
project spans nine years and will be concerned with three major literacy areas […]. 
This will be the first time when direct international comparison will be possible 
in three key curricular areas at 15 years of age, an age when the vast majority of 
pupils sit the junior certificate examination.’ (M. Martin, 1998) 
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Thus, the policy relevance of PISA was established from the start because of its link with 
the Junior Certificate Examination (JCE) taken by the majority of 15/16 year-old students at 
the end of compulsory education. Notice that the salience of PISA was predicated on its ability 
to provide information on ‘key curricular areas’, not to assess skills for life. The Minister also 
thought that the “A” in “PISA” stood for “Achievement” instead of “Assessment”. This is a 
minor but interesting mistake, as there might be policy implications when treating something 
as a strategy for achievement rather than an assessment. Similar mistakes were made in 
parliamentary debates in Belgium. They are indicative of a certain inattention to small but 
nontrivial aspects of large-scale assessments by policymakers that could easily translate into 
loss of alignment when international recommendations are adopted on a national level.  
The education policy advice for Ireland 
In Ireland, ‘PISA is implemented by the Educational Research Centre on behalf of the 
Department of Education and Skills. A national advisory committee oversees the 
implementation of PISA and advises on all major aspects of the study, including reviewing 
the assessment materials and providing input into national reporting’ (ERC, 2015). The ERC 
also produces teacher guides to PISA (for PISA 2000, see Cosgrove, Sofroniou, Kelly, & 
Shiel, 2003), in which PISA findings are presented in the context of country policies. These 
guides provide the same information as the national reports and they do not seem to be trying 
to affect classroom practice, as recommendations to teachers and schools are general and 
limited to a few paragraphs. Perhaps they are a form of ‘opinion mobilization’ (see Table 2.1: 
Levin’s categorisation of policy levers), a strategy to ensure policy absorption and 
implementation. Because of their unclear function and impact, however, they are not 
considered any further in this chapter. 
As mentioned above, after the release of the international report, a national version is 
prepared by the ERC. It can be shown (Appendix 3, Tables 5.A–D) that the OECD and the 
ERC generally come to the same conclusions with respect to Irish performance but this is not 
always the case. Sometimes, this is due to the more extensive analyses carried out by the ERC. 
Sometimes, however, OECD findings are absent from the ERC reports or the same data are 
interpreted differently.  
This is a reminder that the national project managers do not simply reproduce OECD 
information, but are rather ‘brokers’ of knowledge (Meyer, 2010; Sriprakash & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2015). According to the principal–agent theory a research centre might, 
depending on its statute and leadership, acquire sufficient autonomy from its principal to add 
its own “voice” to that of the OECD. To understand the degree of autonomy of the ERC, this 
author tried to access further information about the its remit, mode of financing and 
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accountability, but without success. It is known that it was established in 1966 with a 
gentlemen’s agreement between the Dean of St. Patrick’s College and the founder, and that it 
has enjoyed a good degree of independence until very recently, when it has started to become 
more integrated with the MoE.  
The mechanisms whereby an ‘intermediary’ organisation (Honig, 2004) like the ERC 
brokers the EPA to Irish policymakers were not the focus of the current study, but the fact that 
the centre’s contribution is not limited to administering PISA and writing the national report 
should be taken into account. Differences between the OECD and the ERC goals and values 
may translate into competing policy recommendations and cause misalignment with the EPA. 
Therefore, this section not only presents the policy advice for Ireland emerging from the 
national reports, but also analyses instances in which the ERC advice does not match that of 
the OECD. 
PISA 2000 
To improve Reading outcomes, the ERC recommended evaluating existing policies to help 
students with serious difficulties. It also suggested that a new syllabus for the Foundation level 
of the JCE18 should be developed and more students should be encouraged to take it (Shiel, 
Cosgrove, Sofroniou, & Kelly, 2001a, p. 18). For Mathematics, the ERC highlighted the poor 
performance of higher-achieving students, and it argued that even though a syllabus revision 
emphasising more ‘realistic mathematics’ was ‘premature’ (p. 15), future developments 
‘should take account of differences […with] the content and format of the PISA assessment 
of mathematical literacy’ (p. 18). For Science, the ERC argued that a science module should 
be available in Junior Cycle to complement the soon-to-be implemented science primary 
curriculum. With a similar rhetoric to the OECD’s, the ERC warned that the current good 
performance ‘should not induce complacency’ (p. 19).  
Most of these recommendations are in line with the EPA; however, the idea of encouraging 
low-performing students to take Foundation rather than Ordinary level, while informed by 
PISA findings, did not challenge systemic streaming as advocated by the OECD. This idea 
was reiterated two years later: 
‘It is significant that 28% of students taking ordinary level syllabus […] achieved 
scores at or below Level 1. This […] points to a need to review the purpose and 
focus on foundation level English and the basis upon which students make choices 
about which level to take. Such a review would need to take into account the 
number who did not achieve grade D or higher in Ordinary level English […] 
                                                     
18 The easiest of the three examinations (and related curricular pathway) available to students. The 
other two levels are Ordinary and Higher. 
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coupled with the large proportion of Ordinary-level students achieving Level 1 or 
below on PISA reading literacy.’ (Cosgrove et al., 2003, p. 37) 
In both instances, the ERC advice was not built upon the OECD recommendation of 
reducing student segregation, but rather attempted to make existing streaming more efficient 
or less unfair. The motives behind this recommendation are not known, but it evidences a 
disconnect between the use of the “descriptive” aspect of PISA (achievement statistics) over 
its normative component at the national level, as argued in Chapter 1. 
PISA 2003 
Only a summary report was released by the ERC in 2004. The advice for Reading was similar 
to that in 2000 and focused on developing policies to help very low achievers. In Mathematics, 
PISA outcomes (which were average but had neither increased nor decreased) were 
instrumental for advocating a curricular revision. Changes in the mathematics syllabus were 
no longer ‘premature’ as the ERC pushed for greater alignment with the principles of Realistic 
Mathematics Education (a movement emerged in the Netherlands in the early 1970s, see Van 
den Heuvel-Panhuizen & Drijvers, 2014).  
The ERC did not fully embrace the PISA curriculum. It recognised that the PISA 
Mathematics content had limitations. However, PISA results were taken as a good measure of 
realistic mathematics ability because ‘the framework for PISA mathematics is grounded in the 
Realistic Mathematics Education movement’ (Cosgrove, Shiel, Sofroniou, Zastrutzki, & 
Shortt, 2004, p. 40). Therefore, outcomes from PISA were a sign that mathematics teaching 
in Ireland did not place sufficient emphasis on real-life situations and problem-solving 
(Cosgrove, Shiel, Sofroniou, et al., 2004). The solution was for Irish mathematics curriculum 
and practice to move towards PISA in order to move towards Realistic Mathematics 
Education.  
This is a use of PISA that was discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, as a means of problematising 
a situation and suggesting solutions, but it is also an interesting case of policy alignment. There 
is a feeling that the PISA curriculum was endorsed only because the ERC believed that it was 
a gateway for a different kind of mathematics instruction. Rather than aligning to the EPA, 
the ERC was aligning the EPA to its views. Consequently, it is possible that other findings 
from the international reports were noticed because they agreed with the ERC’s priorities. 
These may include recommendations on classroom disciplinary climate and home educational 
processes, the continuation of existing interventions addressing socio-economic disadvantage, 
and the development of new ones to help single-parent families.  
The ERC also noticed that the students not taking the science JCE performed worse in 
PISA and were predominantly female; therefore it advised, in line with the EPA, that ‘all First-
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year students, and especially females, [should be] well informed about the benefits of choosing 
science as a subject’ (Cosgrove, Shiel, Sofroniou, et al., 2004, p. 43). The positive OECD 
finding (2004b, p. 121) whereby Ireland was the only country in which males did not express 
higher motivation or engagement in Mathematics, instead, was not commented on.  
It is unclear why some PISA findings captured the attention of the ERC and others did 
not. As mentioned earlier, analysing the production of knowledge by national policy brokers 
was outside the scope of this research because if the EPA “works”, it should work regardless 
of whose advice a country is aligning to. Nevertheless, it is a reminder that the OECD may 
have only tangential influence on national policymaking when the voice of national advisors 
is sufficiently strong.  
The 2005 symposium 
A symposium aimed at ‘second-level teachers, representatives of the Department of Education 
and Science and its agencies, lecturers and researchers in education at third-level institutions’ 
was held ‘to reflect on the outcomes of PISA 2003 in Ireland, in terms of their implications 
for practice, research and policy development’ (DES & ERC, 2005, p. 2). Proceedings from 
the symposium (ERC, 2005) are illustrative of what policy areas captured the stakeholders’ 
interest at that time. Intervention strategies showed a remarkable alignment with the EPA. 
Three problematic areas were identified in Reading: a sizeable percentage of very low 
achievers, socio-economic disadvantage and gender gap. To increase achievement, the 
introduction of early support mechanisms paired with teacher and whole school CPD was 
suggested, and so was participation in PIRLS as a way to monitor performance at the primary 
level. To tackle disadvantage, lessons from Nordic countries as well as school allocation 
policies were mentioned. Finally, participants discussed how to get boys more engaged with 
reading through teaching practices, specific assessment formats and more ‘appealing’ literary 
genres in the curriculum. 
In Mathematics, delegates seemed to agree that a greater focus on problem-solving skills 
and real-life contexts was needed to raise student achievement. PISA was recognised as a 
valuable instrument. Some delegates asked whether the national curriculum should ‘be altered 
to reflect something more of what PISA assesses’—even though it was unclear whether PISA 
tested ‘literacy or ability’ (ERC, 2005, p. 6). PISA managed to problematise mathematics 
education in Ireland. It was widely agreed that there was ‘a need for a major debate on the 
kind of mathematics curriculum that [… stakeholders wanted] in Ireland’ (ibid.). 
Promotion, uptake and the relationship between the syllabus and the real world were 
mentioned also in respect of Science. It was argued that the recently-revised 2003 curriculum 
‘was more of a response to concerns about attitudes towards the hard sciences and uptake at 
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Leaving Certificate’ rather than an implementation of an underlying ‘coherent philosophy’ 
building on the primary curriculum (ERC, 2005, p. 17), which would ensure a smoother 
transition between primary and secondary education. A lack of resources for science teaching 
was also lamented. 
PISA 2006 
With the third cycle, trend analyses became an important part of the national reports. It is 
interesting to note how lack of change in Irish results, which relegated the country to the 
background in the international report, was instead highly relevant at the national level, given 
the many curricular reforms that were taking place in those years (see the “Changing 
Curricula” section below).  
Following a slight decrease in Reading 2003, a non-statistically significant improvement 
in 2006 was almost welcomed with relief by the ERC, as it was ‘sufficient to ensure’ that the 
overall 2000–2006 trend was not negative (Eivers, Shiel, & Cunningham, 2007, p. 35). The 
2006 national report was also more critical of PISA compared to previous years. It was 
suggested that the 2000–2003 decrease might have been due to ‘technical difficulties with a 
small number of items’ (ibid.), and that the gender gap could be partly explained by the 
assessment contents and format. Policy recommendations were still highly aligned with the 
EPA but cited national evaluations (e.g., Inspectorate, 2006) rather than PISA reports. They 
included delaying ability grouping, increasing opportunities for collaborative teacher 
planning, emphasising formative assessment and raising teacher expectations of lower 
achievers. 
In Mathematics, lack of change was used to critique the backwash effect of existing 
assessments on instruction and to promote the realistic approach endorsed by Project Maths, 
a curricular intervention that was being developed at the time.  
In Science, lack of change was met with disappointment, given recent changes in the 
primary and secondary curricula that had made them more closely aligned with PISA. This 
also led to further criticism of PISA: ‘Section 1B of the [revised Junior Certificate Science 
Syllabus …] is not represented by any PISA items. While it is impossible to provide in-depth 
coverage of all the main branches of science, it is ironic that an assessment of real-life science 
ignores the development of life itself’ (Eivers et al., 2007, p. 35, emphasis in the text).  
A few pages later, however, PISA was again the reference point to critique the 
effectiveness of the Ordinary level of the curriculum: it ‘does not provide [… students] with 
any additional knowledge of science (as measured by PISA) and therefore raises the question 
of what scientific skills and knowledge the course does provide, and what PISA assesses’ (p. 
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37). It looks as if some aspects of PISA were critiqued and some praised depending on whether 
they agreed with the ERC view of what was valuable education. 
Most recommendations for science were integrated into the full report one year later 
(Eivers, Shiel, & Cunningham, 2008) and focused on monitoring curricular implementation, 
increasing technical support to science teachers, promoting science and science-related 
activities to parents and students, and motivating students. The critique to the Ordinary-level 
syllabus was complemented by the advice that the motivation and attitudes of students taking 
that pathway should also be examined. 
The 2008 symposium 
The proceedings from the 2008 PISA Symposium are not available, but it was possible to 
access the concluding remarks of the Assistant Chief Inspector (Murtagh, 2008). In line with 
the ERC, Murtagh praised Project Maths as the solution to Irish performance and uptake. The 
author supported his argument with a joke comparing the existing syllabus to an old dog that 
had to learn new tricks because ‘the old tricks are not compatible with Windows Vista’ (p. 6). 
Windows Vista was the newest Microsoft operating system at the time and the implication 
seemed that the mathematics syllabus had to adapt to keep up with the requirements of 
contemporary society or the demands of PISA.  
PISA 2009 
PISA 2009 was characterised by a large performance drop in Reading (−31 points) and 
Mathematics (−16 points), which turned Ireland into a negative example in the international 
report (OECD, 2010d). This captured all the attention and pushed other findings to the 
background: the decline in disciplinary classroom climate, as well as positive aspects such as 
the consistently low between-school variance, went uncommented. This gives support to the 
argument that the greatest achievement of the OECD with PISA has been to popularise the 
idea that scores and rankings matter (Grek, 2009; Martens & Niemann, 2010; Martens, 
Rusconi, & Leuze, 2007). Had this not been the case, the ERC would have granted other 
indicators the same relevance as it did to the decrease in scores. Instead, on 13 January 2011, 
representatives from the ERC, the DES and the Inspectorate were questioned by the Joint 
Committee on Education and Skills (2011) about the results: the title of the discussion was 
“Ireland’s ranking on PISA”, which is revealing of the policymakers’ priorities. 
The outcomes of PISA 2009 resulted in the production of five additional reports (Cosgrove 
& Moran, 2011; Cosgrove, Shiel, Archer, & Perkins, 2010; Cosgrove, 2011; Perkins, 
Cosgrove, Moran, & Shiel, 2012; Shiel, Moran, Cosgrove, & Perkins, 2010), plus two from 
independent sources (Cartwright, 2011; LaRoche, Cartwright, & Statistics Canada, 2010), as 
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well as two journal articles (Cosgrove & Cartwright, 2014; Eivers, 2010), all determined to 
explain (to stakeholders) the plausible causes for the falling scores.  
It is telling that, in these reports, the ERC dedicated extensive effort on the validation of 
PISA. Some discontent had been expressed after PISA 2006, but this was the first time that 
the validity of PISA was so explicitly put under scrutiny19. The ERC identified three main 
factors behind the 2009 drop: student engagement, demographic and curricular changes. 
Student engagement referred to an increase in the percentage of missing and non-reached 
responses, especially in link items, which might have introduced DIF and biased the trends 
downwards (Cartwright, 2011; Cosgrove & Cartwright, 2014). This finding is further evidence 
of the effect of linking error on country outcomes critiqued in Chapter 4. 
Demographic changes in the sample were represented by an increase in low-achieving 
students: first-generation immigrants, students with special education needs and students at 
risk of early school leaving (Cosgrove & Cartwright, 2014; Perkins, Moran, Cosgrove, & 
Shiel, 2010). Many of these findings were not discussed from a policy perspective. It is 
striking that a social issue (the declining performance of first-generation immigrants) and an 
educational success (the reduction in the proportion of school leavers) were instrumental for 
the analysis of PISA trends but were not treated as policy-relevant results in their own right.  
Claims about the impact of the science curricula on the observed PISA outcomes are 
similarly puzzling. The ERC suggested that reforms of the primary and secondary curricula 
‘may have mitigated the effects of changes in demography and sampling that might otherwise 
have lowered performance in science in PISA 2009’ (Perkins et al., 2010, p. 58). The ERC did 
not have comparable data from national assessments showing improvements in science 
performance. However, it did have: evidence of lack of impact of the primary and secondary 
curricula in English and Mathematics (e.g., Perkins et al., 2010); evidence of moderate 
implementation of the primary (Varley, Murphy, & Veale, 2008b) and Junior Cycle science 
curricula (Eivers, Shiel, & Cheevers, 2006); and evidence of the stability of Irish performance 
in science from all previous international assessments. In other words, it had more information 
suggesting that Science results should not have improved, rather than the opposite.  
Perhaps the ERC had additional evidence that warranted its positive interpretation 
regarding the role of the science curricula (indeed, Science scores increased again in 2012). 
An alternative explanation is that the revised science curricula were much more aligned with 
                                                     
19 From informal conversations with ERC staff, it emerged that scores had been stable for so many 
years in previous national and international assessments that the ERC thought a sudden drop of that 
magnitude was unlikely. This author noted that if outcomes were so predictable there would be little 
incentive for participating in PISA. The ERC staff counter-argued that the usefulness of PISA came 
from its rich databases rather than from mean country estimates, even though these latter drew the 
attention of policymakers. 
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PISA in terms of real-world contextualisation and problem-solving—an approach that the 
ERC endorsed (at least in mathematics). This may have led the centre to be slightly biased 
towards its effectiveness.  
Analysis of selected policies 
The analysis in this section covers reforms of three aspects of the Irish education system: 
curriculum, evaluation and assessment, and equity. Curricular and equity reforms have the 
potential to impact on PISA outcomes directly. Interventions on systemic evaluation and 
assessment were included as they represent the typical accountability policies that some 
research strands claim to be driven by globalising forces such as PISA. The case studies 
provided a good opportunity to understand whether these policies were actually the product 
of global forces, what role the local context had in shaping them, and how they could be linked 
to the EPA. 
The analysis of each policy follows a prescribed format including context and influences, 
contact points with the EPA (or PISA, in case of curricular reforms), implementation, and 
(when possible) impact. The first step contributes to an understanding of how “international” 
discourses are translated on a national level. The second step helps to differentiate the level of 
goals and values (acknowledgment) from that of alignment (see Chapter 2): a policy may be 
influenced by international discourses or PISA outcomes in its general ideas or objectives and 
still not be aligned with the EPA in its specific modes of intervention. The third step links 
enactment of the EPA to its ability to influence student outcomes.  
Evidence of alignment with the EPA and effectiveness from each policy feeds into the 
broader end-of-chapter conclusions which, in turn, contribute along with the cross-country 
evidence from Chapter 4 to answering the second and third research question.    
Changing curricula 
Mathematics: the revised Junior Certificate Mathematics Syllabus (rJCMS), 2000  
Context and influences 
After the introduction of the Junior Certificate in 1989, a mathematics committee was 
established and asked, in late 1994, ‘to critique the Junior Certificate mathematics syllabuses 
[…] with a view to introducing some amendments if required’ (DES & NCCA, 2002, p. 6). A 
final draft was approved by the NCCA council in May 1998, and the revised syllabus (the 
rJCMS) was introduced in September 2000 for first examination in 2003. 
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‘The drive to change came from the Inspectorate’ (I420), but many other stakeholders were 
unhappy with the state of the system. The exams were highly predictable, so much that 
newspapers published hints on how to answer specific questions before they came out, without 
any resistance from the examination board (I4, see also Lubienski, 2011). There was also an 
‘enormous cultural drive’ (I4) to teaching to the test and this was partly due to teachers’ 
inadequate subject knowledge—an issue that is still relevant today (I11). ‘Junior Certificate 
mathematics teachers [… were] usually not subject specialists in that they [… taught] other 
subjects as well as mathematics’ (Lyons, Lynch, Close, Sheerin, & Boland, 2003, p. 5; citing 
Oldham, 2001). As a result, they favoured abstract, procedural knowledge (Beaton, Mullis, et 
al., 1996).  
Contact points with PISA 
In its intentions, the rJCMS focused more than its predecessor on mathematical understanding 
and problem-solving in real-life contexts, in line with Realistic Mathematics Education, but 
its main source of inspiration was the recently-revised primary curriculum (NCCA, 1999). 
Merriman et al. (2014) argued that Realistic Mathematics Education underpins both the 
primary curriculum and PISA. This would provide a trait d’union between primary 
curriculum, secondary curriculum and PISA, but it is also where the similarities stop.  
The primary curriculum borrowed from Dewey’s (1915) idea of balanced education 
(Breacháin & O’Toole, 2013), and its guiding principle was ‘celebrating the uniqueness of the 
child’ (NCCA, 1999, p. 8). Of course, the primary curriculum had been developed in a period 
in which international LSAs were ‘receiving attention’ (DES, 1995, p. 203). But the 
educational goals it promoted lacked references to concepts such as “ability”, “growth” or 
“econonomic development”, and its international vision was limited to the role of Ireland 
within the European Union. It is also difficult to argue that the move towards realistic 
mathematics and problem-solving was to promote 21st century skills, given that the former 
refers to a movement initiated in the 1970s and the latter had been in the Irish agenda since 
the 1980s (I4). 
In summary, the rJCMS had little alignment with the EPA/PISA, but acknowledged its 
importance by suggesting that the PISA model could form the basis for future reviews of the 
mathematics assessment practices (DES & NCCA, 2002). 
Implementation and impact 
The rJCMS was accompanied by targeted CPD focusing on realistic mathematics education, 
but the impression at the time was that the reform had little impact on classroom practice 
                                                     
20 Interviews with Irish experts are coded “I” (for “Ireland”) plus a sequential number. In some 
occasions, it was felt that even this system may compromise the anonymity of the participant, in which 
case the number was replaced with a bar (“I-”).  
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(Lyons et al., 2003). As noted earlier, the ERC suggested further curricular revisions as early 
as after the first PISA cycle, one year after the introduction of the rJCMS. The rJCMS ‘had to 
be done’ (I2) but its effectiveness was severely hampered by the fact that the examinations 
(and therefore teaching) did not change. Stakeholders knew that to achieve results ‘everybody 
needed to be engaged’ and ‘the whole problem’ needed to be tackled (I2). This was the 
approach that became Project Maths (below in this chapter). 
Science: the revised Junior Certificate Science Syllabus (rJCSS), 2003  
Context and influences 
Like the mathematics syllabus, the science syllabus (rJCSS) was prepared by a subject 
committee as a review to the 1989 curriculum (NCCA, 2003). The syllabus was devised in a 
period of substantial investment in science and technology by research councils and higher 
education institutions, but concern was expressed about science uptake and teacher training 
(MoE M. Martin, 1999a, 1999b; Task Force on the Physical Sciences, 2001). The rJCSS was 
introduced in the same year as all primary school pupils began to study the subject as part of 
the social, environmental and scientific education syllabus (DES & NCCA, 2006). 
Contact points with PISA 
The rJCSS was much more responsive to international trends and the knowledge economy 
framework than the rJCMS, but so was science education in Ireland in general.  
O’Leary (personal communication of 19 November 2014) argued that the perceived poor 
performance in the IAEP2 of 1991 was ‘a real wake-up call for science’. The science domain 
of the primary curriculum was ‘largely based on the content and cognitive domains found in 
TIMSS 1995 and is considerably different to its predecessor, Curaclam na Bunscoile’ (C. 
Murphy, 2013, p. 179; also I11). The Task Force on the Physical Sciences (2001) argued that 
‘Science should be included as a core component in the education of all students [also because 
of] its inclusion as one of the three literacy domains examined by the OECD as part of the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)’ (p. 40). Following these 
recommendations, the National Policy and Advisory Board for Enterprise, Trade, Science, 
Technology and Innovation (Forfás) launched, on 30th October 2003, the Discover Science 
and Engineering Programme, a national awareness intervention that brought together a range 
of pre-existing campaigns (Forfás, 2004).   
Curricular changes introduced with the rJCSS improved ‘in many ways […] the alignment 
between the Junior Certificate Science Syllabus and PISA, in terms of moving closer to the 
concept of scientific literacy as defined by the PISA assessment framework. In fact, the 
definition of scientific literacy used for the PISA 2000 assessment […] was cited as part of 
the rationale for a syllabus revision’ (Eivers et al., 2006, p. 4; see also NCCA, 2008). One 
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informant said: ‘Cynical people say it’s to prepare students for PISA, because they [PISA 
tests] are carried out one year later [compared to the science JCE]… but that’s cynical people’ 
(I10). Stakeholders’ perception of a strong curricular alignment between the rJCSS and PISA 
might explain why the ERC was disappointed when PISA 2006 “failed” to test one area of the 
rJCSS (Eivers et al., 2007). 
Implementation 
To facilitate the implementation of the rJCSS, a Junior Science Support Service was 
introduced with CPD opportunities involving ‘six one-day seminars over the first three years 
of the syllabus implementation’ (Eivers et al., 2006, p. 7). Typical attendance ‘comprised 75-
80% of existing Junior Cycle teachers’ (Varley et al., 2008b, p. 37). However, Eivers et al. 
(2006) reported that ‘the revised syllabus has achieved some, but not all, of its aims’ (p. 29), 
because ‘while many teachers support the syllabus as theoretically constructed, there are 
difficulties with its implementation’ (p. 28). These difficulties involved lack of differentiation, 
an excessive use of textbooks, a teacher-centred approach and few opportunities for students 
to engage in practical work (Inspectorate, 2008, drawing from 63 inspections carried out 
between 2004 and 2006).  
Following teacher feedback, the syllabus underwent minor changes (NCCA, 2008). After 
a few years, Varley, Murphy, & Veale (2011) found evidence of a greater emphasis on 
practical work in 15 schools. However, the authors also reported a lack of consistency between 
the primary and post-primary science experiences, ongoing traditional teaching, and ‘a neglect 
of certain areas recommended in the new syllabus’ (p. 295).  
Teacher training was another issue. Using data from 150 pre-service teachers, Murphy & 
Smith (2012) reported that student teachers had not acquired ‘sufficient understanding of 
scientific background knowledge to implement the science curriculum in a sufficiently 
competent manner’ (p. 89). 
Impact 
As in 2009, Perkins et al. (2013) argued that the introduction of scientific education in the 
1999 primary curriculum and the rJCSS ‘may have contributed to the significant increase in 
science achievement observed in Ireland in [PISA] 2012’ (p. 161). Yet the evidence above 
provides only limited support to the hypothesis that the syllabus was implemented 
consistently. Even assuming that it did and that this would have been sufficient to affect PISA 
outcomes, it is unclear why the performance increase was confined to Second- and Third-Year 




Recent developments: The Literacy and Numeracy Strategy and Project Maths 
Some interventions have taken place too recently to be thoroughly evaluated, but they are 
illustrative of recent trends in curricular development. 
The National Literacy and Numeracy Strategy (NLNS), 2011 
In July 2011, a strategy called “Literacy and Numeracy for Learning and Life: The National 
Strategy to Improve Literacy and Numeracy among children and Young People, 2011–2020” 
was launched in Ireland. The name is reminiscent of OECD’s Knowledge and skills for life, 
and indeed some think that the strategy was ‘completely informed by PISA 2009’ (I6). More 
moderate statements argue that it ‘was informed by evidence from [… PISA 2009] and 
findings from Inspectorate reports and other sources that suggested that the teaching of literacy 
and numeracy needed to be strengthened’ (Inspectorate, 2013, p. 15). In any case, the NLNS 
provides an example of enactment of the EPA in Ireland.  
The NLNS draws heavily from OECD recommendations and improvement in PISA is one 
of the targets set for secondary education (DES, 2011b, p. 18)—a choice considered by some 
‘embarrassing… almost’ (I9), since Irish governments have a tendency to miss these kind of 
objectives. The importance of literacy and numeracy had already been recognised in the 
primary curriculum (Breacháin & O’Toole, 2013; O’Donoghue, 2002), but they were part of 
a broader set of academic and socio-emotional skills to be taught. With the NLNS, the holistic 
approach of the primary curriculum disappeared and cuts were recommended to ‘desirable but 
ultimately less important activities’ (Breacháin & O’Toole, 2013; DES, 2011, p. 15). What 
had changed? 
On the one hand, a narrative of crisis (Apple, 1988; Takayama & Apple, 2008) had entered 
the education policy arena, riding on the back of the actual economic crisis of 2008. As a 
result, the narrow focus of the NLNS was presented as a ‘difficult choice[…]’ that ‘ha[d] to 
be made’ because of the ‘extremely difficult’ economic circumstances, in order to ‘ensure the 
most efficient use possible of available resources’ (DES, 2011b, p. 15). The language of crises 
and opportunities is a staple of PISA reports, therefore outcomes from the assessment could 
easily resonate in Ireland. The new government, which came into power in 2008, needed ‘to 
be seen to respond to PISA results’ (Breacháin & O’Toole, 2013, p. 413), and this response 
took the shape of the NLNS.  
On the other hand, the system was ready for a change (see Steiner-Khamsi, 2006, on 
timing). Calls for greater focus on literacy and numeracy had started ‘well before PISA 2009’ 
(I9). Kellaghan et al. (1995) had recommended ‘paying particular, though not exclusive, 
attention to literacy and numeracy skills’ (p. 66). Archer & Shortt (2003) had critiqued ‘the 
absence of a clear prioritisation of literacy and numeracy’ in schemes for tackling 
disadvantage (p. 19). When the PISA 2009 results came out, the DES ‘was in a stronger 
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position to argue their [its] case’ (I11): ‘when you are trying to push a policy, it does not hurt 
that your country is slipping in the PISA’ (I7). Teacher unions were more ready ‘to buy in the 
policy than if PISA hadn’t happened’ (I9).  
In spite of its extensive instrumental use by the government and the unions, one informant 
thought the way PISA interprets mathematics as literacy has educational value: ‘students need 
to be able to mingle their literacy with their numeracy and need to know when to use them’ 
(I1). Instead, Irish students treated ‘the wordy part’ as disconnected from the procedural part, 
‘as if they were being asked opinions, they couldn’t see that it was still maths’ (I1). 
Project Maths, 2012 
Context and influences 
The three principles underpinning Project Maths are Realistic Mathematics Education, 
knowledge economy and problem-solving: ‘It involves empowering students to develop 
essential problem-solving skills for higher education and the workplace by engaging teenagers 
with mathematics set in interesting and real-world contexts’ (NCCA, 2015). ‘Project Maths 
is a work in progress’ (NCCA, 2012, p. 1) that ‘sets out to change the traditional didactic 
approach’ (McMorris, 2008): ‘we are changing a culture [… ;] we are moving, as many 
European countries are, towards more emphasis on applications and producing 
mathematically literate people rather than people who are able to reproduce information’ 
(McMorris, 2008).  
Project Maths was more than a curricular reform, it was meant to be a paradigm shift in 
mathematics instruction and assessment. It was a cultural change that had been brewing for 
two decades. Until the early 1990s, the DES claimed the education system was excellent and 
the attitude towards assessment was: ‘let’s not measure it, in case it isn’t’ (I4). It was a tried 
and true paradigm, and in this lay its strength and weakness (Oldham, 2001). Following a 
generational change, the DES became more open to data-gathering approaches like 
inspections and comparative surveys (I4). TIMSS 1995 critiqued a traditional approach to 
teaching and assessment and teacher over-reliance on textbooks. These findings informed the 
first curricular reform (the rJCMS) described in the previous section: ‘perhaps TIMSS 1995 
helped to ask questions’ (I4). 
As seen earlier, after the first and the second PISA cycle, the ERC attacked current 
mathematics education and the rJCMS. Critiques were not limited to national PISA reports. 
In 2003, the influential book Inside Classrooms (Lyons et al., 2003) corroborated  suspicions 
that teaching practice was exceedingly similar in schools across the country (I1). Interestingly, 
Lyons et al. (2003) were much better-disposed towards PISA than towards ETS and IEA 
studies. The book opens with a reminder about the importance of mathematics for the 
knowledge economy, and the PISA objectives are readily endorsed at face-value: all 
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international studies suffer from limitations, ‘not least because they assess only limited aspects 
of the curriculum’, but PISA is an ‘exception’, because it aims ‘at assessing how well students 
can use mathematics to solve realistic problems’ (pp. 9–10). 
From its end, the ERC continued to attack teachers’ over-reliance on traditional text-book 
problems—unlike PISA, ‘which places a strong emphasis on solving mathematics problems 
set in real-life contexts’ (Shiel, Surgenor, Close, & Millar, 2006, p. 154, following the 2004 
national assessment results). Teachers were said to be lacking ‘confidence in using 
constructivist approaches in teaching problem solving’ (ibid.). The ERC was particularly 
critical of the role of existing examinations as an obstacle to changing instructional practices 
(Cosgrove, Shiel, Oldham, & Sofroniou, 2004). 
The NCCA added to the pressure. In International Trends in Post-Primary Mathematics 
Education, Conway & Sloane (2005) extensively argued that the existing system was 
inadequate to meet global challenges. A major reform, of assessment practices in particular, 
could ‘produce a significant ripple effect right through secondary education’ (p. 248). A 
consultation on mathematics education was started. First, within the NCCA, which comprises 
‘25 members […] appointed by the Minister and [coming] from organisations representing 
teachers, school managers, parents, employers, trade unions and interests in education’ 
(NCCA, 2009, p. 6). Then, between November 2005 and January 2006, it was also open to the 
public.  
The first discussion paper from the consultation (NCCA, 2005) adopted not only the 
OECD definition of literacy, but also the rhetorical style of its reports. From the second 
discussion paper, it emerged that many agreed ‘that more concrete experiences of mathematics 
in real-world contexts [were] needed for primary and junior cycle students’ (NCCA, 2006, p. 
15). The NCCA consultation papers were well-received by the Royal Irish Academy 
Committee for Mathematical Sciences (2006), the Irish Mathematical Society (O’Reilly, 
2006) and the Irish Maths Teachers Association—‘the only Maths organisation that is 
permitted to have an input into the development of the programme’ (2013, p. 3).  
Isolated criticism came from academics at University College Cork who were ‘very 
concerned about the influence of the PISA philosophy of mathematical education which seems 
to be heavily influencing Project Maths’ (Grannell, Barry, Cronin, Holland, & Hurley, 2011, 
pp. 3–4). Others argued that ‘teachers were mostly on the outside of the consultation process 
because they do not want to be consulted: they want to maximise points [at JCE]’ (I3). 
After PISA 2006, the ERC related the visions of PISA and Project Maths and suggested 
they were not opposite to currently-taught content: ‘Ultimately, it may be a case of adjusting 
the current Junior Certificate syllabus and examinations to address some of the apparent 
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shortcomings identified by PISA and other studies, while at the same time retaining the most 
important content’ (Shiel, Perkins, Close, & Oldham, 2007, p. 47). 
The first document identifying the new initiative as “Project Maths” was produced in May 
2007, and in July the NCCA submitted a report to the Department of Education (I-). In 
January/February 2008 the NCCA council asked for a commitment to the Department of 
Education of multi-year funding of intervention, which was agreed in March/April of that year 
(I-). 
Given that discontent had been mounting for some time, experts might be correct in saying 
that ‘there was not a huge impact of PISA, only some impact’ (I2); that PISA was ‘another 
spike in the wheel that maths teaching needed to change’ (I1). Other motivations for Project 
Maths came from performance at Leaving Certificate, dropout rates, and poor mathematical 
preparation of students when they entered third-level education (I4). However, it is clear that 
the issue at the time was not whether, but to what extent mathematics education in Ireland 
should ‘move toward a PISA-like approach’ (Conway & Sloane, 2005, p. 213)—or ‘buy into 
PISA’, as participants to the PISA Symposium put it (ERC, 2005). 
Contact points with the EPA  
On paper, Ireland “bought into” PISA—or, more precisely, into the EPA—to a considerable 
extent. Apart from the overall vision of mathematics education, Project Maths was meant to 
increase formative assessment, CPD, teacher collaborative action research and parental 
involvement in the teaching of mathematics (NCCA, 2006). Curricular alignment with PISA 
was already high before the reform, but mismatching areas were not necessarily amended; for 
instance, the new syllabus paid little attention to concepts of space and shape, although they 
are an area in which Ireland has consistently underperformed (I10). The boldest move towards 
PISA, and the greatest rupture with the past, however, was in the assessment format, which 
was very much PISA-like. This made Irish students more familiar with this kind of test (I2; 
I4; Merriman et al., 2014).  
Implementation 
The reform was firstly piloted in 24 schools in 2008 for testing in 2010 (Leaving Certificate) 
and 2011 (Junior Certificate; McMorris, 2008; NCCA, 2011). National rollout began in 
September 2012 for Junior Certificate examination in 2015, whereas the Leaving Certificate 
underwent further revisions and was implemented nationwide one year later (NCCA, 2014, 
but see also Jeffes et al., 2012, p. 18, for a summarising table). 
Preliminary reports found mixed-to-positive results in terms of programme 
implementation (Jeffes et al., 2012, 2013; Lubienski, 2011; Merriman et al., 2014). There was 
overall support for the reform which still had to translate into classroom practice and student 
work. Mathematics textbooks in 2010/2011 were ‘a genuine attempt to match the intentions 
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of Project Maths’ but they fell short of the standard needed to support it (O’Keeffe & 
O’Donoghue, 2011, p. v).  
Some doubts were raised about the ability of the intervention to keep the momentum in 
light of some resistance towards the new examination format. Almost immediately, there was 
a ‘national outrage over a mock paper’ which was ‘out of proportion’ but was nevertheless 
sufficient to make some policy makers wonder whether it would be worth ‘rolling-back’ to a 
better-known and ‘safer’ format (I1).  
Impact 
Impact evaluations were also more positive than negative. Jeffes et al. (2013) reported 
‘emerging evidence of positive impacts on students’ experiences of, and attitudes towards, 
mathematics’ (p. 6) but no overall change in achievement using a purposefully-developed test 
comprising TIMSS and PISA items. Merriman et al. (2014), in contrast, compared the 
performance in PISA 2012 between the 24 schools participating to the initial phase of Project 
Maths and non-participating schools. They found that, once socio-economic and demographic 
variables were accounted for, attending a school participating to Project Maths was associated 
with ‘a 10-point advantage on print mathematics over students in Non-initial schools’ (p. xi), 
and that stronger improvements could be seen particularly in PISA areas in which Irish 
performance had been weaker in the past. Still, considering that the PISA standard deviation 
is 100 points, a 10-point difference represents a small effect size (0.1). 
Changing evaluation and assessment 
Assessment in primary education 
In primary education, pupils undergo standardised assessments of progression. Moreover, 
every five years, a cohort sits an ERC-developed low-stakes national assessment of reading 
and mathematics (NAMER). The NAMER was commissioned ‘to establish links […with] the 
Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)’ (Shiel & Kelly, 2001, p. v) and 
to this date it borrows from TIMSS and PIRLS. This section focuses primarily on the 
standardised tests, since they bear higher stakes for teachers and pupils.  
Context and influences 
In the early 1990s, during the national debate culminating in the Education Act, 1998, 
‘proposals relating to the assessment of pupils by their teachers at the end of first and fifth 
class’ started to surface in the Green and White paper (INTO, 2008a, p. 14), as well as in 
NCCA publications (1993). However, many stakeholders thought that the proposals ‘would 
cause considerable disquiet’ because such assessments ‘could devalue the teaching process’ 
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(INTO, 1997, p. 5); therefore, mentions of standardised testing disappeared from the policy 
discourse for some time.  
In 2000, the Drumcondra English Profiles—‘cumulative records of achievement […] that 
are based on teacher judgements’ (Shiel & Murphy, 2000, p. 1)—were introduced. Teacher 
unions claimed the Drumcondra profiles ‘caused grave concern among teachers’ (INTO 
Education Committee, 2004, p. 55), yet ‘nobody pushed them’ (I10) and to this date they have 
never been compulsory. 
In 2004, standardised testing started to be associated with accountability practices in 
governmental discourses; there was ‘a need to have aggregated assessment data for decision-
making, identifying progress and the allocation of resources’ (INTO, 2008a, p. 17). Circular 
0138/2006 (available from www.education.ie) made standardised testing of reading and 
mathematics between the 1st and 2nd Class and the 4th and 5th Class compulsory from 2007. In 
the same year, national assessment guidelines were produced (NCCA, 2007).  
This change of pace did not affect standardised testing only. The NCCA guidelines also 
included recommendations from an expert group on assessment for learning (AfL). The AfL 
framework was devised between 2005 and 2007 and had been informed by the works of Black 
and Wiliam (1998), the Assessment Reform Group (1999), as well as by ‘the work of others 
in the area, such as Airasian, Stiggins, Hattie, Crooks etc.’ (O’Leary, personal communication 
of 19 November 2014).  
Standardised testing remained compulsory at two stages of primary education until 2011, 
when Circular 0056/2011 raised the frequency to 2nd, 4th and 6th classes from 2012 and required 
schools to report data to the Department of Education (see also Circular 0018/2012). 
Contact points with the EPA 
The EPA supports standardised assessments for diagnostic purposes as an early-warning 
mechanism to help identify and support struggling students (the AfL component). It also 
welcomes standardised testing for school accountability by public posting of achievement 
data, provided it is accompanied by greater school autonomy. However, it is argued below 
that Irish tests to date have served neither purpose. 
Implementation and impact 
When officially “implemented”, standardised testing was nothing new for the great majority 
of teachers. Informally, ‘assess[ing] the progress of pupils at the end of each year and 
particularly at the end of the final year at school’ was ‘routine practice’ even before the 
Education Act (MoE M. Martin, 1997). Circular 0138/2006 estimated that ‘95% of schools 
already use such tests’, whereas some informants mentioned values around 80%. Even if the 
government’s rationale for the legislation was influenced by new public management ideas, 
the Circular did little more than formalise ‘existing assessment practice’ (INTO, 2008a, p. 37).  
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Eivers et al. (2010) reported that standardised tests were not widely used to establish 
school-level learning targets, to identify the pupils’ strengths and weaknesses, to plan for 
differentiation at the classroom level or to inform parents, who are usually given verbal 
feedback or no feedback at all.  There is no evidence of increase in testing (I9) and, given that 
the tests are not secured (I10), they cannot be used to track performance over time as they are 
affected by score inflation. CPD was also lacking, with only two days provided in 2007 that 
did not even cover the new guidelines, which were disseminated one year later (INTO, 2008b). 
Overall, standardised assessment ‘appears to operate as a stand-alone activity […], and 
assessment data seems to be regarded more as a record of pupils’ attainment rather than as a 
means of informing ways to improve and support their learning’ (DES, 2012, p. 59).  
With respect to AfL, schools are more aware that ‘[they] should be doing it’, but the 
implementation of AfL strategies can still be categorised as ‘emerging / sporadic’ (O’Leary, 
personal communication, but see also Lysaght & O’Leary, 2013). Likewise, school 
inspections found improvements in the assessment of English between 2010 and 2012, but 
also ‘significant shortcomings […] in almost one quarter […] of the English lessons observed’ 
(Inspectorate, 2013, p. 45). Assessment ‘is not satisfactory in 28% of mathematics lessons’ 
and shortcomings ‘tend to be in the area of formative assessment’ (p. 48).  
School inspections 
The Inspectorate (a division of the DES) utilises many forms of inspection. Some are specific 
to secondary schools, but most are carried out at both the primary and the secondary levels. 
The most comprehensive are whole school evaluations (WSEs), assessing the quality of 
teaching and learning, leadership and school management, planning and self-improvement. 
But there are also thematic, follow-through, incidental (unannounced) and probationary 
teachers’ inspections (Inspectorate, 2015). 
Context and influences 
The Inspectorate was not always as active, particularly at the secondary level. Between the 
1970s and early 1990s it was burdened with administrative tasks and not allowed to interfere 
in school affairs by teacher unions (McNamara, personal communication of 20 November 
2014; see also McNamara & O’Hara, 2012). This was observed also by the OECD (1991). At 
the time, the MoE defended the work of the inspectors—they were ‘not “snoopers” but 
enablers’ (p. 122)—but she conceded that their role could be reviewed.  
Things began to change in the mid-late 1990s. On the one hand, the White Paper of 1995 
separated evaluative and advisory functions in education matters: the Inspectorate was put in 
charge of the former and support services of the latter (INTO Education Committee, 2009). 
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On the other hand, there were demands for greater school accountability from parents and the 
business community, in line with European trends (DES, 2012).  
The WSE strategy ‘[had] been in gestation since 1996’ (Stack, 2005, p. 6) and was 
introduced alongside whole-school planning in 1999 with a pilot project in 35 schools. Since 
the external monitoring component of WSE encountered strong teacher resistance, the 
evaluation strategy had to be framed and presented as school self-evaluation (SSE, McNamara 
& O’Hara, 2005).  
When the guidelines on WSE/SSE appeared (Inspectorate, 2003), external inspections had 
been relegated to the background but had not disappeared completely. This was a political 
victory for the Inspectorate and Chief Inspector, Eamon Stack, who was in charge between 
1997 and 2009 and the person behind many of the interventions that increased the relevance 
of the Inspectorate during that period (National Council for Special Education, 2013). The 
evaluation framework had retained ‘some of the key elements of external inspection central to 
the original proposal and resisted attempts to make the process one made up entirely of self-
review and self-evaluation’ (McNamara & O’Hara, 2005, p. 271). Not only this, but the project 
‘was endorsed by principals, teachers and inspectors and there was a general perception that 
the process was workable’ (ibid.).  
Contact points with the EPA 
A presentation by the Assistant Chief Inspector (Egan, 2010) mentioned two influential 
sources for the Inspectorate’s new evaluation approach: ‘International reviews of education: 
e.g. PISA’ and recommendations of ‘international educational bodies’ (p. 16) such as the 
OECD and the CERI. If one assesses the available evidence, however, it seems unlikely that 
the strategy could be specifically informed by PISA or by any education department within 
the OECD. 
On the one hand, the only form of evaluation explicitly endorsed by the EPA is public 
posting of achievement data, which is illegal in Ireland (though yearly “league tables” are 
produced by some newspapers using other data, such as progression rates to university by 
school). On the other hand, the only source referenced by Egan (2010) was a peer review of 
public management policies (OECD, 2008a) not carried out under the supervision of the 
Education Secretariat or the CERI. 
Of course, the OECD is broadly speaking not opposed to school accountability, capacity 
building and self-regulation, and apparently (I-) Eamon Stack thought the strong support of 
the OECD for school accountability was a very useful lever in his campaign to re-establish 
effective inspection. This, however, does not mean that WSEs in Ireland were based on 
evidence from PISA or any specific educational recommendation.  
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More likely, they were a ‘refraction’ (Sugrue, 2006) of international recommendations and 
European convergence on the same themes over the previous 20 years (McNamara, O’Hara, 
Lisi, & Davidsdottir, 2011) —a policy whose ambitions were international but whose actual 
design and development were idiosyncratic. In other words, the reform of the inspectorate 
seemed more an acknowledgement of the OECD goals than alignment with the EPA. 
Implementation 
The major limitation of WSE when first introduced was the fact that ‘any kind of sensible and 
useful judgements [… required] data that in the […] system simply [did] not exist’ 
(McNamara & O’Hara, 2005, p. 278). There was ‘no way in which schools [could] hope to 
obtain any significant data on current performance and ways of improving’ (p. 279). 
Moreover, schools did not have enough control over resources or staffing to address their 
shortcomings. Thus, the first attempts to implement WSE were described as ‘data free 
evaluation’ (McNamara, 2006, p. 581): highly supported by school staff but of dubious utility.  
In 2010, a new policy document (Inspectorate, 2010) attempted to address these 
shortcomings. It placed a greater emphasis on gathering effectiveness data and acting upon it, 
and ‘new procedures were put in place to enable […] schools to formally discipline and, if 
necessary, to dismiss under-performing teachers’ (DES, 2012, p. 14). Inspections could now 
be triggered by school performance, though criteria and consequences were not specified 
(McNamara & O’Hara, 2012).  
In 2012, WSE/SSE became a formal requirement to complement the implementation of 
the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategy (Circulars 0039 and 0040/2012), but once again 
an absence of a clear follow-up strategy could be noted. As of today, ‘school inspection in 
Ireland remains largely subjective in nature. […] Objective measurements […] are not used 
in any systematic way to reach judgements, nor is there any system of sanctions or rewards 
for schools which fail to meet particular criteria’ (Ehren et al., 2014, p. 57). Other research 
showed that school evaluation is felt in many cases as a pointless bureaucratic exercise that 
neither empowers schools, nor does it help them improve (McNamara et al., 2011). 
The way policy affects teaching and learning in practice changes over time. In a personal 
communication (20 January 2016), McNamara noted that he is much more positive about 
inspection now than the quotes of 2011 might imply. This is because the most recent changes 
in inspection procedure in Ireland, he argued, have all combined to make inspection much 
more effective as both an accountability and formative tool. There is now a wider use of 
examination data; there are self-evaluations involving surveys of pupil and parent opinions; 
and WSEs were replaced by more risk-based and shorter and sharper inspections, requiring 
schools to formally respond in the form of action plans. 
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This is a reminder that policy implementation and integration is a slow but continuous 
progress, and that stakeholders’ reactions and practices might change even substantively once 
certain tipping points are reached.  
Changing equity 
Delivering Equality of opportunity In Schools (DEIS), 2005 
‘Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools (DEIS) the Action Plan for Educational 
Inclusion, was launched in May 2005 and remains the Department of Education and Skills 
policy instrument to address educational disadvantage. The action plan focuses on addressing 
and prioritising the educational needs of children and young people from disadvantaged 
communities, from pre-school through second-level education (3 to 18 years).’ (DES, 2014) 
Context and influences 
DEIS is the result of policies addressing disadvantage dating back to 1969, when the Rutland 
Street project attempted to affect the pre-primary and primary experiences of poor children 
(Holland, 1979; Kellaghan, 1977). Another intervention was the Disadvantaged Areas Scheme 
(DAS) of 1984, providing additional funding to primary schools designated as 
“disadvantaged” ‘on the basis of the number of students from families in poverty as assessed 
by socioeconomic indicators such as unemployment, and possession of a medical card’ (Lewis 
& Archer, 2002, p. 2).  
The Rutland Street project evolved into Early Start in 1994 (see Lewis, Shortt, & Archer, 
2011, for a recent evaluation). The DAS was the basis for other interventions, including the 
Home/School/Community Liaison scheme (HSCL) of 1993 (National Educational Welfare 
Board, 2013; Ryan, 1994), the Breaking the Cycle initiative of 1996–2001 (Weir, 2003) and 
its successor, Giving Children an Even Break (GCEB, Weir, 2004).  
Each of these policies had its own history but eventually—following recommendations 
from the Educational Disadvantage Committee (2003a, 2003b) and ERC reviews of national 
policies and international literature (Archer & Weir, 2004; Weir & Archer, 2004)—they all 
flowed into the School Support Programme of DEIS. DEIS brought together, streamlined and 
improved existing measures to tackle disadvantage, including DAS, HSCL and GCEB; the 
Support Teacher Project; aspects of the Early Literacy Initiative such as Reading Recovery, 
the Junior Certificate School Programme Literacy Strategy and the Demonstration Library 
Project; and the School Completion Programme (DES, 2005). 
DEIS is the result of national experiences that were sometimes affected by European 
standards and OECD recommendations. DEIS was informed by ‘the Lisbon Strategy, the 
Agreed Programme for Government, the social partnership agreement Sustaining Progress, 
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the National Anti-Poverty Strategy and the National Action Plans against Poverty and Social 
Exclusion’ (DES, 2005, p. 7). Some considered the focus of DEIS on literacy, numeracy and 
evaluation ‘a very new idea for Ireland’ (I7), and the ERC used the OECD definition of literacy 
in the reports informing the government’s action plan for DEIS (Eivers, Shiel, & Shortt, 2004, 
2005). Outcomes from an OECD review on early childhood care and education (OECD 
Directorate for Education, 2004) were used to ‘support the development of future policy’ in 
that area (DES, 2005, p. 34). Praise by the OECD of the effectiveness the HSCL scheme in 
fostering parental involvement (OECD, 1997c) was also mentioned, perhaps as a motivating 
example that good work could gain international recognition.  
The greatest point of agreement between Ireland and the OECD, however, was in the very 
definition of “educational disadvantage”. O’Sullivan (2005) argued that a ‘mercantile’ 
understanding of educational disadvantage had driven policy development at least since the 
mid-1990s (e.g., Kellaghan et al., 1995). Early school leavers and low achievers were 
‘positioned as deviant participants in a mercantile world’ (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 188). The 
Education Act (1998) brought the focus on the inequality of opportunities caused by differing 
socio-economic conditions and preventing students ‘from deriving appropriate benefit from 
education’ (§ 32(9)), but it was an isolated case. For instance, the National Development Plan 
2000–2006 (Government of Ireland, 2000) suggested that marginalised communities should 
be encouraged ‘to help themselves by identifying their own problems and working towards 
their solution in a planned and integrated way with the agencies of the State’ (p. 196).  
The framework endorsed by the Educational Disadvantage Committee for DEIS was 
devised and presented in November 2002 by ‘Professor Peter Evans of the OECD’ who 
‘complimented the government on taking the innovative action of setting up the [Educational 
Disadvantage] Forum, saying that it would [have been] difficult to convene such a meeting in 
other countries’ (Educational Disadvantage Committee, 2003b, p. 9). The new framework was 
to be ‘customer-driven’, ‘family-oriented’, outcomes-based, preventative and intervening, 
‘decentralised’ and funded by both public and private sources (Educational Disadvantage 
Committee, 2005, p. 11). 
Contact points with the EPA 
Because of its comprehensive nature, DEIS covers many areas of the EPA, including 
instruction time, the desegregation of migrant students, curricular changes, cooperation among 
schools and with parents, as well as the allocation of resources to schools and students (DES, 
2005). There are also contact points with the specific EPA for Ireland. Disadvantaged schools 
were identified through a six-variable model measuring the percentage of: unemployment, 
single-parent families, travellers, large families, free book grants, and local authority housing. 
Of these, the performance of students coming from single-parent families was often 
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highlighted as an issue in OECD reports. This is not to suggest that it caused the variable to 
be included in the model (it had been part of the criteria to identify disadvantage since 1996, 
see Comptroller and Auditor General, 2006), but it means that both the Irish strategy and PISA 
were looking at the same population.  
Implementation 
Almost all reports on DEIS agreed that implementation levels were high (Inspectorate, 2011a, 
2011b; Weir, Archer, O’Flaherty, & Gilleece, 2011; Weir & McAvinue, 2012; Weir, 2014). 
Weir & Errity (2014) noted that ‘measures under DEIS exceed what was available under 
previous schemes and better reflect what has been identified as important in addressing 
disadvantage’ (p. 15). An isolated critique came from Smyth & McCoy (2009), who argued 
that more than half of young people from at-risk families attended non-DEIS schools. The 
introduction of DEIS also meant that some schools received fewer funding than before, but 
principals were generally satisfied by funding levels (Smyth & McCoy, 2009). 
Impact 
Using baseline data collected in 2005 and 2007, Weir, Archer & Millar (2009) found that 
pupils from a poor background in rural schools performed better than those in urban schools, 
and that both urban and rural disadvantage students performed under the national average for 
reading but not for mathematics. The relative advantage of pupils living in the country was 
later attributed to a higher level of educational activities within the home and a lower level of 
unstructured free-time activities (Weir & McAvinue, 2013). 
A summary of findings from three reports on the achievement of pupils in DEIS schools 
between 2007 and 2010 reported ‘clear evidence that the DEIS programme is having a positive 
effect on tackling educational disadvantage’ (DES, 2011a, p. 1; also Weir & McAvinue, 
2013). Improvements were found in literacy and numeracy, attendance and home-school 
relations. In urban primary schools gains were ‘particularly evident in the junior grades and in 
schools that have high levels of disadvantage’ (Weir & Denner, 2013, p. 20). Even though the 
gap between DEIS and non-DEIS schools was still evident, DEIS schools improved at Junior 
Certificate level at a faster rate in the period 2008–2011 (McAvinue, 2014). Currently, there 
is a feeling that DEIS ‘works better for pupils until the age of 12, less well for the 12–15 
bracket’ (I7, also MoE Quinn, 2014, p. 9).  
Overall, the strengths of DEIS were identified in its integrated approach (Weir & Errity, 
2014), the fact that it involves the school as a whole, and in its focus on literacy and numeracy 
in Junior Classes —an ‘enormous emphasis’ (Errity, 2014, p. 16) compared to previous 
interventions. Some also think it involves less paperwork for principals and school managers, 
but not everyone agrees on this point (I8).  
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Policy alignment of Irish policies to the EPA 
The selection of policies above is just a sample of all the interventions that were analysed 
before and during the study visit. This section provides a comprehensive view of Irish reforms 
and the extent to which they were in line with the EPA. Information from this and the previous 
section then feeds into the end-of-chapter conclusions below. 
The policy evaluation literature has a range of instruments to measure policy alignment 
between and within countries. Delta convergence (Heichel et al., 2008) is one of them. It 
attempts to evaluate changes in policy alignment between a country and ‘an exemplary model, 
for example a model promoted by an international organisation or a frontrunner country’ (p. 
83). Delta convergence can be calculated when the policy options provided by the exemplary 
model can be quantified. Examples include taxes based on energy consumption or 
international regulations on the maximum amount of lead in petrol (Arts, Liefferink, Kamstra, 
& Ooijevaar, 2008).  
Unfortunately, the exemplary model provided by the EPA does not set quantitative rules 
for policymakers. Following Arts et al. (2008) and Chapter 4, one could try to measure policy 
convergence by tracking the number of interventions broadly in line with OECD 
recommendations over time. The disadvantage of this approach is that it would not exploit the 
richness of the information gathered during the case study visits. It would not distinguish 
between acknowledgement, alignment or enactment, and it would not consider policy 
implementation.  
Table 5.2 retains the concept of delta convergence while accounting for different degrees 




Table 5.2: policy alignment towards the EPA in Ireland 
Year T1 T2 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 P1 P2 P3 Policies 
1998      1    2      Education Act 
1999               3 revised primary curriculum 
2000             4   Education (Welfare) Act, rJCMS, Learning support, Equality Act 
2001                Giving Children an Even Break  
2002                Teaching Council Act, School Completion Programme 
2003                rJCSS, State Examination Commission, Reading Recovery 
2004   5             Equal Status Act, Education for Persons with SEN 
2005           6     WSE/SSE, AfL, Disability Act, DEIS 
2006                Síolta Quality Framework, National Behaviour Support Service 
2007                Standardised testing 
2008                Curriculum framework for Guidance 
2009                 
2010                Free pre-school year 
2011                Literacy and Numeracy Strategy 
2012                Project Maths 
Colour coding: 
     





The first column displays the year from the most recent overarching education framework 
before PISA, the Education Act (1998), until the last PISA cycle at the time of this writing. 
The T1–P3 columns are the EPA areas21, and the last column lists the Irish policies under 
consideration by year of coming into force, when known, or publication.  
The cell colours represent policy alignment: red is for policies that are contrary to OECD 
recommendations; white means that there is no national policy clearly attempting to intervene 
on that policy area; yellow stands for acknowledgement (interventions purporting or aspiring 
to be in line with the OECD goals); blue is for policies actually aligned with the EPA, whether 
intentionally or not and regardless of whether they managed to be implemented effectively; 
and green represents policies that are not only in line with OECD recommendations on paper, 
but for which there is plausible evidence of implementation. 
Colour shades signal when policies first addressed the EPA (dark shade) and how long for 
(light shade). Once again, this does not take into account whether implementation was 
effective but only the fact that, at a certain point in time, a policy agreeing (dark blue/green) 
or disagreeing (dark red) with the EPA came into force, and that policy was “active” for a 
number of years afterwards (light blue, green or red). Notice that yellow comes in one shade 
only because it just serves to flag up purported but not actual alignment. 
Finally, the numbered cells index some policies that are followed up in the following 
section to make more general comments.
                                                     
21 T1 = Increase overall time spent in education; T2 = Increase instruction time; E1 = Reduce 
disabled or immigrant students’ segregation; E2 = Reduce the gender gap; E3 = Reduce the streaming 
/ grouping / stratification of students; E4 = Reduce school competition; E5 = Help socio-economically 
deprived students; Q1 = Strengthen the teaching profession; Q2 = Allocate resources more efficiently 
or in a more equitable way; Q3 = Pair more autonomy with accountability measures; Q4 = Promote 
cooperation between parents, teachers, principals and schools; P1 = Help low-performing students; P2 
= Standardise the educational outcomes; P3 = Review curricular priorities. 
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Trends in policy convergence towards OECD recommendations 
Most cells in Table 5.2 are blue, suggesting that Ireland and the OECD generally agree on 
educational matters. The only contentious aspect is parental choice (point 1 in the table). The 
Education Act (1998) promotes ‘the right of parents to send their children to a school of the 
parents’ choice’ (§ 6(e)), and although there have been interventions to increase equality of 
access, the segregating effect of high-SES parents sending their children to the “best” schools 
is still present. Because of the shrinking pool of secondary school applicants up until the early 
2000s, school competition and polarisation even increased (Byrne & Smyth, 2010). 
The Education Act also laid the bases for a proliferation of accountability policies (point 
2), including WSE/SSE in 2005, public posting of school reports (but not achievement data) 
in 2006 and compulsory standardised testing in 2007. Three issues can be identified in this 
respect. Firstly, not all interventions drew from the EPA. Secondly, and relatedly, more 
accountability was not accompanied by increased school autonomy at least until 2010. Finally, 
there is only partial evidence that the “spirit” of the EPA was preserved when implementing 
these policies—i.e., that they were more than a bureaucratic exercise. 
Points 3 and 4 serve as a reminder that some subject domains were more aligned with 
PISA after curricular revisions and more affected by measures to help low-performing 
students. An example was the scientific area of the revised primary curriculum (3, and see 
INTO, 2008b; Varley, Murphy, & Veale, 2008a). Likewise, learning support (4) was strongly 
biased towards English and relegated Mathematics—traditionally perceived as a less-
prestigious subject—to a secondary role (Inspectorate, 2005; McCarthy & Burns, 2005; 
Surgenor & Shiel, 2008; Travers, 2010). 
Similar observations can be made about equity, and in particular about equality of access 
(5). Recent legislation and interventions have been highly attentive to racial discrimination 
(Smyth, Darmody, McGinnity, & Byrne, 2009; Taguma, Kim, Wurzburg, & Kelly, 2009) and 
considerate towards the needs of students with learning difficulties (Rose, Shevlin, Winter, & 
O’Raw, 2010). However, this same legal framework exacerbated religious discrimination, it 
created a ‘Catholics first’ system (E. Daly, 2009) which has caused concern on the part of the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in more than one occasion 
(Kilkelly, 2007). 
Sometimes, EPA coverage concerns only some parts of the population. For instance, 
parental involvement in school matters in Ireland (6) has increased since the 1970s but it still 
at a lower level than desired (Eivers & Creaven, 2013; Mac Giolla Phádraig, 2010). The HSCL 
improved parental involvement in DEIS schools, but there is no information about non-DEIS 
schools (Inspectorate, 2011b; Weir et al., 2011). 
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There are limitations in the scope of this analysis. For instance, the list excludes 
overarching strategies and umbrella frameworks such as the National Anti-Poverty Strategy 
(Government of Ireland, 1997), the National Development Plans (Government of Ireland, 
2000, 2007), the National Action Plan against racism (Department of Justice Equality and Law 
Reform, 2005) or the Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (Department of 
Enterprise Trade and Employment, 2006). Altogether, these strategies enabled policy 
development and created synergies between education policies and other reforms. This may 
have altered country alignment with the EPA in ways that were not fully captured by Table 
5.2.  
Nevertheless, some general comments on Irish policy convergence towards the OECD 
“model”—the inverted quotes are necessary, given the scarce coherence highlighted in 
Chapter 3—are possible. A country disregarding the EPA would have a predominantly white 
table, whereas a country strongly aligned with it, both in intentions and in practice, would 
have a green table. The table for Ireland has two features: it is mostly blue, suggesting good 
policy alignment with the EPA (though there is hardly any intervention specifically trying to 
decrease streaming); and it has become greener in recent years and especially since 2005. This 
was the effect of DEIS, the free pre-primary school year and Project Maths, which have 
convincingly managed to introduce some key OECD recommendations in the Irish system.  
The impact of EPA-aligned policies on achievement and equity  
Of the many policies theoretically in line with OECD recommendations, only four have been 
thoroughly and effectively implemented: centralised external exit examinations (CEEEs), 
DEIS, the free pre-primary school year and Project Maths. The latter two are too recent to be 
evaluated, but there are some indications that Project Maths is on the right track to produce 
systemic changes. CEEEs were already in place before PISA. DEIS, instead, was implemented 
in 2005 and there is evidence that it is having an impact on national assessments. One could 
tentatively claim that, in this circumstance, introducing a policy aligned with the EPA is 
having positive results on the system. Note that the importance of equity finds support in 
educational literature: perhaps, introducing a policy aligned with the EPA was beneficial 
because the EPA itself is aligned with research.  
According to the OECD argument, PISA should be able to detect changes in the 
performance and equity levels of Ireland as a result of its policies. This argument can be put 
to the test using Willms’ (2006) LSA-based policy evaluation framework. The framework 
states that the effects of ‘universal’ interventions should be captured by changes in mean 
country outcomes, ‘SES-targeted’ interventions by the Strength and Slope of the socio-
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economic gradient, and that ‘performance-targeted’ interventions should lower the percentage 
of students scoring below proficiency levels 1 or 2 (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: a framework to detect the effect of Irish policies on PISA outcomes 
Type and variable Example policies in Ireland Abbreviation 
Universal interventions strive 
to increase the educational 
performance of all children 
through reforms that are 
applied equally across the 
schooling system.  
 
Variable: mean country 
performance 
Transition Year 
revised primary curriculum 
Education (Welfare) Act No. 22 
Teaching Council Act 
revised Junior Cert. Mathematics Syllabus 
revised Junior Cert. Science Syllabus 
Assessment for Learning 
Síolta Quality Framework 
Whole School Evaluation / self-evaluation 
Standardised testing 
Free pre-school year 
















aim to improve the 
educational performance of 
students with low 
socioeconomic status by 
providing a specialised 
curriculum or additional 
instructional resources. 
  
Variable: Strength and Slope 
of the socio-economic 
gradient 
Home-School-Community Liaison scheme 
Early start 
Breaking the Cycle 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy 
Giving Children an Even Break 
School Completion Programme 









interventions provide a 
specialised curriculum or 
additional instructional 
resources for particular 
students based on their levels 
of academic performance. 
 
Variable: Percentage of 
pupils below level 2 
Junior Certificate Support Programme 
Learning Support 
Reading Recovery 
Delivering Equality of opportunity In Schools 






Source: adapted from OECD (2013e, pp. 108–109); Willms (2006) 
Figure 5.1 is a timeline of universal interventions and country mean scores. Policies 
focusing on raising performance in a specific domain were colour-coded. Scores from 2009 
are missing following evidence that PISA results for that cycle were unreliable (Cosgrove & 
Cartwright, 2014). Therefore, the trendline connecting 2006 with 2012 results is dashed. 
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Figure 5.1: Universal interventions and performance in Ireland 
 
It can be noticed from the graph that, despite the “universal” nature of the interventions, 
trends in the three PISA domains are slightly diverging, but it is not clear why. There is 
extensive evidence, which could not be covered in this chapter, that the fundamental aspects 
of teacher training, induction and CPD have not been touched since the 1970s (Conway, 
Murphy, Rath, & Hall, 2009; Coolahan, 2007). As a result, it is possible that only the most 
effective policies, like those on science education, managed to affect student scores. Yet their 
effectiveness was questioned earlier in this chapter. 
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the Slope and the Strength of the socio-economic gradient 
in Ireland. In this case, 2009 results were used to produce these graphs under the assumption 
that the additional error affected all students equally. Notice that, as was the case in Chapter 
4, the charts for the Slope and the Strength follow different patterns even though they are 
supposed to reflect to sides of the same equity measure. This suggests once more that the 





























Figure 5.2: SES-targeted interventions and the Slope of the socio-economic gradient in Ireland 
 
Figure 5.3: SES-targeted interventions and the Strength of the socio-economic gradient in Ireland 
 
Inequality levels in Ireland are very close to the international average of about 40 PISA 
points for the Slope and 14% of the “explained” variance for the Strength. It is not clear why 
the socio-economic gradient for Reading was lower in 2000, but the trend has been rather 
stable since 2003, regardless of the various interventions and especially of DEIS.  
Finally, Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4 attempt to capture the effects of performance-targeted 
interventions on the performance of the highest- and lowest-achieving students. Once again, 
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Figure 5.4: Performance-targeted interventions and performance in Ireland 
 
Table 5.4: Changes in the performance of the highest and lowest achievers in Ireland between the first 
comparable assessment and PISA 2012 
 Scores % < lv2 % > lv 5 10th score 90th score 
R (2012-2000) NS NS -2.8 NS NS 
M (2012-2003) NS NS NS NS NS 
S (2012-2006) +14 −4.4 NS +18.6 NS 
Source: PISA database and national reports for Ireland. “Scores” = change in country mean scores; “% 
< lv2” and “% > lv5” = change in the percentage of students performing below the performance level 
2 or above level 5; “10th score” and “90th score” = change in the scores of the 10th or the 90th student 
percentiles; “NS” = Non-Significant) 
Table 5.4 shows that significant changes were limited almost exclusively to the Science 
domain and driven by the score increase of the low achievers. This result is puzzling: if it 
captured the effect of the science curriculum, it is unclear why only low achievers benefitted 
from it. Moreover, most policies targeting lower-performing students did not focus on 
Science, but on Reading and, to a much more limited extent, Mathematics. Nevertheless, the 
only significant change in either domain was a decrease in high achievers in Reading. 
Overall, Willms’ framework did not help to capture important relationships. This is 
because categorising policies by outcome does not take into consideration the fact that policies 
are qualitatively different. Interventions within the same group may touch deeper or more 
superficial components of the education system. Some affect 15-year-olds more directly than 
others. Structural policies such as delaying streaming by one year can have an immediate and 
strong impact on PISA scores (as was the case in Poland), whereas changing pedagogical 
methods is likely to have a slow and cumulative effect (as seems to have been the most 
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Conclusions to Chapter 5 
This chapter analysed policy alignment with OECD recommendations in Ireland and the 
extent to which EPA-aligned policies affected PISA outcomes using data collected through 
documentary analyses and expert interviews. The alignment of each policy was considered 
along the acknowledgment—enactment axis, whereas the concept of delta convergence was 
borrowed to interpret alignment over time. Policy implementation was accounted for, and the 
plausible impact of national reforms was explored using Willms’ (2006) framework. 
Evidence of country alignment with OECD recommendations 
Hopkins, Pennock, & Ritzen (2008) reported that PISA ‘achieved relatively low levels of 
impact on policy formation’ in Ireland (p. 36). The expert responding to the e-mail 
questionnaire for this research, in contrast, stated that Irish reforms had been highly in line 
with the EPA. Both claims may have some truth: policy alignment of Irish policies with the 
EPA was already high before 2009; on the other hand, it was with the apparent drop of results 
in 2009 (after Hopkins et al.’s visit) that PISA became a stand-alone education topic among 
Irish policymakers. 
Historically, Ireland has been very attentive to its international dimension, whether this 
meant following European or OECD practice, or participating to LSAs. Because of this, the 
OECD visit of 1991 had a spillover effect on the national legislative framework for education, 
the Education Act (1998). Changing existing practices took varying amounts of time.  
In 1991, the OECD inspectors observed widespread frontal teaching, overreliance on 
textbooks and scarce attention to mathematics and science. Similar findings were reported in 
the IAEP2 and TIMSS 1995. However, what constituted a ‘wake-up call’ for science was not 
so for mathematics. Many science policies and initiatives emerged between 1999 and 2004, 
and there is some evidence of their adoption in the classroom. Instead, mathematics instruction 
seemed more deeply ingrained in the system; one has to wait until the 2012 pilots of Project 
Maths to see strong changes in national practice, and even then they were met with a certain 
resistance.  
Similarly, reforms of the Inspectorate beginning in 2005 reflected a request for stronger 
data-based school accountability, but it is not clear whether the increased bureaucratic burden 
has effectively altered the relationship between the schools and the government. The teacher 
continuum (training, induction and CPD) also looks very similar to how it was in the 1970s, 
in spite of the 1991 OECD inspection and many years of debates and small amendments. 
Policies like standardised testing in primary schools and the publication of inspection 
reports appear to be responding to international demands, but it is not evident that they are 
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influenced by the educational demands of the OECD—more by a national reinterpretation of 
new public management. Therefore, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which they can be said 
to be “aligned” with the EPA.  
The 2011 National Literacy and Numeracy Strategy is the best example of policy 
enactment; it was developed in response of PISA outcomes, it draws from the PISA curriculum 
and literacies, and it will be evaluated by PISA. And yet, calls for a stronger focus on literacy 
and numeracy date back to the mid-1990s, so PISA may have just been the catalyst for policy 
demands that had been circulating in Ireland for some time. 
Discourses on equity entered Irish policymaking in the 1980s and have become a cross-
party staple of the political agenda. The conception of equity in Ireland has traditionally been 
highly aligned with the OECD’s. Many policies addressing socio-economic disadvantage have 
emerged over the years and most of them flowed into DEIS, a cohesive framework covering 
much of the EPA. There have also been legislative developments to cater for SEN and 
immigrant students, but the system is still characterised by religious and gender segregation.  
At the national level, PISA is administered by the ERC. There is generally good alignment 
between the views of the OECD and those of the ERC, but they not always have the same 
priorities. To improve Reading scores, the ERC recommended both policies targeting low-
achievement and increased streaming. The centre was generally satisfied with national policies 
for science and attributed lower-than-expected outcomes to inadequate PISA coverage and 
lack of student motivation. On the other hand, it strongly argued for a change in the 
mathematics curriculum and used PISA results to support its case.  
Overall, these findings confirm previous research on the differential ability of policy 
recommendations to penetrate a system depending on their timing and the extent to which they 
are shared by like-minded policy actors. They also highlight the role of national project 
managers as policy brokers and of research centres as intermediary agents which, depending 
on their unique combination of autonomy, personnel and leadership, can substantively impact 
on the national policy agenda. Instead, there is only limited support to the idea that Ireland 
was a passive recipient of globalising forces when it comes to accountability policies. 
Evaluation and assessment reforms were developed in-house and according to the “house 
rules”, even though they may have been re-branded as cutting-edge international policies in 
some occasions. 
Evidence of EPA-aligned policy effects 
Very few policies in Ireland present three characteristics simultaneously: being aligned with 
the EPA; having been implemented effectively; and being sufficiently old that effects on 
student learning can be evaluated. DEIS is the best example, and evaluations suggest that it is 
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having an impact on student outcomes. Preliminary positive results can also be reported for 
Project Maths. If one takes a step back and categorises policy by supposed area of influence, 
however (as in the impact section above), no clear impact of national interventions on PISA 
outcomes can be detected. Given that this is seen even when there is independent evidence of 
policy effectiveness, this is more likely a shortcoming of Willms’ (2006) evaluation 




Chapter 6: The use and impact of OECD education policy 
advice in the French Community of Belgium 
This chapter examines policy alignment with OECD recommendations and the impact of this 
in the French Community of Belgium. Belgium has been a federal state since 1970, when the 
1831 Constitution was amended to divide the nation in three Communities: French 
(Communauté française de Belgique, CFB22), Flemish and German-speaking. Each has a 
parliament and a government and, since 1988, each is in charge of education within its area. 
A comparison between the education system in the CFB and in Ireland is provided in the 
Appendix. As in Chapter 5, the chapter is articulated in the following parts: 
- A historical overview of the main educational issues in the country before its first 
PISA participation, including country relations with the OECD, participation in other 
LSAs and the key educational legislative framework. 
- A summary of the targeted EPA received after each PISA cycle, drawing from the 
national version of the report. 
- A detailed analysis of selected policies, covering the context surrounding the policy 
interventions, their degree of alignment with the EPA and, when possible, any 
evidence of implementation and impact. 
- A summary of country trends in policy alignment with the EPA. 
- An evaluation of the plausible impact of national reforms on PISA outcomes. 
In the case of the CFB, it is argued that PISA entered the political discourse representing 
“international standards” to which Belgian policies aspired to conform. Because of the high 
level of socio-economic and educational segregation of the Community, however, attempts to 
standardise educational structures, processes, pedagogies and curricula have been met with 
scepticism and resistance. Performance in Reading seems to be on the rise, perhaps thanks to 
the increasing student familiarity with PISA and to support mechanisms that were put in place 
to help low performers. However, EPA-aligned policies addressing systemic inequalities have 
produced little improvement in this field thus far, whereas grade repetition appears to be 
worsening.  
                                                     
22 In 2011, the French-speaking parliament (Parlement de la Communauté française) voted to refer 
to the CFB as Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles in all communications and publications. The move was 
contested by the Flemish Community, which rejects the name on constitutional grounds. The use of 
Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles is widespread in the French Community, but since it is still the object 
of controversy, this study adopts the original Communauté française de Belgique (CFB). 
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Historical overview  
The evolution of education between identity and segregation  
A key concept to understanding the Belgian education system is “freedom of education” as 
sanctioned in Art. 24 of the 1831/1994 Constitution. “Freedom of education” has two 
meanings: freedom to organise and freedom to choose education. 
Provided they comply with some standard regulations, any physical or legal person can 
establish and manage a school, including its timetable, resources and staffing, curriculum and 
pedagogical approach. The authorities controlling a school are called pouvoirs organisateurs 
(PO, organising powers). Since the transfer of most education matters to the Communities in 
1988, the POs are organised into réseaux (networks) along overlapping dimensions: one can 
speak of réseau officiel (public) and réseau libre (independent and private); or réseau 
confessionnel and non-confessionnel (religious and secular networks). Another key distinction 
can be made between schools that are completely managed and financed by the CFB and grant-
aided schools (both public and private). Almost all schools below the tertiary level receive 
some sort of public funding (Eurydice, 2016a). Table 6.1 summarises the different networks 
that schools and POs can belong to. 
Table 6.1: The different networks organising education in the CFB   
Public Private 
Fully financed Grant-aided 
Secular Religious 
 
The freedom to choose education acknowledges the historical chasm between the 
religious-conservative half of society and its non-religious and progressive counterpart: 
‘Belgian society is organised around big divides—linguistic divides, but there is also one 
which is typical of 19th century and is the relationship between the state and religion. […] It 
was decided that different societies would coexist in Belgium, and so […] you have a Secular 
and a Christian society’ (B123). The Pacte Scolaire of 1959 (L. 29-05-1959; M.B. 19-06-
195924) formalised this divide by granting parents the power to choose whether to send their 
                                                     
23 Interviews with Belgian experts are coded “B” (for “Belgium”) plus a sequential number. In 
some occasions, it was felt that even this system may compromise the anonymity of the participant, in 
which case the number was replaced with a bar (“B-”). All interviews were done in French and 
translations were done by this author except where noted. 
24 Following the Belgian convention, legislation is referred to with two dates: when it was passed 
by the parliament and when it was published in the official gazette, the Moniteur Belge. All laws and 
decrees cited in this chapter can be accessed from the Gallilex website (http://www.gallilex.cfwb.be/fr/, 
accessed 16 April 2016). 
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children to a secular or a religious institution. Today, the choice is played more on the axis of 
academic reputation (Ryelandt, 2013) but is still reminiscent of its historical origins. 
The resulting system is a “quasi-market”, with privately managed schools competing for 
students and receiving public funding based on a very specific idea of state neutrality (defined 
in D. 31-03-1994; M.B. 18-06-1994): for instance, any ‘social advantage’ a state school 
provides to its population (such as food, clothes, trips, sport equipment…) must be granted to 
all private schools in the area (D. 07-06-2001; M.B. 26-06-2001).  
While criticised because of its segregating effects, the quasi-market in the CFB was not 
the result of a mercantile view of education as was the case in Ireland, but rather of a 
compromise (‘un compromis à la Belge’, B1) to ensure that parents could choose between 
secular and religious institutions when neither philosophy ‘managed to impose itself in the 
education sphere (or anywhere else)’ (Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 242)25.  
The history of education in the CFB is intertwined with the history of the Community 
itself and of the Walloon region. The relationship between regions and cultural-linguistic 
communities was complex. Identity issues crossed financial ones. The 1970s and 1980s in 
particular were years of substantive deregulation and intense political action.  
Social services experienced heavy cuts under the restructuring of the 1970s, and many 
hoped that the upcoming transfer of powers of educational matters from the central state to 
the CFB would also entail a transfer of capital. When competencies were handed over between 
1988 and 1989 however, budget allocations were frozen. This led to waves of teacher strikes 
including violent protests like one on 27 September 1990 that left many injured (Destatte, 
1995; Guidet & Bouillon, 1990).  
One attempt to solve the crisis was the establishment in 1990 of the Conseil de l'éducation 
et de la formation (CEF), a council bringing together representatives from all stakeholders to 
advise the government on education matters (Ryelandt, 2010). The purpose was to provide a 
platform where teacher unions could express their discontent without bringing it to the streets. 
The protests subsided, and not for long, only between 1992 and 1994, when two agreements 
between the leading political parties and the constitutional revision unlocked some funding 
for education (Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politique, 2015; Destatte, 1995).  
The search of the CFB for structural and financial emancipation from the central 
government accrued the autonomist pushes of the réseau libre and the segregation within the 
education system. This conflicted with ideas such as whole-system evaluation and 
accountability, which started to take hold in those years in Anglo-Saxon countries and 
progressively seeped into the policy arena of the CFB. 
                                                     




International relations: the OECD 
The oil crisis of the late 1970s affected both educational resources and discourses until the 
turn of the century. Austerity policies were carried out by left- and right-winged ministers and 
gave rise to teacher protests in 1982, 1990 and 1996 (Grootaers, 2005)—‘the last strikes we 
had of that amplitude’ (B5). The ‘quest for efficiency’ (Beckers, Florkin, & Leroy, 2008, p. 
11) and accountability increased the significance of student assessment and systemic 
evaluation. Schools were criticised because they were (apparently) unable to provide young 
people with the skills employers sought, while international results from IEA studies in the 
early 1990s became the object of ‘a special attention of authorities wanting to impose 
restrictions’ (ibid.).  
Austerity policies were ‘somewhat legitimised by several audits commissioned by Belgian 
policymakers to national and international experts’ (Grootaers, 2005, p. 32). These included a 
McKinsey report in 1986 and an OECD review in 1993 pointing to the higher cost per student 
in Belgium compared to other countries. It has been argued (Grootaers, 2005; also B2) that 
contacts with the OECD, including participation in the INES project, provided Belgian 
policymakers not only with the evidence, but also the right narrative to justify cuts in public 
spending.  
Consistent with its role of knowledge mediator handing out both problems and their 
solutions (Chapter 1), the OECD (1993) pointed to the shortcomings of the system and 
explained that resources should be allocated on a need-basis rather than distributed to everyone 
equally. Note, however, that the report was requested by the three MoEs of the French, 
Flemish and German-speaking communities (Ryelandt, 2010, p. 34)—an example of 
voluntary submission to peer reviewing (Chapter 1) and a reminder that national policymakers 
are not simply passive recipients of globalising forces.  
The background to the review and the national report (Ministère de l’Education, 1991; 
OECD, 1993) flagged up a lack of clear objectives and governance mechanisms in the 
education system (CEF, 1992b). The recently-established CEF was immediately receptive to 
the advice and published two policy documents mostly in line with the OECD 
recommendations (CEF, 1992a, 1992b). Since then, the CEF has often played the role of 
intermediary forum (Draelants, 2007)—a broker charged with translating international 
recommendations for a national audience (Cattonar, 2010).  
On the government’s side, proposals for the introduction of a steering committee to 
develop educational strategies began to surface in 1993 ‘inspired’ by the OECD report 
(Ryelandt, 2010, p. 39). A public hearing on education (Assises de l’enseignement) was called 
and ‘took place in Charleroi on 13—14 May 1995 to examine the general issue of education 
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and its financing’ (Beckers & Voos, 2003, p. 4). The outcomes of the consultation informed 
the contents of the key educational framework for the CFB, the Décret « Missions » of 1997.  
Key educational framework  
Drawing from OECD-informed CEF advice (1992b, 1994b) and from the Assises de 
l’enseignement of 1995, the first proposal of the Décret « Missions » was submitted by the 
Green Party ‘to fill the gap’ represented by the lack of educational objectives and evaluative 
instruments in the CFB (Cheron, 1995, p. 2; also in Dupont, Neven, & Deghilaghe, 1997, p. 
18). When the Décret was eventually passed (D. 24-7-1997, M.B. 23-9-1997), it provided the 
legal and conceptual framework for most education policies of the following 15 years, 
including the introduction of the Core and the Final Skills (Socles de compétences and 
compétences terminales) that students should acquire and which are common to all networks; 
or the establishment of a Steering Committee in 2002 for system monitoring and evaluation.  
Table 6.2 summarises the alignment between the Décret « Missions » and the EPA. 
Table 6.2: Contact points between the Décret « Missions » and the OECD education policy advice 
Equality of opportunities to learn 
 All actors should ‘ensure equal access to all types of education for girls and boys’ (Art. 
10) 
 One of the four objectives of education is to ‘ensure to all pupils equal chances for social 
emancipation’ (Art. 6) 
 Each school is required to establish in its education plan how it will cater for special 
education needs (Art. 67) 
Quality of provision 
 Collaboration among schools is promoted as a means to ease transition between primary 
and secondary education (Art. 14) 
 In each school, teachers, students, parents and other education professionals participate to 
the drafting of the school education plan (Art. 69) 
 Schools are requested to produce a yearly ‘activity report’ (Arts. 72–73). In the first 
version of the decree, the report was sent to the Steering Committee and was highly 
confidential. Mentions of confidentiality were removed from subsequent amendments, 
and the report became one of the sources of data available to the Inspectorate. 
 CPD providers receive sample Core Skills assessments for teacher training purposes (Art. 
19), and information about the provision of CPD must be included in the school activity 
report (Art. 73) 
Student performance 
 Introduction of standardised educational outcomes. Note that the Core Skills ‘give priority 
to reading for understanding, writing and oral communication, as well as the command of 
basic mathematical tools with a view to problem-solving’ (Art. 16, § 3), but also to one 
modern language. 
 A commission to develop and disseminate standardised tests of the Core Skills (which are 
then delivered to CPD providers) is also established, but these tests are sample materials 
and are not meant to be used in the classroom for assessment purposes (Art. 19)   
Source: Décret « Missions », author’s translation.  
There are some similarities between the Education Act (1998) in Ireland and the Décret 
« Missions », like the idea of “gender equality” and an attention to special education needs 
(though SEN legislation in the CFB was not formalised until 2004). Irish policymakers 
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developed the concept of “educational disadvantage” in more detail, whereas Belgian 
policymakers were more attentive to stakeholders’ involvement and cooperation—perhaps 
because of their multi-layered and multifaceted education system.  
An interesting measure in the Décret is the supplementary year (année complémentaire or 
grade 1S). As advocated by the OECD (1993), schools should enable each pupil to progress 
‘at his or her own pace’ through AfL and differentiation (Décret « Missions », Art. 15). 
Therefore, a supplementary year ‘adapted to his or her learning needs’ was established for 
those pupils who were ‘led’ or ‘brought’ to complete (‘amené à parcourir’) primary education 
or the premier degré of lower secondary in one extra year.  
In its intention, the supplementary year was seen as a fairer intervention than grade 
repetition to address underachievement—since  grade repetition is often used simply as a 
disciplinary measure (Baye, Chenu, Crahay, Lafontaine, & Monseur, 2014). In practice, 
however, the année complémentaire was modelled on the existing system whereby schools 
enjoyed substantial freedom to decide who should or should not go through an extra year in 
education (hence the wording about pupils being brought to complete education). As a result, 
the supplementary year became just another form of grade retention, which is largely 
recognised to be a harmful and expensive policy (Education Endowment Foundation, 2016; 
Hattie, 2008). 
Previous participation in international assessments  
Just before PISA, the CFB participated in TIMSS 1995. The greatest issue was school 
participation rate, which fell below 85% because of teacher resistance (e.g., Beaton, Mullis, 
et al., 1996, p. 21). Positive comments were expressed with regard to teacher opportunities to 
meet and collaborate, whereas the issue of grade repetition was flagged up. TIMSS 1995 did 
not receive media attention, and this was the main difference between TIMSS and PISA: their 
findings were similar, but they reached the public only through PISA (B4). 
Student results in TIMSS Mathematics were ‘encouraging’ because the CFB was ‘slightly 
above the international average’ (Monseur, 2000, pp. 16–17), but the performance advantage 
of the Flemish community on the CFB was ‘more than a [school] year’ (p. 17). A CEF analysis 
of the report suggested that gaps in teacher knowledge resulted in instruction that 
overemphasised procedural knowledge to the detriment of problem-solving (1998b). TIMSS 
1995 was one of the many information sources that contributed to a wider debate about the 
purposes and instruction of mathematics in the CFB. 
A second analysis (CEF, 1998a) was produced for Science. In this case, the CEF noted 
‘unsatisfactory results in a domain where skills are rapidly-evolving and an integral part of 
everyday life’ (p. 4). The CEF recommended developing scientific literacy starting in primary 
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education by focusing on the relationship between science and society, problem-solving and 
experimentation. It also asked for a ‘rigorous external evaluation [… to] measure in particular 
the effects of the actions taken, without waiting for the next IEA surveys’ (p. 5). It is worth 
noting that, unlike Ireland, the IEA drew the attention towards teacher under-reliance (rather 
than over-reliance) on textbooks. This was deemed a problem by the CEF (1998a), and as a 
result, while other countries were trying to limit teacher use of textbooks because of concerns 
over their effectiveness, the CFB passed a decree (19-05-2006; M.B. 11-08-2006) to increase 
it among the scepticism (and criticism) of many experts (B7). 
TIMSS participation served as the background for an interesting political exchange on 21st 
May 1997 between Laurette Onkelinx (Socialist Party, centre-left, MoE 1995–1999) and 
Pierre Hazette (Liberal Reformist Party, centre-right, MoE 1999–2004; see Parlement de la 
Communauté Française, 1997). The conversation aptly captures the complex relationship 
between “international” recommendations and national policies. 
Hazette accused Onkelinx of presenting a draft of the Décret « Missions » that was too 
lenient towards students, because it removed barriers such as grade retention or exit 
examinations. Hazette thought that these measures were necessary ‘to increase the pressure 
on students so that they could provide quality work’ (p.17). He backed his argument with 
results from reading and mathematics assessments of ‘the University of Liège’ (ibid.)—in fact, 
the university-administered IEA RLS and TIMSS. Onkelinx defended her choice of having 
‘semi-external examinations’ (ibid.) that would be internally developed by schools following 
governmental blueprints. She also added that low science results in TIMSS could be explained 
‘on the one hand, in part by the assessment methodology of the OECD [sic] for this subject 
and, on the other hand, by the perverted effects of [the] education system, particularly in 
science education’ (p. 18). 
Two features in this exchange are worth noting. Firstly, neither politician was completely 
in line with current EPA: Hazette supported both centralised examination and streaming 
policies, whereas Onkelinx was in favour of local autonomy but did not mention any 
accountability measure. Secondly, both seemed to be hardly aware of the data source. Hazette 
attributed TIMSS ownership to the University of Liège whereas Onkelinx to the OECD. Can 
one claim that the IEA was influencing national policymaking in this instance, when the 
product was being used but the owner was misstated?  
Onkelinx’s mistake may be evidence that the OECD was already being recognised as an 
LSA provider, but her response also shows that she did not simply accept everything the 
“OECD” said: the CFB did not satisfy the guidelines for sample participation rates in TIMSS 
1995, but Onkelinx waved this off as a methodological issue with the assessment, moving the 
fault from the country to the international organisation.  
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The education policy advice for the French Community of Belgium  
PISA is administered in the CFB by an independent research centre attached to the University 
of Liège, the Service d’Analyse des Systèmes et des Pratiques de l’Enseignement (Service for 
the Analysis of Systems and Practices in Education, ASPE, http://www.aspe.ulg.ac.be). The 
ASPE was founded in the 1960s by Gilbert de Landsheere—a key figure at IEA—under the 
name ‘Laboratory for experimental pedagogy’. It has traditionally focused on issues of justice 
and fairness in education.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is hard to refer to the OECD as an international player when 
it comes to PISA in the CFB. ASPE researchers were involved in the INES programme, and 
they reportedly had a key role in promoting PISA to the Directorate for International Relations 
at the government of the CFB (Cattonar et al., 2009). Today, ASPE staff are not only in charge 
of the national implementation; they are represented in the PISA Governing Board, the PISA 
consortium, the Technical Advisory Group, the Reading and the Questionnaire Expert Groups. 
At the same time, the centre has been involved in developing, evaluating or advising the 
government on national education policies for many years, leading some detractors to question 
its actual independence from political sides (Cattonar et al., 2009)26. 
The ASPE appeared more aware of its role for policy than the ERC. The staff argued that 
there is an expectation that PISA data will be used by national project managers (NPMs) to 
produce policy-relevant reports. At a meeting in which the current research was presented, 
some claimed that PISA is not meant to generate any kind of general or international policy 
advice (i.e., the EPA) at all, but only to provide the data for national research centres to deliver 
tailored policy recommendations. 
A few comments can be made on this point. Firstly, the pivotal role of the ASPE in 
brokering PISA knowledge to the CFB is undoubted but not representative of all countries. 
For instance, developing countries often have to rely solely on international reports as they do 
not have the capacity to re-analyse PISA data (Best et al., 2013; Gilmore, 2005).  
Secondly, it was shown in Chapter 3 that international reports provide policy advice which 
might not be directly connected to PISA findings. The implication is that while NPMs may be 
a convenient means to tailor the EPA to a country, the EPA itself would still exist without 
national research centres or PISA. It could also be argued that while NPMs are supposed to 
work with PISA data, there is probably an expectation from the OECD—the Secretariat in 
particular—that national recommendations will not be too dissimilar from those in the 
                                                     
26 This author was informed that the ASPE is in fierce competition with the academic group at the 
Université Catholique de Louvain that produced the cited report (Cattonar et al., 2009). The ASPE 
strongly contests its findings or academic value, suggesting that they were politically motivated to 
discredit the centre. 
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international report. The Secretariat is not simply a data provider, it is a policy advisor with a 
certain degree of autonomy and an agenda: if advice were systematically ignored or contested, 
its political credibility would be affected.  
Finally, there is hardly any difference for practical purposes between claiming ‘the EPA 
is supposed to influence national policies’ and ‘the EPA is supposed to influence national 
policies through the NPMs’, provided changes in the EPA due to the NPMs’ contribution are 
also analysed, as is the case in this research. Following the structure of the previous chapter, 
this analysis is provided in Appendix 3 (Tables 6.A–D) and summarised below. 
PISA 2000  
There is a remarkable alignment between the international and the national versions of the 
PISA 2000 report. The OECD and the ASPE identified similar problems, in particular the high 
inequality level of the education system. In line with their pre-PISA work, the ASPE tended 
to stress the negative effects of grade repetition.  
The ASPE noted that issues with reading literacy were known and due to ‘a tendency to 
consider learning to read as concerning almost exclusively the first two years of primary 
education’ (Lafontaine, 2001a, p. 43). Citing post-PISA inspection reports, the ASPE argued 
that current reading instruction did little to improve the students’ literacy and recommended 
supporting students with reading difficulties and improving teacher training and professional 
development in this area. The criticism on grade repetition and the reading curriculum was 
seconded by the CEF (2002), which also noted that the government had ‘only partly 
responded’ (p. 3) to recommendations that had been laid out ten years earlier (CEF, 1992a, 
1992b).  
In later reports, the ASPE critiqued the mainstream pedagogical approach in the CFB 
because it rewarded uncritical memorisation and meant that most students could only ‘execute 
routine operations’ in the PISA domains (Lafontaine & Blondin, 2004, p. 68). On equity, ‘in 
spite of structural measures aimed at compensating social inequalities [e.g., decrees 
introducing Priority Education Zones and positive discriminations …] the diagnosis is without 
appeal’ (Lafontaine & Blondin, 2004, p. 86). More was asked from the government to tackle 
grade retention practices: ‘Even though there have been several conferences and debates 
around PISA […] we have not yet moved on […] from the debate stage to actions and reform 
proposals’ (Lafontaine et al., 2003, p. 197). 
The Flemish Community stood out for its better performance and its traditional teaching 
methods. Lest teacher-centred education could be taken as a viable policy option by the 
government, Lafontaine (2002) cautioned that the arrow of causality could go from higher 
performance to teaching style, rather than the opposite. In other words, it was argued, the 
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better performance of Flemish students could be explained by better socio-economic 
conditions, higher parental engagement and a more ‘academic’ demeanour of students—not 
by better instruction: ‘if Flemish teachers are more demanding, it is because they can “get 
away with it”, since their pupils perform better and are therefore more receptive with this kind 
of push…’ (Lafontaine, 2002, p. 225).  
It is unclear whether the impression that Flemish students were more academically-
oriented may have been influenced by pre-existing regional bias. An interviewee said:  
‘What I am going to tell you is not at all scientific […] but… what you hear quite 
often… is that– pupils in the Flemish Community are more… serious-minded in 
school than French-speaking pupils, and that they are more disciplined […]. 
People [in Brussels] often say that there is an enormous difference in the 
atmosphere around French-speaking schools, where all students, they arrive late, 
they make noises, they are everywhere, they play… and: The Flemish schools 
where all students arrive like little soldiers, all responsible and disciplined.’ (B4)  
PISA 2003 
The ASPE was generally satisfied with Mathematics performance and devoted its attention to 
inequality levels (Baye, Demonty, Fagnant, Matoul, & Monseur, 2004a, 2004b). The 
outcomes of grade repeaters in vocational tracks and in disadvantaged schools were ‘seriously 
worrying’, and equity was ‘the challenge to rise to’ (Baye et al., 2004b, p. 9). It was shown in 
Chapter 3 (“The consistency of the EPA”), that correlations between equity and performance 
can be read in different ways, including the possibility that inequality does not prevent 
achievement. For instance, the inequitable Flemish Community was also high-performing. 
The ASPE, however, adhered to the OECD interpretation: ‘the examples of Australia, Canada 
[etc.] show that it is completely feasible to reconcile effectiveness with equity […]. It is one 
of the main teachings of PISA’ (Baye et al., 2004b, p. 10).  
The visions of the OECD and the ASPE were also in line with respect to the interpretation 
of the high correlation between domains. Where in the previous report the correlation of 
Mathematics and Science with Reading produced a cautionary note that PISA literacies might 
not completely capture actual mathematical and scientific competencies but rather the ability 
to read long texts (Lafontaine et al., 2003), the 2003 report justified the verbosity of PISA as 
reflecting ‘real-life’ applications (Baye et al., 2004b). 
The fight against segregation and the narrative of possibility became part of a number of 
publications targeting education stakeholders (Baye, Demonty, Fagnant, Matoul, & Monseur, 
2005; Demonty & Fagnant, 2006), including teachers. Unlike the teachers’ guides to PISA in 
Ireland, the “Document for the attention of mathematics teachers of the first and second stages 
of secondary education” (Commission de Pilotage, 2004b) did not simply reproduce 
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information from the national report: it suggested changes in classroom practice based on 
detailed analyses of released PISA items. 
The document attempted to link the PISA vision to the Core and the Final Skills 
frameworks. It conceded that PISA did not completely reflect the mathematics syllabi of the 
different réseaux, but argued that this was a strength rather than a limitation. The problem-
solving approach of PISA Mathematics, the document explained, could easily be integrated 
within the curricula of general and vocational tracks. The released PISA items would serve as 
reference material. The high proportion of low achievers was ‘not acceptable […, therefore] 
all mathematics courses should make room for teaching these kind of problems’ (Commission 
de Pilotage, 2004b, p. 48, emphasis in the text).  
PISA 2006 
The full national report was published two years after the international version (Baye et al., 
2009). Once again, there was substantial alignment between the OECD and the ASPE, both 
in their understanding of PISA and in the EPA.  
The ASPE commented positively on the Science results as evidence that the ‘basic’ 
science curriculum (comprising three or four science periods per week) ‘achieves its 
objectives’ (p. 113). Engagement, interest and motivation were strong points as well as viable 
policy options, because they were variables ‘that the education system should be able to affect 
without having to overhaul its structures’ (p. 150). There was a good level of gender equality 
which contrasted with the wide gap between science graduates, where the percentages were 
30 to 70 in favour of males. A follow-up report (Lafontaine & Goffin, 2009) showed that 
gender expectations, which were often reinforced in schools, were at the source of the gender 
gap. In line with the EPA, the authors recommended changes in terms of orientation and 
guidance. 
The hierarchical structure of the education system was accused of reducing the 
‘“reservoir” of pupils at ease with scientific skills’ (Baye et al., 2009, p. 222), and academic 
selection was indicated as a source of between-school segregation: ‘“good schools” have many 
students in the first stage and less and less in the following years. On the contrary, other 
schools have a structure resembling an inverted pyramid, taking in masses of pupils that were 
rejected elsewhere’ (p. 232). It is ‘one thing […] to enrol in a top school, a whole other thing 
to manage to stay there’ (Monseur & Lafontaine, 2009, p. 163). 
In this regard, the ASPE praised recent interventions attempting to address inequalities 
such as changes in enrolment procedures, in the Inspectorate, as well as ‘remediation in 
primary education, a cap on student transfers between schools […], a reorganisation of the 
premier degré différencié and an attempt to make vocational streams more valuable’, which 
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were seen as a ‘first step’ to contrast academic selectivity (Baye et al., 2009, p. 232). Some of 
these policies are analysed later on in this chapter. 
As in 2003, the teachers’ guide to PISA 2006 suggested using published items for training 
purposes: ‘PISA questions can support learning whether the objective is to form scientifically 
literate citizens or […] to approach scientific problems from a wider perspective’ (Quittre, 
Baye, Fagnant, & Hindryckx, 2008, p. 45). In general, the document reads more like an 
endorsement than a critique of PISA, and the premises upon which the assessment is built 
were hardly questioned: ‘The objective of PISA is to assess whether young people are 
prepared to enter adult life’ (p. 3); ‘PISA adopts a “citizenship” perspective to assessment’ (p. 
4). 
PISA 2009  
Unfortunately, only the summary report could be retrieved to inform this section (Baye, 
Demonty, Lafontaine, Matoul, & Monseur, 2010). Where PISA 2009 was highly problematic 
for Ireland, the CFB celebrated a 14-point increase in Reading, especially because the 
improvement was greater among lower-performing students (those under proficiency level 2, 
boys and immigrant students) and was matched by higher indexes for engagement and 
motivation—ASPE’s preferred policy lever. This led the ASPE to claim that ‘the general 
mobilisation of field personnel—teachers in particular—and of the system to try and redress 
a situation that was considered to be alarming in 2000 is starting to bear fruit’ (p. 16).  
What the ASPE did not acknowledge was that some of the positive changes were not 
statistically significant: the mean score increase, the decrease in the share of lower-performing 
students and in between-school variance were not significantly different in 2009 from their 
2000 values; the reduction in gender gap was significant, but the 18-point increase in boys’ 
scores was not (OECD, 2010d, pp. 191–198). Lack of statistical significance does not imply 
that changes were not real, but it is unclear why the ASPE decided to overlook significance 
tests for some variables. In other cases, findings from the international report (an improvement 
in teacher-student relations despite a worsening of classroom climate) were not followed-up, 
as though the centre were more receptive to certain issues than others.  
Even though the optimism about improvements in Reading was not completely warranted, 
this was the message that reached policymakers, together with reminders about the still high 
inequality levels. The resulting text resembled OECD discourses in which praise (used to show 
that improvement is within reach) is moderated by cautionary notes (used to keep future 
evidence relevant): ‘we will have to remain vigilant and continue in the direction of narrowing 




Analysis of selected policies 
In this section, selected national policies are analysed following a tripartite structure: context 
and influences, points of contact with the EPA or the PISA curriculum and, when available, 
evidence of implementation and impact. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the first step contributes 
to an understanding of how “international” discourses are translated on a national level. The 
second step helps to differentiate the level of goals and values (acknowledgment) from that of 
alignment. The third step seeks to assess the effectiveness of EPA-aligned policies. 
Several policies were analysed in this fashion (see Table 6.4 at the end of the chapter), but 
only some are discussed in this section: as in the case of Ireland, they are curricular reforms, 
policies on national evaluation and assessment, or interventions seeking to improve the equity 
of the education system. Evidence of alignment with the EPA and effectiveness from each 
policy feeds into the broader end-of-chapter conclusions which, in turn, contribute along with 
the cross-country evidence from Chapter 4 to answering the second and third research 
questions. 
Changing curricula 
Core Skills, 2001 
Context and influences 
The Core Skills (Socles de compétences)27 are defined in the Décret « missions » as a 
‘framework of reference presenting the basic skills that should be practised until the end of 
the first eight years of compulsory education, and those that should be mastered […] as they 
are considered to be necessary for social inclusion and later education’ (Art. 5).  
There are competing theories about the goals and values of the Core Skills. The idea of 
“skill/competency-based education” first appeared in 1993 as part of the reform of the first 
                                                     
27 The term “compétence” is not a perfect translation of “skill” in the sense of the word intended in 
PISA—a definition is never provided in PISA, it is another multi-vocal symbol (Turner, 1975). The 
Décret « missions » formalised “compétence” as the ‘ability [aptitude] to use an organised combination 
of knowledge, know-hows and attitudes allowing to carry out a certain number of tasks’ (Art. 5). In 
francophone literature (e.g., Dolz & Ollagnier, 2002; Jonnaert, Masciotra, Barrette, Morel, & Mane, 
2007) the notion of “competence” involves the ability to use one’s knowledge, resources and potential 
to address a real-life situation in practice. The competency-based approach in education is framed 
within socio-constructivism and is more akin to problem-based, situated or minimally-guided learning 
than with “skills for life”.  
At the same time, the French version of the framework (OCDE, 1999) translated ‘knowledge and 
skills’ alternatively as ‘connaissances et aptitudes’ or ‘connaissances et compétences’. Consistently 
with the OECD and the most recent Belgian translation of the Socles de compétences (Ministère de la 
Communauté française, 2014), this research translates “compétence” alternatively with “competence/y” 




stage of lower secondary education (1er degré). In line with the OECD report (1993), the 
reform organised grade progression, envisioned measures to support struggling students and 
interpreted education in terms of skills rather than contents. Competencies were ‘structured 
behaviours to attain a goal in a given situation’ (Odrovic, 2003, p. 3).  
To some, competency-based education was introduced to address equity issues; it was a 
way to ‘remedy [...] school dropout, to answer […] to the desire to teach always more 
[content], and to react to a certain student disengagement’ towards prescribed knowledge 
(Rey, Caffieaux, Defrance, & Marcoux, 2005, p. 3). Others thought that competency-based 
education was a ‘political response to demands formulated by international organisations and 
the business world’ (B2). In 1994, the director of the ASPE was summoned by the MoE Di 
Rupo, ‘and Di Rupo apparently told him—I’ll quote verbatim […]—“I am just coming from 
a meeting with the OECD, and now what they… they told us is what matters nowadays is to 
work on skills”’ (B2). From another angle, the European Round Table of Industrialists [ERT] 
wanted education reforms that could increase the production of human capital to meet the 
demands of a rapidly changing world (Hogenboom, 2003). 
The ERT policy preferences were highly aligned with the OECD’s. Key points were ‘a 
palette of skills covering both numeracy, literacy, critical judgement and a knowledge of the 
basics of […STEM], humanities, economics and social sciences’ (ERT, 1995, p. 7); pre-
primary and adult education; ICT; decentralisation paired with accountability; lifelong 
learning; and ‘the practice of benchmarking’, which ‘should be introduced to identify weak 
and strong points of education systems and to identify […] best practices’ (ibid., emphasis in 
the text).  
Economic interference in educational matters has always been resisted by teachers and 
‘certain pedagogical movements of the progressive left’ (B4), and at the time there were claims 
‘that education had sold out to enterprises’ (Beckers, 2007, p. 5). Some authors, including 
Beckers (2007), disagreed with this view. For instance, Romainville (2008) acknowledged the 
influence of the ERT and the OECD reports, but stressed that the impact from within the CFB 
of teacher complaints about student knowledge and competences was not negligible for the 
paradigm shift:  
‘This thesis about a shady conspiracy of the “business world” does not stand [up] 
to scrutiny. Rather, the competency-based approach was introduced in schools 
under the pressure of a number of interconnected internal and external factors, and 
it would be over simplistic to reduce this complex interconnection to the pressure 
of the economic and social stakeholders alone.’ (Romainville, 2008, p. 36)  
Contact points with PISA 
Irrespective of their intended goals, it is possible to evaluate the alignment of the Core Skills 
with the PISA literacies. Attempts to link the two were found in the teachers’ guides 
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(Commission de Pilotage, 2004b; Quittre et al., 2008), and other similarities can be detected 
by comparing the OECD and CFB definitions of reading, mathematics and science (Appendix 
3, Table 6.E). The strongest connection is in mathematics, where the idea that problem-solving 
skills can be used to address real-life problems and become active citizens underpins both 
definitions. “Reading” is defined more narrowly in the CFB, and a connection with PISA 
Reading as a skill for life can only be made by considering the purposes of the whole French 
syllabus.  
One interviewee (B7) argued that these contact points exist because the OECD and the 
Core Skills were inspired by the same pedagogical theories, which were brought into PISA by 
the expert groups. This backs the argument made at the beginning of this document whereby 
the “international” and the “national” levels are confounded in PISA; yet the alignment 
between OECD guidelines and country-level interpretation is never perfect, and some 
idiosyncrasies can be spotted.  
For instance, despite the influence of Belgian experts on PISA literacies, there is hardly 
any alignment in the science domain. The objectivity of science is not taken for granted in the 
CFB, where a religious and a secular society coexist and school neutrality towards worldviews 
is regulated by specific legislation. As a result, questioning the role of science in society and 
recognising that scientific values are not immutable are important features of the science 
curriculum (e.g., CEF, 1998a). This can be contrasted with the Irish curriculum for science 
which, despite the Catholic heritage of the country, embraces instead the OECD definition of 
“scientific literacy” and stresses the value of the scientific process for personal and societal 
wellbeing (NCCA, 2008).  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that science in Belgium, which unlike French and 
mathematics was not a priority subject in the Décret « missions », has moved up a few places 
in the list after PISA and is now presented right after the other two Core Skills in official 
documents (Ministère de la Communauté française, 2014). 
Implementation 
The legislative procedure leading to the enactment of the Core Skills provides a good example 
of the extent to which freedom of education is a sensitive topic in the CFB. 
The Core Skills were meant to come into force in 1999 (D. 26-04-1999, M.B. 27-08-1999), 
but three not-for-profit associations and some private individuals appealed against the 
government’s decision to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the Core Skills would 
undermine their constitutional freedom to follow the pedagogy of Rudolf Steiner. The court 
accepted the appeal because of the backwash effect that the norm, which was deemed ‘too 
attentive to curricular details’, could have on instruction (Cour d’Arbitrage, 2001, § A.8.3). 
The court also mentioned that the decree was based ‘on the standardisation of achievement 
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levels advocated for Belgium in the OECD report of 13 November 1998’ (ibid.), but the report 
itself could not be retrieved in this study. 
The government successfully circumvented the appeal, without substantially addressing 
the issue, by granting schools limited exemption from following the Core Skills provided they 
could prove this ‘did not compromise the coherence of the education system’ (D. 19-07-2001, 
M.B. 23-08-2001, Art. 10). Since then, the existence of a backwash effect of the Core Skills 
on teaching practice has been a contentious point. Some authors claim the Core Skills produce 
an ‘invisible pedagogy’ (Bernstein, 1975; in E. Mangez, 2004, p. 68). Others note that they 
are hardly prescriptive and that curricula and assessments remain highly decentralised 
(Romainville, 2008, also B2, B5).  
In fact, while the language of the new paradigm was adopted across all réseaux (E. 
Mangez, 2004), the curricula of some smaller associations (e.g., the Fédération des 
Etablissements Libres Subventionnés Indépendants) were adapted to account for the Core 
Skills as late as 2008.  
No rigorous study of the effects of the Core Skills on curricula and classroom practice is 
available to date, but Rey et al. (2005) and Sylla & De Vos (2006) argue that—in spite of the 
constructivist slant of teacher training programmes and the focus on competences of the Core 
Skills—lack of time, resources, teacher confidence and professional development resulted in 
teachers reverting to more traditional and easier-to-implement instructional methods.  
Beckers (2007) noted that the quality of the Core Skills varied by subject. In another paper, 
she cited Inspectorate reports mentioning ‘difficulties’ (Beckers, 2011, p. 12) in the 
implementation of the skill-based approach. This was an understatement. The first 
Inspectorate publication reported ‘major structural difficulties in [the] education system’ 
(Service général de l’Inspection, 2009, p. 25), including weak internal coherence of the Core 
Skills and a lack of consistency in learning experiences even within the same school. Curricula 
and assessments were poorly aligned with the Core Skills.  
In secondary education, two thirds of lessons were found to be at odds with skill 
acquisition, and while there was evidence of attempts at a different pedagogy, ‘their practice 
was […] clumsy and intermittent’ (Service général de l’Inspection, 2009, p. 12). Instruments 
devised to foster teacher cooperation and to help struggling students were seen as 
administrative burdens. One year later, the Inspectorate underlined again the inadequacy of 
the Core Skills as a basis for teaching and assessment: ‘From one school to the next, from one 
classroom to the next, pupils do not learn the same thing and are not assessed in light of the 
same criteria, and this happens even in […] essential domains’ (Service général de 




After PISA 2009, Baye et al. (2010) argued that the reforms of the early 2000s, including the 
Core Skill regulations, had started to bear fruit in terms of student achievement. If this were 
the case, the evidence above suggests that Core Skills may have played an enabling role but 
not have had a direct effect. The framework ‘has the great merit of existing’ (Beckers, 2011, 
p. 11), because it helped to regulate the pedagogical freedom enjoyed by Belgian teachers. It 
was useful to shake up the system (Chenu, Crahay, & Lafontaine, 2014) but in everyday 
practice it suffered from clear shortcomings that other systemic interventions, such as the 
School Contract of 2005 (below), tried to address (Beckers, 2011). 
School Contract, 2005 
The Contrat stratégique pour l’éducation (Strategic Contract for Education; Gouvernement 
de la Communauté française, 2004, 2005b)—then renamed Contrat pour l’école (School 
Contract; Gouvernement de la Communauté française, 2005a)—was an attempt by the 
government and the MoE Arena to set a long-term strategy for education by involving all 
stakeholders in the deliberation process. While it was not strictly a curricular reform, it is 
analysed in this section because of its strong links with the Core Skills and its goal of raising 
all pupils’ achievement. 
Context and influences 
Two factors provided the impetus for the School Contract. On the one hand, teacher 
consultations in 2003–2004 highlighted discontent among professionals about the reforms of 
the mid-late 1990s: teachers argued that they had been left out from the deliberation process, 
that new frameworks lacked clarity, and that the scarcity of resources and opportunities for 
professional development translated into difficulties in implementing the Core Skills in the 
classroom (Gouvernement de la Communauté française, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). On the other 
hand, PISA 2000 and 2003 had drawn attention to the mediocre performance of the CFB on 
an international stage and to its high inequality levels (ibid.). 
PISA results showed that too many students did not achieve satisfactory performance 
levels in domains considered the bases for ‘active citizenship’—which were therefore in need 
of greater attention ‘without sacrificing other areas’ (Gouvernement de la Communauté 
française, 2005a, p. 5; note the difference with the narrative for the National Literacy and 
Numeracy Strategy in Ireland, whereby other areas “had to be sacrificed”). Social and 
academic segregation, including grade repetition, were identified as the greatest culprits 
behind low achievement.  
The School Contract was an attempt to raise both equity and performance simultaneously 
by working on two fronts. On the one hand, it provided a coherent conceptual and financial 
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framework for policy instruments that already existed (such as Décret « missions », Core 
Skills, Steering Committee, legislation to contrast segregation) but were somewhat 
disconnected (de Commer, 2005). On the other hand, it introduced a new model in education 
governance where all stakeholders would be involved in the consultations.  
The debates, compromises and negotiations lasted for months, and the resulting policy 
document provided a vision for education that was certainly all-encompassing, but not always 
coherent and in which many voices seem to overlap. 
Education is ‘the priority in a democracy’ (Gouvernement de la Communauté française, 
2005b, p. 2, emphasis in the text), and education for citizenship fosters ‘democratic values and 
intercultural dialogue’, which are ‘the fundaments of social cohesion’ (2004, p. 1). Education 
enables individual and collective emancipation, and this in turn leads to (sustainable) 
economic growth and ‘the well-being of future generations (2004, 2005b, p.1). ‘Teaching 
evolves in a global context’, years of austerity ‘imposed’ to the CFB severely affected society 
and the education system, and although school ‘cannot and should not be accountable for all 
problems of society’, measures could be taken on the ‘quality, effectiveness and equity’ of the 
system (2004, p. 2). Education is like a rising tide lifting all boats: ‘for this, school should 
guarantee to everyone equal access to knowledge and know-how’, which will enable young 
people to think for themselves and develop their personality (2005a, 1).   
Contact points with the EPA 
The School Contract had ten priorities and about 54 action points, and at least 37 of them 
(69%) had clear links with the EPA. They included: increasing the teaching time dedicated to 
French and mathematical literacy; developing supporting mechanisms for struggling students 
and reducing segregation; introducing standardised testing at different levels of education; de-
gendering career paths and raising awareness among teachers about gender equity; developing 
a coherent policy for resource allocation and removing teacher allocation restrictions; making 
vocational education more appealing to all students; improving teacher training and 
professional development with a view to the quality, equity and effectiveness of the 
instruction; strengthening school leadership; improving teacher cooperation and parental 
involvement; strengthening the Inspectorate and the Steering Committee. 
Implementation 
A week after the publication of the School Contract, de Commer (2005) argued that it could 
succeed only if it managed to fit within other strategies of the federal government, which were 
outside the control of the CFB, and if teachers could be engaged. Work to address some of the 
priorities began immediately. The Steering Committee issued suggestions to improve teacher 
training (Commission de Pilotage, 2006), while the Universities of Mons and Liège 
collaborated on a project to tackle inequality within the ‘ghetto-schools’, so called because of 
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their high segregation levels (Demeuse et al., 2007; Friant, Derobertmasure, & Demeuse, 
2008).  
The Contract was supposed to undergo biannual evaluations, but ‘nowhere’ was there an 
interest in complying with these deadlines and the monitoring aspect was put aside (B4). Then, 
four years after the Contract, the government gladly reported that over 91% of the action points 
had been completed or were underway (Gouvernement de la Communauté française, 2009). 
The report mentioned unprecedented financing, great support for the reforms and concrete 
results but its findings were disputed by the opposition (CEF, 2015a). 
In 2014, the new government commissioned a new evaluation from the CEF. Policy-wise, 
it was shown that a great number of decrees, frameworks, pedagogical interventions and 
instruments, research studies and CEF publications had seen the light of day between 2005 
and 2014, though they were not matched by as many evaluations (CEF, 2015b). Some areas 
had been targeted by policy more than others; priorities such as raising attainment levels, 
improving links between employers and students or increasing systemic evaluation and 
monitoring had been pursued with greater determination than, for example, streamlining 
teacher qualifications. The CEF also noted the uneven distribution of policy enactment. Most 
interventions took place between 2006 and 2009, many changed substantively over the years, 
some appeared late and some (teacher training and CPD) were never attempted (CEF, 2015a, 
also B5). 
Overall, the CEF argued that the School Contract managed to redesign the governance and 
administration of the education system: learning objectives were standardised and instruments 
for assessment, evaluation and monitoring were reinforced; the management of the 
educational structures was decentralised but schools were held more accountable; at the same 
time, more resources like teaching materials and equipment were unlocked. To summarise, 
where the OECD report of 1991 found an education system affected by severe lack of funding 
and with no central structures for steering and evaluation, the School Contract created one that 
had all these features (CEF, 2015a). Some interventions, however, ‘collided more than others 
against the existing context’ (p. 92). This was the case for new mechanisms of enrolment in 
lower secondary education and for changes in teacher training and interventions to support 
low achievers. 
Impact 
The School Contract had six objectives set for 2013: increase the attainment of all students; 
increase the performance of all students; reduce grade repetition; reduce school segregation 
and between-school variance; place vocational and academic tracks on an equal standing; 
reduce academic selection and streaming. The success of the second objective was to be 
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measured by an increase in PISA mean performance and a decrease in the percentage of low 
achievers. 
Most criteria were not met: there was some improvement with regard to basic skill 
acquisition—particularly in relation with school completion—but it was confined to certain 
geographical areas and was still considered unsatisfactory; instead, the levels of grade 
repetition, school segregation and overall inequality had remained stable (CEF, 2015a). With 
respect specifically to PISA outcomes, the objective of reaching the OECD average was 
achieved only in Reading: mean Mathematics scores were already at OECD levels, and 
Science scores remained below the average. Similarly, a reduction in the proportion of very 
low achievers (below PISA level 1) was observed only in Reading, where the percentage 
decreased from 28.2 in 2000 to 19.2 in 2012 (ibid.). There were no differences in the size of 
the gap between the highest and the lowest performers (an equity measure, though not an 
explicit objective of the Contract), or between tracks. 
These results led the CEF to argue that ‘a system holding its actors accountable and 
regulating by performance evaluation is not sufficient to change what happens in the 
classroom’ (CEF, 2015a, p. 92). 
Changing evaluation and assessment 
Assessment in primary education 
Low-stakes external assessments in primary and secondary education were put in place in 
1994 to monitor the education system as advocated by the OECD in 1991. Since they were 
positively received by teachers, the Inspectorate tried to exploit them to standardise teacher 
practice regarding the Core Skills, but the attempt was hampered by insufficient legal framing 
and institutional support (Lafontaine, 2001b). As in Chapter 5, however, this section will focus 
primarily on standardised testing of pupil progression, which should bear higher stakes for 
teachers and pupils.  
Context and influences 
A non-compulsory examination leading to a certificate of primary school completion had 
existed since the 1920s and another was introduced by the Catholic réseau in the 1960s. 
Participation varied by school network and area (C. Mangez, Maroy, Cattonar, Delvaux, & 
Mangez, 2009), and since exams were independently developed by school inspectors, the state 
network alone could count 10–15 different tests every year (B4). In principle, a unified 
assessment would have been a ‘logical extension’ of the Décret « missions » of 1997, the first 
policy document trying to turn a ‘juxtaposition of schools’ into a cohesive education system 
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(B3). But the Décret did not alter the fragmented state of educational certifications, because 
‘since there were no common programmes, there could be no common examinations’ (B3).  
The systemic inequality reported by PISA 2000, however, resonated with the MoE Nolet, 
who saw in a centralised examination leading to a common Certificat d’Études de Base (CEB, 
basic learning certificate) an instrument to ensure higher ‘equity and, therefore, effectiveness’ 
by addressing the segregation caused by streams and réseaux (Lafontaine, 2007, p. 6). 
Common standards (the Core Skills) were introduced in 2001, and in 2003 the Minister 
presented to the attention of the Steering Committee a ‘request for suggestions regarding an 
increased regulation of first-level education in a quasi-market context’ (de Commer, 2003; 
Lafontaine, 2007). The Steering Committee welcomed the reform provided that ‘failing the 
test would not automatically entail failure to be awarded the certificate’ (Commission de 
Pilotage, 2004a, p. 2). 
The resulting decree (02-06-2006, M.B. 23-08-2006) strengthened the evaluative 
capabilities of the CFB in two ways: it made low-stakes external assessments compulsory and 
it introduced an examination for awarding the CEB, which became compulsory in 2009 (in 
2011, an additional but non-compulsory examination was introduced at the end of the 1st stage 
of lower secondary). The low-stakes tests are triannual and at each cycle they focus on French, 
mathematics or one of the subjects listed in the Décret « missions », while dedicating a 
‘particular attention’ to technology and science (Art. 8 § 1). Similarly, the CEB is based on 
the Core Skills and has focused in recent years on French, mathematics and science or 
history/geography (Ministère de la Communauté française, 2015). French and mathematics 
were selected first because it was easier to agree on test contents and objectives (B6). 
Contact points with the EPA 
Both before and after the CEB examination became compulsory in 2009, the stakes have been 
high. Failure to attain the certificate means being unable to progress in secondary education 
at the same pace as other children. While the rest of the cohort enters the 1ère commune (1C), 
a pupil without CEB is directed into the 1ère différenciée (1D). At the end of 1D, he or she sits 
the examination again. If the CEB is not attained, the pupil continues in 2D; even if the CEB 
is attained, the pupil will not join his or her original cohort, because enrolment in the new 
academic year will be in 1C or in 1S (the supplementary year introduced by the Décret 
« missions »), not 2C (Ministère de la Communauté française, 2009b). In other words, this is 
a streaming policy that also entails automatic grade retention. In 2014, 11% of pupils did not 
attain the CEB at the end of primary education—a figure seven percentage points higher than 
2013 and in line with 2009 results (CEF, 2015a). 
The OECD endorses Wößmann’s (2005) argument that centralised external exit 
examinations (CEEEs) can be used to standardise educational outcomes by holding schools 
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accountable, for instance by posting their students’ results publicly. This may be true (see 
Chapter 3 for a critique), but the CEB is only superficially similar to the CEEEs described by 
Wößmann and the OECD.  
The examination leading to the CEB is indeed centralised but it is placed at the exit of 
primary—not compulsory—education. The new system is considered fairer by some because 
it sets a bar at a common height (B7), but the test itself is not standardised and it is affected 
by reliability and administration issues compromising its fairness (Blondin & Giot, 2011, p. 
77; also B4). In spite of the worries of school management regarding CEB-related 
accountability (Blondin & Giot, 2011), the decree excludes uses of data that may lead to 
“league tables” and the consequences for schools have thus far been very limited (see next 
section).  
The new regulations were devised to ‘reinforce equity in education by regulating 
qualifications by organising a centralised test’ (Commission de Pilotage, 2004a, p. 1), and 
some argue that they did, combined with other decrees affecting the organisation of the first 
stage of lower secondary education (Lafontaine, 2014). As an individual policy, however, the 
CEB regulations did not meet OECD requirements of standardisation and accountability, even 
though they may have acknowledged the OECD goals and values in their intents. This is a 
reminder that the usefulness of a policy and the value of OECD recommendations (the focus 
of this thesis) are two separate aspects. 
The Steering Committee and the Inspectorate 
It has been argued that the establishment of the Steering Committee and the reform of the 
Inspectorate, along with other policies for systemic evaluation such as the CEB, signal a 
paradigm shift in the governance of education in the CFB from a model based on complete 
school autonomy to one seeking to centralise and standardise some of its components (C. 
Mangez et al., 2009). 
The idea of systemic monitoring for steering purposes was already present in the CFB in 
the late 1980s, but it was the OECD report of 1993 that popularised the concept (C. Mangez 
et al., 2009). A ‘light steering structure’ was created in 1993. Its work introduced new ideas 
in evaluation such as external assessments (section above), the publication of the first 
education statistics at the Community level and suggestions about a possible reform of the 
Inspectorate. The body acquired more formal status in 1995, but the next few years represented 
something of a hiatus: The Décret « missions » of 1997 recognised the value of evaluation and 
monitoring but the steering modes it envisioned (non-compulsory tests and inter-network 
collaborations) were not in line with the view of the group. Subsequently, PISA 2000 results 
showing high inequality levels in the system ‘accelerated the adoption of a new decree’ that 
241 
 
strengthened and enlarged the existing steering group (Ministère de la Communauté française, 
2008, p. 80). 
The decree of 27th March 2002 (M.B. 17-05-2002) established the Steering Committee in 
its current form. The Committee was opened to representatives from parent associations and 
teacher unions and was charged with key responsibilities in system monitoring and evaluation, 
but also in strategy development, curricular standardisation and teacher training. It was a key 
player in the implementation of the School Contract and was involved with the ETNIC (a 
public agency for data and information management also created in 2002) in producing 
statistics on the education system. It receives data from external assessments, from CEB 
examinations and, since 2007, from the reformed Inspectorate. 
In a draft version of the decree it had been suggested that the Steering Committee should 
develop PISA-based national indicators of equity, effectiveness and socio-economic 
conditions of the school population. The purpose was to ‘assure the scientific nature of 
indicators and their effective coherence with international standards’ in line with the national 
development plan (Charlier et al., 2002, p. 2), but the recommendation was not integrated into 
the enacted decree. 
The reform of the Inspectorate (D. 08-03-2007, M.B. 05-06-2007 erratum 13-12-2007), 
on the other hand, changed three aspects in the existing evaluation system: it separated the 
evaluative and advisory functions within educational services and assigned inspectors to the 
former (as happened in Ireland with the White Paper of 1995); it relieved the Inspectorate 
from administrative burdens; and it extended its mandate to all school networks (C. Mangez 
et al., 2009). This was ‘an enormous change for school inspections’, as the focus shifted from 
individual teachers to schools (B5). The reformed Inspectorate claims to have been very 
active, producing around 3000 school reports per year, informing national debates, providing 
data to the Steering Committee and helping each school to improve (Service général de 
l’Inspection, 2012).  
It is unclear, however, whether the new regime produced actual change in school practice. 
At least until 2012, there was no standardised measure or reference framework to evaluate 
teaching and learning, so the Inspectorate had to develop its own criteria and instruments 
(Service général de l’Inspection, 2012). It was found that the objectives, timings, modes and 
outcomes of inspections needed improving (ibid.). The legitimacy of inspectors was also 
called into question: the independent network felt bereft of the power to evaluate its own 
schools, and claimed that government inspections could not capture the quality of independent 
schools adequately (B1).  
The government answered the criticism in the national development plan 2014–2019, 
where it set out its plans to ‘stabilise’ and transform the Inspectorate into a ‘professional body 
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entrusted with the auditing of the quality of education in all schools as it happens already in 
other education systems’ (Gouvernement de la Communauté française, 2014, p. 24). The 
independent network is currently more open to school inspections as long as it can retain 
autonomy in pedagogical matters (B5). 
In terms of sanctions, they ‘are light, very light on a collective level, and individual 
implications may be even less significant. The inspector produces a report which is transmitted 
to the authorities with requests for improvement […] and then either the teacher complies or 
there are other requests but no sanctions’ (B1). As a result, ‘not much’ (repeated three times) 
happens after school inspections (B1). 
Changing equity 
Systemic inequality is, together with low performance, the most frequently-debated topic in 
the CFB, particularly after the OECD report of 1993 and ‘the electroshock’ of PISA 2000 
(MoE Simonet, 2010, quoted in Grootaers, 2014, p. 5). It would be unfeasible to evaluate all 
interventions attempting to correct these trends; therefore, this section focuses on one specific 
policy regulating enrolment in lower secondary education as an exemplary case of how EPA 
alignment was reached but highly contested. 
Enrolment regulations in lower secondary education, 2007–2010 
Context and influences 
The significance of new enrolment policies in the 1er degré (the first stage of lower secondary 
education, see Appendix 2), which were introduced between 2007 and 2010, can only be 
understood within the wider context of a long-term fight of part of the society against socio-
economic segregation and academic exclusion.  
To contrast socio-economic segregation, Priority Education Zones (Zones d’éducation 
prioritaire, ZEPs) were introduced in 1989. Loosely based on the French model, the ZEPs 
were also similar to the Disadvantage Areas Scheme in Ireland (Chapter 5) because they 
unlocked additional resources for schools within specific areas (Friant, Demeuse, Nicaise, & 
Aubert-lotarski, 2008). The ZEPs were criticised because rich schools in poor areas benefitted 
by the targeting system for years, so the policy was eventually replaced in 1998 by a decree 
on positive discrimination.  
Discourses on positive discrimination had appeared a few years earlier, when the CEF 
argued that ‘the 1960s and 70s policy of equality of opportunities did not produce equality of 
outcomes. Rather, it benefitted those who were already advantaged’ (CEF, 1994a, p. 3). 
Positive discrimination for resource allocation was seen as a way ‘to give more to those who 
have less’ (ibid.). A first hesitant attempt to translate the principle into practice was made by 
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the ‘schooling for success’ decree (14-03-1995; M.B. 17-08-1995). In 1996, the MoE 
Onkelinx called for ‘an ambitious policy on positive discrimination’ (quoted in CEF, 1998c, 
p. 5), which the Décret « missions » did not deliver. Thus, the CEF elaborated a policy 
proposal based, among other sources, on an OECD report on the French experiences in these 
matters (CEF, 1998c). The proposal was rapidly converted into a decree, which ‘aimed to 
ensure equal chances of social emancipation to all students, namely by implementing positive 
discrimination’ (D. 30-06-1998, M.B. 22-08-1998).  
A socio-economic index was developed by a research team (Demeuse, 2000) and 
associated with each student; schools were ranked according to their average index and extra 
funding was unlocked above a certain threshold (Grootaers, 2005). Over the years, the decree 
was amended many times with changes predominantly focusing on modes of financing and 
calculation of the index: the most significant was the decree of 30th April 2009 (M.B. 09-07-
2009), or encadrement différencié (differentiated management), which introduced progressive 
funding allocations to replace the binary system operating since 1998. There are, however, no 
clear evaluations of the outcomes of these policies (Friant, Demeuse, et al., 2008; Thilmany, 
2011). 
With respect to academic exclusion, in contrast, the issue had always been how to limit 
vertical and horizontal streaming (grade retention and tracking) while retaining the existing 
structure involving tracks and réseaux. The ‘schooling for success’ decree of 1995 attempted 
to reduce grade retention by introducing pedagogical cycles with automatic promotion within 
cycles. The Décret « missions » positioned the 1er degré at the end of a pedagogical continuum 
terminating with the acquisition of the Core Skills. Since then, the 1er degré was no longer ‘an 
open door’ to secondary education but ‘an airlock’ that could be exited only by those who 
managed to achieve the Core Skills (Grootaers, 2014, p. 10). This had repercussions on its 
relevance for policymaking and parental choices. 
At the policy level, there was a need to account for pupil achievement in decisions 
concerning their progression. This translated into structural adjustments, including the 
introduction of the année différenciée mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as measures 
such as individualised learning plans for struggling students (see D. 30-06-2006, M.B. 31-08-
2006; D. 07-12-2007, M.B. 26-02-2008; or Ministère de la Communauté française, 2009a). 
From the parents’ perspective, the initial choice of a secondary school became critical to 
ensure that their children got through ‘the airlock’ without delays. 
As can be inferred from this brief historical overview, the battle against socio-economic 
segregation and academic exclusion introduced new forms of risk for some stakeholders: 
advantaged families did not want to send their children to designated disadvantaged schools, 
neither did they want for them to end up in a differentiated stream. It is in this context that the 
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government tried to regulate school enrolment to ensure better chances to disadvantaged 
pupils. The outcomes are discussed below. 
Contact points with the EPA and implementation issues 
Enrolment in the 1er degré had always been unregulated in the CFB: parents could choose any 
institute at any time (even years before the child qualified for entry), and schools had the 
power to accept or decline registrations with very few constraints (Ryelandt, 2013). A doubly-
segregating mechanism was at work. On the one hand, those who were able to move within 
the system with the greatest ease could plan in advance the best learning path for their children 
and close doors to other children. On the other hand, since admissions were interview-based, 
personal relationships between schools and families were an asset: many schools regulated 
access by discouraging unwanted families to proceed with the enrolment (Draelants, 2014).  
In 1997 and 2001, the Décret « missions » and inter-network financial agreements 
(accords ‘de la Saint-Polycarpe’) attempted to streamline enrolment procedures by penalising 
social discrimination and obliging schools to accept all applications provided parents 
subscribed to the school ethos and pedagogy (Delvaux & Maroy, 2009; Ryelandt, 2013). This, 
however, did not solve issues such as early enrolment or the self-selection of disadvantaged 
families into disadvantaged schools (Ryelandt, 2013; B5; for a more general overview on self-
segregation, see Hoelscher, Hayward, Ertl, & Dunbar‐ Goddet, 2008). A clearer policy 
direction was set by the PISA-motivated and EPA-aligned School Contract of 2005 (see 
above). One of the priorities of the MoE Arena was to ‘say no to ghetto-schools’ by targeting 
enrolment, student transfers and disciplinary exclusions (Delvaux & Maroy, 2009).  
Enrolment and student transfer were addressed in the Décret « inscriptions » (D. 08-03-
2007, M.B. 03-07-2007). The decree introduced two simple but ground-shaking procedures: 
it introduced a common yearly window for enrolment in the 1er degré and prohibited student 
transfers for the first two years of secondary education. In other words, it precluded early 
access to prestigious schools by applying a ‘first come, first served’ policy and, in line with 
the EPA, it made it harder for schools to  ‘suggest’ to struggling students that they should 
continue elsewhere (Ryelandt, 2013, p. 24). The political recoil that ensued cost the post to 
the MoE Arena. Teachers, parents, anti-heterogeneity ideologists, unionists and new lobbyists, 
journalists and politicians came from both sides of the political spectrum to accuse the 
Minister of attacking constitutional freedoms or merely to critique some side-effects of the 
reform, such as the few but highly-mediatised queues of people standing for days in front of 
the “best” schools to gain a place (Ryelandt, 2013). In early 2008, the MoE was ‘promoted’ 
to the federal government (Delvaux & Maroy, 2009, p. 8). 
Her successor, MoE Dupont, tried to adjust the aim with a second decree, known as the 
Décret « mixité sociale » (D. 18-07-2008, M.B. 26-08-2008). The decree changed the 
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admission criterion from chronological to stratified-random: a percentage of places would be 
automatically offered to pupils coming from disadvantaged primary schools, whereas the 
remaining would be randomly allocated. Theoretically, this decree was even more aligned 
with the EPA than the former, as it reduced segregation by forcing each school to take in a 
certain number of disadvantaged students, rather than by “hoping” that poorer parents would 
be at the front of the queue (besides, it had emerged that most people queuing were socio-
economically advantaged parents that had lost their early-reserved place).  
Two main issues affected this second decree. Firstly, since the government could not agree 
on a unique randomised allocation procedure, schools were asked to devise their own method 
within certain constraints, causing logistic and administrative repercussions that lasted for 
months. Secondly, the decree suffered from what was renamed ‘the enrolment bubble’: 
strategically-minded parents sent applications to many schools to maximise their chances of 
being assigned a place, with the result that twice as many schools compared to the previous 
academic year figured as fully-subscribed (Delvaux & Maroy, 2009; Ryelandt, 2013). The 
decree was amended three times between 2009 and 2010 to no avail. 
In 2010, a third major attempt to regulate enrolment was made with the decree 18-03-2010 
(M.B. 09-04-2010)—also called Décret « inscriptions » or Décret « Simonet ». In the face of 
criticism from some Belgian economists (e.g., E. Cantillon, 2013; Maniquet, 2009), the new 
decree eliminated randomisation in favour of a complicated system of parental preferences 
managed by a centralised agency, but it retained a quota of 20.4% school places to be allocated 
to disadvantaged students. It, too, was met with some discontent: since it relied on statistical 
approximation to calculate priorities, it created problems for a minority of families. Overall, 
however, it enjoyed a better reputation and had a better political fate than its predecessors 
(Ryelandt, 2013).  
The extent to which the policy was enforced is less clear. One interviewee noted that many 
in the cabinet to the MoE Simonet were school principals who strongly opposed their 
Minister’s decree. It ‘was really a paradoxical situation in which she knew that the rules were 
not followed’ but could not take any action other than ‘saying to the principals “well, you 
should do what the décret says…” [laughs] that’s Belgium’ (B7). Another expert said that 
having a quota ‘does not mean that this 20%, you should put them all in the same classroom. 
Some schools do just this, there is no mixité…’ (B6).  
Impact 
The Décret « Simonet » featured in the PISA 2013 international report as a possible policy 
option to reduce segregation (OECD, 2013g, p. 133). So far, however, there is little evidence 
that this outcome was achieved. Three reports of the Inter-network Enrolment Committee and 
an interim report of the Steering Committee found a small ‘quivering’ of school population 
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statistics towards greater diversity, but this was limited to certain geographical areas and a few 
percentage points (Commission de Pilotage, 2013, p. 44; also Ryelandt, 2013). The main 
impression, which was restated in the final report (Commission de Pilotage, 2014) was one of 
general stability in equity and achievement since 2007. Two interviewees (B5, B6) suggested 
that there can be no improvement at the school level so long as there is socio-urban 
segregation, which is an issue particularly in Brussels.  
Policy alignment of Belgian policies to the EPA 
There is extensive evidence that the OECD goals and values were acknowledged in many 
education policies in the CFB, particularly after PISA. As often restated in this research, 
however, sharing goals (acknowledgement) is no guarantee that specific policy levers will 
follow OECD recommendations (alignment). Sometimes, alignment may even precede 
acknowledgement. For instance, policies on teacher training and CPD in the CFB were 
introduced before a narrative was constructed linking teacher quality with student outcomes 
(Cattonar, 2010).   
Policy alignment in the CFB is summarised in the table below. As in the case of Ireland 
(Table 5.2), the first column displays the year from the most recent overarching education 
framework before PISA, the Décret « missions » of 1997, until the last PISA cycle at the time 
of this writing. The T1–P3 columns are the EPA areas (footnote 21, p. 209), and the last 
column lists the Belgian policies under consideration by year of coming into force, when 




Table 6.3: policy convergence towards the EPA in the CFB 
Year T1 T2 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 P1 P2 P3 Policies 
1997              1   Décret « missions » 
1998         2       D. on (pre-)primary education, D. « discriminations positives »  
1999                 
2000             3   D. on teacher training, pedagogical cycles (1) 
2001                Core Skills, additional science instruction 
2002                
Steering Committee, ONE, IFC and D. on CPD, ouvrir mon 
quotidien (primary) 
2003                 
2004            4    
D. on special education, D. addressing school dropout, exclusion 
and violence 
2005                School Contract 
2006              5  CEB, external assessments, ouvrir mon quotidien (secondary) 
2007     6     7      
Inspectorate, Décret « inscriptions », D. on school leaders, 
pedagogical cycles (2), ETNIC, D. reorganising 1er degré, 
personalised learning plan 
2008                Décret « mixité sociale », pedagogical cycles (3) 
2009                 
2010                Décret « Simonet » 
2011                 
2012                 
Colour coding: 
     




The cell colours represent policy alignment: the white colour means that there is no 
national policy clearly attempting to intervene on that EPA category; red is for policies that 
are contrary to OECD recommendations; white means that there is no national policy clearly 
attempting to intervene on that policy area; yellow stands for interventions purporting or 
aspiring to be in line with the OECD goals; blue is for policies actually aligned with the EPA, 
whether intentionally or not and regardless of whether they managed to be implemented 
effectively; and green represents policies that are not only in line with OECD 
recommendations on paper, but for which there is plausible evidence of implementation. 
Colour shades signal when policies first addressed the EPA (dark shade) and how long for 
(light shade). Once again, this does not take into account whether implementation was 
effective but only the fact that, at a certain point in time, a policy agreeing (dark blue/green) 
or disagreeing (dark red) with the EPA came into force, and that policy was “active” for a 
number of years afterwards (light blue, green or red). Notice that yellow comes in one shade 
only because it serves simply to flag up purported but not actual alignment. 
Finally, the numbered cells index some policies that are followed up in the following 
section to make more general comments. 
Trends in policy convergence towards OECD recommendations 
Most cells in Table 6.3 are blue, suggesting that the CFB and the OECD generally agree on 
educational matters, especially after the School Contract of 2005. Compared with Ireland, it 
was more difficult to gather evidence that policies were implemented at the classroom level. 
This is because the fragmentation of the education system and the high autonomy enjoyed by 
POs made large-scale evaluations more the exception than the rule. As Mangez & Cattonar 
(2009) explain, Belgian society traditionally relied on élites (for instance, religious and secular 
powers) achieving results by negotiating, compromising and generally ‘not meddling in the 
affairs [… of] one’s neighbours’ (p. 18). In this context, systemic or ‘objective’ knowledge 
was of little political utility. Quantitative evaluations had no place in public policy before 
PISA.  
This created two hurdles in this research: determining whether a policy was implemented, 
and determining whether it was implemented as intended (plus, of course, deciding what 
impact it had if implemented). In the first case, a decision was reached after considering who 
was in charge of the implementation (schools, réseaux or central government): the more 
centralised the procedure, the more likely the implementation. It was harder to decide whether 
a policy retained the spirit of the legislator—an issue referred to by an expert as the difference 
between achieving ‘policy impact on’ versus ‘policy integration into’ classroom practice (B2). 
This depends on the strength of the coupling between different levels of the education system 
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(Scheerens et al., 2015), which in the case of the CFB is very loose. In practice, this meant 
that many cells in the table could have been shaded in blue or green according to one’s 
interpretation of the evidence.  
The numbers in the cells of Table 6.3 exemplify some of the problems with the 
classification of Belgian policies. The first concerns the supplementary year introduced by the 
Décret « missions ». Its purpose was to provide a modified curriculum for underachieving 
students until they achieved the Core Skills (i.e., they were awarded the CEB), so at least in 
its intentions it was a supporting mechanism. It also grouped underachieving students forcing 
them to spend an extra year in education, and in this respect was a form of grade retention. 
Consider, however, that grade retention was already practised, so if the supplementary year 
had been integrated into school practice as a supporting—rather than a sanctioning—
mechanism, it could have been considered an improvement compared to the previous 
situation. 
The final decision to assign a blue colour to the cell (alignment, but not implementation) 
was reached after evaluating the decrees on positive discrimination (point 2 in the table). As 
a centralised intervention, the likelihood that resources were indeed allocated more equitably 
was higher and therefore, when in 2004 a SES-based formula was introduced to give extra 
funding to schools in need, the cell turned to green—though it could still be argued that one 
cannot know whether funds were used for equity purposes.  
Following these lines of reasoning, pedagogical cycles (3) were intended as a way to 
support low achievers (column P1) and simultaneously address grade repetition (column E3), 
but there is little evidence of integration and therefore the cell was shaded in blue. Similarly, 
there is currently an ‘overload of measures and devices’ to tackle school dropout, exclusion 
and violence, which creates a ‘parcelling out of the actions to take’ (ASPE, 2013, p. 17) and 
makes it difficult to gauge whether these policies (4) have been implemented as expected on 
a large scale. 
Number 5 refers to the examination leading to the CEB. As argued earlier in this chapter, 
its status as a centralised external exit examination is disputable, and this is the reason behind 
the yellow label: there is acknowledgement of the goals and values of the OECD, but hardly 
any alignment with the EPA. Nevertheless, in combination with decrees affecting the 
organisation of the 1er degré (e.g., D. 07-12-2007, M.B. 26-02-2008) it is thought to have 
addressed some inequalities by reducing the amount of low achievers, the gender gap and the 
native/non-native gap in reading (hence the green shading at point 6, see Lafontaine, 2014).  
The reason why the cells in column E3 remain light red-shaded after 2007 is because the 
combined effects of the CEB regulations and the decrees were only ‘small steps in the right 
direction’ (Lafontaine, 2014): previously, pupils failing to acquire the CEB were streamed 
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into pre-vocational tracks without any support; after the reforms of 2006–2007, these pupils 
are streamed into the 1er degré différencié, which has a closer curriculum to the 1er degré 
commun and makes some pedagogical provisions. However, horizontal and vertical 
segregation mechanisms (i.e., curriculum differentiation and grade retention) are still in place.  
Finally, the transition from blue to green in column Q3 in 2007 (7) signals the 
consolidation of accountability policies in the CFB. Surely, school autonomy in resource 
allocation (including teacher pay) was still limited and public posting of achievement data was 
forbidden. On the other hand, autonomy in curriculum and pedagogy was already high and 
external evaluations were introduced through examinations, assessments, school education 
plans and inspections. Even if these measures did not have a large impact on teacher practice 
or student outcomes, they represented a considerable disturbance of the system. 
The impact of EPA-aligned policies on achievement and equity  
Of the many policies theoretically in line with OECD recommendations, only one has been 
thoroughly and effectively implemented: the change in enrolment procedures in the 1er degré 
(the decrees « mixité sociale » and « Simonet »). Thus far, the reform has produced little 
measurable improvement but there is also some evidence of greater diversity within schools.  
According to the OECD argument, PISA should be able to detect changes in the 
performance and equity levels of the CFB as a result of its policies. This argument was put to 
the test using Willms (2006) LSA-based policy evaluation framework. Recall that the 
framework states that the effects of ‘universal’ interventions should be captured by changes 
in mean country outcomes, ‘SES-targeted’ interventions by the Strength and Slope of the 
socio-economic gradient, and that ‘performance-targeted’ interventions should lower the 
percentage of students scoring below proficiency levels 1 or 2 (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: a framework to detect the effect of policies in the CFB on PISA outcomes 
Type and variable Sample policies in the CFB Abbreviation 
Universal interventions strive to 
increase the educational 
performance of all children 
through reforms that are applied 
equally across the schooling 
system.  
 
Variable: mean country 
performance 
D. organising (pre-)primary education 
Decree on teacher training 
Core Skills 
Additional reading / mathematics 
instruction 
Steering Committee 
Office de la Naissance et de l’Enfance 
Institut Formation en cours de Carrière 
D. on dropout, exclusion and violence 
School Contract 
CEB 
Reform of the Inspectorate 
Décret « inscriptions » 
Décret « mixité sociale » 
Décret « Simonet » 



















SES-targeted interventions aim to 
improve the educational 
performance of students with low 
socioeconomic status by providing 
a specialised curriculum or 
additional instructional resources.  
 
Variable: Strength and Slope of the 
socio-economic gradient 
Positive discriminations (1,2,3) 
School Contract 
Décret « mixité sociale » 







interventions provide a specialised 
curriculum or additional 
instructional resources for 
particular students based on their 
levels of academic performance. 
 
Variable: Percentage of pupils 
below level 2 
Pedagogical cycles (1,2,3) 
School Contract 
Personalised learning plan for 
struggling students 






Source: adapted from OECD (2013e, pp. 108–109); Willms (2006) 
Figure 6.1 is a timeline of universal interventions and country mean scores since 1995. 
Interventions focusing on raising performance in a specific domain were colour-coded.  
Figure 6.1: Universal interventions and performance in the CFB 
 
Unlike the case of Ireland, country mean trends in the CFB converge. While Mathematics 
and Science have been rather stable, Reading performance has increased by about 21 points, 
or a fifth of a PISA standard deviation. The ASPE has argued that the improvement, which 
affected the lowest performers in particular, could be due to three factors: an additional hour 
of French instruction introduced in 2006; the students’ greater familiarity with PISA-type 
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forces even the weakest students (those who did not attain the CEB at the end of primary 
education) to reach basic skills in French and Mathematics (Lafontaine & Baye, 2012; 
Lafontaine, 2014). 
This possibility can be critiqued. Firstly, the three factors should also have influenced the 
Mathematics domain (mathematics benefitted from additional instruction time, too). 
Secondly, after the introduction of the année différenciée, there were more students in the 1er 
degré supplémentaire and they performed better. Perhaps, higher performance does not 
capture the effects of instruction but the increase in number of students who had the ability to 
perform at level 3 or 4 in PISA and were retained because they did not attain the CEB. Finally, 
Reading scores aligned with Mathematics and Science scores as their standard error shrunk to 
almost half of its magnitude in 2000 (data not shown): PISA has become more accurate over 
time, so earlier Reading scores may have been underestimated.  
Consider that the confidence interval at the 5% level for Reading 2000 was 462–490 and 
the mean score in 2012 was 497. It can be shown that if the 2012 value had been one point 
lower, the improvement between 2000 and 2012 would have been non-significant at the 5% 
level. Once again, this is not to deny that a change happened, but given the many issues in 
PISA reliability—especially in Reading—highlighted in Chapter 4, a certain caution when 
interpreting these results is recommended. 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 show the Slope and the Strength of the socio-economic gradient 
in the CFB.  
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Figure 6.3: SES-targeted interventions and the Strength of the socio-economic gradient in the CFB 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the PISA database. 2003 data for the CFB were not available in the 
OECD database and had to be extrapolated, which led to missing data. Since 2006, the CFB and the 
German-speaking Community data were merged. 
A consistent finding emerging from documents and interviews was that inequality levels 
did not change in the last 15 years; if anything, retention levels have worsened (Baye et al., 
2014). Data from PISA agree with information gathered on site: a difference of one standard 
deviation in socio-economic status corresponds to an average score difference of 52 points, 
and this relationship captures about 20% of the variance (higher than the international average 
2000—2012, which is 13%). 
Figure 6.4 and Table 6.5 link performance-targeted interventions to the performances of 
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Figure 6.4: Performance-targeted interventions and performance in the CFB 
 
Table 6.5: Changes in the performance of the highest and lowest achievers in the CFB between the first 
comparable assessment and PISA 2012 
 Scores % < lv2 % > lv 4 10th score 90th score 
R (2012-2000) +21 -9 NS +36 NS 
M (2012-2003) NS NS -4.2 NS -17 
S (2012-2006) NS NS -2.1 NS NS 
Source: PISA database and national reports for the CFB. Standard errors for PISA 2000 were not 
available, therefore the average of following cycles was imputed. “Scores” = change in country mean 
scores; “% < lv2” and “% > lv4” = change in the percentage of students performing below the 
performance level 2 or above level 4; “10th score” and “90th score” = change in the scores of the 10th or 
the 90th student percentiles; “NS” = Non-significant at the 5% level) 
Figure 6.4 shows that there was a constant decrease in the percentage of students below 
level 2 in Reading and Science, but not in Mathematics. Table 6.5 adds that these changes 
were accompanied by performance improvements only in the case of Reading, whereas there 
was a decrease in the performance of the higher achievers in Mathematics and Science. It was 
argued above that improvement in reading may be due to stronger performers being retained 
in lower secondary education. Admittedly, this explanation conflicts with the -17 difference 
observed at the 90th percentile of PISA Mathematics: grade retention would explain it, but it 
is unlikely that retained students were top achievers. 
Belgian researchers claimed that reading comprehension was ‘the big project in the years 
2000–2010’ (Baye et al., 2010, p. 17, emphasis in the text), but there was little evidence 
available from this research that the project had been implemented coherently and successfully 
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streaming of students have altered the distribution of the PISA population among grades and 
tracks.  
PIRLS 2011, which also focused on reading, showed no changes in performance at the 
primary level and a situation which was ‘way more worrying’ than that at the secondary level, 
with a large proportion of low achievers (Schillings, Hindryckx, Dupont, Matoul, & 
Lafontaine, 2012, p. 7). If the project to improve reading had been successful, it is unclear 
how the PISA and PIRLS cohorts may have experienced such a different instruction that 
would account for their different results. This gives some credit to the explanation reported 
above that improvement in reading was not driven by subject-specific reforms, but by the 
reforms of lower secondary education of 2006–2007, which would affect the PISA but not the 
PIRLS cohort (Lafontaine, 2014; and personal communication of 9 February 2016).  
Whether this is the case will appear more clearly after the next PISA cycle, but it should 
be stressed that, once again, Willms’ framework did not make it any easier to uncover PISA-
policy relationships. In fact, the evaluation in this chapter is evidence of the difficulties of 
linking interventions and consequences when policies are examined in detail. And yet, the 
OECD and some econometric research still recur to simplifications such as “number of 
policies in one domain” or “number of SES-targeted interventions” for policy evaluation as if 
it were possible to draw valid conclusions from these variables. 
Conclusions to Chapter 6 
Evidence of country alignment with OECD recommendations 
In the online questionnaire, the national expert agreed with Hopkins, Pennock, & Ritzen 
(2008) that policy alignment in the CFB was ‘medium’. If one considers EPA reception only, 
this is certainly an understatement. PISA results were highly mediatised and known by all 
stakeholders. Consistent with the theory, there is extensive evidence that policymakers 
extrapolated results to support their arguments. Some referred to this practice as ‘reading 
recommendations according to an ideological prism’ (B5), some were more openly critical: 
‘And so PISA becomes like a potluck: people find what they bring’ (Romainville, 2002, p. 1).  
Two parallel narratives appear to have developed in the CFB, and both use the PISA 
findings that best support their claims: on the one hand, players broadly linked to the political 
left focus on equity and the high proportion of low achieving students to request structural 
changes; on the other hand, the Catholic network and the political right focus on performance 
and the low proportion of high achieving students to request more autonomy. Even their 
reference societies differ: Scandinavian countries and Poland for the former, the Netherlands 
and the Flanders for the latter (E. Mangez & Cattonar, 2009; also B3 and B4). 
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Because of its active role in policymaking, the ASPE was often accused by its direct 
competitors of being politically motivated (Cattonar et al., 2009)—unlike the OECD, which 
is generally considered super partes and whose data is seen as reputable and objective. This 
is interesting, as it was shown in this chapter that there is usually a remarkable alignment 
between OECD and ASPE reports, meaning that they should equally be slated of partiality or 
praised for their objectivity. From its part, the ASPE is aware of its responsibility as a policy 
advisor but also, together with some informants (e.g., B3), regards PISA as a diagnostic tool 
for the use of researchers whose findings do not necessarily entail policy decisions. 
In terms of acknowledgement, PISA entered the political discourse representing 
international standards to which Belgian policies have increasingly aspired to conform. 
Acknowledgement of the OECD goals and values was expressed mainly through policies 
addressing equity, educational governance and student and system evaluation. This was a 
novelty for the CFB (B4). A former member of the Steering Committee said: ‘the first time I 
talked about an external examination, the common CEB, they looked at me [with an 
expression] saying “where are you from??” […] and then we did it. When we came with the 
idea of the CE1D at the end of the 2e degré… I’ve never had it as easy to negotiate a text since 
everyone agreed. Everyone said “well, of course [we should do it]!”’ (B-).  
It was shown earlier that there is considerable alignment between Belgian policies and the 
EPA, particularly since the School Contract of 2005. There have been also attempts to address 
equity issues, although in many instances equitable aims were counterbalanced by segregating 
outcomes. Future policies have the potential to be even more strongly informed by the EPA: 
for instance, the new “Pact for an outstanding education” (http://www.pactedexcellence.be, 
accessed 16 April 2016) is being developed in collaboration with McKinsey Belgium and the 
OECD (B6, B7). 
As was the case in Ireland, one of the most-debated but least-affected areas was the teacher 
continuum. The decrees in the early 2000s ‘were not major reforms’, and there were few 
policies ‘trying to influence what teachers do in the classroom’ (B3). The problem with 
reforms of teaching, it was argued (e.g., B6), is that they would affect the existing status quo 
among teachers, teacher training providers and réseaux: in other words, any proposed 
intervention would be resisted by at least half of the stakeholders. 
Evidence of EPA-aligned policy effects 
The ASPE has claimed that Reading performance has increased thanks to the combined effects 
of examination policies (the CEB), support mechanisms for low performers (an extra hour of 
French and the année différentiée) and a greater familiarity with PISA. Of these factors, the 
only one that can be said to be somewhat in line with the EPA is the année différentiée, which 
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“ticks the box” as a support mechanism but does not change existing streaming arrangements. 
Moreover, the lack of increase in Mathematics and the standard error on Belgian performance 
suggest caution in accepting the argument of the ASPE.  
On matters of equity, despite years of consultations and several attempts, EPA-aligned 
policies addressing systemic inequalities have produced little improvement thus far, whereas 
grade repetition appears to be worsening. Some mechanisms are deeply rooted in the system. 
Most teachers and parents support grade repetition as a useful measure to address behavioural 
and academic problems (Dupriez & Dumay, 2008, also B6). Cornet & Dupriez (2004) found 
that some teachers reject the idea that social inequalities could be visible from a young age, 
and when presented with the evidence they failed to link national trends to the reality of their 
own classrooms. This creates a ‘culture of failure’ in the CFB whereby ‘normal’ students 
proceed at an expected pace and everyone else is retained (Baye et al., 2014).  
Some opt-in projects were reportedly more successful than systemic policies in addressing 
these issues. An example is Décolâge, which attempts to reduce retention in primary education 
by providing teachers practical and cultural alternatives to it (e.g., B5, B6, B7). The issue then 
becomes upscaling (‘we are world leaders in pilot projects’, B6). Besides, measures to change 
the culture of grade repetition would not be sufficient when retaining a child is instrumental 
to increase the school population and access more funds, as it was claimed to be the case in 
some kindergartens (B6). 
If aligning to the EPA has not been a “game changer” in the CFB with respect to 
performance of equity, there was at least some consensus among interviewees that PISA was 
a useful instrument for policymaking, especially as a diagnostic tool: ‘it taught us a lot’ (B2). 
The fact that findings can be used ‘to support A as well as the opposite of A’ (Figazzolo, 2009, 
p. 28) was considered more an indication of its quality than a limitation. PISA was likened to 
a thermometer (B2, B4, B6) producing ‘solid empirical data’ (B3), whereas national tests ‘can 
always be suspected of being subjective’ (B6). To some, PISA created ‘a cult of international 
evaluations’ because it was the only objective instrument available (B5), and in general there 









Limitations and future directions 
All research activities have to compromise between scope, scale and accuracy, and this study 
was no exception. It was the first time an attempt to reconstruct the whole OECD policy advice 
and link it with national policies and country outcomes was made. New and valuable data 
were gathered, but not all parts of this study were equally effective. In this section, some 
limitations are addressed and suggestions for further studies are provided. 
The main limitation when reconstructing the EPA (RQ1) was that there is no unique source 
from which it originates and no unique audience. Over 100 OECD publications appear each 
year; most of them have multiple authors, contributors and editors and are directed not just at 
policymakers, but at researchers and other stakeholders. Online databases have no 
recognisable author, and even the PISA reports, which are produced by the Secretariat, are a 
collective enterprise and are reviewed by the PGB before publication. As was argued in 
Chapter 1, there is no real distinction between an international and a national level when it 
comes to the relationship between the OECD and individual member countries. This is 
because of the very nature of the organisation: the OECD is its member states but it is also 
more than the sum of its parts; national experts may sit in committees taking decisions which 
affect the international community; the Secretariat has some autonomy but not full autonomy. 
As a result, whenever a recommendation was analysed it was often unclear who was 
talking and to whom. Was a piece of advice being pushed by a research agenda or policy 
agenda? Was it meant to be heard by researchers, teachers or by policymakers? Knowing this 
could have helped to focus the evaluation on the most pressing issues. Instead, during the 
study all recommendations felt relevant, all were given the same weight even though some 
might have been less prominent in the OECD discourses of the last fifteen years. 
This limitation was partly mitigated by adopting the OECD categorisations of policy 
options to identify key areas and thanks to the validation of the EPA reconstruction (see Table 
3.2) by Andreas Schleicher. Nevertheless, a different clustering of policy recommendations 
or a different way to approach the synthesis (for instance by interviewing more experts within 
the OECD to reconstruct the EPA) would have altered the EPA presented in this thesis and 
perhaps some of the findings on policy alignment (RQ2). 
On this matter, both the email survey and the online questionnaire (the PAIQ) had 
limitations. To increase the response rate, the email survey asked only one question, therefore 
it could not capture trends over time. It is likely that each respondent interpreted the question 
slightly differently. This is common with expert judgements, and there was some evidence 
suggesting that experts struggled to decide whether policy alignment should take 
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implementation into consideration. Moreover, it is not known how much effort each put into 
responding, and answers tended to gravitate towards the central option.  
Ideally, one would have wanted to ask more questions to more experts to be able to rate 
their consistency, and to follow them up to probe effort and understanding. It was once again 
a matter of trading off depth for breadth, but a follow-up attempt was made through the PAIQ. 
The strength of the PAIQ was that it was straightforward to complete and it returned simple 
but thorough information. The response rate was also relatively good (about 40% of the email 
respondents completed it). However, the accuracy of the PAIQ relied on the accuracy of the 
EPA conceptualisation and, as stated above, this latter was difficult to evaluate. The four areas 
and 15 subcategories in which policy options were grouped into were informed by OECD 
publications but still depended on this author’s judgement. 
The fuzzy boundaries of the EPA and its scarce internal coherence had repercussions also 
on this author’s ability to evaluate policy alignment in the two case studies. The concept of 
“delta-convergence” was appealing, but the model promoted by the OECD was not suited for 
a quantitative approach. A solution was found by visualising policy convergence on a time 
map (see Table 5.2 for Ireland and Table 6.3 for the CFB), but even then it difficult to assign 
some interventions to a definite category since they agreed with one recommendation and 
went against another. At least, this confirms that this author’s scepticism towards the additive 
approach of Braga et al. (2013) for quantifying policy impact was legitimate. 
An analysis of the role of national project managers (NPMs) and other policy brokers was 
outside the scope of this research, but it was clear from the two study visits that the ERC and 
the ASPE did more than reproduce OECD recommendations within local boundaries. This 
was not a huge limitation, because changes in the EPA due to the NPMs’ contribution were 
taken into account. Nevertheless, future developments of this research could look into this 
issue, drawing from existing literature on knowledge brokers (Meyer, 2010; Sriprakash & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2015), on the political role of “independent” policy advisors (Craft & 
Howlett, 2013; Van Damme, Bossens, Brans, & Fobé, 2014), and on the relationship between 
the ability of countries to make sense of international policy advice and policy convergence 
(Howlett & Joshi-Koop, 2011). 
Finally, it was hard to locate or produce solid evidence of policy effectiveness (RQ3), as 
is often the case in policy evaluation. In Chapter 4, the correlational and multi-level analyses 
returned some valuable information, but expert responses were too few to provide conclusive 
findings on the influence of EPA-alignment on achievement or equity. The association 
between the EPA Index and PISA rankings was probably driven by an interacting variable, 
and while small effect sizes and lack of data were expected, they were still somewhat 
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disappointing. Although the information from the NPMs was valuable and provided 
contextual information, there have been too few PISA cycles to observe clear trends.  
Willms’ (2006) framework was adopted as an additional theoretical instrument to facilitate 
policy evaluation because it is used by the OECD, but in the end it did not make policy effects 
much clearer. Country policies seemed to be always unrelated to country trends when they 
were grouped according to the framework, with the exception perhaps of the impact of Belgian 
policies on the 1er degré, which may have been captured by the decrease in percentage of low 
achievers as expected by the framework (Figure 6.4). Notice that this disconnect was present 
also when independence evidence of policy effectiveness existed. For instance, the DEIS 
policy in Ireland improved equity, but this was not captured by changes in the PISA socio-
economic gradient as posited by the OECD and Willms’ framework.  
If one considers the positive correlations observed in Chapter 4 between changes in pre-
primary enrolment and changes in PISA outcomes as an indication of a real underlying policy 
effect, then the question becomes what types of policy is PISA more sensitive to, and whether 
Willms’ framework is the best way to categorise policy outputs.  
Despite these limitations, this research adds to the current body of knowledge through its 
attempt to link the production of educational knowledge (the EPA) to consequences and 
outcomes, while providing the theoretical and methodological instruments to extend this work 
to other countries and future assessments. It also addressed two requests expressed by other 
researchers and outlined in Chapter 1.  
Baird et al. (2011) proposed that ‘a more thorough study of the temporal relationship 
between policy thrusts and PISA results [… could] shed light on the plausibility of the claim 
that PISA causes policy’ (p. 2). Evidence from Ireland and the CFB suggests that this 
possibility should not be excluded, especially in recent years. Specifically, PISA results might 
have directed the attention to policy advice that was just waiting to be noticed and integrated 
into national plans. 
Hanberger (2014) stated that ‘whether and how PISA has helped develop education 
(systems) and its consequences for school practice merit further research’ (p. 176). PISA has 
certainly helped to develop a culture of evaluation and accountability, but both Ireland and the 
CFB reinterpreted this culture to suit their existing practice. Since neither education system 
had a tradition of large-scale evaluation and accountability, the outcome was a top-down 
approach whereby policies reproducing the narrative of the OECD were introduced but had to 
face national contexts in their application. School inspections became more frequent and 
teachers felt under attack, however no real sanctioning or formative measures followed from 
them. Consequences for school practice may have included an increased administrative burden 
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or a sense of vulnerability on the teachers’ part, but at the time of writing the impact of PISA 
in terms of evaluation and accountability was more in words than in practice. 
Future research might want to update the EPA and the multilevel analysis in light of new 
data whilst keeping the current methodology, and focus its attention on other countries. 
Because policy intentions often do not transpire from published documents, the use of 
educational experts is still encouraged. Where possible, however, expert opinions should be 
collected from different time points (either longitudinally during the research or through 
historical analysis) to account for policy changes. Expert opinions sometimes change when 
the policies do. In this study, time was factored in when looking at policies and policy advice, 
but it was given somewhat less prominence when reporting informed opinions (for instance, 
semi-structured interviews did not include contrasting questions such as “What did you think 





This research sought to evaluate the OECD education policy advice (EPA) by assessing the 
extent to which following OECD policy recommendations can help countries to achieve the 
goals of greater performance and equity in education. The evaluation addressed the “theory 
and practice” of the OECD policy advice: on the one hand, what the OECD says countries 
should do and whether this is reasonable advice; on the other hand, which recommendations 
find actual application on a national level and whether this can be linked to improvements in 
quality and equity. 
The rationale for the evaluation was that the OECD has gained prominence as a policy 
advisor in educational matters, particularly after PISA. PISA has become a well-known 
“brand” among policymakers, and the education reforms of participating countries have more 
or less implicitly purported to align with the OECD goals or have aimed to rectify country 
underperformance in the assessment. This has led to a strand of research investigating the use, 
usefulness and effects of PISA: how different countries prepare and respond to the survey; 
whether it is a valid and reliable measure of student abilities; and how international surveys 
such as PISA promote a culture of accountability at the country level. 
By placing the spotlight on PISA, this literature has analysed only the more superficial 
and “neo-liberal” aspects of the EPA, such as advice to deregulate and decentralise. National 
policies thought to be in line with OECD recommendations were considered as examples of 
the globalising effects of neo-liberalism on education systems through PISA. What was 
missing in the literature was a systematic and comprehensive analysis of what the OECD 
advises that countries should do to improve education, beside the “neo-liberal” suggestions. It 
was unclear whether policies thought to be in line with the EPA were truly so or simply tried 
to adhere to some vague international standards, or whether EPA-aligned policies have helped 
countries to increase the performance and equity of their education systems as envisaged by 
the OECD.  
If the EPA is advice worth following, it should be possible to detect improvements on a 
national or international level when it is followed. Therefore, this research attempted to fill 
the gaps in the literature by assessing the quality of the EPA and looking for connections 
between EPA-informed policies, country performance in the three PISA literacies of Reading, 
Mathematics and Science, and country equity in education. 
The evaluation of the education policy advice was guided by four questions: 
RQ1) Is the OECD education policy advice “sound” advice? 
RQ2) To what extent do countries follow the OECD education policy advice in 
their national policies? 
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RQ3) What is the evidence that education policies informed by OECD 
recommendations influenced country performance? 
RQ4) Considering the evidence, how valuable is the OECD education policy 
advice? 
RQ1 aimed to reconstruct the EPA, analyse whether it was coherent, consistent and supported 
by evidence (including PISA evidence). This was the “theoretical” aspect of the OECD policy 
advice mentioned above. Its “practical” side was investigated in RQ2 and RQ3. RQ2 was 
about the use of the EPA. Acknowledgement of OECD goals by policymakers was separated 
from policy alignment with the EPA, as only interventions actually in line with the EPA could 
provide evidence that following it made a difference to performance and equity. RQ3 searched 
for this evidence by taking policy implementation into consideration. Finally, the last research 
question was used to summarise the evaluation by looking at the overall value of the EPA. 
Here, “value” means that the EPA is advice worth following either because there is evidence 
that it could work (RQ1) or because there is evidence that it did work (RQ2 and 3).  
In the continuation of this chapter, findings are first broken down by research question, 
and then compared against the research hypothesis laid out in Chapter 2.  
RQ1: Is the OECD education policy advice “sound” advice? 
After analysing OECD publications and receiving feedback from the Director of PISA, 
Andreas Schleicher, this research identified four areas in which the OECD provides policy 
advice: educational time, equity, quality of provision and student performance. Across the 
four areas, a total of 15 different policy recommendations were given, spanning from 
increasing instruction time, to reducing school competition, to promoting cooperation between 
schools and parents (Table 3.2).  
The policy options provided by the OECD are rather specific considering the scale of the 
endeavour, but the framework itself is not very cohesive. Even though the analysis concerned 
education policy advice, it was hard to identify clear boundaries between recommendations 
targeting education policymakers and those could may be better directed to policymakers in 
other areas of country governance (such as welfare, finance, or infrastructures).  
One implication of this can be exemplified by looking at the whole school evaluation 
strategy in Ireland. The Inspectorate claimed that the strategy had been informed by the OECD 
education advice, but a closer analysis revealed that the it had started to take shape before 
PISA and had been developed independently. It did borrow an overarching narrative of 
accountability and efficiency from the OECD, but when it did, it borrowed recommendations 
directed at policymakers outside education. The loan was possible because it took concepts 
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such as “accountability” and “efficiency”, which are not specific to one policy domain and are 
therefore highly versatile multi-vocal symbols. 
As a Belgian policymaker put it: ‘in a more or less conscious fashion, the OECD discourse 
comes in the ideas that are in the air at the time, […] we know that there are some ideas that 
come and that everybody says at a certain time without knowing who said it among them’ 
(B5). The risk with this is that, when making policy, vague concepts may be preferred over 
potentially useful domain-specific policy recommendations. 
The multi-vocal nature of the OECD’s educational concepts and policy options means that 
the extent to which the EPA can act as an organic whole, rather than as a collection of stand-
alone suggestions, depends on the reader. The framework is a ‘patchwork of loosely connected 
topics [… that] have been strung together to provide a minimum semblance of coherence’ 
(Henry et al., 2001, p. 52). Any further systematisation is added by the ideological position 
and prior knowledge of policymakers. To paraphrase another Belgian expert (Romainville, 
2002), the OECD policy advice is like a potluck, in which you find what you bring. 
Another implication of the (scarce) internal coherence of the EPA is that OECD 
recommendations in educational matters are not simply a reproduction of a “neo-liberal” 
narrative. The double quotation marks are necessary because there is no single accepted 
definition of “neo-liberalism”. For some it is ‘synonymous with unfettered capitalism and an 
economic imperialism that aims to subject all spheres of society to the logic of the markets. 
Others suspect the term to be useless except for polemical purposes’ (Biebricher, 2015, p. 
256). Neo-liberalism involves deregulation, market mechanisms, privatisation, accountability, 
performativity and efficiency, but there are regional and local variations on the form it can 
take (Connell & Dados, 2014).  
It is evident that the EPA is not fully “neo-liberal” in this sense. Demands for 
performativity and efficiency are matched by calls for greater equity, which also involve 
cooperation and reduction of market-based competition. In this respect, the EPA reflects both 
the strong social democratic positions of some OECD members and the CERI (see Chapter 
1), and a recurrent identity crisis of the OECD (Marcussen & Trondal, 2011), which sets the 
OECD aside from other international organisations such as The World Bank (Mahon, 2010) 
and is exemplified by the lack of clear objectives for PISA (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2008) other 
than measuring what can be measured. 
It was also shown that the EPA tends to be unaffected by PISA findings. On the one hand, 
this is because PISA results are stable, but on the other hand it is due to the fact that OECD 
recommendations are informed by a variety of sources—even when they are presented in PISA 
reports and supposedly follow from PISA evidence. Furthermore, the OECD has often made 
instrumental use of PISA just as countries do. Data from PISA are regularly presented and 
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interpreted to confirm, rather than challenge, pre-existing policy stances. Nevertheless, in 
recent years the OECD has substantially increased the grounding of PISA in research, which 
might progressively affect the content of its recommendations. 
This research also investigated the soundness of the EPA. In formal logic, an argument is 
sound if the conclusion follows from the premises and the premises are true. However, it was 
argued in Chapter 2 that the EPA is a practical argument using appeals to shared goals and 
values as well as presumptions to tell policymakers where and how to intervene. 
“Presumptions” are provisional conclusions drawn from some premises when ‘there is no 
sufficient evidence to show that the proposition is false’ (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 
39; quoting Walton, 2006a, p. 72). Therefore, the soundness of the EPA is not so much about 
its truthfulness or falsehood, but rather the extent to which it is supported by evidence. In other 
words, what has the OECD been basing its policy advice on? And how does the OECD know 
that what it suggests will produce any positive effect?  
After reviewing selected recommendations from the four main educational areas 
(educational time, equity, quality of provision and performance), four interrelated issues could 
be identified. On a few occasions, the EPA was indeed backed by strong evidence from the 
educational literature but this was not capitalised on by the OECD: the quality and strength of 
the EPA did not match the quality and strength of the evidence. This was the case with pre-
primary education, CPD and streaming practices. It was suggested that this may be due to the 
prevalence of econometric experts within the organisation, who may pay less attention to 
topics that traditionally belong to the field of education.  
A second issue was the lack of theorisation of some areas of the EPA such as the gender 
gap. The concept was poorly defined; therefore, the policy advice did not address known 
issues such as the different mechanisms behind gender gap in secondary versus higher 
education. This corroborated the impression that despite the aura of objectivity and scientific 
rationality that the OECD wants to convey, its policy recommendations may or may not be 
grounded in solid scientific evidence. The OECD appears to have started to address this second 
issue, meaning that the EPA might become more accurate in the future (provided it also starts 
drawing from evidence more frequently). 
A third issue was when the EPA itself changed over time not because the evidence did, 
but because the OECD had yet to decide what stance to take on a topic. This was somewhat 
linked to a poor theorisation of the mechanisms behind certain interventions mentioned 
above—i.e., what should be done and why it should work. Examples were cited about school 
vouchers and school autonomy. School vouchers are often unequitable and ineffective, but 
some OECD publications treated them more favourably than others. This suggests that the 
OECD does not have one clear position or proposed strategy on vouchers, so its many internal 
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voices (such as the authors of papers and reports) have enjoyed a certain freedom on how to 
present them.  
School autonomy, in contrast, was treated as a single concept at the beginning of PISA. 
Although more than one indicator measured different types of autonomy (resources, 
curriculum, assessment, staffing), the OECD did not explain why it had chosen to measure 
those aspects or how they interacted except from a purely statistical perspective. At the 
beginning, the OECD suggested that autonomy in resources allocation could be a viable policy 
option, but the spotlight later moved on to curricular autonomy. At the same time, a connection 
was established between autonomy and accountability—perhaps drawing from econometric 
research, but replacing the role of centralised external exit examinations with public posting 
of achievement data as a measure of accountability.  
The issue with borrowing an argument developed within econometrics research, adapting 
it to fit a New Public Management perspective, and using it as a policy recommendation, is 
that the EPA stopped being backed by evidence. In fact, PISA data are available that directly 
contradict this argument, but they were downplayed by the Directorate for Education and 
Skills. 
Finally, there was the issue of the PISA implicit curriculum. When the OECD suggests 
that country curricula should be more aligned with 21st century skills it is implicitly conceding 
that it is not true that PISA is curriculum-free, only that it follows its own. It is unclear what 
21st century skills are. Since the contents of PISA are the result of an international effort, it 
was argued that the PISA curriculum may just be a watered-down synthesis of national 
curricula.  
At present, there is no evidence that reforming curricula so that they are “21st century-
ready” improves country outcomes in PISA—with the possible exception of Project Maths in 
Ireland. It is also unclear whether higher-performing students as measured by PISA have 
greater achievements in the labour market outcomes as “promised” by the OECD. The fact 
that different studies found PISA scores to be predictive of a lower risk of school dropout may 
simply indicate that PISA captures general academic ability rather than skills for life.  
RQ2: To what extent do countries follow the OECD education policy 
advice in their national policies? 
The short answer is: to a good extent, but not necessarily because of the OECD. This research 




The cross-country analysis returned limited indirect evidence that countries are aligning 
with OECD recommendations. Inequality is decreasing, but the effect concerns only OECD 
countries and can only be detected in the correlation between the Strength of the socio-
economic gradient and Reading scores. Furthermore, the rate of decrease is very small (3 
percentage point in 12 years) and in general equity trends are very stable. The performance of 
partner countries is increasing, but that of OECD countries is not. 
Many experts stated that their countries were more in line than not with the EPA, but a 
follow-up questionnaire (the PAIQ) revealed that, in a small sample of 15 countries, only five 
had implemented policies covering more than half of the EPA and only three had privileged 
equity policies. Given that answering the PAIQ required more time and commitment, it is 
likely that these findings reflected country contexts more accurately than those from the first 
expert questionnaire.  
Equity was a key aspect of policies in both case studies. The conception of equity in 
Ireland has traditionally been highly aligned with the OECD’s. Many policies addressing 
socio-economic disadvantage emerged over the years and most of them flowed into DEIS, a 
cohesive framework covering many EPA categories. Additionally, there have been legislative 
developments to cater for SEN and immigrant students, but the system is still characterised by 
religious and gender segregation.  
The CFB has a higher level of educational inequality than Ireland. This is due to a 
fragmentation of the education system that reflects fragmentations in the Community. Because 
of this, acknowledgement of an OECD goal such as equity happened recently and not 
homogeneously. The public and private sectors have different visions of what an equitable 
education system should look like, and attempts to address equity issues in the CFB often did 
not achieve the intended outcomes. 
Both Ireland and the CFB provided examples of policies purporting to be aligned with 
OECD recommendations which were in fact simply informed by values similar to those of the 
OECD. One example were the reforms of the Inspectorate, which were driven by greater calls 
for school accountability in both education systems but fell short of including measures such 
as public posting of achievement data as advocated by the OECD. 
In spite of these findings, which made it explicit for the first time in this research strand 
that using the OECD or PISA “brands” in policymaking is no guarantee that reforms will 
actually follow what the OECD says, Irish and Belgian policies were broadly in line with the 
EPA. This was mostly due to the fact that national policy frameworks such as the Education 
Act (1998) and the Décret « Missions » of 1997 were aligned with the EPA even before PISA, 
but some post-PISA EPA-aligned reforms were also introduced. Interestingly, the clearest 
examples of policy alignment (the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategy in Ireland and 
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the “Pact for an outstanding education” in the CFB) were both recent and had links with prior 
interventions. This suggests that the influence of the OECD on national policymaking may be 
increasing, but in an incremental fashion and where it does not create major breaks with 
existing practice. 
In Ireland as well as in the CFB, OECD policy recommendations were only rarely 
disseminated by OECD staff or external consultants. The role of policy brokers was more 
often played by the national project managers (the ERC and the ASPE) with the support of 
public councils such as the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment (NCCA) in 
Ireland and the Conseil de l’Education et de la Formation (CEF) in Belgium. Both the ERC 
and the ASPE served as policy advisors to the government before PISA and were involved in 
the administration of other LSAs such as PIRLS and TIMSS, which made them a natural 
choice as national project managers. 
However, a question arises as to whether their expertise may be a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it is certainly preferable for the Secretariat at the OECD and for governments 
to employ experienced education centres to manage PISA and disseminate policy advice. On 
the other hand, the independence enjoyed by the ERC and the ASPE—which is necessary for 
producing high-quality research—may come to the detriment of the EPA when there is 
disagreement between the OECD and the two research centres on educational matters. The 
vision and recommendations of the ERC or the ASPE and the OECD were generally in line, 
but there were instances in which the “voice” of the national project managers was louder and 
diverged from that of the Secretariat—even though it was still informed by PISA. 
The issue is that while the Secretariat and the NPMs have complementary roles on purely 
administrative matters, they are in competition when it comes to delivering policy advice. The 
prestige and financial health of the Secretariat depend not only on the quality of its research, 
but also on the policy relevance of its recommendations, and the same applies to the ERC, the 
ASPE and probably many other NPMs. 
RQ3: What is the evidence that education policies informed by 
OECD recommendations influenced country performance? 
There is little evidence that education policies informed by OECD recommendations 
influenced country performance. Lack of evidence does not necessarily mean that the advice 
is not sound, but in the few instances in which it was possible to gather stronger evidence, the 
outcomes were mixed.  
In Chapter 4, it was shown that expanding access to pre-primary education was positively 
related to PISA outcomes, and it was argued that this may have been because the OECD advice 
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is itself aligned with solid research evidence. Future PISA cycles will be informative in 
understanding whether the observed correlation will increase in strength or disappear when 
new data become available. For now, these findings suggest that PISA might be able to detect 
policy effects of a similar magnitude, where 1 percentage point increase in an indicator is 
associated with 3–4 PISA points. 
In Chapter 5, it was argued that very few policies in Ireland presented three characteristics 
simultaneously: namely, being aligned with the EPA; having been implemented effectively; 
and being sufficiently old that effects on student learning could be evaluated. DEIS was the 
best example, and evaluations suggested that it had an impact on student outcomes. 
Preliminary positive results could also be reported for Project Maths.  
Because of the few national policy evaluations available, an attempt to evaluate policy 
impact was made using Willms’ (2006) policy evaluation framework. Despite the “universal” 
nature of many interventions, significant changes were limited almost exclusively to the 
Science domain and driven by the score increase of the low achievers. If this result captured 
the effect of the science curriculum, it is unclear why only low achievers benefitted from it. 
The Strength and the Slope of the socio-economic gradient also remained stable.  
In Chapter 6, it was found that Reading performance increased on average because of the 
higher scores of low achievers, whereas a drop in the performance of high achievers could be 
observed in Mathematics and Science. Belgian researchers claimed that the increase in 
Reading scores was due to structural changes in the system and additional instruction, but this 
does not explain why scores in other domains were not affected by them. Moreover, it was 
found that EPA-aligned policies addressing systemic inequalities produced little improvement 
whereas grade repetition—a mechanism which is deeply rooted in the system—worsened. 
Overall, no clear-cut policy effects could be identified when applying Willms’ framework. 
Given that this was the case even when national reports were available showing the impact of 
some policies, it was concluded in the “Limitations and future directions” section that the 
framework was scarcely helpful when trying to capture policy effects.  
Drawing some general conclusions, the clearest instances in which following the EPA was 
associated with positive outcomes were when the EPA reflected established knowledge in 
education (as in the case of pre-primary education and DEIS) and was implemented 
effectively. Lack of wide-scale implementation may be why equity policies in the CFB did 
not have the desired results—which reminds of the importance of securing the stakeholders’ 
support to achieve policy outcomes. 
This is easier said than done. Both in Ireland and in the CFB teachers were consulted 
before key education reforms, and yet many policies still failed to be integrated into classroom 
practice. The dynamics of teacher resistance were outside the scope of this research, but it is 
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clear that involving teachers may only be a pre-condition for successful policy 
implementation. It should be noted that in neither education system was the teacher 
professional “continuum” (teacher training, induction and continuing development) 
substantively improved alongside an increae in teacher accountability. It is possible that 
teachers felt that the government became more demanding while not providing the conditions 
for easing policy changes into classroom practice, and that requests for feedback through 
surveys and public hearings (the National Education Convention of 1993 in Ireland or the 
Assises de l’enseignement in 1995 in the CFB) were too little a step in the right direction. 
RQ4: Considering the evidence, how valuable is the OECD 
education policy advice? 
Findings from expert interviews in Ireland and Belgium matched those from previous research 
whereby, with all its flaws, PISA is a useful instrument to have available. PISA was seen as a 
‘thermometer’, a monitoring or diagnostic tool, as well as a source of valuable data. Experts 
were aware that PISA can be used ‘to support A as well as the opposite of A’ (Figazzolo, 
2009, p. 28), but for many this was an indication of its quality rather than a limitation:  PISA 
produced ‘solid empirical data’ (B3), whereas national tests ‘can always be suspected of being 
subjective’ (B6). Other experts thought that presenting PISA findings in the most favourable 
way was part of the political game and not an inherent flaw of PISA, which was considered 
objective. Even PISA detractors thought that it was convenient to have PISA data to 
complement national assessment data. 
All these opinions concerned what was called in Chapter 1 the “descriptive” or technical 
aspect of PISA: PISA, PIAAC, TALIS and other surveys are assumed to be a more or less 
accurate reflection of the state of education across countries and can be used to argue for one’s 
position. This, however, says little about the usefulness of the “normative” component of the 
OECD work in education policymaking—that is, whether it makes sense to follow the OECD 
policy advice. A separation between the descriptive and normative sides of PISA (and other 
OECD surveys) has been generally neglected by education literature, although some authors 
have pointed out that PISA results and the EPA were two different matters: ‘there is no logical 
connection between, for example, the activities of publishing PISA results […] and providing 
policy recommendations […] and the assumption that these activities will help actors, 
particularly at the local level, learn about their own practices and take action to improve 
education’ (Hanberger, 2014, p. 177). 
It was shown in this research that the EPA exists and it is linked to PISA, but not 
necessarily informed by it. It pre-exists and survives PISA, and it encompasses OECD 
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publications that are only tangentially related to PISA. In line with Hanberger (2014), it was 
posited that the usefulness of PISA may not coincide with the usefulness of the EPA. Whether 
the OECD policy advice on educational matters is valuable advice depends on its quality 
(RQ1), its relevance for national policymaking (RQ2) and its ability to inform effective policy 
(RQ3). The expected answers to these questions were summarised in a working hypothesis, 
which is reproduced below from Chapter 2: 
Education policy advice might be vague or inconsistent over time. Despite the powerful 
narrative about the influence of the OECD in national policymaking, reforms that seem 
aligned with OECD recommendations may not necessarily informed by them. Of the few 
policies that make explicit use of the EPA, even fewer might be successfully implemented. 
Finally, a very small number of implemented policies may have plausibly contributed to 
(positive or negative) changes in educational outcomes, even when these outcomes are 
measured by the very assessment that originally informed policymaking. 
 
Unlike what was hypothesised, the EPA is neither vague nor inconsistent over time. Of 
course it is general, as it has to apply cross-nationally, but what countries should be doing is 
often explicitly stated. The EPA was also found to be highly consistent over time, so much 
that even when it could draw on the most up-to-date evidence (PISA evidence) it was not 
necessarily informed by it. Its greater shortcoming, however, lies in its internal incoherence.  
There is not one individual policy advice framework, and that produced for this research 
is a synthesis of multiple publications scattered around the OECD website and outside it. There 
is no clear dissemination strategy, probably because there is no consensus within the OECD 
about what mechanisms within education systems are worth focusing on and how they are 
supposed to interact. This is reflected, for instance, in the ever-changing nature of the 
education indicators used in PISA. Individual policy recommendations are not strung together 
in a coherent strategy, even though the OECD often stresses the importance of policy 
coherence.  
The soundness and strength of the recommendations also vary: some are backed by higher-
quality evidence than others; some are given more prominence than others; some are theorised 
more clearly than others; and only a few show these three characteristics together (e.g., the 
negative impact of streaming policies). The OECD openly states that PISA is a work in 
progress, but to some extent each cycle feels like a new pilot project. Nevertheless, the 2015 
assessment framework is a clear attempt to introduce some consistency in the educational 
vision of the OECD. 
It is true that not all national reforms acknowledging the OECD goals and values follow 
the EPA, and few instances of policy enactment (when a policy is both aligned with the EPA 
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and acknowledges the contribution of the OECD or PISA) were found. While it is unclear on 
a global scale how many policies are in line with the EPA, many instances of policy alignment 
were observed in Ireland and the CFB. Both national education frameworks were already in 
substantive agreement with the EPA before PISA, but even greater policy convergence was 
reached from the mid-2000s. This suggests that PISA may have been an effective method for 
delivering the EPA in these receptive jurisdictions. 
Many interventions “broke down” at the implementation level and were not integrated into 
classroom practice. There is also very little evidence that following the EPA is beneficial for 
the quality and the equity of the education systems under investigation. EPA-informed policies 
may or may not work. Moreover, the limitations of PISA in capturing changes below 20 or 
even 30 points reliably, as well as the inability of Willms’ (2006) evaluation framework to 
detect policy effects, suggest that it is still too soon to base policy advice on PISA trends. 
To conclude, Table 7.1 reviews the initial argument statement provided in Chapter 2 in 
light of the knowledge gathered during this research. 
Table 7.1: A revision of the initial thesis statement in light of the knowledge gathered during this 
research 
Initial argument Final argument  
Is it possible that despite the use of data from 
PISA within political and scientific circles, 
OECD recommendations are currently of 
little educational value, because they are not 
solidly grounded empirically; they provide 
vague policy direction; advice is not 
followed; and even when it is followed it is 
not associated with measurable changes?  
The educational value of OECD 
recommendations varies. Some are solidly 
grounded, but other are not. Policy direction 
is provided, but it does not reflect any clear 
strategy. There is some evidence that OECD 
advice is increasingly being followed after 
the first two or three PISA cycles, but very 
limited evidence that following it is 
associated with measurable changes.   
 
As mentioned earlier, one natural avenue for future research would be to update the OECD 
policy advice and continue to track cross-sectional data over the next PISA cycles, to see 
whether more countries will start improving and the increase experienced by a range of 
countries will be sustained. If the OECD policy databases become more thorough and 
granular, these data could eventually be crossed to find more convincing (albeit still indirect) 
evidence of EPA effects on country outcomes. Additional case studies could be investigated 
in parallel, as time and resource constraint limited the current analysis to two. 
A different but equally compelling future direction would be to build upon one of the key 
findings from this research—the positive effects of pre-primary education on student 
achievement. Like the OECD’s thematic reviews, such research would focus on comparing 
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the effects of one type of policy across many countries. Unlike the OECD reviews, that 
hypothetical study would employ two methodological improvements that were used in this 
thesis. One would be to pay greater attention to policy alignment and convergence, including 
the disconnect between acknowledgement and alignment, on the one hand, and policy 
intention and implementation (or integration), on the other hand. The second improvement 
would be to complement correlational analyses with multilevel regressions that modelled 
more explicitly and accurately the effects of time, so as to provide more robust evidence that 
introducing or altering early childhood policies (and not simply having versus not having 
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Appendix 2: A comparison of the education systems in Ireland and in the CFB 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Age ISCED Education 
(1) 
Enseign. (1) Edu. (2) Ens. (2) Curriculum Continuum 
pédagogique 
Class/Year Année Qual. Certification 
17/18 3 Post-
primary 
Secondaire Senior Cycle 3e degré LC Tr (G,T,A) / Q 
(T,A,P)  





Secondaire Senior Cycle 3e degré LC Tr (G,T,A) / Q 
(T,A,P)  





Secondaire Senior Cycle 2e degré LC / TY Tr (G,T,A) / Q 
(T,A,P)  
TY / 5th year 4e   CES2D 
14/15 2 Post-
primary 
Secondaire Junior Cycle 2e degré JC Tr (G,T,A) / Q 
(T,A,P)  
3rd year 3e  JC  
13/14 2 Post-
primary 
Secondaire Junior Cycle 1er degré JC 3e étape, C/D/S 2nd year 2e   CEB / CE1D 
12/13 2 Post-
primary 
Secondaire Junior Cycle 1er degré JC 3e étape, C/D/S 1st year 1re   CEB 
11/12 1 Primary Fondamental  Primaire Primary 2e étape, 2e cycle 6th class 6e   CEB 
10/11 1 Primary Fondamental  Primaire Primary 2e étape, 2e cycle 5th class 5e    
9/10 1 Primary Fondamental  Primaire Primary 2e étape, 1er cycle 4th class 4e    
8/9 1 Primary Fondamental  Primaire Primary 2e étape, 1er cycle 3rd class 3e    
7/8 1 Primary Fondamental  Primaire Primary 1re étape, 2e cycle 2nd class 2e   
6/7 1 Primary Fondamental  Primaire Primary 1re étape, 2e cycle 1st class 1re   
5/6 1 Primary Fondamental  Maternel Primary 1re étape, 2e cycle Senior infant 3e    
4/5 1 Primary Fondamental  Maternel Primary 1re étape, 1er cycle Junior infant 2e   
3/4 0 Early 
childhood 
Fondamental  Maternel 
 
1re étape, 1er cycle Early Start 1re   
Sources: Ministère de la Communauté française (2008); Department of Education and Science (2004); online resources 
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The table in the previous page compares the education systems in Ireland and in the CFB. 
With the exception of columns 1 and 2 (Age and ISCED), which are common to both 
jurisdictions, the rest of the table alternates Irish categories (columns 3, 5 … 11) to Belgian 
categories (columns 4, 6 … 12). Notes and explanations are given below. 
Column Notes 
1 Education is compulsory in Ireland from the age of 6 to 16, and in the CFB from the 
age of 6 to 18 (though the last two years can be part-time) 
2 The “International Standard Classification of Education”, or ISCED (UNESCO-UIS, 
2012) is a ‘standard framework used to categorise and report cross-nationally 
comparable education statistics’ (p. iii). ISCED level 0 corresponds to early childhood 
education. ISCED 1 is primary education, 2 is lower secondary and 3 is upper 
secondary education. 
3–6 One way to organise education systems is in terms of education levels. For instance, 
one can refer to ‘first-level education’ in Ireland or ‘enseignement fondamental’ in the 
CFB (columns 3 and 4). Alternatively, one can speak of ‘primary education’ or 
‘enseignement primaire’ to refer broadly to the same period (columns 5 and 6). Note, 
however, that the Belgian ‘enseignement fondamental’ (column 4) includes the final 
year of ISCED 0, and that the ‘enseignement maternel’ extends to the age of 5/6 
(column 6), roughly corresponding to kindergarten in some countries. 
 
Another difference is the organisation of secondary education. In Ireland there are a 
Junior and a Senior Cycle that broadly correspond to ISCED 2 and 3, the CFB has 
three two-year-long stages (degrés, column 6). The most relevant for this research is 
the first stage of lower-secondary education (premier degré du secondaire), 
corresponding to the ages 12 to 14 for a child who did not repeat any year, which is 
common practice in the CFB (recent data show that only about 65% of the pupils enter 
this stage at the correct age; see Baye et al., 2014). The 1er degré was the object of 
many reforms in the last few years, both in terms of syllabus and instruction and in 
terms of enrolment procedures. 
7–8 A second way to organise education systems is in terms of taught curriculum, or 
continuum pédagogique (columns 7 and 8). In Ireland, there is a common primary 
curriculum followed by a common Junior Certificate (JC) curriculum, which leads to 
the qualification of the same name (shown in column 13). In upper-secondary 
education, Irish students follow the Leaving Certificate (LC) curriculum (leading to the 
Leaving Certificate Established, LCE), or vocational syllabi such as the Leaving 
Certificate Applied (LCA) programme or the Leaving Certificate Vocational 
Programme (LCVP). More than half of Irish students do not enter LC directly from JC, 
but prefer to enrol in an optional Transition Year (TY) where they can pursue non-
academic interests and ‘develop a range of transferable critical thinking and creative 
problem-solving skills’ through ‘active and experiential’ learning (Department of 
Education and Science, 2006; see also the work of Clerkin, 2013, for a recent 
evaluation). 
 
There is no common curriculum in the CFB, although the introduction of the Core and 
Final Skills in 2001 was an attempt to standardise the educational experiences of 
Belgian pupils. To give a sense of structure and continuity while abiding by the 
constitutional freedom of education, the pedagogical continuum in the CFB is 
organised in terms of legs (étapes) and cycles (column 8). Over the years, many 
policies have tried to reduce grade repetition by prohibiting the practice within cycles 
or and sometimes étapes, but schools are allowed to add one supplementary year 
(année complémentaire) per étape to the educational career of pupils to account for 
individual learning rhythms. In the 3e étape, which corresponds to the 1er degré, pupils 
can follow a common curriculum (C), a differentiated curriculum (année différenciée, 
D) leading to the (CEB)—if they failed to attain it at the end of primary education (see 




Starting from the 2e degré, students are streamed into two main branches: Transition 
(Tr), the academic path leading students to higher education; and Qualification (Q), the 
vocational option. Each branch is subdivided into three tracks determining the school 
curriculum. The enseignement de transition is divided into Général (G), Technique (T) 
and Artistique (A). The two latter tracks are available also in the enseignement de 
qualification: the idea is to provide two different “flavours”—one more, one less 
academically-oriented—to technical and artistic education. Moreover, vocational 
education also has the Professionnel (P) route leading to lower-skill occupations.  
9, 10 A third way to organise education systems is in terms of grades. It is customary both in 
Ireland and in the CFB to restart the count at each level of education (columns 9–10). 
At the primary level, one generally speaks of 1st–6th Class in Ireland and 1e–6e année 
primaire (or 1P–6P) in the CFB. At the secondary level, Irish students go from 1st to 
3rd year and then they move either to Transition Year or directly to 5th Year (a 4th year 
does not exist); this means that the Irish 5th and 6th Years gather students from two age 
groups: those that did and those that did not do a TY. Likewise, it means that the 
Senior Cycle can last two or three years depending on this choice. Because of TY, the 
PISA cohort in Ireland is enrolled either in TY or in the 5th Year. 
 
In Belgian documents, the number of the year is generally followed by a letter 
indicating the curriculum or track. For instance, 1C or première commune refers to the 
first year of lower-secondary education following the common curriculum, 1D or 
première différenciée is the first year of lower-secondary education in the 
differentiated curriculum, and so on. Because of grade retention, the PISA cohort in the 
CFB may be enrolled anywhere between the 1e and the 4e années of secondary 
education. 
11, 12 Neither the JC nor the various LC options are compulsory in Ireland, though they are 
taken by most students. In the CFB, the CEB is compulsory at the end of primary 
education (6P). Pupils who attain the CEB enter secondary education in 1C, otherwise 
they enter 1D or 1S and resit the examination one year later. If they are unsuccessful, 
they continue in 2D/S. At the end of 1er degré, pupils sit the CE1D, which is 
compulsory since 2013–2014. Remedial classes similar to the D and S routes are 
organised in case of failure. The CES2D is not compulsory, but the CESS is. 
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Appendix 3: Additional tables and figures 
Chapter 1 
Table 1.A: Members of the expert groups 
Name Domain Country 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 TOT 
Dominique Lafontaine R Belgium (Fr) 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Stan Jones R Canada 1 1 1 0 0 3 
Pirjo Linnakylä R Finland 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Jean-Francois Rouet R France 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Martine Rémond R France 1 1 1 0 0 3 
Wolfgang Schneider R Germany 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Wolfgang Schnotz R Germany 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Ryo Watanabe R Japan 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Sachiko Adachi R Japan 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Minwoo Nam R Korea 0 0 0 1 1 2 
John de Jong R Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Eduardo Vidal-Abarca R Spain 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Alan Davies R UK (Eng) 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Charles Alderson R UK (Eng) 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Irwin Kirsch R USA 1 1 1 1 1 5 
John Guthrie R USA 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Marilyn Binkley R USA 1 1 1 0 0 3 
Caroline Bardini M Australia 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Kaye Stacey M Australia 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Peter Schüller M Austria 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mogens Niss M Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Werner Blum M Germany 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Sean Close M Ireland 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Raimondo Bolletta M Italy 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Toshikazu Ikeda M Japan 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Yoshinori Shimizu M Japan 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Kyung Mee Park M Korea 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Jan de Lange M Netherlands 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Zbigniew Marciniak M Poland 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Valdimir Burjan M Slovak Republic 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Luis Rico M Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Maria Luisa Moreno M Spain 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Martin Ripley M UK (Eng) 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Joan Ferrini-Mundy M USA 0 0 0 0 1 1 
John Dossey M USA 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Mary Lindquist M USA 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Solomon Garfunkel M USA 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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Thomas Romberg M USA 1 0 0 0 0 1 
William Schmidt M USA 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Peter Fensham S Australia 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Robert Laurie S Canada 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Andrée Tiberghien S France 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Pierre Malléus S France 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Manfred Prenzel S Germany 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Michelina Mayer S Italy 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Yasushi Ogura S Japan 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Donghee Shin S Korea 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Svein Lie S Norway 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Ewa Bartnik S Poland 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Paulina Korsnakova S Slovak Republic 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Raul Gagliardi S Switzerland 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Robin Millar S UK (Eng) 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Wynne Harlen S UK (Scot) 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Elizabeth Stage S USA 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Rodger Bybee S USA 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Senta Raizen S USA 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Pascal Bressoux Q France - - - 1 0 1 
Eckhard Klieme Q Germany - - - 1 1 2 
Ludger Wößmann Q Germany - - - 1 0 1 
Yin Cheong Cheng Q Hong Kong - - - 1 0 1 
Eduardo Backhoff Q Mexico - - - 0 1 1 
Fons van de Vijver Q Netherlands - - - 0 1 1 
Jaap Scheerens Q Netherlands - - - 1 1 2 
Ying-yi Hong Q Singapore - - - 0 1 1 
David Kaplan Q USA - - - 1 1 2 
Henry Levin Q USA - - - 1 1 2 
R = Reading, M = Mathematics, S = Science, Q = Background Questionnaire. Sources: PISA 





Table 1.B: What country agencies are represented in the PISA Governing Board and as National 
Project Managers? 






1 Australia yes Ministry of 
Education 
ACER no 





yes Ministry of 
Education 
University of Ghent no 
4 Belgium 
(Fr) 
yes ASPE ASPE yes 
5 Canada yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
6 Chile yes Agency of Quality 
of Education 










8 Denmark yes Ministry of 
Education 
KORA no 
9 Estonia yes Ministry of 
Education 
Foundation Innove no 





11 France yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
12 Germany yes Ministry of 
Education 
ZIB no 
13 Greece yes Harokopio 
University 
Harokopio University yes 
14 Hungary yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
15 Iceland yes Ministry of 
Education 
Namsmatsstofnun no 
16 Ireland yes ERC ERC yes 
17 Israel yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
18 Italy yes INVALSI INVALSI yes 
19 Japan yes NIER NIER yes 
20 Korea yes KICE KICE yes 
21 Luxembour
g 
yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
22 Mexico yes INEE INEE yes 





yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
25 Norway yes Ministry of 
Education 
University of Oslo no 
26 Poland yes Ministry of 
Education 
IBE no 
27 Portugal yes IAVE IAVE yes 
28 Slovak 
Republic 
yes NUCEM NUCEM yes 
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30 Spain yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 





32 Switzerland yes Ministry of 
Education 
Other no 
33 Turkey yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
34 UK (Eng) yes Ministry of 
Education 
RM Results no 





yes Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
37 Albania no Ministry of 
Education 
National Agency of 
Examinations 
no 
38 Algeria no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
39 Argentina no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
40 Brazil no INEP INEP yes 
41 Bulgaria no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
42 China no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
43 Colombia no ICFES ICFES yes 
44 Costa Rica no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
45 Croatia no National PISA 
Centre 
National PISA Centre yes 
46 Dominican 
Republic 
no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
47 Georgia no NAEC NAEC yes 
48 Hong Kong 
SAR 
no Chinese University 
of Hong Kong 
Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
yes 
49 Indonesia no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
50 Jordan no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
51 Kazakhstan no MESRK MESRK yes 
52 Kosovo no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
53 Latvia no University of Latvia University of Latvia yes 
54 Lebanon no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 





56 Macao SAR no Ministry of 
Education 
University of Macau no 
57 Macedonia no NAEEPM NAEEPM yes 
58 Malaysia no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
59 Malta no University of Malta Ministry of Education no 
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60 Moldova no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
61 Montenegro no Examination Centre Examination Centre yes 
62 Peru no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
63 Qatar no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
64 Romania no CNEE CNEE yes 
65 Russian 
Federation 
no Russian Academy 
of Education 
Russian Academy of 
Education 
yes 





67 Singapore no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
68 Taiwan no Ministry of 
Education 
National Chiao Tung 
University 
no 
69 Thailand no IPST IPST yes 
70 Trinidad 
and Tobago 
no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
71 Tunisia no CNIPRE CNIPRE yes 
72 United Arab 
Emirates 
no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
73 Uruguay no ANEP ANEP yes 
74 Vietnam no Ministry of 
Education 
Ministry of Education yes 
Source: OECD website. When a country had more than one delegate in the PGB or as NPM but one 
institute featured in both groups, that institute was reported in both columns. Note that even when the 
Ministry of Education does appear in the list, some institutes may be dependent from it. 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.A: the draft model of multi-agent practical reasoning applied to one OECD argument 
Means (EPA) Goals Means-goals Values Circumstances 
Ensure that the 
quality of pre-
primary 
education is high 
Improve 
performance 
































































will lead to more 
access and 
therefore to 
























ought to be 
valued 
- 
Source: Own interpretation of an OECD policy recommendation (2014c, p. 4).  
Table 2.B: the revised practical reasoning model applied to an OECD argument from the Education 
Policy Outlook for Australia. 
Consider this passage from the Education Policy Outlook for Australia: 
‘Fair and inclusive policies contribute to an equitable education system. […] 
Australia has a high degree of school choice which, if not well targeted, can 
contribute to segregation of students. Around 96% of students attend a school 
that competes for enrolments with at least one other school. Evidence shows 
that school choice, along with other factors, may undermine equity in the 
education system by segregating students into schools based on their socio-
economic background. It is important to ensure that there are mechanisms to 
mitigate this negative effect.’ (OECD, 2013b, p. 6, emphasis in the text) 
Problem Evidence 
Australia has a high degree of school choice 
which, if not well targeted, can contribute to 
segregation of students 
Probably national statistics 
Goals and values  
Equity in the education system  
Circumstances  
Around 96% of students attend a school that 
competes for enrolments with at least one other 
school 
Probably national statistics 
Means-goal  
If Australia limited school choice or 
counteracted its effects there would be more 
equity 
‘Fair and inclusive policies contribute to an 
equitable education system’ 
 
‘Evidence shows that school choice, along with 
other factors, may undermine equity in the 
education system by segregating students into 





It is important to ensure that there are 
mechanisms to mitigate the effect of school 
choice on segregation 
 
Source: : Own interpretation of an OECD policy recommendation (2013b, p. 6).  
Table 2.C: Sample email and integrated questionnaire sent to national education experts 




As part of my doctoral thesis at the University of Durham ‘The relationship between international 
large-scale assessments and national education reforms’, I am asking education policy experts 
around the world to give an overall anonymous rating of their government’s policies over the last 
decade. 
 
I was wondering if you could help by answering two brief questions (below, all personal 
information will be deleted after replying to your email): 
 
What is your country? 
To what extent have your government’s education policies been in line with the OECD’s advice, 
over the last decade? (for a summary of OECD’s policy advice, see 
http://community.dur.ac.uk/cesare.aloisi/OECD_recommendations.html)  
a. Not at all 
b. Very slightly 
c. To a modest extent 
d. Quite a lot 
e. Completely 
 
Thank you very much for your time, your contribution is extremely appreciated. If you think any 
other colleagues/contacts are able to provide additional information by completing the same 
questionnaire, I would be grateful if you could forward this message to them to help collect more 
data for my PhD. 
 
Table 2.D: The OECD policy advice implementation questionnaire (paper version) 
Which areas did your country most effectively target through education policies, interventions and 
reforms, in the last decade? Please tick each relevant box: 
Educational time 
1 Tick Area of reform Interventions in this area may include… 
a  Increasing overall 
time spent in 
education 
expanding access to pre-primary education, 
targeting enrolment or changing the age of entry 
into school 
b  Increasing 
instruction time 
targeting lateness, attendance, by introducing full-
day schooling, or by increasing the time spent in 
classes 
Equality of opportunity to learn 
2 Tick Area of reform Interventions in this area may include… 
a  Reducing disabled or 
immigrant students' 
segregation 
by reviewing the sorting of pupils in institutions, or 
by better allocating special education teachers 
where they are most needed 
b  Reducing the gender 
gap 
for instance, by promoting subjects/career paths that 
are traditionally dominated by one gender to boys or 
girls 
c  Reducing the 
streaming / grouping 
/ stratification of 
students 
by reviewing the academic or vocational paths, 
reducing the transfer of students to different 
schools, reviewing retention policies or ability 
grouping within classes 
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d  Reducing school 
competition 
by changing school incentives to take in the 'best' 
students or by tackling the elite status of private 
institutions 
e  Helping socio-
economically 
deprived students 
by providing additional instructions, free learning 
resources, fee waivers, cash transfers/vouchers or a 
modified curriculum 
Quality of provision 
3 Tick Area of reform Interventions in this area may include… 
a  Strengthening the 
teaching profession 
qualifications required, initial teacher training, 
allocation of excellent teachers/principals where 
they are needed the most, retention of teachers in 
the most challenging schools, teacher pay, in-
service training/professional development, career 
paths 
b  Allocating resources 
more efficiently or in 
a more equitable way 
by changing the share of spending towards public 
and private schools, by targeting socio-economic 
depressed areas or acting upon the evaluation of 
intervention programmes 




by increasing school autonomy in budget, 
curriculum and/or assessments while at the same 
time holding schools accountable for their results 
by public posting of results, external monitoring of 
standards 





through collaborative programmes, by increasing 
parental involvement in school matters and in 
school governance, by facilitating/incentivising 
school-based research or the sharing of good 
practice 
Student performance 
4 Tick Area of reform Interventions in this area may include… 
a  Helping low-
performing students 
through feedback and appraisals for students, or by 
establishing early-warning mechanisms and 
providing a modified curriculum or additional 
instructional support for struggling students 
b  Standardising the 
educational 
outcomes 
by introducing central, external exit examinations 
for qualification purposes 
c  Reviewing curricular 
priorities 
by introducing curricular that are better aligned with 
students' interests and 21st century skills, or by 
examining curricular choices in the light of the 








Table 3.A: Policy lever and policy themes in the Education Policy Outlook Reforms Finder 
Lever Theme 
Equity and quality Disadvantaged students 
Investing early on 
System-level policies that promote or hinder equity 





Funding Economic resources in education 
Use of resources 
Governance Education priorities 
Organisation of decision-making process 
Preparing students for the future Quality of secondary 
Vocational education and training 
Quality of tertiary 
Transition between school and work 
School improvement Learning environments 
School leadership 
Teachers 
Source: Education Policy Outlook Reforms Finder 
Table 3.B: Educational areas available on the Education GPS website 
Area Aspect 
Access & Participation Access & Participation 
Career guidance 
Attainment  Attainment 
Economic & Social outcomes Social & Health outcomes 
Innovation 
Labour market outcomes 
Regional development 
Public returns 
Equity Socio-economic status 
Migrant background 
Evaluation & Quality assurance Teacher appraisal 
System evaluation 
School leader appraisal 
Student assessment 
School evaluation 
Finance & Funding Sources of funding 
Uses and allocation of public funds 
Internationalisation Student mobility 
Cross-border quality assurance 
Learning environment Learning time & Disciplinary climate 
Teacher practices 
Class size & Student-teacher ratio 
Organisation & Governance Parental involvement 
School choice 
Public & Private stakeholders 
School autonomy 
Research & Innovation in education Research & Innovation in education 
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School leadership School leader working conditions 
School leader preparation and development 
School leader employment 
Skills Skills 
Teachers Teacher initial education  
Teacher working conditions 
Teacher professional development 
Teacher employment 
Trends shaping education Trends shaping education 
Source: Education GPS 
Figures 
Figure 3.A: Non-significant change between 2003 and 2012 in the strength of the socio-economic 
gradient and annualised mathematics performance  
 
Source: own elaboration using data from the PISA 2012 Database, Figure II.2.12, available from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932964813 
Figure 3.B: Statistically significant change between 2003 and 2012 in the strength of the socio-
economic gradient and annualised mathematics performance 
 
Source: own elaboration using data from the PISA 2012 Database, Figure II.2.12, available from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932964813 
  






































Change in the percentage of variation in mathematics performance 
explained by the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status …
Change is statistically non-significant in either variable
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Table 4.A: The country sample used in this study 
Country 00 03 06 09 12 Country 00 03 06 09 12 
Albania  N/A N/A   Korea      
Argentina  N/A    Latvia      
Australia      Liechtenstein      
Austria    N/A  Lithuania N/A N/A    
Azerbaijan N/A N/A   N/A Luxembourg N/A     
Belgium      Macao N/A     
Brazil      Malaysia N/A N/A N/A   
Bulgaria  N/A    Mexico      
Canada      Montenegro N/A N/A    
Chile  N/A    Netherlands N/A     
Taipei N/A N/A    New Zealand      
Colombia N/A N/A    Norway      
Costa Rica N/A N/A N/A   Peru  N/A N/A   
Croatia N/A N/A    Poland      
Czech Rep.      Portugal      
Denmark      Qatar N/A N/A    
Dubai N/A N/A N/A   Romania  N/A    
Estonia 
N/A N/A    Russian 
Federation 
     
Finland      Serbia N/A N/A    
France      Shanghai N/A N/A N/A   
Germany      Singapore N/A N/A N/A   
Greece 
     Slovak 
Republic 
N/A     
Hong Kong      Slovenia N/A N/A    
Hungary      Spain      
Iceland      Sweden      
Indonesia      Switzerland      
Ireland      Thailand      
Israel  N/A    Tunisia N/A     
Italy      Turkey N/A     
Japan 
     UAE (w/o 
Dubai) 
N/A N/A N/A   
Jordan 
N/A N/A    United 
Kingdom 
N/A N/A    
Kazakhstan 
N/A N/A N/A   United 
States 
  (R 
only) 
  
Kyrgyzstan N/A N/A   N/A Uruguay N/A     
The columns of the table represent data availability for each PISA administration, which takes into 
consideration the exclusion of some specific countries and years from trend comparisons because of 
anomalies in their test administration and sampling (OECD, 2010d).  
Table 4.B: The reliabilities of PISA scales between 2000 and 2012 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Reading 0.93 0.848 0.891 0.921 0.888 
Mathematics 0.90 0.918 0.892 0.882 0.914 
Science 0.90 0.843 0.920 0.896 0.885 




Table 4.C: Model-building approach to analyse trends over time in strength and slope of the socio-
economic gradient 
 Model 
Component A B C D E F 
Intercept (random)       
Time (fixed)       
Time (random)       
Time (quadratic)       
OECD (dummy)       
Time*OECD       
“X” variable (GDP, pre-primary, equity etc.)       
 
Table 4.D: A comparison of different models to map PISA trends over time 
 Reading 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error 





Time -  2.48***  (0.56) 3.34***   (0.77) 
σ2u0   2891  (2037‒4102) 2931  (2067‒4157) 4012   (2785‒5780) 
σ2u1   -  -  20.45   (9.51‒43.97) 
σu01  -  -  -233.66    




104.31   (81.95‒
132.78) 
Log L -1176.264  -1167.038  -1149.466  






 Model A Model B Model C 
 Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error 





Time -  1.25**   (0.63) 2.44***   (0.93) 
σ2u0   3587  (2536‒5075) 3603  (2547‒5097) 4665  (3278‒6638) 
σ2u1   -  -  40.09  (23.14‒69.45) 
σu01  -  -  -315.84    




44.45  (32.73‒60.36) 
Log L -989.9554  -988.0101
  
 -959.0912  






 Model A Model B Model C 
 Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error 





Time -  2.45***   (0.67) 2.71*    (0.83) 
σ2u0   3009  (2128‒4254) 3009  (2129‒4254) 3239   (2288‒4586) 
σ2u1   -  -  29.23   (16.87‒50.63) 
σu01  -  -  -119.77    




24.66   (17.02‒35.72) 
Log L -805.1779  -798.8580  -784.0280  
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***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Model A is a null model assuming no time effects but with random intercept (γ00). Model 
B is the random intercept, fixed slope (γ10) model; and Model C is the random intercept, 
random slope model. All models have been estimated using restricted maximum likelihood 
using the “nlme” package (version 3.1-117, Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 
2015) in the statistical environment R (R Core Team, 2015). Note that the analysis of variance 
(Log L) between A and B was carried out after estimating the two models using standard 
maximum likelihood, because B has an additional fixed effect. Standard errors are for the 
fixed effects and confidence intervals (at the 95% confidence level) for random effects. 
Confidence intervals are preferred as an indication of error on the variance component because 
these latter are non-symmetrical. It is acknowledged that variance components often do not 
have a normal distribution and intervals calculated in this fashion can only be an 
approximation (Bates, 2009; Goldstein, 2011). 
Table 4.E: Between-country variance as a function of time 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Reading 4012 3565.13 3159.16 2794.09 2469.92 
Mathematics  4665 4073.41 3562 3130.77 
Science   3239 3028.69 2876.84 
Modelled using information from Model C in Table 4.D above. 
Table 4.F: Initial level (β0) and average change (β1) of the Strength and Slope of the socio-economic 
gradient in different countries 
 
Reading Mathematics Science 
 
Strength Slope Strength Slope Strength Slope 
ID β0 β1 β0 β1 β0 β1 β0 β1 β0 β1 β0 β1 
ARG 




DEU 21.56 -1.69 53.98 -3.59 22.59 -1.98 










    
GBR 17.56 -1.49 
  
18.46 -2.19 




        
ISR 
    
8.95 2.8 
      








        
LIE 17.7 -2.28 41.9 -3.54 21.99 -4.6 47.71 -6.01 18.66 -4.56 47.07 -9.45 
LVA 6.5 1.68 
          
MEX 19 -2.01 35.02 -3.15 17.47 -2.15 30.74 -3.54 16.51 -2.76 27.85 -4.46 
NLD 
    
17.89 -1.96 




      
43.17 3.4 
    
PRT 
      
27.84 2.66 




      
16.06 6.4 
ROM 7.15 1.96 27.09 3.15 





30.48 3.48 7.11 3.57 31.05 6.57 
SVK 




          
48.35 -5.06 
THA 





45.82 -3.76 23.34 -2.75 49.79 -5.16 17.66 -2.77 38.91 -6.64 
TWN 
    
8.51 2.71 41.54 4.45 
    
URY 10.15 2.2 
  
15.79 2.37 




      
51.05 -6.9 
The significance level was set as p < 0.05. Blank cells indicate that β1 was not significantly different 
from 0 (i.e., the Strength or the Slope of the socio-economic gradient did not experience detectable 
changes over time), and therefore information about β0 was superfluous. 
Table 4.G: Multilevel models mapping the evolution over time of the Strength of the socio-economic 
gradient for Reading, Mathematics and Science 
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
γ00 
(intercept) 
10.42*** (1.11) 188 12.50*** (1.10) 148 11.81*** (1.06) 108 
γ10 (t) 0.29 (0.24) 188 0.07 (0.31) 148 -0.24 (0.35) 108 
γ01 (OECD) 3.63** (1.38) 54 3.37** (1.38) 53 2.20 (1.34) 53 
γ11 (t*OECD) -0.60** (0.29) 188 -0.62 (0.38) 148 0.24 (0.45) 108 
σ2u0   19.40 (12–31) 20.63 (13–32) 20.90 (14–32) 
σ2u1   0.34 (0.10–1.14) 0.82 (0.34–2.01) 1.08 (0.38–3.08) 
σu01  -0.768   -1.397   -1.023   
σ2e  5.37 (4.25–6.79) 3.65 (2.75–4.85) 3.04 (2.09–4.41) 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Table 4.H: Multilevel models mapping the evolution over time of the Slope of the socio-economic 
gradient for Reading, Mathematics and Science 
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
γ00 
(intercept) 
31.92*** (2.12) 188 33.54*** (1.83) 148 31.64*** (1.98) 108 
γ10 (t) -0.32 (0.48) 188 -0.73 (0.52) 148 -1.49** (0.63) 108 
γ01 (OECD) 7.31*** (2.66) 54 6.34*** (2.30) 53 10.86*** (2.51) 53 
γ11 (t*OECD) 0.27 (0.60) 188 0.98 (0.64) 148 -0.14 (0.81) 108 
σ2u0   79.88 (51–123) 58.55 (38–91) 74.57 (48–130) 
σ2u1   2.89 (1.57–5.31) 2.90 (1.42–5.93) 3.92 (1.56–9.89) 
σu01  -7.246   -2.347   -3.736   
σ2e  10.85 (8.53–13.79) 8.81 (6.63–11.70) 9.02 (6.21–13.11) 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Table 4.I: Between-country variance of the Strength and the Slope of the socio-economic gradient as a 
function of time 
Strength 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Reading 19.4 18.2 17.68 17.84 18.68 
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Mathematics  20.63 18.65 18.31 19.61 
Science   20.9 19.94 21.14 
Slope 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Reading 79.88 68.27 62.44 62.39 68.12 
Mathematics  58.55 56.75 60.75 70.55 
Science   74.57 71.01 75.29 
Modelled using information from Table 4.G and Table 4.H above. 
Table 4.J: A multilevel model on the relationship between mean and change in the Strength of the socio-
economic gradient and PISA scores 
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
(Intercept) 420.44*** (17.50) 167 429.82*** (20.79) 140 443.28*** (17.57) 109 
Δ Strength 0.26 (0.35) 167 -0.11 (0.31) 140 -0.09 (0.30) 109 
Time 6.64*** (1.39) 167 5.24*** (1.57) 140 4.31*** (1.31) 109 
OECD 78.67*** (13.57) 62 64.45*** (15.35) 61 60.35*** (12.55) 61 
AVG Strength -0.63 (1.29) 62 0.09 (1.39) 61 -0.34 (1.29) 61 
Time*OECD -5.57*** (1.67) 167 -5.66*** (1.98) 140 -2.88* (1.69) 109 
σ2u0   2570.98 (1723–3834) 3470.50 (2395–5027) 2341.61 (1632–3359) 




σu01  -124.820   -195.651   -57.625   






***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Table 4.K: Multilevel models mapping the linear and quadratic evolution over time of the gross 
enrolment ratio between 1998 and 2013 
 Linear model Quadratic model 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
(intercept) 38.40*** (4.72) 1271 41.68*** (4.75) 1270 
Time 1.21*** (0.19) 1271 0.50** (0.21) 1270 
OECD 32.07*** (6.30) 59 31.53*** (6.32) 59 
Time*OECD -0.32 (0.25) 1271 -0.30 (0.26) 1270 
Time2    0.03*** (0.004) 1270 
σ2u0   583.66 (404–841) 586.47 (408–842) 
σ2u1   0.90 (0.62–1.33) 0.94 (0.67–1.31) 
σu01  -12.80   -13.00   
σ2e  41.53 (38.34–44.98) 39.49 (36.46–42.77) 
Log L -4636.865 -4607.665 
(df), p diff    (1), <0.0001 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Table 4.L: A multilevel model of the relationship between GER and PISA in a subsample of lower-
income countries. 
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
(intercept) 360.77*** (17.82) 83 369.99*** (17.96) 67 400.06*** (22.29) 46 
Δ GER 0.33* (0.18) 83 -0.03 (0.22) 67 0.10 (0.24) 46 
Time 3.41*** (1.19) 83 4.06** (1.72) 67 2.57 (1.94) 46 
AVG GER 1.20*** (0.32) 30 1.06*** (0.31) 30 0.91** (0.37) 23 
σ2u0   1681.42 (937–3016) 2401.18 (1401–4114) 1666.64 (927–2993) 




σu01  -41.827   -210.138   -44.804   
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***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Given that most countries in the sample were not OECD members, the OECD variable 
was excluded from the model. 
Table 4.M: A multilevel model of the relationship between GER and PISA in a subsample of high-
income countries. 
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF Estimate Error DF 
(intercept) 473.74*** (21.76) 87 472.09*** (24.77) 67 467.63*** (24.11) 45 
Δ GER 0.38* (0.18) 87 0.03 (0.17) 67 0.16 (0.18) 45 
Time 0.42 (1.50) 87 0.22 (1.67) 67 1.62 (1.38) 45 
AVG GER 0.24 (0.25) 26 0.32 (0.29) 26 0.40 (0.29) 26 
σ2u0   2563.66 (1347–4878) 2533.54 (1413–4542) 1506.79 (867–2620) 





σu01  -304.144   -321.539   -150.453   






***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
Given that most countries in the sample were OECD members, the OECD variable was 
excluded from the model. 

































Belgium Fr 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
Canada 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Chile 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 10 
Denmark 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 
Finland 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 8 
Germany 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 9 
Indonesia 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Jordan 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 12 
Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 
Portugal 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 7 
Russian 
Federation 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 10 
Russian 
Federation 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Thailand 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 






T1 Increase overall time spent in education 
T2 Increase instruction time 
E1 Reduce disabled or immigrant students’ segregation 
E2 Reduce the gender gap 
E3 Reduce the streaming / grouping / stratification of students 
E4 Reduce school competition 
E5 Help socio-economically deprived students 
Q1 Strengthen the teaching profession 
Q2 Allocate resources more efficiently or in a more equitable way 
Q3 Pair more autonomy with accountability measures 
Q4 Promote cooperation between parents, teachers, principals and schools 
P1 Help low-performing students 
P2 Standardise the educational outcomes 
P3 Review curricular priorities 
 
Table 4.O: Country rankings according to their score on the PAIQ and according to the EPA Index 
Ranking By PAIQ score By EPA Index Change PAIQ → EPA 
1 Korea Finland +4 
2 Chile Korea -1 
3 Russian Federation Denmark +4 
4 Germany Chile -2 
5 Finland Germany -1 
6 Portugal Netherlands +5 
7 Denmark Russian Federation -4 
8 Indonesia Canada +4 
9 Latvia Belgium Fr +1 
10 Belgium Fr Portugal -4 
11 Netherlands Latvia -2 
12 Canada Israel +3 
13 Jordan Indonesia -5 
14 Thailand Thailand 0 
15 Israel Jordan -2 
 
Table 4.P: Common (link) items between comparable assessments 
Reading 2003 2006 2009 2012 
2000 28 28 26 3 
2003 - 28 26 3 
2006  - 26 3 
2009   - 44 
Mathematics 2003 2006 2009 2012 
2003 - 48 35 84 
2006  - 35 48 
2009   - 35 
Science 2003 2006 2009 2012 
2006 - - 53 53 
2009    53 
Sources: PISA technical reports 2006–2009 (OECD, 2009c, 2012e), and PISA international report 2012 




The tables below summarise findings from the national and international reports for Ireland, 
along with the differences between the two versions. Remarks are coded as follows: 
+1 is a positive remark that suggests achievement in a ‘positive’ aspect. Example: ‘at 
both grades close to half the students in Singapore (45% at the eighth grade and 44% at the 
seventh grade) reached the Top 10% level.’ 
0 is a descriptive or mixed statement. Example of a descriptive statement: ‘Countries 
close to the trend line are where the predictor GDP per capita suggests that they would be; 
examples include…’. Example of a mixed statement: ‘students in the top quarter of the index 
in […] Ireland report a much greater interest in reading than students in the top quarter of the 
index in Belgium […] In Ireland there is much wider variation in students’ interest in reading 
than in Mexico’. In this case a positive aspect (high values at the top 25%) is followed by a 
negative (large spread).  
−1 is a negative remark and it serves to flag up a potential problem, to suggest that there 
is an area open for review. Example: ‘Fewer than 40% of the eighth-grade students in [...] 
Ireland [...] had teachers who felt it was very important to think creatively, and fewer than 
40% [...] had teachers who felt it was very important to understand how mathematics is used 
in the real world.’ The follow-up is: ‘with the current calls from business and industry for 
helping students improve their ability to apply mathematics and solve practical problems in 
job-related situations, it might be rather surprising that...’ 
Table 5.A: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2000 
report 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
0 - GDP (close to the trend line) 92 - 
-1 - Engaging learning environment 108 - 
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 +1 Overall achievement 44 vii 
+1 -1 Gender differences in achievement 125 see txt 
+1 - Succeeding against the odds (counterbalancing mother’s 
SES) 
151  
+1 -1 Overall impact of SES 195 x,9,12 
0 -1 Distribution of achievement (Finland < %below L1 < OECD 
average) 
47 14 
0 0 Interest 102 ix 
0 - Teacher shortage 172  
0 -1 Slope of SES-Score relationship 191 x,9,12 
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-1 -1 School type 63 ix 
-1 - Gender differences in engagement 131  
-1 -1 Single-parent family 152  
 MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
-1 -1 Achievement compared to reading  90 viii 
Sources: OECD (2001a); Shiel et al. (2001a; 2001b) 
While the PISA report is rather positive with respect to gender differences (“Some 
countries do appear to provide a learning environment that benefits both genders equally”, 
OECD, 2001a, p. 125), the ERC summary report is more critical: on the one hand, their 
interaction with other explanatory variables is stressed; on the other hand, where findings 
indicate no significant gender differences (e.g., in Science), the authors advise that ‘the PISA 
findings should not induce complacency’ (Shiel et al., 2001a, p. 19). Another area whose 
interpretation differs substantially from OECD’s is the score distribution: OECD mentions 
that Ireland has a proportion of students below Level 1 greater than that of Finland, but 
nevertheless lower than the OECD average; however, Shiel et al. (2001a) add: ‘While the 
proportion of Irish students achieving Level 1 or below on the PISA combined reading literacy 
scale (11.0%) was lower than the OECD country average (17.9%), it is nevertheless a cause 
for concern’ (p. 14). Given that the Slope of the socio-economic gradient in Ireland is lower 
than in other countries, the PISA report treats the impact of an Irish student’s socioeconomic 
status more leniently than the ERC does. 
Additionally, the ERC remarks other issues such as the distribution of achievement in 
Mathematics: ‘Irish students at the national 90th percentile achieved a score that is below the 
corresponding OECD country average. Ireland ranked 20th, indicating a relatively poor 
performance by higher-achieving students.’ (Shiel et al., 2001a, p. viii). The ERC is more 
critical of the Science performance: ‘While this relatively good performance is welcome, it 
cannot be concluded that it represents a level of achievement in science that is superior to that 
in earlier studies.’ (ibid., p. 15). It is also noted that this round of PISA was covered aspects 
of biology more than chemistry or physics. Finally, the test-curriculum alignment is also 
discussed, and the overall conclusion is that while the Mathematics and Science taught in the 
Junior Certificate syllabus are different from the domains assessed by PISA, ‘there is 
considerable overlap’ between PISA and the Junior Certificate examinations (ibid., p. 13). 
Table 5.B: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2003 
report 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
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0 - Determining course content 235–
238 
 
0 - Parental influence 238  
0 - Instruction time 241  
0 - Principal inspection 247  
-1 - Tracking 261  
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
-1 +1 Performance 284 42 
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 0 Classroom disciplinary climate 215 44 
+1 0 Between-school variance 163 41–42 
+1 - Gender (interest) 121  
0 -1 Distribution of achievement 95 40–41 
0 - Change in Space and Shape scale since 2000 62  
-1 -1 Space and Shape scale 89–90 40 
-1 0 Gender (performance) 98 41 
-1 - Gender (sense of belonging to school) 128  
-1 -1 Single-parent family 167 44 
 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 0 Performance 293 43 
0 - Change in achievement since 2000 296  
Sources: OECD (2004b); Cosgrove et al. (2004) 
Some differences between the international and the ERC reports are explainable by the 
additional analyses carried out by ERC. The two reports agree on the negative Mathematics 
performance, especially in the Space and Shape subdomain, but the ERC also stresses the high 
number of students achieving at the lowest levels and the relative underperformance of those 
at the highest ones.  
The ERC tends to downplay some aspects that were positively commented on by OECD, 
like the generally positive classroom climate and the low between-school variance: while the 
international reports concludes that ‘parents […] can be confident of high and consistent 
performance standards across schools in the entire education system’ (OECD, 2004b, p. 163), 
the ERC simply attributes this ‘to relatively homogeneous composition of the school-going 
population in Ireland’ (Cosgrove, Shiel, Sofroniou, et al., 2004, p. 42). On the other hand, 
PISA findings of a higher sense of belonging in school for girls are not reported. 
Table 5.C: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2006 
report 
 GENERAL  
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Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
0 -1 Examination board influence on assessment practices 251 36 
-1 - Parental pressure 233  
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 +1 Achievement 299 33 
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1  Distribution of achievement 319  
0 0 Achievement 315 33 
 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 +1 Between-school variance 173 38 
+1 - Migrant status (performance) 175  
0 0 Motivation, self-concept, attitude (see text) 127–
163 
36 
0 0 Ability grouping 223–
225 
38 
0 - Private institutions 231  
Sources: OECD (2007b); Eivers, Shiel, & Cunningham (2007, 2008) 
According to the ERC, ‘Ireland’s students performed very well on the reading assessment, 
reasonably well on science, and about average on mathematics’ (Eivers et al., 2007, p. 33), 
and the narrow is distribution in Science was also positively remarked (ibid.). As in 2003, 
Ireland was elected by the OECD an exemplary country for its lower between-school variance 
(2007b, p. 173), but the ERC focused instead on the negative effects of ability grouping 
(Eivers et al., 2007, p. 38). Other school issues raised by the ERC were student absenteeism 
and bullying.  
At the family level, the ERC reported lack of change in home educational resources 
(measured in number of books at home), which was ‘unfortunate’ given its positive 
relationship with achievement, especially in the context of an increase of indicators (such as 
measures of affluence) negatively related with performance (Eivers et al., 2007, p. 37). 
From the OECD reports, a tripartite positive relationship emerged between: student SES; 
their motivation, self-concept and attitudes; and Science performance. Moreover, the majority 
of students valued science but did not enjoy studying it and ‘did not agree with the wider 
conception of it bringing economic and social benefits’ (OECD, 2007b, p. 128). Science was 
more highly valued by immigrant students, whereas lack of enjoyment correlated with socio-
economic disadvantage. These findings probably warranted further investigation, yet the ERC 
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focused only on differences in the interest towards biology, physics and chemistry. The 
absence of comments on the good performance of students with an immigrant background and 
their valuing science is noteworthy. Another puzzling exclusion is the high percentage of 
principals reporting high levels of parental pressure, since many governmental interventions 
at the time mentioned the importance of better communication between families and schools.  
Table 5.D: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2009 
report 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 - Student transfer policies 4.66  
0 - Private institutions 4.43  
0 - Instruction time 4.79–80  
0 - Class size 4.82  
0 - Resource allocation 4.84  
0 - Parental pressure 4.98  
0 - Leadership 4.102  
-1 - Change in disciplinary classroom climate 5.100  
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 - Between-school variance 2.84–86  
+1 - School location (urban or rural) 2.14  
+1 - Reflect and Evaluate subscale 1.71  
+1 +1 Understand and Remember  3.77–79 ix 
0 - Achievement 1.55  
0 - Continuous texts 1.85  
0 0 Socio-economic status and performance 2.31, 
2.57 
ix 





-1 -1 Single-parent family 2.14 26 
-1 - Pre-primary education (more than one year) 2.96, 
4.81 
 
-1 -1 Motivation (reading for enjoyment) 3.34, 
3.66 
ix 
-1 -1 Change in motivation (reading for enjoyment) 5.90, 
5.97 
ix 
-1 -1 Change since 2000 5.13 vii 
-1 -1 Distribution of achievement 5.13, 
5.43 
viii 
-1 -1 Gender differences in change in achievement 5.48 vii–viii 
-1 -1 Socio-economic status role in explaining change 5.50  
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 0 Gender differences  1.137 viii 
-1 -1 Change since 2000 5.60 viii 
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-1 -1 Distribution since 2000 5.63 viii 
 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ERC  OECD ERC 
+1 0 Achievement 1.14 viii–ix 
Sources: OECD (2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g); Perkins et al. (2010) 
The drop in student achievement in both Reading and Mathematics is deemed to be 
‘notable’ by OECD, and mentions of it can be found in the Executive Summary for volume V 
(OECD, 2010d). This is aggravated by the fact that ‘student performance would have declined 
more rapidly than actually observed if the changes in the socio-economic composition of the 
student population had been accounted for’ (ibid., p. 50), as it shows that there is a strong 
relationship between high socio-economic status and high achievement. As it happened in 
previous years, the ERC picks up on the same negative aspects identified by OECD whilst 
also minimising the positive ones. 
The relationship between migrant status and performance is, once again, multifaceted. 
Firstly, immigrant students have a similar socio-economic status to that of native students. 
Secondly, there are major achievement differences between first- and second-generation 
migrants, with the latter performing as well as native students: ‘These large gaps […] possibly 
[highlight] the different backgrounds across immigrant cohorts […]. However, they could also 
signal positive educational and social mobility across generations’ (OECD, 2010e, p. 72). 
Moreover, ‘the relationship between attendance in pre-primary education and performance is 
greater for students with an immigrant background’ (ibid., p. 98). 
Another interesting finding is that socio-economically advantaged students are much more 
likely to read for enjoyment, which is in turn associated to higher achievement. This mirrors 
the finding from Science 2006. Moreover, the percentage of students reading for enjoyment 
‘decreased by almost 18 percentage points among disadvantaged students’ (OECD, 2010d, p. 
97). 
Parental pressure regarding academic standards is a difficult topic to categorise, because 
it seems that OECD itself has yet to decide whether it is a positive or a negative feature of a 
system. For PISA 2006, OECD writes that ‘parental pressure on schools is largely absent 
[…in] Finland – the best performing country’ (OECD, 2007c), which seems to hint as lack of 
pressure as a positive thing. However, for PISA 2009, there is an opposite take on the matter: 
‘Research suggests that students perform better when parents, teachers and schools have high 
expectations for them. A driving force behind school expectations is parental pressure’ 





The tables below summarise findings from the national and international reports for the CFB, 
along with the differences between the two versions. Note, however, that in the case of the 
CFB this exercise is less informative than in the case of Ireland because findings from the 
three communities are aggregated in international reports. 
Remarks are coded as follows: 
+1 is a positive remark that suggests achievement in a ‘positive’ aspect. Example: ‘at 
both grades close to half the students in Singapore (45% at the eighth grade and 44% at the 
seventh grade) reached the Top 10% level.’ 
0 is a descriptive or mixed statement. Example of a descriptive statement: ‘Countries 
close to the trend line are where the predictor GDP per capita suggests that they would be; 
examples include…’. Example of a mixed statement: ‘students in the top quarter of the index 
in […] Ireland report a much greater interest in reading than students in the top quarter of the 
index in Belgium […] In Ireland there is much wider variation in students’ interest in reading 
than in Mexico’. In this case a positive aspect (high values at the top 25%) is followed by a 
negative (large spread).  
−1 is a negative remark and it serves to flag up a potential problem, to suggest that there 
is an area open for review. Example: ‘Fewer than 40% of the eighth-grade students in [...] 
Ireland [...] had teachers who felt it was very important to think creatively, and fewer than 
40% [...] had teachers who felt it was very important to understand how mathematics is used 
in the real world.’ The follow-up is: ‘with the current calls from business and industry for 
helping students improve their ability to apply mathematics and solve practical problems in 
job-related situations, it might be rather surprising that...’ 
Table 6.A: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2000 
report for the CFB 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
-1 -1 high proportion of low achievers 44 49 
+1  mean performance 52  
-1  like school 108  
0  use of elaboration strategies (Fl) 112  
0  teacher support 162  
0  school climate importance 167  
0  teacher morale importance 169  
-1  homework 171  
-1  teacher shortage 172  
+1  infrastructures 173  





-1  specialist teachers 211  
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
 -1 Retention  12 
 -1 Gender differences  71 
-1 -1 Retrieving information stronger 54 54 
-1 -1 country-level variance, widest spread, note on Fr. Vs Fl. 56, 57 55 
-1 -1 most variance btw schools 60 Chap 4 
0  close to GDP prediction 92  
-1 -1 interest (Fl.) 100 98 




 -1 Variety of texts and performance  105 
-1 /+1 -1 Parental occupation vs family wealth 139, 
143 
86 
-1  Mother education 149  
-1  Single-parent families 152  
-1 +1 first-generation and immigrant students 155 80 
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1 0 mean 80, 
125 
59 
-1 -1 distribution, similar pattern to reading 80, 82 60 
+1  gender differences 125  
 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
0/-1 -1 performance, AVG but worse than reading 90 63 
Sources: OECD (2001a); Lafontaine (2001a); Lafontaine et al. (2003) 
Table 6.B: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2003 
report for the CFB 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
0  Use of control strategies 148  
0  School climate 218  
0  Assessment for school accountability 232  
0  School autonomy over teachers and budgets 234,235  
0  Monitoring by principals  247 
0/-1  Teacher commitment and student results 225  
-1  Sense of belonging in schools, and higher in females 128  
-1  Use of standardised assessments 230  
-1  Pre-primary education attendance gap 243  
-1  Teacher shortage 245  
-1  School resources 255  
 READING   




OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1 +1 Percentage at level 5  277  
+1 0 Mean performance  280 4 
-1 -1 Spread 278  
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1  Percentage over level 6  51  
+1  Mean performance increase change/relationship 72  
+1  Gender gap 96, 98  
+1  Spending per student 103  
+1/0  Btw-school variance decreased (maybe) 164 
(204) 
 
+1/0 -1 Mean performance increase space/shape 28 points / driven 
by higher-ability students 
61, 63 4 
-1  Uncertainty scale lower than others 89  
-1 -1 Subnational differences: French Community average 93 4 
-1 -1 Spread 95  
-1  Intrinsic motivation 118  
-1  Instrumental motivation 123  
-1  Between-school variance 161, 
163 
 
-1  Parental occupation 165  
-1  Single-parent families 167  
-1  Immigrant students (greatest gap), even after accounting for 





 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1 -1 Mean performance 293 4 
+1/0 +1 Mean performance increase / driven by higher-ability 
students 
295 8 
Sources: OECD (2004b); Baye et al. (2004b) 
The full national report was not available at the ASPE, therefore the comparison is 
between the international report and the summary report. 
The difference in the remarks concerning mean performance are due to the fact that in the 
international report this is pushed up by the performance of the Flemish Community. It is 
interesting to note, nevertheless, that in the national report the ASPE underlines the greater 
distance of the CFB from the OECD average in Mathematics and Science. This contrasts with 
the accurate explanation about confidence intervals and statistically significant differences 
that follows and makes one wonder why opening with a statement apparently showing the 
critical status of mathematics and science education if caution is then advocated. 
Performance differences due to the segregating effects of streaming and retention are 
highlighted in both reports, but the ASPE does not comment (at least in the summary report) 
about a positive signal, such as a possible decrease observed in between-school variance. 
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Instead, a non-significant increase in Science was an opportunity to remark that the increase 
was driven by mid-low performers.  
Table 6.C: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2006 
report for the CFB 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1  Average number of students per teacher 256  
+1  Importance of catchment area 217  
+1  Ability grouping 223  
0  National income 59  
0  School autonomy 251  
0  Parent / public reporting of results 242  
0  Result-based teacher accountability 240  
-1  Streaming 220  
-1 -1 Teacher shortage 254 216, 
217 
 -1 Retention  15 
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1 0 Percentage at level 5  294 75 
+1 -1 Mean performance 299 48 
-1 -1 Spread 299 75 
-1 -1 Gender differences 303 81 
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1 0 Percentage over level 6  313 72 
+1 0 Mean performance 315 48 
-1 -1 Spread 319 72 
-1  Change 2003–2006 among higher achievers 320  
 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 





+1 +1 Decrease in between-school variation 173 134 
 +1 Intrinsic motivation  173 
 +1 Engagement in science-related activities  185 
 0 Percentage high achievers  63 
0 0 Knowledge about science higher than knowledge of science  71 229 
0  Learning time 269  
-1 -1 Difference mean performance Flanders vs French 
Community 
55 58 
-1  Gender differences within schools 62  
-1 -1 Advances in science bring social benefits 128 162 
-1 0 Higher interest in science for higher-SES students 140 164 




-1 -1 Between-school variance 172 134 





-1 -1 Relationship SES-achievement 185 96 
 -1 Number of students enrolled in scientific tracks  16 
 -1 Explain Phenomena Scientifically scale  52 
 -1 Earth & Space worse, but also physics and biology are low  55 
 -1 Spread  56 
 -1 Percentage low achievers  62 
 -1 Guidance and satisfaction with their classes  205, 
206 




 -1 Promotion of science within schools  214 
Sources: OECD (2007b) ; Baye et al. (2009) 
The different sign in the mean performances are due to the fact that the national report 
refers to the French Community only.  
Table 6.D: Findings and differences between the international and national versions of the PISA 2009 
report for the CFB 
 GENERAL  
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1  Student-teacher ratio positively related to school SES 2.43  
+1  Participation to pre-primary education 2.96  
+1  School autonomy on curriculum and assessment 4.41  
+1  School climate 4.94, 
4.96 
 
+1/-1  School choice 4.72, 
4.74 
 
0  Class size 4.82  
-1  Grade repetition 4.64  
-1  Transfer policies 4.66  
 READING   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1  Mean performance (combined) 1.13  
 +1 2000–2009 increase in mean performance   8 
+1  Integrate and interpret 1.63  
+1  Percentage of top performers 1.156  
+1  No difference urban-rural 2.49  
+1  Awareness of strategies to summarise information 3.79  
 +1 2000–2009 gender gap narrowed  11 
+1 +1 2000–2009 immigrant gap narrowed 5.14 11 
+1 +1 2000–2009 variance, decrease in below level 2 5.74 9 
+1  2000–2009 relationship SES-achievement between schools 5.80  
0  Relationship reading strategies-scores 3.13, 
3.47 
 
0  Relationship enjoyment-scores 3.30  
0  Reading for enjoyment > time spent 3.34  
-1 -1 Spread 1.53 12 
-1  Gender gap on non-continuous texts 1.85  
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-1 -1 Relationship SES-achievement 2.14, 
2.45 
13 
-1  Single-parent family 2.14  
 -1 Grade repetition gap  15 
-1 -1 Immigrant students, school resources 2.70, 
2.79 
15 
-1 -1 Between-school variance, inclusion 2.84, 
2.86 
16 





-1 -1 Streaming 4.36 15 
-1  Teachers recommend books 4.94  
-1  2000–2009 gap from speaking the test language at home 5.82  
-1 +1 2000–2009 no change boys reading for enjoyment 5.89 11, 12 
 MATHEMATICS   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1  Mean performance (combined) 1.14  
+1  Percentage high performers  1.130, 
1.132 
 
-1  Spread 1.53  
-1  Gender differences 1.137  
-1 0 2003–2009 performance 5.14 8 
-1  2003–2009 increase in below level 2, decrease in top 
performers 
5.63  
 SCIENCE   
Remark Area Reference 
pages 
OECD ASPE  OECD ASPE 
+1  Mean performance (combined) 1.14  
 0 2006–2009 performance  8 
Sources: OECD (2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g); Baye et al. (2010) 
The full national report was not available. The OECD notes that Belgium allocates more 
teachers into disadvantaged schools ‘presumably with the objective of moderating that 
disadvantage’ (OECD, 2010e, p. 43). This policy, which is in line with the EPA, was not 
commented upon by the ASPE. In spite of the already active policies on positive 
discriminations, the OECD generically reminds that ‘policies that target socio-economically 
disadvantaged schools are more likely to succeed in improving performance and equity’ 
(OECD, 2010e, p. 113). This suggest that the EPA is not responsive to country efforts. 
The EPA concerning school choice is unclear. On the one hand, the OECD writes that the 
most successful countries ‘tend to grant higher levels of autonomy to schools in formulating 
and using curricula and assessments and lower levels of school competition’ (OECD, 2010f, 




Both the ASPE and the OECD agree that ‘higher levels of engagement in reading activities 
and positive approaches to learning’ may benefit disadvantaged students in particular (OECD, 
2010c, p. 93). 
Table 6.E: A comparison between PISA literacies and the French, mathematics and science literacy 
according to the Core Skills 
 OECD CFB 
R Reading literacy is understanding, using, 
reflecting on and engaging with written 
texts, in order to achieve one’s goals, 
develop one’s knowledge and potential, and 
participate in society. 
The French language is the first key that is 
offered to the child and adolescent to 
access all areas of learning. […] pupils will 
be prompted to perform a set of interactive 
skills, mental processes, learning strategies 
and relational attitudes, that can be used 
directly in the construction of their 
knowledge, but more importantly, once 
their schooling is completed, as the 
foundations of their life-long learning 
processes. 
M Mathematical literacy is an individual’s 
capacity to formulate, employ, and interpret 
mathematics in a variety of contexts. It 
includes reasoning mathematically and using 
mathematical concepts, procedures, facts 
and tools to describe, explain and predict 
phenomena. It assists individuals to 
recognise the role that mathematics plays in 
the world and to make the well-founded 
judgments and decisions needed by 
constructive, engaged and reflective citizens. 
Mathematics is taught on the basis of 
objects and situations experienced and 
observed in real life to raise questions 
about mathematical facts. The mathematics 
course is not just about imparting 
knowledge. From primary school to the 
end of the first stage of secondary school, 
stimulating the imagination, provoking 
thought and developing critical thinking 
about these observations lead pupils to 
understand their environment and have an 
effect on it. […] Through problem-solving, 
pupils develop mathematical abilities, 
acquire in-depth knowledge and forge a 
confident and active personality. 
S For the purposes of PISA, scientific literacy 
refers to an individual’s: 
 Scientific knowledge and use of 
that knowledge to identify 
questions, acquire new knowledge, 
explain scientific phenomena and 
draw evidence-based conclusions 
about science-related issues. 
 Understanding of the characteristic 
features of science as a form of 
human knowledge and enquiry.  
 Awareness of how science and 
technology shape our material, 
intellectual and cultural 
environments.  
 Willingness to engage in science-
related issues, and with the ideas of 
science, as a reflective citizen. 
Teaching science is both about the 
development of specific and transversal 
skills and the acquisition of knowledge and 
offers the most appropriate methodologies 
to encourage young people to get a lasting 
grasp of them. The progressive 
construction of knowledge and skills is the 
founding element (paradigm) of any 
scientific approach. This, in effect, allows 
pupils, regardless of their age and level of 
study, to be the main actors in their 
learning process starting out from 
situations that encourage them to get 
involved in research. Furthermore, the 
study of science offers some specificity 
because it opens the eyes of young people 
to their natural environment and puts them 
in direct contact with real objects, natural 
phenomena and living beings. In the virtual 
age with its packaged products, this is an 
important input that should be highlighted. 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title: The use and usefulness of international large-scale assessments (PISA, PIRLS, TIMSS) for 
national policy-making in the French Community of Belgium (1995-2009) 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study on the relationship between international policy 
advice and national education reforms in different countries. Please read this form carefully and 
ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.   
 
The study is conducted by Cesare Aloisi as part of his doctoral studies at Durham University. This 
research project is supervised by Prof Peter Tymms (peter.tymms@cem.dur.ac.uk) and Dr 
Christine Merrell (christine.merrel@cem.dur.ac.uk) from the School of Education at Durham 
University.  
 
The purpose of this study is to understand in details how international large-scale assessment 
reports were received in the French Community of Belgium, to what extent they may have 
informed national reforms, interventions and policies, what the impact of these policies was, and in 
general whether international reports have been useful agents for educational improvement.  
 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to take part in an interview in which I will ask 
your views on these issues. The whole interview should last one hour. 
You are free to decide whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, you are free to 
withdraw at any time without any negative consequences for you. 
 
All responses you give or other data collected will be kept confidential. The records of this study 
will be kept secure and private.  All files containing any information you give are password 
protected.  In any research report that may be published, no information will be included that will 
make it possible to identify you individually.  There will be no way to connect your name to your 
responses at any time during or after the study.   
 
If you have any questions, requests or concerns regarding this research, please contact me via email 
at: cesare.aloisi@durham.ac.uk; or by telephone at 0489 70 02 38. 
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the School of Education Ethics Sub-Committee at 
Durham University (date of approval: 18 March 2015)  
 
Thank you for your time.  
 





Leazes Road   
Durham City, DH1 1TA 
Telephone +44 (0)191 334 2000 Fax +44 (0)191 334 8311 
www.durham.ac.uk 





Declaration of Informed Consent  
 
I agree to participate in this study, the purpose of which is to understand the reception, use and 
usefulness of international large-scale assessment reports for policy-making in the French 
Community of Belgium. 
 
 I have read the participant information sheet and understand the information provided. 
 I have been informed that I may decline to answer any questions or withdraw from the 
study without penalty of any kind. 
 I have been informed that all of my responses will be kept confidential and secure, and 
that I will not be identified in any report or other publication resulting from this research. 
 I have been informed that the investigator will answer any questions regarding the study 
and its procedures. Cesare Aloisi, from the School of Education, Durham University, can 
be contacted via email: cesare.aloisi@durham.ac.uk or telephone: 0489 70 02 38. 
 I will be provided with a copy of this form for my records.  
 
Any concerns about this study should be addressed to the Ethics Sub-Committee of the School of 
Education, Durham University via email (Sheena Smith, School of Education, tel. +44 (0)191 334 
8403, e-mail: Sheena.Smith@Durham.ac.uk). 
           
      
Date    








           
           
  
Date    
Signature of Investigator 
 










Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 (main document) map the trends in PISA scores in Reading and 
Mathematics for OECD and partner countries. To model these and the Science trends, 
multilevel/hierarchical modelling (Goldstein, 2011; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) was 
employed. This is a form of ‘partial pooling’ (Gelman & Hill, 2007) analysis that takes the 
grouping of the observations into account by assigning a variance component not only to the 
individual observations, but also to the different clusters, or levels, within which the 
observations are nested. To model these trends, one can write: 
 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 (1) 
Where the subscript i indexes country-year observations (the Level-1 unit) and the 
subscript j indexes countries—the cluster in which the observation took place (the Level-2 
unit); t is an ordered variable representing PISA administrations, and it takes the values 0 to 4 
for Reading (0 corresponds to the year 2000), 0 to 3 for Mathematics (0 corresponds to 2003) 
and 0 to 2 for Science (0 corresponds to 2006). Note that both the intercept β0 and the slope β1 
take the j-subscript, because they are both allowed to vary by group (country), and in fact, 
they can be decomposed thus: 
 𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝑢0𝑗 (2) 
 𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝑢1𝑗 (3) 
In Equations (2) and (3) both the intercept and the slope coefficients are composed of a 
fixed part γ, which is common to all groups, plus a random part u that varies by group. 
Equations (1)‒(3) can be expressed in long form whilst separating fixed from random 
(between brackets) components: 
 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾10𝑡𝑖𝑗 + (𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗) (4) 
Equation (4) has six parameters that need estimating: γ00 and γ01, the variances of u0, u1 












Model-building followed the heuristic shown in Appendix 3, Table 4.C. Model A and B 
were respectively the null model and a model with one fixed slope for all countries. A simple 
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visual analysis of Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 may suggest that slopes vary by country, and 
indeed an analysis of variance confirmed that Model C, representing the Equation (4) 
introduced above, was more efficient (Appendix 3, Table 4.D).  
Following diagnostics (Appendix 6), a model (D) was produced that accounted for 
different variances of the Level-1 residuals between OECD and partner countries, 
autocorrelation of the Level-1 residuals in Reading and a curvilinear structure in the Reading 
data28 (Table i). 
Table i: Quadratic (Reading) and linear (Mathematics) growth models with weighted variances and 
autocorrelated [MA(1)] residuals (Model D) 
Model D READING  MATHEMATICS  
γ00 462.71*  (6.78) 463.47*  (8.51) 
γ10 63.43*  (16.40) 2.23*  (0.90) 
γ20  37.02* (10.09)  
σ2u0   3857  (2654‒5605) 4694 (3291‒6697) 
σ2u1   16.22  (7.00‒37.54) 36.94  (21.79‒62.62) 
σu01  -210.52   -323.75   
σ2e  191.07  (124.95‒292.16) 74.37 (47.86‒115.57) 
Θ  0.25 (0.03‒0.46)  
*p<0.01. All values estimated with restricted maximum likelihood (REML) 
Compared to Model C (Appendix 3, Table 4.D), there is a small reduction in the Level-2 
variance, counterbalanced by a larger increase in Level-1 variance. This means that while 
Model D gives a better account of the relative position of countries between each other, it is 
less successful in “tracking” the evolution of within-country score-change over time. 
Moreover, Model C is more efficient, as it has fewer degrees of freedom, and it can be equally 
applied to all three PISA domains while still providing a good fit (Figure i). 
  
                                                     
28 A quadratic model of the form 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑗
2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 was fitted. To avoid 
correlation between the t terms, orthogonal polynomials were used. While they have the advantage of 
being uncorrelated, their estimated coefficients are not directly interpretable, therefore γ10 and γ20 in 
Table i above cannot be compared with the coefficient in Appendix 3, Table 4.D. 
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Eventually, Model C was replaced by one that took into consideration the clustering of 
countries into OECD and partner economies (Model E, Table ii).  
Table ii: A model using OECD as a Level-2 (time-invariant) predictor (Model E) 
 Model E Reading Model E Maths Model E Science 
γ00 (intercept) 414.73***  (9.36) 427.31***  (10.68) 437.80***  (8.60) 
γ01 (OECD) 75.83***  (12.84) 68.10***  (14.79) 61.01***  (11.96) 
γ10 (t) 6.23***   (1.16) 5.80***   (1.34) 4.20***   (1.23) 
γ11 (t*OECD) -5.18***  (1.46) -6.10***  (1.74) -2.77*   (1.64) 
σ2u0   2536  (1728‒3722) 3517 (2457‒5035) 2327 (1636‒3308) 
σ2u1   14.01  (5.61‒34.97) 31.68 (17.33‒57.92) 28.29 (16.22‒49.33) 
σu01  -127.84  -209.59 -76.64 
σ2e  103.71 (81.45‒132.06) 44.04 (32.47‒59.74) 24.47 (16.91‒35.39) 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1  
The final step was to introduce a variable capturing access to pre-primary education. One 
possibility was to add this predictor x to the Level-2 unit j, but it would have implied that it is 
constant over time, whereas one of the main purposes of this paper is to see if changes in the 
indicators are associated to changes in PISA scores. On the other hand, since the x varies from 
year to year, it could be entered as a Level-1 variable in the equation, but this would have 
caused other issues: 
‘Though the x variable of interest varies both over time and across countries, these 
two dimensions of its variability are treated singly—making it impossible to know 
whether just one dimension is driving any covariation found with y, or even 
potentially whether the two associations have different signs. This approach 
effectively assumes that the cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships 
between x and y are the same: a single coefficient β linked to [xj] captures both.’ 
(Fairbrother, 2013, p. 10) 
Following Fairbrother (2013) and others (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002; Raudenbush, 1989), a solution was adopted by decomposing the indicators into two 
components—a time-invariant, group-centred mean at Level-2 (?̅?𝑗), and its Level-1, time-
varying difference (𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗ ), as follows: 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 =  ?̅?𝑗 +  𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗  (7) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗ =  𝑥𝑖𝑗 −  ?̅?𝑗 (8) 
Once all amendments were taken into account, Equation (4) became: 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01?̅?𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾10𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑗 + 𝛾20𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗ + (𝑢0𝑗 +
+ 𝑢1𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗) (9) 
Equation (9) represents Model F, and the decomposition of the predictor measure is 





Figure ii: Decomposition of the predictor into two orthogonal components 
 
Since ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?) = 0
𝑁
𝑖=1 , ?̅?𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗  are orthogonal and the effect of 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗  is independent 
from the magnitude of ?̅?𝑗. In other words, this model allows us to explore changes in the 
predictor variable regardless of the average conditions in each country. Equation (9) relies on 
the assumption that such effect would be equal in each country. Normally, this assumption 
would be unwarranted, but the reader is reminded that in this research 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗  captures the effect 
of changes in the regressors over and above the effect of time within a relatively short time 
frame: therefore, its value is expected to be rather small and consistent across Level-2 units. 
The use of a lagged predictor 
Equation (9) provides a general model, but consider once again the relationship displayed 
in Figure ii. What the model is testing is whether and how changes in predictor variables are 
related to simultaneous changes in the outcome variable within the same time frame. Since 
some variables used in this research, such as enrolment in pre-primary education, must be 
considered at the time when it could have had an impact on the PISA cohort, the time frame 
of the predictor was shifted so that PISA scores were compared to past values.  
A shift of one year (k) corresponds to one lag unit (λ), so that kx = ky – λ. For instance, to 
model the relationship between changes in the predictor one year before PISA, and PISA 
scores, the time frame of x is shifted by one year (λ = 1), so that Scoresk  = {2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012} 







Figure iii: Shifting of the time frame of the predictor variable 
 
The amount of shifting depends on the predictor (see the section on variables). Shifting 
the time frame also affects the group-centred mean, ?̅?: this makes it possible to understand the 
evolution of Level-2 effects over time; the trade-off is that the size of the Level-1 effects 
cannot be compared over time, as it is relative to the group-centred mean.  
Outcome variable 
The outcome variable Scores is the country mean estimates in Reading, Mathematics, and 
Science published by OECD in its international reports (OECD, 2014g, and previous). These 
estimates are measured on a scale with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation (SD) of 100, 
and they are calculated from the students’ plausible values29 (OECD, 2014h). It is worth 
remembering that country estimates are associated to an error component that is generally 
small (between one and three PISA points) but which can reach six or seven points for some 
non-OECD countries, especially in the early cycles. This means that the 95% confidence 
interval of a country whose estimate was reported to be 500 could actually range from 486 to 
514 points. 
On a cross-sectional level, countries can be separated by hundreds of points. For instance, 
245 points divided the top and bottom scorers in Mathematics 2012 (Shanghai, 613; Peru, 
368); the average score in that year was 473, the median 483, the SD 56 points and the median 
absolute deviation about 35. From a longitudinal perspective, however, score changes from 
                                                     
29 Plausible values are not scores, but a function representing ‘a likely distribution of a student’s 
proficiency’ (von Davier, Gonzalez, & Mislevy, 2009, p. 11). Student-level analysis of PISA data 
generally requires the use of a subset of five such values that were obtained through random draws from 
each student’s posterior distribution (OECD, 2009d) and can be found in the PISA databases. 
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one cycle to the next are much smaller. It can be shown that most country score changes are 
well below ±20 points (Lenkeit & Caro, 2014, calculated that 95% of them are between -13.8 
and +17.8 points), and although larger improvements or drops have been recorded, their being 
reflective of actual student ability has been questioned on the grounds of the PISA equating 
methodology and the differential functioning of certain items in some countries (see for 
example Gebhardt & Adams, 2007; Monseur & Berezner, 2007; Wu, 2010). 
Input variables 
Time 
Time enters this research in three forms: as a coded variable for each PISA administration (or 
measurement occasion, t); as calendar year (k); and as a measure of lag (λ). The measurement 
occasion t orders the time-points in which each assessment was held and, in order to measure 
growth, it is zeroed at the first comparable PISA in the trend. Since different domains have 
their first comparable test at different times, the same value of t can stand for different calendar 
years k: therefore, t = 0 represents the year 2000 (k = 2000) in case of Reading; but t = 0, k = 
2003, for Mathematics; and t = 0, k = 2006, in the case of Science. As explained above, the 
lag λ is the number of years by which a certain time-point or time frame can be shifted back 
in time.  
Economic productivity 
Two variables were used to measure economic productivity: GDP per capita (variable: GDP) 
expressed in constant 2005 US Dollars, and income group. Income is a categorical variable 
that uses The World Bank division of economies into low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and 
high income according to gross national income (GNI) per capita. Income takes two values: 
lower, which stands for countries in the low, lower-middle and upper-middle income groups; 
and high. The high category corresponds to a GNI per capita above 9,265 USD for PISA 2000 
and 12,615 USD during the 2012 assessment (The World Bank, 2014). Income was used to 
cluster countries and extract subsamples in some analyses. [Sources: UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, The World Bank, and International Monetary Fund].  
The choice regarding the amount of lag to apply was based mainly on practical constraints, 
as the literature on systemic change provides little insights on the time required for countries 
to transform their wealth and expenditures for education into effective policies. Time frames 
range from two years  (Earl et al., 2002), to four (Fullan, 2007), five (Borman et al., 2003), 
eight (Fullan, 2000), ten (Harris, 2011) until up to a generation (Wedell, 2009). The stability 
of PISA scores suggests that, at the global level, change is small and consistent, with countries 
improving by about 1 point per year in Reading, or even less in the case of Mathematics and 
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Science. Clear trends emerge after three or four administrations (or 9 to 12 years). This could 
be evidence that reforms take a decade to make a sizeable impact or that PISA can capture 
long-lasting systematic effects but not rapid changes in education systems. In either case, it 
seemed best to focus on changes in GDP and Income that had taken place during the lifetime 
of each PISA cohort. 
Measuring equity 
Equity is measured in terms of the Strength and the Slope of the socio-economic gradient 
(OECD, 2013e, p. 35; Willms, 2006). The “socio-economic gradient” is the regression line 
(or curve) of student scores on their composite index of economic, social and cultural status 
(ESCS). It has different attributes (see OECD, 2013e, p. 35; Willms, 2006), but the most 
important are its Strength and its Slope (capital letters are used to differentiate them from 
general statistical terms).  
The “Strength” of the socio-economic gradient is the amount of score variance captured 
by the regression line (in statistical terms, the R2): the higher the “explained” variance, the 
stronger the ESCS-score relationship, and the less equitable a system. The “Slope”, instead, 
refers to the extent to which differences in socio-economic background are associated to 
differences in outcomes, with steeper slopes being related to greater disparities. Theoretically, 
only one between the Strength and Slope would be necessary for analysing country equity, 
because if ESCS and PISA scores were converted to standardised scores (Z-scores), the 
correlation between them would be the Slope of the line and the R2 the Strength. Nevertheless, 
it was decided to follow the OECD procedure and run analyses using both attributes as the 
outcome variable. 
The PISA database does not have socio-economic gradients for all administrations, but 
up-to-date ESCS indexes were provided on the OECD website to enable comparisons over 
time. Therefore, using the methodology detailed in the Data Analysis Manual (OECD, 2009d), 
a new dataset with comparable values for the Strength (variable: R-squared) and the Slope 
(Slope) of the socio-economic gradient was created and it is available upon request. Since 
these variables are constructed from PISA data they are entered in the model without any lag 
(conceptually, a country has the same amount of time to alter both the educational and the 
equity outcomes of its students). 
Measuring the expansion of pre-primary education 
The variable GER is the gross enrolment ratio in pre-primary education. It is calculated as the 
ratio, expressed as a percentage, between the number of children enrolled in ECE and the 
number of all children in the official pre-primary age group.  
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ECE generally targets children ‘from age 3 years to the start of primary education’ 
(UNESCO-UIS, 2012, p. 26). By accessing UNESCO databases, it was established that the 
average primary school starting age was 6.3 years for all PISA 2000–2012 participants. 
Therefore, GER was measured when the population was between three and five years of age, 
which corresponded to time lags of 10, 11 and 12 from each PISA cycle. To obtain a unique 
value to correlate to each PISA score, it was decided to estimate GER when the average child 
would have been around four (λ = 11) by calculating the average GER of lags 10–12. The 
resulting time frame is summarised in Table iii.  
Table iii: Time frame for gross enrolment ratio in pre-primary education (GER) 
Lag  Student age 
(average) 
GER Outcome Time 
points 
10/12 4 1988/90–2000/02 R 2000–2012 5 
10/12 4 1991/93–2000/02 R, M 2003–2012 4 
10/12 4 1994/96–2000/02 R, M, S 2006–2012 3 
Since some countries are flexible about enrolment in ECE of children of a different age from the 
reference group, reported GER values can sometimes be higher than 100%. 
Accounting for OECD membership 
OECD is a dummy variable that was entered both as a Level-2 unit (to represent its 
contribution to variations in the intercept), and as a Level-1 interaction term with time (to 
represent its effect on the slope, see Equation 9). It takes the value of 1 for OECD countries 
and 0 for partner countries. Three countries (Chile, Estonia and Israel) joined OECD only in 
2010, but since the process to acquire membership must have begun some years earlier and 
they were all high-income economies before or by 2012 (The World Bank, 2014), they were 









Appendix 6: Model diagnostics 
All models rely on assumption concerning the fixed and random components. In this paper, a 
framework for model diagnostics was adapted from Pinheiro & Bates (2000). The first 
assumption concerns the Level-1 error components and is formally represented by Equation 
5, whereas the second assumption concerns the Level-2 components and is represented by 
Equation 6. 
1) The Level-1 components are: 
a. Independent from one another 
b. Normally distributed 
c. With mean 0 and variance σ2 
2) The Level-2 components are: 
a. Independent from one another 
b. Normally distributed 
c. With mean 0 and covariance matrix Ω. 
The growth model in Appendix 3, Table 4.D, and represented by Equation 4 in Appendix 5, 
was analysed through this framework. While the following sections only apply to the Reading 
domain (because it has the greatest number of time-points and shows the higher variability), 
the same tests can be carried out (and similar considerations be made) for Mathematics and 
Science. 
Level-1 components 
Assumption of independence 
Given that at each time point the observations came from the same ‘individuals’ (countries), 
the assumption of independence between residuals may be unwarranted, and their 
autocorrelation could be instead a better choice. Autocorrelation in Level-1 residuals happens 
when the errors in two consecutive observations for the same individual j, e1j and e2j are not 
independent from one another. Therefore, their covariance is not 0.  
To investigate into this possibility, residuals from the same country from different years 
were plotted against one another (Figure iv).  
328 
 
Figure iv: Matrix plot of within-country, between-years correlations. Each dot represents a country. 
 
Most correlations appear to be rather close to 0, yet the correlation between two 
consecutive years (e.g., 2006‒2009 or 2009‒2012) or that between 2000 and 2006 seem 
stronger and negative. This impression was put to the test by analysing the outcome of the 
empirical autocorrelation function [(ACF), Pinheiro & Bates, 2000], which takes this form: 
 

















- ?̂?(𝜆) is the estimated correlation parameter at lag 𝜆  
- 𝑀 is the number of Level-2 groups, indexed by 𝑗30 
- 𝑛𝑗 is the number of observations in group 𝑗 
- 𝑟𝑖𝑗 are the standardised Level-1 residuals returned by a fitted multilevel model 
- 𝑁(𝜆) is the number of residual pairs used at the given lag 
Following this equation, ?̂? was calculated and plotted (Figure v), and the initial impression of 
negatively correlated residuals at lag 1 and 2 was confirmed.  
                                                     
30 Note that Pinheiro & Bates (2000) follow an opposite notation, indexing Level-2 variables with 
i and Level-1 variables with j. 
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Figure v: Autocorrelation function for Level-1 residuals. The dashed lines represent the 0.05 
significance level. 
 
Since there is evidence of autocorrelation for the first two lag, we analysed models of the 
form ARMA(p,q) (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2011), with p and/or q = {0,1,2}, as possible 
explanatory candidates. The analyses showed that both the ARMA(1,0) and the ARMA(0,1) 
models represented a slight improvement over the baseline model, with this latter providing 
the best alternative (Table iv). 
Table iv: Comparison between the baseline and the autoregressive moving average model. 
Model DF AIC BIC logLik Lik.Ratio p-value 
Baseline growth 6 2310.932 2332.319 -1149.466   
Autoregressive [AR(1)] 7 2310.143  2335.095  -1148.072  2.78856   0.0949 
       
Baseline growth 6 2310.932 2332.319 -1149.466   
Moving average [MA(1)] 7 2309.550  2334.501  -1147.775  3.382225   0.0659 
 
Despite it being significant at the 0.1 level, the MA(1) model does not explain all of the 
residual correlation as one would expect if it were a plausible fit, but tends instead to reduce 
the correlation at lag 1 and to increase it at lag 3 (Figure vi).  
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Figure vi: Autocorrelation function for Level-1 residuals using an ARMA(0,1) model. The dashed lines 
represent the 0.05 significance level. 
 
To understand why this may be the case, recall that the empirical correlation function in 
Equation A aggregates within-country results at the country level by computing the sum of 
the Level-1 products across all groups. This means that while each individual country may not 
present any evidence of autocorrelation, the trends in Level-1 residuals of all countries taken 
together might; in other words, PISA countries may show what may be called ‘emergent’ or 
‘apparent’ autocorrelation. 
Support for this hypothesis can be found by looking at the trends in residuals. Figure vii 
compares the trends in residuals of a random sub-sample of five countries from the dataset 
(D3, at the top) to those of the full sample (D0, at the bottom). Trends from D3 look indeed 
random: for instance, r2,RED and r2,VIOLET are lower than r0,RED and r0,VIOLET, whereas the 
opposite is true for r2,GREEN and r2,BLACK; all residuals show a decrease from lag 3 to lag 4, but 
r4,VIOLET does not; etc. In the global trends from D0 represented at the bottom, instead, there 
are hints of an emergent pattern, whereby most residuals seem to be decreasing between λ = 0 
and λ = 2. 
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Figure vii: Comparison between the residual trends for a random sub-sample of five countries in the 




Notice that trends in residuals from D0 seem to follow a curvilinear trajectory, and indeed 
a quadratic growth model for Reading can be fitted (Figure viii). While this slightly 
‘straightens’ the residual pattern, however, it does not eliminate the autocorrelation, which 
suggests that the causes for values of ρ ≠ 0 must lie elsewhere—for instance in the regression 
towards the mean effect noted in the main text. 
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Overall, these findings give backing to the idea that while some global trends in PISA 
results can be identified, differences among countries will be more evident than their 
similarities until more data are produced, making in-depth analyses worthwhile only at the 
national level. Figure ix completes this picture by representing the ACF for each member of 
D1 (that is, the dataset containing only countries with valid observations at all time-points): in 
no instance can the autocorrelation be said to be statistically different from 0, suggesting that 
the base growth model using measurement occasion as a predictor captures well both within- 
and between-country score variation. 
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Figure ix: Autocorrelation function for countries with complete observations. The dashed lines 
represent the 0.05 significance level. 
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Assumption of normality 
An examination of a normal Q-Q plot for OECD and partner countries (Figure x) shows that 
the distribution of the Level-1 residuals does not deviate too much from normality, although 
there tend to be more observations close to the mean than there are in a normal distribution. 
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Assumptions about the mean and the variance 
In single-level regression, a routine diagnostic test to check whether residuals have a mean 0 
and equal variance σ2 is a scatterplot of standardised residual against fitted values—and the 
one in Figure xi shows that, despite some outlying observations, the assumption of 
homoscedasticity seems to be well-founded. 
Figure xi: Distribution of residuals by fitted values. 
 
This procedure, however, is less optimal when used with nested data, because it can mask 
important differences between groups. For instance, note how Argentina appears twice in 
Figure xi, and at opposite sides of the graph, which suggests a wider spread that most other 
countries. To assess the within-country variance, another plot taking grouping into account 
was produced (Figure xii). While the expectation of the mean can be said to be approximately 
0―with the exception of outliers such as Qatar or Serbia―there is clearly greater between-
country variation in within-country variance, with trends such as that of the United Kingdom 
being almost perfectly captured by the growth model and others, such as that of Argentina, 
which are instead more unpredictable. 
Ideally, one would want to model each country’s variance individually, but this would 
result in an over-parameterised model and would also defeat the purpose of multilevel 
modelling. Another approach, instead, is to divide countries into a manageable number of 
categories and weight the variance according to them. A compromise was found, in this case, 
by splitting the variance component into two, one for OECD countries and one for partner 
countries, whereby 𝜎𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
2 ≅ 0.648𝜎𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟
2 .  



































Figure xiii shows how individual residuals are affected by the weighting: the change in 
conditions entails that different countries are identified as outliers.  
Given that the non-weighted and weighted models are nested, their explanatory power can 
be compared with a likelihood ratio test. Table v shows that the weighted model provides a 
better fit for the data, and highlights how variances are affected by the transformation. While 
both the Reading and Mathematics models can be adapted in this fashion, Science data are 





Figure xii: Within-country variance and mean.  
  
The boxplots represent the estimated spread of residuals, whereas the black dot the estimated mean. 
338 
 
Figure xiii: Change in the Level-1 variance after applying a weight based on OECD membership. 
Within-country variance before weighting 
 
Within-country variance after weighting 
 
 
Table v: Comparison between the non-weighted and weighted model, Reading. 
 Before weighting  After weighting 
DF 6 7 
AIC 2310.932 2298.031 
BIC 2332.319 2322.983 
Log-likelihood -1149.466 -1142.015 
Likelihood ratio  14.90116 
p-value  <0.01 
σ2u0 4012*  (2785‒5780) 3993*  (2762―5774) 
σ2u1 20.45*  (9.51‒43.97) 19.53* (9.57―39.85) 










































































Assumption of normality 
Q-Q plots can be analysed to check for significant departures from normality of the level-2 
residuals. In this case, separate plots can be made for the intercept and the time residuals, as 
well for OECD countries and partner countries (Figure xiv and Figure xv).  
Figure xiv: Q-Q plot of Level-2 residuals. 
 





































Figure xv: Q-Q plot of Level-2 residuals by OECD membership. 
 
Once again, there are sine departures from normality but they are not as extreme to warrant 
a complete redefinition of the model. 
Assumption of homogeneity 
The top panel of Figure xvi plots the strong negative correlation between estimated intercept 
and slope. This is a result of the general positive-definite variance matrix of the model, which 
imposes no structure on the variance components. By looking at the actual trends over time, 
however, this modelling could exaggerate actual covariances. To test this possibility, the 
baseline growth model was compared with one using a diagonal matrix that forced σu01 = 0. 
Doing so produces different variance estimates, and the new estimated covariance between 
intercept and time residuals is displayed in the bottom panel of Figure xvi. 
  



























-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100
(Intercept)
Partner






















Since the two models are nested, their informative power can be compared through a 
likelihood ratio test (Table vi). In this case, unstructured model proves to be a better fit for the 
data by all information criteria. 
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Table vi: Analysis of variance of two models, one with an unstructured covariance matrix, one assuming 
0 covariance 
Model DF AIC BIC logLik Lik.Ratio p-value 
Diagonal   (σu01 = 0) 5 2332.937 2350.760 -1161.469   
Baseline growth (σu01 ≠ 0) 6 2310.932 2332.319 -1149.466 24.00516 <0.01 
 
It could be argued that OECD and partner countries should be modelled independently, as 
their scores seem to vary and be affected by time in substantially different ways. While this is 
probably true, once this splitting is done, other dissimilarities within these two groups could 
be found, and one would have no reason not to continue in splitting groups into smaller entities 
until a single country is tracked in its progression since PISA 2000. In other words, the purpose 
of multilevel modelling is to provide a compromise between an analytic and a synthetic, or 
holistic, inquiry. Besides, while OECD members have effectively something in common 
(OECD membership), non-OECD membership cannot be said to be a trait d’union of partner 
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